The Russian invasion of Ukraine created exacerbated different dynamics in the Middle East and we had a chance to talk about it with Ukrainian editor and journalist, Vitaliy Portnikov. The interview was conducted by Denys Kolesnyk, French analyst and consultant.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has highlighted interesting trends in the Middle East, such as the appetite for non-alignment, and the unwillingness to join the Western position on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. How can you explain it?
When we talk about the position of the countries of the Middle East and the so-called Global South, we have to remember that these countries have completely different experiences, a different historical and legal experience than the Western countries, the European Union states, and the countries of North America.
The experience we have is the experience of the Second World War. I would rather even say the experience of two world wars. Europeans remember that two world wars destroyed Europe. Americans are also well aware of this because they were directly involved in these two events. The conclusion from these two wars was very simple: you need to respect international law, you need to respect the inviolability of borders, and you need to do everything to prevent one state from appropriating the territory of another.
At the same time, it is worth remembering that from 1945 to 1975, from the Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin conference in Yalta to the Helsinki Conference, where the Helsinki Final Act was signed, even in Europe and North America, we were not sure about the stability of borders. The general perception was that there was some kind of agreement after the Second World War, but to what extent this agreement is stable? It was only after 1975 that the countries that received their borders as a result of the Second World War breathed a sigh of relief.
Now let’s look at the Global South and the Middle East. There is no such perception there since there are certain countries that still do not have stable borders. The classic example is the state of Israel, which has been living without stable borders since 1948. India and Pakistan, still have quarrels about Kashmir. And it goes on and on. In the Global South, there are territorial conflicts and historical claims, doubts about the stability of the borders of a particular state. For instance, China claims the territory of India because Beijing annexed Tibet. In other words, they have completely different priorities.
And one of the main priorities, or even the main priority, is not that there is a need to restore international law, but that war should be avoided. And who is the aggressor, who started it first, is a completely different story. These are secondary or even tertiary issues for them. At the same time, their economic interests are of utmost importance.
Hence, Russia doesn’t look like a violator of any rules from the perspective of those countries. Of course, they would like Russia and Ukraine to stop fighting, but not at the cost of some internal problems, not at the cost of the collapse of the economy, and not at the cost of a Western victory. Because for many of these countries, Russia is still perceived as an alternative to the West.
But look, there is Saudi Arabia and Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many believed that Riyadh would join the Western camp and support sanctions against the Russian Federation. But it did not happen. On the contrary, we saw how Saudi Arabia was able to use the oil price issue. Or how Saudi Arabia, for example, is trying to position itself as a mediator. How would you explain this position in Riyadh?
During the Soviet times, Saudi Arabia was quite an anti-communist state. And to such an extent that even diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Moscow were non-existent for several decades up until the collapse of the Soviet Union. In other words, the hatred of communism was higher than the colonial experiences of the region.
But what does modernisation mean in Saudi terms? It doesn’t mean becoming a European democracy. It means becoming a state closer to traditional behaviour in the Arab world. In other words, Prince Salman is a typical Arab national leader who navigates the competition, whereas his parents, who were kings, simply had no political adversaries to contend with. And in this situation, of course, he is manoeuvring between different interests.
As for the United States, it is no longer the only country he is focused on. Prince Salman is finding common ground with China. The fact that China has acted as a mediator between Saudi Arabia and Iran speaks volumes. And the United States itself, you know, they can’t do what they used to do.
Previously you’ve mentioned Israel as one of the examples related to the instability of borders. And Israel has taken a rather interesting position. If you read the declarations of Ukrainian officials, this position is unfriendly to Ukraine. How would you explain Israel’s reluctance to provide military assistance and to take Ukraine’s side in the Russo-Ukrainian war?
Well, the Israeli logic is that it is now a neighbouring country of the Russian Federation. And this has nothing to do with the Russo-Ukrainian war, but with Syria. Russia has entered the region in a way that no one expected. And the fact that Russia has come closer to Israel’s borders is something that any Israeli leader has to take into account because Russia is not just close, it controls the airspace. Depending on Moscow’s will, it may or may not deter the Iranians. It can deter or not deter Israeli air attacks on certain important Iranian and Syrian military targets. Thus, in any of its actions, Israel is forced to look at how Russia might react.
Moreover, Moscow maintains ties with radical Islamist movements in the Middle East. Russia was the only country among the then G-8 member states whose foreign minister met with Hamas leaders after Hamas won the parliamentary elections in the Palestinian Authority and even after it formed its government in the Gaza Strip. And these contacts between Russia and Hamas continue to this day. In addition, Moscow has its contacts with Hezbollah and no one hides this either.
In any case, Russia is capable of changing the situation in the Middle East if it wants to. For instance, try to put yourself in the shoes of the Prime Minister of Israel, who understands that he is supplying Ukraine with weapons that allow it to defend itself against Russian missiles, or even shoot down Russian military equipment. And then missiles of a different quality than those currently used by Hamas fall on Tel Aviv. Or an Israeli aircraft gets shot down let’s say “accidentally”, by the Russian air defence during a raid into Syria. These are the things the Israeli leadership has to take into account.
