When the Turkish government confirmed in September that it would be the first NATO member to join the BRICS alliance, dominated by Russia and China, it reignited a long-standing question: Is Türkiye turning away from the West? However, at least in terms of public opinion, the opposite seems to be true. According to a survey by the American Pew Research Center, the percentage of Turks with a positive view of NATO has doubled since the previous survey in 2019.
Support for the EU also rose by twelve percentage points to 46 percent in the same period. Although Türkiye’s EU accession negotiations have been stalled for years, 56 percent of the Turks surveyed support EU membership – the highest level in years. Meanwhile, Russia and China have become less popular among Turks. However, distrust of Russia is outpaced by skepticism toward the United States, with only 18 percent having a favorable view of America.
For the country’s future orientation, it is notable that pro-Western attitudes are significantly stronger among younger Turks than older generations. This aligns with surveys in which a high percentage of young Turks express a desire to emigrate to the West. Yet, Turkish society remains polarized: Supporters of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tend to be more pro-Russian and skeptical of Europe than his critics. Only on NATO is there near-consensus, with both government supporters and critics rating the alliance similarly.
The authors of the study view the growing support for NATO as a response to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. The war has not only revitalized the transatlantic alliance but has also enhanced Türkiye’s geopolitical importance, strengthening its bargaining position. Erdoğan’s positioning of Türkiye as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv is seen across party lines in Ankara as a successful strategy. Another factor that strongly shaped Turks’ foreign policy views for years has seemingly lost importance: the 2016 coup attempt. At the time, Russian President Vladimir Putin used the chaos to support Erdoğan, while the West’s muted response led to frustration within both the Turkish government and the public. Türkiye’s subsequent shift towards Russia culminated in the 2019 purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, which continues to strain its NATO relationships. Türkiye was excluded from the U.S. F-35 fighter jet program, delaying the modernization of its air force by years.
There now appears to be some movement on this issue. Washington has suggested that Ankara could rejoin the program if a “solution” is found for the unused S-400 system. Ankara is also reportedly hopeful about purchasing Eurofighter Typhoon jets. Citing a “source familiar with the matter,” it was reported that the German government agreed to technical discussions on a potential sale, after Berlin allegedly blocked such talks for a long time. This topic is likely to have been discussed during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s recent visit to Istanbul.
Erdoğan has dismissed claims that Turkish membership in BRICS would signal a shift away from the West. “Our face is turned toward the West,” he said. But that doesn’t mean Türkiye can turn its back on the East. Türkiye, he argued, must remain open to opportunities tied to new “power centers.” According to Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Türkiye sees primarily economic benefits in joining BRICS, such as access to the BRICS Development Bank. European diplomats in Ankara caution against overinterpreting Türkiye’s possible BRICS membership. “We shouldn’t pressure Türkiye to choose,” said one diplomat. “But it’s a different story with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” Notably, just before the NATO summit in July, Erdoğan expressed interest in joining this China-led organization, which also includes defense cooperation. This, the diplomat argued, would be incompatible with NATO membership.
