In January Denys Kolesnyk discussed the recent developments in the Middle East with Maksym Yali, Professor at the Department of International Relations of the National Aviation University of Ukraine.
How would you describe the geopolitical situation in the Middle East, especially in the context of the rapid emergence of new conflicts in the region?
There are several factors at play here. Firstly, there is the fact that the collective West, led by the United States, failed to mobilise and sufficiently support Ukraine to repel Russian armed aggression. Very important time was lost, which allowed Russia to build the so-called “Surovikin Line” and move to strategic defence, which posed problems to the Ukrainian counter-offensive.
But the main factor is primarily the fault of the United States, which did not develop a strategy for Ukraine’s victory, but a strategy to ensure that Ukraine did not lose. In this regard, not enough weapons were provided when the front line was not yet firmly established, as we saw in the second half of 2022 when the Ukrainian Armed Forces successfully conducted counteroffensives. Instead of providing additional weapon support after the successful operation in the Kharkiv region, when it was possible to build on this success, including in the southern direction, this was not done.
The American media once reported that General Zaluzhnyi asked for support at that time, but it was not provided by the White House, it was not approved. The European allies were not too powerful to provide significant assistance with weapons, while the United States had plenty of weapons in its warehouses.
All of this indicates that the White House’s strategy has been and still is to reach a compromise and prevent a humiliating defeat for Russia. This is also evidenced by statistics: almost 50% or 52% of the occupied territories since the full-scale invasion were regained by Ukraine in 2022. This is exactly the kind of compromise that is usually reached at 50/50, where both sides have half the success. In this case, it is as if Ukraine has won half, and Russia controls half of what it managed to capture after 24 February 2022.
The second factor is that 2024 is the year of the US presidential election campaign. We see the weakening of the Biden administration, with all its attention focused on the domestic agenda and the confrontation with the Republican Party in Congress.
And this conflict, if we’re talking about Hamas, coincided with the start of these preparations for the presidential election. And when it became clear that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were unable to achieve their stated goals in the counter-offensive, and that the US was also not providing them with sufficient assistance, it gave confidence to the US’s greatest enemies, the so-called “axis of evil” that had already been formed. This is a coalition of Russia’s allies, primarily Iran and North Korea, which makes loud militaristic statements, constantly launches ballistic missiles, tests, and admits the possibility of some kind of war with South Korea.
This may be a new line of tension, by the way. And, of course, it is clear to everyone that North Korea is a proxy for China, because it is completely dependent, including economically on the will of Beijing, and China has a huge influence on it. And we know that the Houthis are a proxy for Iran and that they also helped Hamas, which is also a well-known fact, because it was impossible to plan such an operation without at least intelligence, training, instructors, and perhaps weapons support. We know that Hamas also received weapons from North Korea.
This coalition of countries is dissatisfied with the existing world order, which was established after the end of the Second World War and strengthened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and is trying to destroy it. In this coalition, we see the so-called revanchist states that are trying to redraw the map of the world and increase their geopolitical influence and status on the world stage.
Let’s talk about Iran. Tehran has announced that it has attacked American targets in Erbil in northern Iraq. Can we interpret this as Tehran’s response to the US-British bombing of the Houthis in Yemen?
This is the logic of Iran’s confrontation with the United States. They achieved several goals here. There were declarations that this was also revenge for the general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, who was killed during the Trump administration.
This is also another theatre of operations. We know the history, the Iran-Iraq war, and Iran’s ambitions in this region. A significant number of the population in Iraq are also Shiites – a Shiite minority that lives compactly there.
But it is also an image blow to the Biden administration, a humiliation, given that Iran can directly strike at US targets. They’ve done it also to demonstrate the US’ weakness and provoke a negative reaction from the Iraqi government, so that Baghdad demands the withdrawal of the US troops. And we see that they have achieved this. Official negotiations are now underway between the Iraqi government and the US administration on the withdrawal of the US contingent.
This will increase Iran’s influence on Iraq. There are also image gains here as if it is the Iranians who are forcing the US to leave the region, which will allow them to further expand their zone of influence in this territory.
And what are Iran’s ambitions in general?
Iran is somewhat similar to Russia. But Iran has a much longer and richer history – the imperial history of Persia. Back in the 19th century, its influence extended to the Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. But Iran lost some of its influence to Russia.
Tehran wants to become a nuclear power and the number one power in the Middle East. And the Iranians have a very strong historical self-identification that goes back thousands of years. I was there in 2015 when I was working in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Ukrainian Parliament).
We should also not forget about identity and the biggest insult to Iranians is when one calls them Arabs. They have a clear self-identification, including religious identity.
If we draw parallels in religion, it is worth reminding that religious wars were the basis of conflicts in the Middle Ages and even in the 17th century. For example, Ukraine entered into a military alliance with Russia precisely because of religious oppression by Poland. Orthodoxy played an important role then. And Orthodoxy is a much smaller “faction” in the macro-Christian world.
