Like no other group before, the social and political life of the generation born at the turn of the millennium and after is determined by social media and the constant connection to it. In this rapidly growing group of young people, now numbering 1.2 billion under the age of 30 and expected to account for nearly a third of the world’s population by 2030, young people of Muslim faith are increasingly in the firing line in a war over identity. This challenges societies, particularly in Europe.
In particular, the representatives of a backward-looking Islam, the networks of Islamist terrorists, but also the so-called legalistic Islam led by organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood use social media to pass on their propaganda, especially to young Muslims. This culturally religious and often misunderstood and misinterpreted phenomenon is proving to be particularly attractive as a new youth and counterculture for Generation Z – in a chaotic “post-truth” world, it offers a clear, rule-based value system that differentiates only in black and white, as well as a strong group identity and a provocative contrast to the orthodoxies of the Islamic establishment. Islamism encourages its followers through a series of “sacred values” that are not subject to utilitarian trade-offs with economic incentives.
Despite its conservative associations, radical Islam has continually adapted to the media of its time to reach new generations and new classes of followers. Building on 20 years of media innovation, digital platforms are proving to be powerful tools for Islamist proselytization: their actors use the Internet to build communities, spread ideological resources, raise funds, communicate strategically with their audiences and expand their membership.
A wide range of Islamist-inspired groups—from apolitical theorists to online activists and violent extremists—hold a virtual monopoly on religion-related searches and dominate the religious video ecosystem on social media. Sectarian clergy are among the world’s most influential online thought leaders, with millions of followers on Facebook and Twitter. However, those responsible in liberal societies do not seem to understand this ideological landscape and how it affects the changing behavior patterns and feelings of belonging of the younger Muslim generation online.
Online Islamism is a cross-platform phenomenon that spans established social media sites such as Facebook, YouTube and Instagram, as well as new platforms such as TikTok and the gaming platform Discord, which are primarily used by younger groups. The platforms serve different functions for Islamist actors, and different platform architectures are used to maximize reach and engagement. Arabic and English-speaking accounts each have an audience in the double-digit millions, with a total international following of 117 million and 109 million accounts across all platforms, respectively. German-language content, on the other hand, has a significantly smaller audience of 3 million followers, which is probably due to its more geographically limited reach. Since 2020, experts in the field of online radicalization have observed a doubling of posts in Arabic-speaking (112% increase) and English-speaking (110% increase) online communities, accompanied by a 77% increase in German-speaking countries.
It must be emphasized that the phenomenon is highly international and closely networked. Research points to independent but overlapping Arabic, English and German-speaking communities, where the channels of internationally known Islamists serve as central hubs to facilitate connections and share content across their broader network. Likewise, it can be noted that Islamist content is becoming increasingly popular on platforms such as TikTok, where influencers with millions of followers extensively use the platforms’ features to amplify and promote polarizing and sectarian narratives.
Much of this content is focused on identity building and practical religious instruction. Two-thirds of the content focused on discussing general religious concepts and activities, while only 9% discussed specific political grievances such as anti-Muslim racism and the international oppression of Muslim populations. While English- and German-speaking Islamist communities are more likely to express toxic attitudes toward non-Muslim outgroups, including Jews and Christians, Arabic-language posts online focus primarily on Muslim groups such as Shiites and Sufis.
A new ecosystem represents a new “Alt-Islamism” threat. At the forefront of digital Islamism is an online community with a membership of over 160,000 accounts that borrows heavily from the alt-right culture with which it is associated increasing ideological convergence around the supposed moral decay of the West and the perceived need to return to an idealized “pure” society. This phenomenon is becoming a new battleground for Muslim identity. The young people who feel addressed define themselves in their own language as part of an “Akh-Right” subculture – an allusion to the “Alt-Right” and the Arabic word for brother – and see themselves in a culture war against “libtards” and “cute Muslims” (terms for progressive Muslims). They are waging a confident digital uprising against liberal Muslims and democracy, as well as against LGBTQ+ and women’s rights.
The focus on Muslim young people brings with it a whole new set of factors that have huge implications for our understanding and predictions, but also for how we develop effective preventative measures. This is a unique group that is heavily focused on the digital space and operates freely on various platforms. The broader online cultures also present a number of unique challenges. The preferred communication formats at the forefront of digital Islamist discourse are no longer three-hour lectures or lengthy online fatwas, but rather gamified theological conversations on Discord servers, religious colored YouTube prank videos and entertaining 60-second clips on TikTok in which polarizing, ideological topics are explained. These cultural dynamics must be understood so that ideological trends can be effectively combated.
In Europe, we are therefore observing the emergence of a broad digital community of young Islamist-indoctrinated people and extremist online subcultures for whom ideological coherence is no longer of central importance. Members of these communities grew up after September 11, 2001 and were shaped by the rise of polarizing social and political movements.
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