By Mohammed Haridi
It was a surprising move when Iranian President Massud Peseschkian personally called Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to wish him success with the Arab-Islamic summit held in the Kingdom. Bin Salman, in turn, was one of the first to congratulate Donald Trump via video call on his election victory. These calls highlight the delicate balancing act that Saudi foreign policy must navigate: pursuing détente with Iran while seeking closer security ties with Washington, one of the Islamic Republic’s staunchest adversaries.
In Riyadh, there seems to be an awareness that this balancing act will not become easier with a President Trump. The Saudi leadership has not forgotten that during his previous term, Trump escalated tensions with Iran through his “maximum pressure” policy and left the Kingdom in the lurch at a critical moment. When Iran-backed Arab allies attacked key Saudi oil facilities in September 2019 using a swarm of drones and missiles, the American response to protect the Kingdom was minimal. This incident significantly contributed to the Saudi leadership’s realization that they could not rely solely on the United States and should also pursue détente with Tehran.
Thus, the euphoria with which Trump was welcomed into office in 2016 has been tempered with skepticism. Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, when asked about Saudi preferences at the “Future Investment Initiative” (FII) in late October, responded cautiously. “We have, of course, worked with President Trump before, so we know him and can work very well with him,” he said, sounding more businesslike than enthusiastic. The Foreign Minister also clarified the Saudi leadership’s priorities. His main task, and that of his ministry, he said, was to protect the societal reforms and economic transformation projects under Vision 2030. These initiatives aim to lead Saudi Arabia to prosperity and reduce its dependency on oil revenues.
Only yesterday, FIFA, under its authoritarian leadership, effectively decreed that the 2034 FIFA World Cup would once again be held in the desert—this time in Saudi Arabia. Megaprojects are springing up across the Kingdom, with parts of Riyadh resembling a forest of construction cranes. The oil-rich Kingdom, which operates without democratic governance, seeks to position itself as a hub for future technologies and artificial intelligence (AI). Its ambitions were showcased at the FII conference, where top executives, business leaders, and startup representatives from around the world were treated to a futuristic spectacle. Even the catering featured AI: a robot serving ice cream was one of the main attractions.
Here, Trump represents a convenient partner for the Kingdom. He and his circle maintain close personal ties to Saudi Arabia. Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, secured a $2 billion investment from the Kingdom for his private equity firm. Criticism of human rights issues is unlikely to trouble the Crown Prince, who rules the Kingdom with significant, sometimes brutal, authority. “I have great respect for Mohammed, who is doing a fantastic job,” Trump said in an interview with an Arab TV station about the Crown Prince, just two weeks before the election. “I mean, he’s truly a visionary.”
In foreign policy, however, the situation is more complex. The Kingdom’s current primary goal is de-escalation. Riyadh seeks to shield the country as much as possible from the destabilizing effects of regional conflicts. The Saudis consider it a significant achievement that the direct communication channel with Tehran has helped prevent a regional conflagration. Speaking at the FII conference, Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan stated that “very clear and honest discussions” are taking place, contributing to “understanding each other’s perspectives and ensuring there are no misunderstandings.” Based on this direct communication, he added, “we are slowly building a much more stable and stronger relationship that serves not only the interests of both our countries but also regional stability.”
The détente efforts with Iran are seen as tactical in nature, according to several observers in Riyadh. The fundamental opposition to the Islamic Republic and its ideology remains unchanged. Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq or the Houthi rebels supported by Tehran, equipped with drones and missiles, stand ready for attacks should Tehran decide to revert to a confrontational course. “Iran remains a threat,” says the Gulf Research Center in Riyadh. Like other well-connected observers in the Saudi capital, the think tank explains that the Saudi leadership hopes for a behavioral shift from the Iranian regime, urging it to cease its destabilizing activities in the region. This sentiment echoes unofficial statements from government insiders. “However, Saudi Arabia does not want Iran to be attacked or for its leadership to lose control.” A cornered Iranian regime could lash out. A Saudi proverb states: “He who is sinking does not care about getting wet.”
A more aggressive U.S. Iran policy would therefore not necessarily align with Saudi interests. Furthermore, the two sides remain at odds over an issue dear to Trump: normalizing relations with Israel, which currently seems distant. The president-elect has already made this a priority for future regional policy. However, for Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel is out of the question without a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as the Crown Prince has emphatically stated. Trump, on the other hand, is viewed as unlikely to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his extremist-laden government into accepting a two-state solution. The Saudi leadership’s reduced willingness to compromise on normalization stems not only from the widespread outrage over Israel’s military actions in Gaza, which would make such a move difficult to justify—both to the Saudi populace and in its role as a regional and Islamic leader. According to a source familiar with Riyadh’s stance, it is a matter of realpolitik and a conviction that the region cannot achieve lasting peace without resolving the Palestinian issue. “How can Saudi Arabia take such a step when the conflict can reignite at any time, with the trigger in someone else’s hands?”
Normalization, however, is not entirely ruled out. A deal with Israel is tied to agreements with Washington, in which the Saudi leadership has significant interest—not least a comprehensive defense pact with the United States, including security guarantees. Currently, Saudi diplomacy is advancing agreements below this threshold, focusing on trade and the Kingdom’s ambitions to develop its own civilian nuclear program. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia is striving to lead diplomatic efforts to advance a two-state solution. At the end of October, Riyadh hosted the first meeting of a new initiative: a global alliance for the establishment of a Palestinian state. On Monday, leaders from Arab and Islamic countries gathered in Riyadh for a summit, which, according to Saudi state media, aims to “end aggression,” “protect civilians,” and “support the Palestinian and Lebanese people.”
However, the Kingdom appears under no illusions about the effectiveness of such international initiatives or Saudi diplomacy. “Saudi Arabia can ensure that the Palestinian issue remains a topic in international diplomacy,” say experts in Riyadh. “It can pressure the United States, in turn, to put pressure on Israel. But the tools and leverage available for this are limited.” The summit, intended to achieve a unified Arab-Islamic position with greater influence, was accompanied by skepticism regarding the potential to engage the incoming Trump administration in Middle East peace efforts. Yet there is at least some hope in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals: that Trump, who cultivates his reputation as a “dealmaker,” desires a quick end to the region’s wars — and that Netanyahu might hesitate to alienate the unpredictable and ego-driven partner in the White House.