The Islamic world works in a similar way. It is mostly divided into Sunnis and Shiites. And it is Iran that is the most powerful state where Shia Islam is practised. And so, just as Russia has a doctrine of the “Russian world”, Iran has a some sort of a doctrine of the “Shia world”, and here we can talk about the use of proxies such as Hezbollah. In other words, all of this has a religious basis, because the ayatollah regime is based on religion.
In general, Iran has imperial ambitions. Both Russia and Iran have the same goal: to become regional leaders and to achieve the status of centres of power that influence the development of the international system. This doctrine has been officially declared in Russia since the late 1990s, even during the Yeltsin era, after the collapse of the so-called bipolar international system. And both Russia and Iran are striving to become one of these poles.
How would you explain American policy towards the Middle East?
Firstly, we need to understand that the policies of Democrats and Republicans are fundamentally different. We need to look back to the events of twenty years ago to understand these processes, when George W. Bush was the US president and when the so-called hawks around him insisted on intervention in Afghanistan right after the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001.
But if the intervention against Afghanistan was legitimate from the point of view of international law, and even Russia provided its airspace and supported the United States. Then the intervention against Iraq, was contrary to the UN, caused serious confrontation and dissatisfaction not only among the opponents of the United States but also among its closest allies.
In other words, it was an attempt to establish a Pax Americana, an American-centric world, if you like. But there was also an anti-American coalition at the diplomatic level – France, Germany and Russia. And this intervention in Iraq, despite a quick victory, failed and also led to the emergence of ISIS.
And when Barack Obama won the election, his campaign was based on a change in the US doctrine and policy. Both in the region and in the world as a whole, it was characterised by the abandon of the status of a global policeman. Obama had already announced his withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq. And the withdrawal from Iraq also contributed to the emergence of ISIS.
In order to fight ISIS a certain American contingent was deployed at the invitation of the Iraqi government. The unprepared withdrawal of US troops provoked the emergence of ISIS because when there is a vacuum, it is always filled by other players. And we know that Iran and Russia played a role in the creation of ISIS as well.
Today we see the continuation of this strategy that Biden is implementing. He withdrew troops from Afghanistan in 2021, and he was vice president under Obama. And as soon as they withdrew their contingent from Afghanistan in a disorganised manner, this became one of the factors that pushed Putin to military aggression against Ukraine, because the United States demonstrated its weakness.
But there is another very important factor, and many people don’t pay attention to it, why the Middle East as a whole plays a much smaller role in US foreign policy. Thanks to the “shale revolution”, the United States significantly increased its oil production, and accordingly, this region has lost its strategic importance for its economy, and for its energy security. Consequently, the amount of oil imported from this region has significantly decreased. And, accordingly, its role in the foreign policy of the United States has also decreased.
If you look at the statistics, the number one buyer of oil in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq is China. And its influence there has increased and is growing. That is why we see these confrontations.
The failure of the Biden administration to get Saudi Arabia on its side to help bring down oil prices so that Russia would not have money to finance its military aggression against Ukraine also indicates that the United States has lost its position in the region.
We can draw a historical analogy. In the second half of the 1980s, it was precisely with the help of Saudi Arabia that oil prices fell significantly, which became one of the key economic factors, and then political and geopolitical, leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
But if we’re talking about Trump, his first visit as US president was to Saudi Arabia. And he signed a contract there selling American weapons worth of $400 billion. For Donald Trump, the Middle East was very important and key partners were Saudi Arabia and Israel. He provided support, and even moved the embassy to Jerusalem, which was very symbolic.
And the Democrats, both under Obama and now under Biden, have quite tense relations with Israel over the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which has escalated again.
In other words, if Donald Trump wins, there will be a reorientation, and Israel and Saudi Arabia will again become key partners, and the risks of confrontation with Iran will increase, because there was also the assassination of General Soleimani, and there was strikes on a military airfield in Syria, where a Russian base is located. Trump will demonstrate strength, there will be new attempts to “Make America Great Again” and to strengthen the status of the United States in that region, in particular. Although in principle, he usually speaks of an isolationist policy and the main confrontation will be with China, which Trump considers the greatest challenge to stability.
We’ve talked about the United States. I would also like to hear your opinion on the main players in the region, the Middle East. What are their interests?
Turkey is worth mentioning. Of course, over the 20 years that Erdogan has been in power, in various capacities, we have seen the country’s ambitions grow. Turkey has supported Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict and has succeeded in expanding its zone of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Their influence is also increasing through so-called “soft power”.
In other words, they are trying to gain the status of a regional power in the future world order, because according to the theory of international order, the old order is always destroyed by a major war. And all these conflicts are aimed at destroying the existing American-centric world order.
And Turkey is trying to play its respective role, and we see it pursuing an independent policy, we see its support for Palestine, and its sharp criticism of Israel and the United States. In other words, Erdogan is trying to strengthen his image in the Muslim world in this way.