But I also believe that Israel should consider this situation from the standpoint of a global danger. In other words, Israel has to be guided by the logic of its national historical experience, where the Jewish state can only feel safe in a democratic world. And in a world dominated by anti-Semites, xenophobes and dictators, it is difficult to be sure of security guarantees for the Jewish state.
Israel’s existence with the Soviet Union, which supplied the latest equipment to the Arab states, and which several times stopped military conflicts in the Middle East by blackmailing them and threatening to intervene is an interesting example for Israel. This happened during the Suez crisis, during the Six-Day War, and the Yom Kippur War.
If the Soviet Union hadn’t been around, Israel’s security might have been achieved much earlier thanks to peace agreements with Arab countries. Arab countries would have understood that they needed to find a _modus vivendi_ with Israel and that they needed to recognise its right to exist. But, in a nutshell, the very existence of the Soviet Union made the Arab states confident that sooner or later they would destroy Israel.
And this is a very similar situation when we talk about Russia and Ukraine. Russia is now fighting against Ukraine in the belief that the most it can lose are the occupied territories. That’s where all the risks and problems end for Moscow. While certain Western politicians are right when they say that if Ukraine stops fighting, it will cease to exist. And if Russia stops fighting, there will be peace.
So, like most of the states, Israel is guided purely by its national interests. There is an understanding among the Israeli leadership that because Russia is in Syria, because there are security and political issues, Israel cannot afford to take steps to help Ukraine. Did I understand you correctly?
In general, you understood it correctly. However, the Israeli government is guided by tactical, not strategic national interests. And speaking of strategic interest, there is a problem because Israel should help democracy to win. Because Israel itself is an outpost of democracy in the Middle East.
Israel is a refuge for the Jewish people, as Ukraine is a refuge for the Ukrainian people. And in this sense, if we want to keep this refuge safe, we need Russia to lose and Ukraine to win. This is not even a question of sympathy for Ukrainians or Russians.
And in this case, it is very important who started the war first. This is a question of one state trying to destroy another brazenly. And given the experience of Jewish history, this never ends well for those who do not feel like the majority. Israel was created because Jews have never felt like they were the majority in any given country they lived in.
Now they have this state. People who live in Israel are defending it. But it is not enough to protect its borders. It is very important to build a world in which Israel will feel comfortable. And the Ukrainians are now fighting for this world. The Ukrainian soldier who is dying on the front line is not fighting for Israel’s interests, he is fighting for Ukraine’s interests, but he is creating a better world, including for Israel.
And at the same time the Israeli soldier, when he stopped Soviet tanks, when he shot down Soviet planes when he confronted authoritarian regimes that wanted to destroy Israel, he was also essentially creating a better world in which, by the way, Ukraine could have emerged.
We need to realise that everything is interconnected. And I think we need to continue talking about this with Israeli officials. For example, President Zelenskyy met with Prime Minister Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly. And I think this should also be part of this conversation. We need to explain many things to Israeli politicians and society.
And what about Turkey? Ankara played an important role during the first weeks of the war by enforcing the Montreux Convention, blocking Russian ships from entering the Black Sea. But we can see that from the very beginning, Erdogan tried to position himself as a mediator. But he failed to achieve any serious results, except for the grain deal, which has now been disrupted. What is the point of such actions for Ankara if it is clear that the Kremlin has no political will for peace?
There are several motives. The first motive justifies the fact that Erdogan can afford special relations with Russia, and there is an economic interest in it as well. Turkey has not imposed sanctions on Russia, has not cancelled air connection with Russia, continues to receive Russian tourists, and has embraced Russian oligarchs.
Ankara has also another motive as a candidate for the EU membership. For instance, when Turkey looks like a mediator, it is difficult for the EU to have the same demands as directed to other countries, like Serbia or Georgia. Because, well, Europe doesn’t have other mediators except Erdogan. And his logic is that if you want me to be a mediator, don’t prevent me from having economic interests. Because this is important for maintaining the channel with Putin. This is the first point.
The second point is political. If Erdogan communicates with Biden, Putin, and Zelenskyy, who else can afford it? No one else. This turns Erdogan into a great global politician. But this role requires Erdogan to manoeuvre. You saw that during his meeting with Putin in Sochi, Erdogan criticised the West and Ukraine. He said that we need to be more compliant and that we need to accept Russia’s terms. But he can also criticise Russia. When he got on the plane and flew back to Ankara from Sochi, he told his journalists that he was not very happy with the Russian position either. This is Erdogan, he manoeuvres this way.
It is also important to understand that the Russo-Ukrainian war, although not a worldwide conflict, is still a global confrontation with the collective West on Ukraine’s side. And Erdogan is the head of a NATO member state, so it’s not so easy to manoeuvre freely. On the one hand, there is China, which says that it understands Russia’s concerns, and on the other hand, alongside Ukraine, there are the United States and the West, and there is Crimea, where there is the Crimean Tatar factor, which plays a very important role in Turkish domestic politics.
