As the world’s largest trading power, China can’t really care if merchant shipping is restricted on one of the most important sea routes. This is particularly true for the Red Sea: 60 percent of the products shipped from China to Europe usually go through the Suez Canal.
The Red Sea plays a crucial role in global trade, particularly connecting Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Here are some reasons why the Red Sea is important for global trade:
The Red Sea is an important shipping route connecting the Suez Canal with the Gulf of Aden. The Suez Canal allows shipping between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, creating a direct and shorter route for trade between Europe and Asia. Using the Suez Canal and the Red Sea significantly reduces travel time and distance compared to alternative sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope. This makes trading more efficient and economically attractive.
Additionally, the Red Sea’s location near the Middle East and Africa makes it an important hub for trade between these regions and other parts of the world. Many of the major ports along the Red Sea serve as transshipment points for goods shipped in various directions.
Especially in times of energy change due to global warming and the global consequences of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Red Sea is also crucial for the transport of energy. A significant portion of the world’s oil and gas trade passes through this region en route to global markets.
Since October 19, the Yemeni Houthi army, more or less under the control of the mullahs’ regime in Iran, has been using missiles and drones to attack ships there that they believe have a connection to Israel. In doing so, it is trying to put pressure on Tel Aviv in the Gaza war. 90 percent of the container ships that used to pass through here are now being rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of South Africa. This takes around ten days longer. Transporting a shipping container between Shanghai and European ports such as Rotterdam or Genoa now costs more than four times as much as it did before the attacks began.
While the Americans and British are attacking Houthi positions in Yemen and other countries are escorting civilian ships with warships, Beijing is content with diplomatic protest. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Beijing said they were seriously concerned about the escalation in the Red Sea. He pointed out that there is no UN Security Council mandate allowing any country to attack Yemen. This should be understood as a hidden criticism of the Americans.
However, China has neither the military capabilities nor the political will to become more involved in the Middle East. The country probably doesn’t want to take the risk of being drawn into the region’s conflicts. The Chinese navy’s assets in the region are limited. Overall, China’s capabilities for major military actions in the region have not yet been tested. The great distance to mainland China and the lack of sea and air transport capacities are limiting factors.
The fact that Beijing is holding back so much in the conflicts in the Middle East contradicts its own claim to transform the global security system. In 2022, party and state leader Xi Jinping launched the Global Security Initiative. The initiative aims to eliminate the causes of international conflicts, improve the global security architecture and thereby promote lasting peace and development in the world, according to a concept paper from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
The initiative implicitly opposes the world order led and dominated by the US. At the moment, however, it is probably still a pipe dream to fundamentally change this. China certainly has ambitions to play a larger role in the international security system. But at the moment it does not have the capacity to realize these ambitions.
In addition to free trade routes in the Middle East, China has other interests. The region is a pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative, the global infrastructure project that has the important goal of improving land and sea transport axes. Beijing, for example, has invested around eight billion dollars in Egypt and another ten billion in Saudi Arabia. Ports and energy projects are particularly on Beijing’s wish list, and the Middle East is also becoming increasingly important as a sales market.
Another problem is the Houthis’ connection to Iran. Greater Chinese protection of goods transport in the Red Sea could lead to tensions between Beijing and Tehran. China has significant influence on Iran, which extends to various areas. Beijing is one of Iran’s most important trading partners. The two countries have extensive trade agreements in various sectors, including energy, infrastructure, technology and agriculture. China imports oil and gas from Iran and invests in various Iranian projects, particularly under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Iran also has extensive oil and gas reserves, and China is one of the largest buyers of these resources. Both countries have concluded energy agreements that promote trade and cooperation in the energy sector. Beijing is investing in various infrastructure projects in Iran, including roads, railways, ports and energy facilities.
Beijing’s ability to exert pressure on the Houthis and Tehran is therefore more than limited, even if China buys 90 percent of the oil exported by Iran. If Beijing stopped these imports all at once, it would certainly jeopardize its long-term relations with Iran. But it could also be that the Chinese reticence is simply a cynical calculation. Beijing views the US-led maritime security task force as an opportunity to criticize Washington’s power in the region. China can place responsibility and blame on Washington for escalating the situation while claiming to behave responsibly by calling for stability and global peace.
All publishing rights and copyrights reserved to MENA Research Center.
