Currently, deportations to Turkey are more than just a political issue: Turkey holds great geopolitical significance for Germany and its NATO partners. Nevertheless, there are now 14,500 Turkish nationals in Germany who are required to leave the country. The number of Turkish asylum seekers surged last year to such an extent that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz took the matter into his own hands. “We need to finally start large-scale deportations,” the Chancellor mandated himself in October 2023. Shortly after, during the visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in November, a breakthrough seemed to have been achieved.
Now there are tangible results: Following months of negotiations with the government in Ankara, the German government has started deporting a significant number of Turkish citizens back to their homeland. Initially, a total of 200 Turks are to be sent back to Turkey on multiple scheduled flights. Simultaneously, Turkey has reportedly offered to take back up to 500 citizens from Germany per week, with necessary preparations underway. Although Turkey still opposes deportations by charter flights, it appears ready to accept such flights in the future if they are labeled as “special flights.”
Last year, the number of Turkish asylum seekers in Germany increased dramatically—by more than 150% compared to the previous year. Turkey rose to second place as a country of origin in Germany, behind Syria. This year, however, the numbers have declined, with Turkey now ranking third, behind Afghanistan. A major factor driving migration was Turkey’s poor economic situation, with official inflation exceeding 80%. This resulted in a low protection rate, with only 13% of asylum applications being approved—a significantly lower rate than for Syrians or Afghans.
The number of applications rose sharply in the second half of 2023, largely linked to President Erdoğan’s re-election, which left opposition supporters feeling hopeless. In addition to ongoing government repression, the devastating earthquake in February was another key reason for migration. Over 10,000 short-term visas were issued to earthquake survivors, some of whom subsequently applied for asylum in Germany. In other cases, migration to the EU was facilitated by the fact that Turks do not require visas for Serbia, allowing them to cross only one border, usually Hungary’s.
The increase in asylum seekers from Turkey is primarily a Kurdish phenomenon. Last year, 84% of applicants identified as Kurdish. In the Kurdish regions of southeastern Turkey, poverty, political repression, and estrangement from the Turkish state are particularly pronounced. Due to the low protection rate, the number of Turks required to leave Germany rose quickly. By the end of 2023, this was the case for more than 13,500 Turks, though only 871 Turkish nationals were deported that year, exclusively on scheduled flights. More than 10,000 of those required to leave were granted a tolerated stay status, with a quarter of cases due to a lack of travel documents, reflecting the limited cooperation of Turkish consulates.
This situation seems to have changed now. Germany recently sent Turkey a list of 200 names of citizens required to leave. Turkey responded positively, confirming that it would take these individuals back. This list was then processed by German immigration authorities in cooperation with Turkish consulates. Both parties must collaborate when, for example, passports have expired and new ones need to be issued. This has traditionally been a tricky area. If a country of origin wishes, it can significantly delay deportations at this stage. Turkey, however, has assured German authorities that cooperation with its consulates will now be “completely smooth,” according to sources in Berlin. Turkish authorities also aim to standardize their procedures to facilitate deportation cooperation. No new agreements or contracts are required for these deportations to proceed.
An agreement seems to be taking shape on another challenging issue: deportation flights. Large groups of people can really only be permanently deported via charter flights. Until now, Turkey had refused to allow such charter flights, fearing damage to its image. Turkey does not want to be seen in the same category as other countries of origin like Syria and Afghanistan. In Turkey’s view, it sees itself not as a country of origin, but as an unwilling transit and destination country for global migration. Due to these sensitivities, deportations have so far only been possible on scheduled flights, limiting the number of deportations.
Officially, the Turkish government argued to the German government that with large groups on charter flights, it feared that individual asylum applications might not have been properly examined. Germany countered this, asserting that the right to asylum is always reviewed, regardless of whether one or 500 people are deported. At the same time, Germany is also willing to cooperate. The solution could be quite simple: Turkey has apparently agreed to accept charter flights in the future if they are officially referred to as “special flights.”
Unlike with other countries of origin, money transfers from asylum seekers in Germany to relatives back home play a minor role. Many Turkish families already have relatives in Germany. Similarly, labor agreements, as established with other countries, are not attractive for Turkey. The connections with Germany are so close that Turkish doctors, nurses, and IT specialists independently find their way to Germany without Turkey actively promoting it.
For Ankara, the greater concern is the damage to its self-image as an emerging regional power, whose appeal is called into question by asylum seekers. In this sense, referring officially to “special flights” rather than “charter flights” is a concession to Turkey. This is also feasible because the Turkish government has access to the partially state-owned airline, Turkish Airlines. According to Turkish sources in discussions with the German government, if this model works, up to 500 deportations per week would be possible.
What does Turkey get in return for showing such cooperation? Officially, surprisingly little. In discussions with German officials, Turkish representatives made it clear that their long-term goal is visa-free travel to Germany. In the short term, Germany has only promised to work on speeding up visa processing times. The German Ministry of the Interior has already discussed this with the Foreign Office. Long waiting times and frequent rejections are a persistent issue for the Turkish public. There are online examples of businesspeople who missed trade fairs, students who missed the start of their studies, and citizens who couldn’t attend the weddings of their cousins in Germany. One reason for the long waiting times is the increased interest in traveling to Germany. Between 2021 and 2022, the number of issued visas more than doubled.
Turks are also frustrated that in 2016, the EU had promised visa-free travel as part of the refugee deal, under certain conditions. However, Turkey has yet to meet some of the 72 criteria established back then, including reforms to anti-terror legislation and data protection. As long as the number of asylum seekers from Turkey remains high, it is questionable whether visa-free travel would be granted to Turkey, even if it met the conditions. The prospect of faster procedures, as now promised, is not a true concession. It is also in Germany’s interest for eligible people to receive visas.
But why is Turkey now willing to accept deportations after resisting for so long? In November last year, Erdoğan was in Berlin. There was a two-hour dinner with Chancellor Scholz at the Chancellery. During this dinner, the Chancellor raised the issue of deportations. According to government sources, Scholz demanded that there should be a “reliable mechanism” for deportations to Turkey. A joint working group was to produce results soon.
What sounds technocratic was apparently already a concrete agreement between the two leaders. In Erdoğan’s system, what matters most is that the president himself supports the process. If there is an agreement at the highest level, many things are possible with Turkey, as experience in Berlin has shown. Moreover, one should not think too institutionally when dealing with Turkey. Instead, it is essential to know the right people, build trust, and be persistent. Threats do not get one very far. Nevertheless, it has taken from November until now because the Turkish contacts responsible for practical issues changed repeatedly, initially without receiving approval from higher authorities. The process may have been facilitated by the fact that Turkish Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya, who is much more pragmatic than his predecessor Süleyman Soylu, has taken office. The change last year is also reflected in increased cooperation in combating drug and human trafficking crimes. Soylu, on the other hand, was often seen more as part of the problem than part of the solution.
