By Ahmed Al-Rumah
Following the rapid developments in Syria, with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies taking control of Aleppo and advancing to the outskirts of Hama in record time, Syrians from all sides have been left astonished and questioning: How is an extremist Islamist group, internationally designated as a terrorist organization, allowed such expansion?
Although the answers to this question remain unclear, let us pause to examine the figure of HTS leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, to better understand his vision for Syria. Where is his project headed? What are his military and negotiation strategies? And has he truly abandoned his Salafi-jihadist ideological roots?
Al-Jolani appears to have a distinct and ambitious project—one that is not necessarily national in nature and perhaps closer to an emirate vision. However, he is unwilling to relinquish or integrate it with others, fearing it might dissolve in the process. Analysts suggest that he is unlikely to collaborate seriously with the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition or Turkey itself, unless it enhances his influence.
Al-Jolani’s first major achievement has been his expansion into Aleppo, undermining Iran’s project there and sending a message to Syrians that he is acting in their interest.
He believes he has established a superior civil governance model in Idlib compared to the one Turkey created in areas like Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch. In his view, his model is worth emulating, with the potential to sustain and grow, especially given that he has succeeded where others—such as the Muslim Brotherhood with their experience, history, and resources, as well as Turkey, despite its status as a major state—have failed.
For instance, in the education sector, Idlib University has made remarkable progress, accommodating over 20,000 students to date. Additionally, hospitals in Idlib offer postgraduate studies and physician training comparable to those of regime-controlled universities, unlike the healthcare facilities in Turkish-controlled zones.
A visitor to Idlib would also notice the administrative discipline. Decisions made by the Salvation Government are implemented rigorously, and even the smallest ministry rulings are enforced with an evident sense of legal authority and respect for the rule of law.
Through this lens, Al-Jolani projects himself as a leader with a structured, enforceable vision, one that aims to position his governance model as a viable alternative amid the ongoing Syrian conflict.
Al-Jolani’s Strategy
When the Syrian revolution began, al-Qaeda decided to extend its influence into Syria. Abu Mohammad al-Jolani was chosen to lead its Syrian branch under the name Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham. It is said that al-Jolani played a role in selecting this name and establishing its foundational principles. From there, he began strategically planning his project, which centered on two key points:
Restricting His Mission to the Assad Regime
Al-Jolani aimed to limit his operations to fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad, avoiding any attacks on U.S. or Western interests. Moreover, he did not allow other factions to plan or target American interests. This approach significantly reduced Western **hostility toward him over time and even paved the way for some level of cooperation between his group and international forces in counterterrorism efforts. Notably, intelligence he reportedly provided led to the elimination of key ISIS leaders who had sought refuge in Syria. This approach contrasted with al-Qaeda’s broader philosophy of global confrontation.
Gradual Separation from al-Qaeda Leadership
From the outset, al-Jolani worked to gradually isolate himself from al-Qaeda’s leadership in Iraq and establish an independent organization in Syria, free from the influence of both al-Qaeda and ISIS. This enabled him to build a strong, cohesive authority in Idlib, with centralized decision-making firmly under his control.
Idlib: The Capital of al-Jolani’s Project
A frequently asked question is: Why did al-Jolani choose Idlib as the center of his project? Several factors contributed to this decision:
The international coalition in its fight against ISIS did not permit him to establish an emirate in eastern Syria. For instance, in 2012, al-Jolani launched several attacks with the military council led by defector Colonel Muhannad al-Kate’ah on Al-Shaddadi and parts of Al-Hasakah to expel Kurdish forces. However, ISIS was stronger than al-Jolani’s faction at the time, which meant he risked either being absorbed into ISIS’s project or being eliminated militarily. Despite this, al-Jolani refused to join forces fighting ISIS during the coalition’s campaign against the group.
Consequently, al-Jolani turned his attention to Idlib, where he established himself and began forging key alliances with local communities. These alliances were reinforced through strategic marriages, including his marriage to a woman from the well-known Al-Badawi family. Her family connections were instrumental—one brother is a medical doctor, and another served as a military commander who greatly supported al-Jolani, both in military engagements and in winning the hearts of people in Idlib and northern Hama, particularly in areas like Halfaya and Taybat al-Imam.
Through such calculated moves, al-Jolani secured his position in Idlib, making it the stronghold of his vision and the base for his broader ambitions in Syria.
Al-Jolani as a Negotiator
Abu Mohammad al-Jolani is highly critical of negotiation processes, particularly those led by Russia. He has described efforts like the Constitutional Committee and the Astana talks as destructive and mere tools to condition acceptance of Bashar al-Assad. Al-Jolani firmly believes in military solutions, viewing political outcomes as mere consequences of battlefield victories. For him, every military gain translates into a political advantage.
Despite his ideology, al-Jolani employs a consultative approach in decision-making, surrounding himself with advisors known for their intellectual capabilities, albeit with clear Islamist leanings. However, he ultimately acts based on his own judgment, often disregarding others’ input if it contradicts his instincts.
His negotiation style is well-known: he starts with a rigid stance, then softens after leveraging his initial inflexibility to secure his objectives. This approach often culminates in a more flexible position and a conciliatory tone, suggesting a willingness to find a resolution. His negotiating tactics have drawn comparisons to a seasoned Damascene trader who knows how to navigate the marketplace.