In any case, this manoeuvring is not something new in Turkish politics. This is a kind of a “Bosphorus strait passage” policy. You have to be careful when you’re standing on the shores of the Bosphorus and wondering how the ships are going to get through. And Turkish politicians do the same thing, in fact, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Since the Ottoman diplomacy did not have such caution, and this led to the collapse of the empire Ankara remembers this very well. The politicians who succeeded the Ottoman rulers were much more cautious and much more flexible.
And in the future, during Erdogan’s current term, do you see him continuing the same policy of cautiously “crossing the Bosphorus” or will there be some kind of more pro-Western course?
The course will be more pro-Western. He needs the West to solve his problems, especially economic ones. Erdogan needs to negotiate many important things with the West. He was not burdened by the elections, which forced him to use some anti-Western rhetoric, even when he didn’t really need it, but somehow had to use it to mobilise the population.
If the Turkish parliament now votes in favour of Sweden becoming a NATO member, this will not be a complete peace with the United States, but it will be a truce, a step forward so to speak. And there can be many such steps.
Most countries are trying to find some interest for themselves and do not want to choose a side between the West and Ukraine and on the other hand Russia and China. And how do you see the balance of power in the Middle East concerning Ukraine?
In fact, only Syria openly supports Russia. As for Iran, Teheran even denies that it supplies Russia with drones. So, even from Iran’s point of view, this is not something to be proud of or to brag about. Iran doesn’t want to be seen as an ally of Russia in the region, because Iran is a serious power from their point of view. Tehran has been also trying to participate in the resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
All other countries are manoeuvring in one way or another. For instance, Morocco was the only MENA country to supply Ukraine with tanks. But at the same time, Morocco is resuming direct flights with the Russian Federation. Morocco has not deteriorated its relations with Russia, it has maintained them.
Then there is Saudi Arabia, which has held talks with many countries around the world. Riyadh organised a conference where the West and the Global South met and discussed the war in Ukraine. But at the same time, Saudi Arabia continues to maintain relations with Russia. And we can say that these are all variations of the policies of the Global South.
Indeed, for many of us, it was a surprise that the state of Israel, which has always been perceived as part of the West, has actually turned into a part of the Global South. And I doubt it is good for the Jewish people. In other words, Israel is pursuing the same policy as the countries of the Global South. The society supports Ukraine and believes that Russia is the aggressor, while the government is trying to manoeuvre and be cautious, just like the governments of the Arab countries. This is an interesting point that highlights that the whole region is in this state of manoeuvre.
But I also think that there can only be a change if Russia really loses this war. And what I mean by defeat is if Ukraine survives as a state. If Ukraine becomes a member of NATO and the European Union. And if Russia has to give up its claim to integrate Ukraine into its fold, or even turn it into a satellite state. In essence, this will be a defeat, but Russia will disappear from the political picture in the Middle East. But will definitely lose its stance, since the Arab world respects the winners, the strong ones in general.
And another thing that may also influence these sentiments is Russia’s behaviour in terms of food security. We saw that when Putin decided to abandon the grain deal, the Egyptian president, Al-Sisi, a very cautious politician, was quite frank in saying that it was wrong, that it was a blow to food security. And for Egypt, a rise in the price of food even by a few Egyptian pounds, is a big problem for the government.
And this brings me to another question. It turns out that most countries in the Middle East are not yet convinced that Ukraine will survive as a state, are they?
I think they simply do not think about it. They see this conflict as a global conflict between Russia and the West. And this is important to them.
And also, if Ukraine survives as a state, it will be a demonstration that the collective West has managed to, let’s say, defend its principles. The preservation of Ukraine is the defence of the principles of the collective West. Respect for international law, for example. And this is something that is not a priority for the Global South.
But if the West stands up for these principles, it means that they are more serious and stronger than the principles that Russia lives by. That the West is ready to fight for its principles. This would be a lesson.
And by the way, do you remember that when the United States led an international coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, it made an impression on the Middle East? It strengthened the position of the United States. It showed that Americans are ready and able to fight for their principles.
And what could Ukraine do in this region to change this situation, the way Ukraine is seen in this region? Is it even possible?
I think that Ukrainian diplomacy has become more active in the past months. It just had to become so. Many countries in the region are now paying more attention to Ukraine than they used to. Perhaps not as much as we might think, because this war is definitely not at the centre of their attention, but there are many signs that they are following it. There are countries in which Ukrainian ambassadors make headlines. For instance in Israel, Ukrainian Ambassador Yevhen Korniychuk is constantly generating the information reality around him in the Israeli media.
In short, I think that firstly, Ukraine just needs to be present there. Secondly, they have to establish contacts at the highest level. The fact that now there are still contacts with those leaders with whom Ukraine has never had such relations. And Mohammed bin Salman is a good example of this. In general, the fact that Saudi politicians are paying attention to Ukraine is very important. Because a lot depends on Riyadh. But I don’t think we can convince them that they should not cooperate with Russia. They just won’t understand why.
But when they vote at the UN or when they oppose Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal. This is all a signal to Vladimir Putin and he follows such signals. This somehow forces Russia to manoeuvre, at least in its foreign policy.
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