At the beginning of February, Saudi Arabia hosted the World Defence Show 2024, and we decided to discuss it, as well as the Red Sea Crisis, with Robert Czulda, Assistant Professor at the University of Lodz (Poland), security & defence analyst who recently returned from Riyadh. The interview was carried out by Denys Kolesnyk, a French consultant and analyst.
Beginning of February, the World Defense Show 2024 took place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. And you have participated in that expo. What was your general impression of the organisation of this event? What were the most interesting expositions and pieces of equipment?
This was the second edition. The first expo was held two years ago. It is a new event on the market in this defence sector. Saudi Arabia is trying to build its position in the international defence industry and its reputation as well.
It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia is trying to move away from buying military equipment for billions of dollars from third countries, mainly from the United States, but also from European countries, and wants to build its defence capabilities, taking some inspiration from the United Arab Emirates, which took a similar path a few years ago with their EDGE Group. Saudi Arabia set up its own company, SAMI, and is now building competence in this field.
Whether it succeeds or fails is a completely different question, but it is worth pointing out that Saudi Arabia, which we rightly associate with a country that is a rentier state, living off oil exports and spending a truly gigantic amount of money on armaments, is slowly trying to build both economic and military self-sufficiency. So it is this first element that is worth paying attention to.
The second element I would say is a social one. Until recently Saudi Arabia was a closed state, strongly conservative, and now Saudi Arabia is changing. It is easy to travel there, they organise different fairs and expos, in other words, foreigners are being invited.
Introducing changes that from a European and Western perspective may not seem very significant, for instance, allowing women to drive cars. Just recently the Crown Prince stated that only women can decide what clothes they put on. This, too, from the perspective of that country is a major change, and its conservatism is something of outmost importance.
As for the World Defense Show 2024, it is the Saudi exhibition that attracts attention, although it was rather empty as far as products are concerned, because, as I said, they are just building up certain competencies. On the other hand, what draws attention is the very strong presence of Turkey, which signs agreements and sells its technologies to countries, and regions, such as Saudi Arabia.
The Chinese presence was also very rich. Something that we in Europe do not see. And also the presence of the Russians, who also want to show that they are not an isolated state. The Russians showed and tried to convince the visitors that Russian equipment is great and that the Russians are fantastic business partners.
By the way, Saudi Arabia tries to be more sovereign and independent in terms of foreign policy, to not be dependent on the US, especially as the Saudis see the Americans slowly withdrawing from the Middle East.
What we have been seeing for a long time in Washington DC, is more focus on Asia. Now it is Europe, obviously, because of the war between Russia and Ukraine, but the Americans are treating the Middle East less significantly than they did until recently. Hence, Saudi Arabia wants to be more sovereign, it wants to be a modern state that is not dependent on oil exports, because however, while it is a fixed income, the price of oil fluctuates, so that also makes it hard to predict the budget, well because you don’t know how much you are going to earn.
This also ties in with the concept that Saudi Arabia has from a few years ago, which is “Vision 2030”, that is focused on building its industry, including arms industry. Saudi Arabia plans that by 2030, 50% of all defence expenditures should be spent on contracts with Saudi companies, which is a very ambitious aim.
Riyadh also has an ambition to host the World Cup and attracting football players to Saudi Arabia, like Ronaldo, shows precisely that this country wants to be more active, and more open than before.
On February 24th, the Pentagon officially informed that the US-led coalition conducted new strikes against Houthis in Yemen. These attacks have been ongoing since January in response to Houthis attacks against ships in the Red Sea. In your opinion, why has no EU nation joined air strikes so far? And what is the main aim of the Houthis in this Red Sea crisis?
It is a good question why the European Union countries have not joined? I would say here that the main reason is the general attitude of European states, which are timid and try not to react to crises. That is to say, he approach of European Union states is to overlook a crisis if it occurs.
We currently have a crisis in the Red Sea and European states are not reacting. It also applies to the migrant crisis, for instance. We have successive waves of illegal migrants storming the European borders in Spain and Italy, for example. A gigantic problem.
