Tehran continues its efforts to dominate Syrian decision-making. It has expanded its influence not only by sending leaders from the Quds Force and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard but is now intervening through the People’s Assembly by placing its own agents and proxies there. Exploiting the war and chaos, Iran seeks to expand its control over Syrian geography and impose its decisions. The recent mock Syrian elections—the fourth since the revolution began—occurred as the Syrian economy continues to deteriorate and collapse, with inflation rates soaring. Moreover, a long-term political solution remains elusive, and the opposition blames the international community for not taking action to halt these farces. They demand the implementation of UN resolutions and a break from the era of tyranny. Experts view the Syrian People’s Assembly elections as “farcical” and devoid of any real value, arguing that the key reason is that the individuals appointed to these service positions must align with the Assad regime’s vision for state management; otherwise, they will have no place in the People’s Assembly.
Experts also note that Iran has largely succeeded in producing certain figures aligned with its ideology—whether administrative or religious—to use these positions to advance its interests in Syria. Influencing certain positions or institutions requires foundations, and perhaps the current mock People’s Assembly allows Iran to control it through its economic, military, and political influence. Consequently, the remaining structure of the Syrian state is gradually weakening, given the regime’s inability to manage this critical and dangerous phase, which has been a fertile ground for advancing Iran’s project in Syria. This project is one of the primary factors in the self-destructive tendencies within Syrian components, given that Iran has a purely sectarian agenda, using religious pretexts as a gateway to achieve near-total dominance over Syrian geography.
Iranian presence in Syria, within political, economic, and military institutions, represents the establishment of a shadow state under the guise of the farcical presence of President Bashar al-Assad. This presence aims to provide sufficient legitimacy for their actions within Syrian geography, which, according to Iran’s view, is a backyard toward the Mediterranean Sea and serves as a foothold to reach or threaten EU countries. Additionally, Iran engages in conflicts with what it theoretically describes as enemies, notably Israel. However, in reality, the Israeli-Iranian conflict is primarily over influence in the Arab region, rather than genuine military confrontations. The upcoming phase poses greater risks, as Israel is increasingly adopting assassination tactics as a primary method to strike at Iran’s political and military projects. The consequences include further displacement of the Syrian people and the settlement of loyalist militias in Syria, remaining as ticking time bombs for the unarmed Syrians.
A group of hackers managed to leak official Iranian documents containing drafts of agreements between Damascus and Tehran, including a draft “Memorandum of Understanding for Strategic Cooperation” between the two countries, signed by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The documents indicate that the fourteenth meeting of the Joint Higher Committee took place between Iran and Syria in January 2019 in Damascus at the level of the First Vice President and the Syrian Prime Minister. The “Strategic and Long-Term Economic Cooperation Agreement” signed in January 2019 by the then-First Vice President and the then-Syrian Prime Minister was a major achievement. This agreement is more comprehensive compared to previous agreements between the two countries and requires ratification by both the Iranian and Syrian parliaments. Unfortunately, ratification by the Islamic Consultative Assembly has become impossible due to some legal issues. Furthermore, $270 million has been paid so far for the implementation of the second credit line (worth $1 billion). According to the decision of the General Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, the remaining funds of the second credit line for Syria are contingent upon a decision and directive from the supervising task force in the Supreme National Security Council. It is noted that the liquidity shortage in the central bank is the main publicly stated reason for not disbursing the remainder of the second credit line to Syria.
Regarding the motivations behind these ambitions, economic considerations, especially in the context of sanctions, appear to influence Iran’s decisions regarding Syria. Syrian state media reported that former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad signed agreements and memoranda of understanding at the end of last year covering various sectors, including oil, agriculture, railways, and free trade zones. The Iranian state-owned railway company has long aspired to expand its network through Iraq and neighboring Syria, linking it to the Syrian port of Latakia on the Mediterranean to strengthen its control. Syrian opposition and critics of Tehran view this as another Iranian attempt to enhance its political influence. Regarding oil, Iran has been supplying it to the Syrian government through a company affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Energy, initially used to evade sanctions under the Moscow “oil-for-goods” scheme with Iran before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Evading sanctions may remain an area of cooperation between Russia and Iran in Syria as sanctions on Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus continue, further tightened under the Caesar Act.
All publishing rights and copyrights reserved to MENA Research Center.