The Turks, among others, have experienced this side of al-Jolani firsthand. They’ve found ways to reach mutually beneficial agreements with him, aligning their goals with his, under the understanding that he does not concede without compensation. He has openly expressed regret over allowing Turkish observation posts in Idlib, considering it a mistake since he believes he did not receive an equivalent return for his concessions.
Al-Jolani consistently declares that he will not join any initiative in which he was not a founding partner. He rejects projects imposed upon him for endorsement or compliance. This attitude extends to his relationship with Turkey, as he opposes their command-driven approach with Syrian factions. He also places immense emphasis on information security, adhering to the principle that knowledge is power and should not be shared freely.
Al-Jolani perceives his project as the primary defender of Sunni Arabs, positioning himself as their leader and protector. He insists that resolving the Syrian issue requires his presence at the negotiating table, representing Sunni Arabs as the majority population. He firmly believes that any settlement must align with the majority’s interests, and he is resolute in his conviction that he is now an indispensable part of the Syrian solution.
His Relationship with al-Qaeda
Though al-Jolani has acknowledged his group’s past association with al-Qaeda, he has decisively severed all ties with the organization. His actions have gone beyond mere dissociation—he has actively dismantled al-Qaeda’s remnants in Syria, not out of ideological opposition, but because the presence of such groups poses a threat to his organization’s influence, popularity, and authority as the representative of Syrian Sunnis.
Al-Jolani also believes that Western powers, including the U.S. and Europe, are not fundamentally opposed to his implementation of Sharia, which he claims is applied “moderately.” He cites the West’s previous acceptance of the Taliban’s application of Sharia as evidence. The primary Western concern, he asserts, is the potential for attacks on their interests abroad, a fear he has sought to alleviate through multiple assurances to the West.
Despite his evolving approach toward the West, al-Jolani’s animosity toward Iran and Shiites remains unwavering. He views curbing Shiite expansion as a central duty. The roots of his antipathy are debated—does it stem from his father’s nationalist ideals, or from his Salafi transformation and his firsthand experiences of Iran’s role in Iraq, which he witnessed closely?
Whatever the origin, al-Jolani continues to see himself as a bulwark against Iranian influence, combining military pragmatism with ideological conviction in his ongoing campaign against Shiite expansionism.
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham Today: A New Identity
Abu Mohammad al-Jolani takes immense pride in the Salvation Government, which he regards as superior to the Interim Government during the leadership of Abdurrahman Mustafa. He asserts that if a unified government were to be formed in northern Syria, it should be based on the Salvation Government. Al-Jolani believes that other factions, such as Faylaq al-Sham, may hold frontline positions but lack the vision and structure to form a functional government.
His unease over the creation of the National Front for Liberation in Idlib was evident. Al-Jolani rejected joining the coalition, dismissing it as a “Turkish drama series” designed to dissolve Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) into subservient factions aligned with Turkish interests, irrespective of Syrian priorities.
One of the most striking transformations within HTS has been the ideological shift among its military ranks. What was once a Salafi-jihadist organization in its core now reflects a more diluted identity. In 2014, approximately 90% of its fighters adhered to its strict ideological framework. Today, that number has dwindled to just 3%. This decline is attributed to HTS’s expansion strategy, which opened its doors to thousands of recruits without imposing strict ideological vetting.
However, this expansion came at a cost. By 2022, investigations revealed that out of 6,000 fighters, around 650 were found to be agents working for various external actors. This security breach underscores the pitfalls of rapid, unregulated growth within its ranks.
Since early 2022, HTS has evolved into what can be described as a multi-national enterprise, serving the interests of various powers involved in the Syrian conflict:
- United States: Leveraged HTS to eliminate groups like Hurras al-Din and ISIS.
- Russia: Utilized HTS for facilitating trade routes and supplying regime-held areas with essential goods, such as gas, sugar, fuel, foreign currency, and even laundering operations.
- Iranian Intelligence: Played a significant role in discrediting HTS as a Sunni Islamic faction.
- European Union: Used HTS as an intelligence asset to track and identify Western-origin ISIS or al-Qaeda migrants.
Economically, the region under HTS’s control has seen the emergence of a class of elite “emirs.” These individuals live extravagantly, driving luxury cars they replace monthly, residing in lavish mansions, and frequenting upscale malls. They enjoy gourmet cuisine while ordinary fighters and residents struggle. This stark inequality has contributed to dissatisfaction among HTS’s rank-and-file, with some driven to espionage for financial gain.
Those who view al-Jolani merely as a tool for external pressure misunderstand him. He envisions himself as the representative of Sunni Arabs and the leader of the largest and most organized opposition faction. This self-perception emboldens him to position himself as a potential alternative to Bashar al-Assad.
Al-Jolani’s successes against the Assad regime bring some relief to Syrians and solve parts of their crises, reinforcing his image as the de facto powerbroker on the ground. This contrasts starkly with the political opposition aligned with Turkey, whose failures have been glaring.
The coming days may reveal whether al-Jolani intends to send a symbolic message positioning himself as Assad’s replacement. The management of Aleppo, should HTS solidify its control there, will serve as a practical indicator of his ambitions and his capacity to realize them.