Migration crisis is the biggest challenge for the future of Europe as such, in my opinion, a mortal threat and we see no response. We have a situation in the east where the Russians are waging a brutal war with Ukraine. There is no proper reaction on the European side, that is, no increase in armaments and production, no significant purchase of military equipment.
And it is the same here. We have a crisis, and the countries of the European Union think, try, or act as if this problem does not exist. So this, in my opinion, fits in with this inaction of the European Union, which is simply incapable of acting, driven by a kind of impotence and lack of readiness to act.
And that, in my opinion, is wrong, because we are facing, as Europe, as the European Union, gigantic challenges and we lack leaders who are prepared to act as they should.
I understand. And what do the Houthi want to achieve in this Red Sea crisis?
First of all, these attacks are the result of the war in Gaza between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The Houthi wanted to show that they were capable of action. I recall that in the first stage, the Houthi fired rockets and drones at Israel.
Only later they started attacking ships in the Red Sea. Firstly these attacks on Israel were ineffective, and the attempt to paralyse the ships in the Red Sea was effective, as we can see. The price of insurance has gone up, the ships have to reroute.
Another aspect is the Houthi showing that they are still strong. It is also a signal from the Iranian side because we see recently an increase in tension around Iran. There is talk of a possible war, so Iran is showing in this way that the Houthi, the operation they support, are active and able to generate costs.
The attacks that they are carrying out are relatively simple, but they generate very large costs, because the Western countries, the US, the UK, they have to commit significant resources, ships, and missiles, so the costs are greater than the costs on the Houthi side.
So it is an example of this kind of asymmetric war. It is also increasing the pressure on the US. The Americans, preoccupied with China, engaged somewhere in Eastern Europe, and must also be in the Middle East again. But the attacks against the Houthi are ineffective. I mean the Houthi still exist, so the Americans have to get involved, they incur some costs, but they don’t make any gains. So, for Houthi and Iran, at least on a propaganda level, the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea illustre the American weakness.
In 2015, Saudi Arabia intervened in the Yemeni civil war, but Riyadh didn’t achieve its aims so far. What are the reasons for a relatively poor Saudi military performance in that conflict? And, coming back to the recent US-led strikes, Saudi Arabia is not a part of the coalition. Why did they choose not to participate in it?
There is a very interesting book written a dozen years ago, under the title: “Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991”. The Arab armies in general, and we can see this from the wars with Israel during the Cold War, are poor regardless of equipment they possess, they are weak. That is, the Armed Forces of Saudi Arabia, undoubtedly very rich in terms of good military equipment, are incapable of modern operations, they are ineffective. And we can see that.
The second is that to win the war, one way or another, you have to be engaged in a land operation, that is, you have to occupy a certain territory. Conducting operations from the air will not break the enemy, and will not defeat him. You have to have ground troops in this war. And Saudi Arabia is not interested and never has been in such a full-scale ground invasion. Well, because there are gigantic costs and losses. And it’s also probably Saudi Arabia’s awareness that its Armed Forces are just too weak. Its military is unable to enter Yemen and defeat the enemy in a land operation. Also probably morale plays a role, because the Houthis are a determined force. The issue is that Saudi Arabia doesn’t have the capability, it’s too weak to win this war. That is the first element.
And the second element is the fact that it didn’t join the coalition. And the reason is that Saudi Arabia is trying to warm relations with Iran. This is an agreement that the Chinese have brokered. So, joining the US-led coalition would be an element of escalation that would simply derail its diplomatic efforts with Iran.
Saudi Arabia is trying to pull out of this war in Yemen. But it can’t just leave. They need to get some sort of situation there that is reasonably favourable. So for the time being they are stuck with this war. But they are trying not to escalate this situation. Its participation in this coalition against the Houthi would be an escalation.
Speaking more in general terms, how do you describe the current geopolitical situation in the Middle East and key internal and external players competing for influence?
