By Ahmad Al-Remeh
After everything that has unfolded in Gaza as a result of Hamas’ approach to governance and ideology, it’s crucial to pause and ask: How did Gaza end up here? What kind of thinking has led to this reality?
One of the central problems lies in Hamas’ prioritization of its Islamist project over the core Palestinian cause. This raises a larger issue: how do we even classify Hamas? Is it a Palestinian Islamic movement? If so, this positions it in a deeply complex and contentious space within both Arab and Islamic political landscapes.
Hamas has strategically leveraged its religious and geographic identity to evoke emotional and ideological support, branding itself as the Islamic spearhead in defense of Palestine. This narrative continues to attract sympathy across wide segments of the Arab and Muslim public, especially in light of the failure of conventional political solutions for the Palestinian cause. Many view Hamas as the only faction with the “keys to power”—thanks to its military tactics and its reluctance to engage in traditional political processes.
But this very stance creates a dangerous illusion. Few ask: Does Hamas have a real, practical plan to liberate Palestine or to protect the Palestinian people? Or is it a media-driven narrative, amplified by a broad circle of Arab preachers and religious figures who, historically, have maintained a highly emotional—yet politically naive—relationship with the Palestinian issue?
To understand Hamas and similar Islamist movements, one must grasp their foundational worldview. They believe that all civilians within their sphere of influence must become a reflection of the movement itself. This concept harks back to early Islamic history—specifically, the Prophet Muhammad’s campaign to Tabuk. Islamist factions often liken their current opponents to the “hypocrites” who failed to support the Prophet in that moment, implying that any deviation from their path is not just political dissent but religious betrayal.
A revealing comparison can be made with the situation in Syria. Civilian populations under the control of one Islamist group are often disregarded or dehumanized by rival factions. Groups like ISIS, for example, viewed civilians living outside their control as apostates who had refused to migrate to the so-called Islamic State. Likewise, Syrian Islamist militias during the revolution viewed civilians outside their areas of influence as being beyond their responsibility—regardless of shared ethnicity, geography, or even sect.
This same mindset is apparent in Gaza. Hamas sees itself as the sole bearer of the “Ummah’s project”—an ideological leadership role that, in its view, warrants not just support but allegiance from all. Since seizing power in Gaza, Hamas has taken control of most mosques, silenced dissent—even from its former ally, Islamic Jihad—and installed its own preachers. These figures have spent years indoctrinating the public with a simple yet potent message: Hamas is Islam. Hamas is Palestine. Hamas is Jerusalem. Anyone else is ignorant, misguided, or a hypocrite.
This mindset reflects the thinking of Sayyid Qutb, whose concept of “modern jahiliyyah” (pre-Islamic ignorance) defined the ideological direction of many Islamist groups. Interestingly, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has made similar remarks—referring to today’s Muslim world as one caught between a new era of ignorance and catastrophe—raising questions about the rhetorical parallels between Tehran and Hamas.
In such a worldview, the civilian is no longer central. The people are there to serve the movement, not the other way around. Unless a civilian aligns themselves with the cause—through material or moral support—they are often labeled traitors or hypocrites. This may explain why many Islamist factions show little regard for civilian well-being in times of conflict.
Gaza today is in crisis. The humanitarian disaster is visible to all. Political deadlock offers no hint of relief. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, youth unemployment (ages 18–29) among those not in school or higher education has reached a staggering 63%. This figure represents primarily those outside Hamas’ sphere of employment or influence. Since the 2007 political split, Hamas has appointed nearly 40,000 people to roles in its governmental and security institutions.
In other words, unemployment is largely concentrated among those who do not belong to Hamas or benefit from its system.
Poverty rates in Gaza have soared to 75%, making it one of the most impoverished areas globally, according to Gaza’s Ministry of Social Development. The health sector is collapsing, with a dire shortage of equipment, hospital beds, and essential medications—especially for chronic and critical conditions.
So, the pressing question is: What does Hamas want from Gaza? Is there a political vision? A strategy to relieve the suffering of its people?
It appears not. Despite its claims to represent “moderate Islam,” Hamas has shown little concern for Gaza’s social collapse. While this may seem counterintuitive—how could any movement, especially an Islamic one, allow its people to reach such desperation?—the unfortunate truth may be that this situation serves Hamas’ interests.
The humanitarian crisis caused by the war has become a political asset. Hamas accuses Arab and Muslim nations of betraying it during its “unplanned” military campaign, which resulted in death and destruction for Gaza’s civilians.
Historically, armies prioritize the safety of their people in existential battles. Criminal groups and drug cartels, on the other hand, are known for abandoning their own while their leaders survive. Hamas’ seeming disregard for civilian safety raises the question: Why doesn’t it protect its own people during its military operations, especially when its legitimacy relies on popular support? Those who believe Hamas has lost in Gaza are mistaken. Those who think it wants change to misunderstand the nature of the organization. Hamas claims victory, despite the suffering, and insists it is the last bastion of Palestinian resistance—even if it stands alone.
In reality, Hamas resembles a group of militants who never expected to hold land, let alone govern it. Their dream was a fleeting jihadi mission. Yet, here they are: controlling territory, managing a military apparatus, operating revenue streams, and establishing what they consider the first Arab Islamic emirate.
And so, the real questions remain: When will Hamas put Palestine before its ideological emirate? When will it prioritize the Palestinian people as the foundation of resistance? And how long will it continue to gamble—with no strategic foresight—with the lives of millions?
Until then, the average Palestinian faces two stark choices: Become part of Hamas and gain access to basic needs—or remain an outsider, condemned as ignorant, a hypocrite, or worse.