And in principle, he has already managed to strengthen his influence in Ukraine in the same way by helping us. In other words, here interests clash with Russia, although Turkey is trying to get its dividends, in particular by demanding and receiving discounts on Russian gas, trying to become a gas hub.
Turkey is building a fleet for Ukraine, supplied Bayraktar drones, and we remember how Turkey’s status as a powerful weapons manufacturer increased. They have signed many contracts for supply of Bayraktar drones after 2022.
As for Saudi Arabia, as I said, also has ambitions to be a regional power, and this is the biggest rival for regional leadership with Iran in the Muslim world. Mohammed bin Salman is a very ambitious leader in the region, he has been building his army, economy, and influence, but he has not been able to defeat the Houthis. In other words, Saudi Arabia was de facto defeated in Yemen, and we know how the Houthis attacked Saudi Arabia with drones and weapons.
And last year, China, as a country that claims to be a global leader, reconciled, or better said, helped improve relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This was another diplomatic victory for China.
All those who are not satisfied with the leading role of the United States, either unite around China or at least try to pursue an independent foreign policy, like Saudi Arabia. And it’s interesting how, under Trump, it was the number one ally, but under the Democrats, as we have seen, there has been a significant cooling of this relationship between Washington and Riyadh.
Israel is a key ally of the United States that is also trying to change the situation. We see a disproportionate use of force in the Gaza Strip, for which Tel Aviv is being criticised by its allies. And of course, another goal that Iran has achieved is derailing of normalisation process between Israel and Saudi Arabia. But Israel is already establishing relations with the United Arab Emirates, which is also trying to play its role there.
There is also Qatar, a seemingly small state, but which was the main sponsor of Hamas and is now a key intermediary in the exchange of prisoners. Qatar’s fabulous gas resources have already been granted a special status as a non-NATO partner to this country.
Its economy is dictating geopolitics, and seemingly small states are raising their geopolitical and diplomatic status thanks to their vast natural resources. And Qatar is a great example of this, how it affects regional politics, in particular.
And how do the conflicts in the Middle East, the escalation of all these situations, affect Ukraine and its ability to defend itself against Russia?
The impact, of course, is negative for Ukraine. Firstly, because the international community’s attention has been focused exclusively on Ukraine. And the media agenda is extremely important.
Today, Ukraine is supported by the countries of Western civilisation. This is a confrontation against autocracy, as Biden put it. If we are talking about the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, our allies here are the countries of Western civilisation, the Western world, led by the United States and the EU. Japan, by the way, is also stepping up its role in helping Ukraine because China is watching.
And, of course, that’s why this is pushing these countries to support us in the most difficult moments when we see these political factors of the internal struggle in the United States and in Europe, where there will also be elections to the European Parliament this year.
The focus has changed to domestic politics in the US. But, of course, the fact that these conflicts have erupted, first the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, then the Houthis, of course, the attention to Ukraine is decreasing. And this hurts assistance for Kyiv, for example, the United States provided 155 mm shells to Israel, which Ukraine desperately needed.
And most importantly, in democratic countries, politicians respond to and take into account public opinion. At some point those horrific images from Bucha or Mariupol had a significant impact on the minds of the public. The flow of Ukrainian refugees who told horrific stories of occupation and war had a significant impact on public opinion in these countries.
All of this was the impetus for a change in the policies of the presidents and prime ministers of Western countries. The best example here is Chancellor Scholz, who was hesitant at the beginning to help Ukraine or not. Everyone remembers the 5,000 helmets that Germany sent to Ukraine on the eve of the invasion when it was already clear that it was going to happen. Everyone was sure that Ukraine would fall and that they should not help and spoil relations with Russia. And this applies to absolutely everyone, including the Joseph Biden administration. We all remember this very well.
And now, attention is decreasing, switching, and there is fatigue from the war. We live in the information age when this kaleidoscope of news is constantly changing. And the public’s attention is also switching. The war has been going on for two years now, and there is a certain fatigue.
I can say from my own experience that this military aggression has opened up Ukraine to many countries around the world. This is especially true for countries, particularly in the Middle East, where they knew nothing about Ukraine at all. Many people there did not even know where Ukraine was. When we had the counter-offensive, something was happening every day, there was constant media coverage from Al-Jazeera, Sky News, Al Arabia, and all the leading media were talking about Ukraine, which was in the spotlight. But after the Hamas attack on Israel, the attention completely shifted and for several months there was no attention to Ukraine at all. And this is understandable.
And the reckless statements of the Ukrainian leadership at the beginning of the Hamas attack also played a role here. Ukraine expressed its full support for Israel when even the United States was silent.
Ukraine is gradually losing its status as the number one news story, and in addition to fatigue and the emergence of new conflicts, the fact that the situation on the frontline is not changing much is also playing a role, and this also has a negative impact, causing a decrease in attention and focus. There is no news, as they say, on the “western front without changes”.
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