First of all, I would say that the situation today is completely different from a year ago. Especially when it comes to optimism, for example. Two weeks before the Gaza war broke out, last October, US security advisor Jake Sullivan said that the situation in the Middle East was the calmest, safest it had been in two decades.
In a short period, war broke out and suddenly now we are afraid of an escalation and more regional wars. So there was some optimism, which turned out to be naive. Those factors that created optimism, such as the warming of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, or, for example, the agreement between Israel and the Muslim states.
But it turned out that such an optimistic outlook was based on false assumptions. The conflicts have not been resolved, and I would now point to three particularly dangerous factors that make for a pessimistic view of the Middle East. These visions of the future are negative.
The first is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was already far from being resolved before; now it is even further away. Hatred on both sides has increased even more. Both sides have grown even further apart. And this conflict is undoubtedly very important for the whole region. There is no possibility of a peaceful solution in the near future. And this factor will remain as a factor that destabilised the Middle East.
The second factor is the Muslim radicalism. Muslims in the Middle East, frustrated by the situation in the countries where they live, the economic situation, and the social situation, will probably become even more radicalised as they watch Muslims in Palestine being murdered.
And the third factor is the lack of equitable economic development. The Arab Spring that occurred over a decade ago did not bring any positive changes. Therefore we should expect a new wave of protests. We can call them the Arab Autumn or the Arab Winter. People in the Middle East are frustrated, they have no jobs, and no prospects. Situation in Gaza further increases their sense of vulnerability, and their general irritation.
So this factor may, in the short term, or the longer term, at some point in the future, lead to further riots, to further upheavals, to further revolutions and to further waves of migration, which will once again be terrible for Europe, because, as I said earlier, Europe is completely ignoring this problem. So, unfortunately, there are a lot of factors of tension and I don’t think they will be resolved soon.
And, for example, when it comes to the interests of such internal and external actors, who are playing the game there?
Well, here I would say, certainly Turkey. Its growing activities and presence in the region, but also in Africa, is worth noting. Turkey has been trying for several years, better or worse, to rebuild, or perhaps allude to, its former influence of the times of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey is going to build a naval base in Somalia, there are already Turkish soldiers in Qatar, so Turkey is undoubtedly active there.
Russia is also a country that cannot be ignored because it is also important to note that many in the Middle East have sympathy for Russia. Not because they support what the Russians are doing in Ukraine, but because the Russians are, quite simply, an enemy of the US, and they look negatively at the US, so necessarily, the enemy of my enemy gains my sympathy.
The European countries are, unfortunately, completely absent, they don’t have that influence, so it’s something that I’d rather characterise as a negative factor, for us at least, for Europe.
And how, in your opinion, the Russo-Ukrainian war has influenced regional affairs? How the issue of this conflict may influence the dynamics in the Middle East?
Speaking in general terms, the war in Ukraine has, among other things, affected food security, for instance the prices have risen for basic products. Egypt is a good example, since this country is a global importer of grain, including from Russia and Ukraine.
This simply increases the cost of living and the price of food in the region. And this makes people even more frustrated. As I said earlier, the economic situation has become even more difficult with this war. Survival in these countries, for ordinary people, has simply become even more challenging. Look at Jordan too, where the cost of living is simply high, and as a result of the Russo-Ukrainian war they have become even higher.
As far as specific countries are concerned, I would point out Iran, which has increased its importance, not least by supplying arms to Russia – not only drones, but most likely also missiles in the near future. So this undoubtedly increases Iran’s position in the region. And Iran will gain in this context, of course, Teheran also has its internal problems, especially economic problems we should not ignore.
The open question is to what extent Russia’s position will be maintained. Let us remember that in recent years Russia has been very systematically building its relations with Egypt, with Algeria, with Saudi Arabia, and with Iran. However, the war in Ukraine has shown that the Russian military equipment is not very good, to say the least. The Middle Eastern countries can now look for other arms suppliers, for instance, China.
The question is whether the Russians will be able to maintain their position in the arms sector. Because, as I said, there are other countries, like Turkey or China, which are ready to offer this equipment.
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