Two months ago, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi offered Iran’s President Masud Peseshkian words of unwavering support. Regardless of changes in the international and regional situation, Wang stated at the UN General Assembly in New York, the People’s Republic would remain a trusted partner for Iran. His promise: “China will support Iran.”
Relations between Iran and China seem close. Diplomats from both countries meet regularly, and their armies have held joint exercises repeatedly. At Beijing’s urging, Iran was admitted this year to the BRICS group, initially a coalition of rapidly growing economies. Since 2023, Iran has also been part of the Russia-Asian Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a largely symbolic group but one that brings geopolitically significant countries like China, Russia, India, and Pakistan to the same table. In 2023, Beijing acted as a mediator in negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with the agreement signed in the Chinese capital.
Beijing is keen to expand its influence in the Gulf region, where Washington plays a decisive role. In 2021, Iran and China signed an agreement for close cooperation over the next 25 years, with Beijing announcing investments of up to $400 billion. In exchange, China gained Iran’s silence on the persecution of Muslim minorities in the Chinese region of Xinjiang.
This relationship also pays off, especially since Yemeni Houthi rebels began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea. While the U.S. urged China to use its influence on Iran to restrain the Tehran-backed militant Islamist rebels, China leveraged its power only to ensure safe passage for Chinese vessels through the strait. According to Reuters, Beijing threatened consequences for its business in Iran if its interests were compromised by the Houthis. A hijacked ship would have forced Beijing to play a more active role in the conflict, yet China managed to protect its ships while Western shipping companies had to reroute, accepting significant delays.
But while Beijing benefits, many of Iran’s expectations have gone unfulfilled. As the think tank Chatham House notes, many announced investments have not materialized, and those that have are comparatively modest: over the past three years, China’s investments in Iran totaled $185 million. By contrast, China agreed to new projects worth $16.7 billion with Saudi Arabia, $3.6 billion with Kuwait, and $2 billion with Qatar. In 2022, Beijing invested 15 times more in Israel than in Iran – a humiliation for Tehran, potentially affecting its willingness to heed Chinese demands.
The primary focus of China-Iran relations remains the energy sector, where the power dynamics are clear: more than 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports go to China, mainly bought by smaller traders, as China’s industry giants seek to avoid violating U.S. sanctions. Most of the oil reaches China indirectly, via routes like Malaysia, and at discounted prices. While Iran depends on China as a buyer, it ranks only sixth among China’s largest oil suppliers, contributing to Beijing’s diversification but not playing a critical role.
The wave of protests in Iran that began in September 2022 has had no impact on China’s Iran policy. Instead, in September, Foreign Minister Wang stated that China would support the regime in resisting “external forces” interfering in the country’s affairs and exerting pressure. This statement likely alluded to the United States, which Beijing accuses of deliberately stirring up trouble. In April, the state newspaper Global Times commented that the key to regional de-escalation lay in the hands of the U.S., which should restrain Israel. This stance is shared by many countries in the Middle East.
Officially, China maintains a neutral position, but shortly after the Hamas terror attacks in October 2023, China called on “all parties” to show restraint without condemning Hamas’s violence. Meanwhile, Chinese social media censors have increasingly tolerated rampant antisemitism. Claims that Jews had infiltrated the U.S. government, for instance, have been shared thousands of times. Where even a single misplaced word against China’s leadership would typically prompt a response from security authorities, such posts remain visible and are sometimes even amplified by state channels.
With this policy, Beijing risks damaging its relations with Israel, which is actually an important supplier of technology, particularly in microchips. Yet China’s leadership appears to view the crisis as an opportunity in its rivalry with the U.S., given that Washington’s influence in the Arab world has suffered significant damage in recent months.
However, the relationship between China and Iran is not without limits. Iran is only one of many partners in the region, with no leverage to push the communist leadership toward greater support. Beijing pursues its own interests and acts only when those interests, like in the Red Sea, are directly at stake. Mediation efforts that would ultimately benefit Washington as well are unlikely. For now, it seems that warm words will suffice.
