The decline of the Muslim Brotherhood continues across the Arab world and Europe, following the wave of transformations that the region witnessed after the Arab Spring. While the organization attempts to shift its activities to other countries in Asia and Africa, the available data indicates a reduced threat compared to previous years. The organization is now facing internal crises and splits, further pushing it out of the spotlight, particularly in the Arab region, with Egypt—its main stronghold and country of origin—at the forefront. It seems that the movement will require many years to recover what it has lost in both the Arab world and Europe.
In Europe, awareness of the MB’s potential danger to European societies, especially among Muslim immigrants, has grown. Consequently, the group’s activities and financial transactions are now under surveillance by intelligence agencies in several European countries. In Turkey, where many of the Brotherhood’s leaders live in exile, there is growing concern that they may be abandoned or used as bargaining chips in negotiations aimed at improving relations with European and Arab nations, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
This study sheds light on the latest developments surrounding the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world and Europe, examining the decline of its political and economic power. It also explores the future of the organization globally and its ability to sustain itself moving forward.
Deterioration Began in Egypt
In recent years, the MB in Egypt has faced a series of escalating crises, particularly in response to significant pressures from the Egyptian government. However, the organization has also struggled with growing internal challenges, amplifying its struggles as it continues to position itself as a political opposition group.
The Egyptian state has undoubtedly applied immense pressure on the MB. After the end of Hosni Mubarak’s era, and especially following the removal of Mohamed Morsi from office in 2013, the state sought alternative ways of dealing with the Brotherhood, now categorizing it as a terrorist organization. The government claims that the group has posed a threat to the state and has been a source of extremism and distorted social consciousness for over 90 years.
The organization has also been crippled by internal divisions since 2013, as it plunged into a structural crisis following its ousting from power. The resulting leadership divisions reached their peak in 2021, when the group split into two main factions, alongside various smaller groups. As its leadership moved abroad, problems with its internal structure became more pronounced.
In October 2021, Ibrahim Munir, the Deputy General Guide and acting leader of the Brotherhood, suspended the membership of six prominent leaders who had held executive positions in managing the organization abroad and coordinating with its Egyptian branch since the ousting of former President Mohamed Morsi in the summer of 2013. This internal conflict exacerbated the factionalism and structural fragmentation the Brotherhood had been experiencing for years, with new fronts and organizations emerging. However, none of the competing factions have managed to decisively settle the conflict in their favor.
The leadership conflicts within the MB have been particularly complex. While the historical leadership of the group claimed to have resolved disputes with the youth faction known as the “General Office Front” or “Reform Faction,” which formed as a result of disagreements over the group’s legitimacy and strategies in 2015 and 2016, under the leadership of acting General Guide Mahmoud Ezzat, the rifts reemerged by late 2020. This time, the discord arose within the historical leadership camp itself, which had controlled the Brotherhood for decades.
The historical leadership camp eventually split into two factions: the faction led by Ibrahim Munir, based in London, and the faction led by former General Secretary Mahmoud Hussein, based in Istanbul. Both sides claim exclusive organizational legitimacy, accusing the other of violating the Brotherhood’s long-standing traditions and committing breaches of its 2009 internal regulations.
Deterioration of Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen
In Yemen, the MB once emerged as a dominant political force within the government following the 2011 revolution. However, the situation has since shifted against the group, with many of its leaders now in exile.
The Brotherhood’s involvement in power began in the 1990s, when an agreement between former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and powerful tribal leader Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar allowed the latter to co-found the Islah Party. This Saudi-backed party was created to balance the influence of socialists in the newly unified Yemen, according to al-Ahmar’s biography.
Today, the Islah Party is experiencing one of its weakest periods, suffering from fragmentation, diminished leadership, and internal discord. As negotiations continue to end the war in Yemen, its primary ally, Saudi Arabia, is engaged in talks with its main adversary, the Houthis, leaving the Islah Party behind. Additionally, many of the party’s members are now living in exile. A significant number of its leaders reside in Turkey, while Yemen’s war nears its tenth year.
Exile in Turkey has had a dual effect on the party’s fortunes. It has weakened the group in Yemen while making it increasingly reliant on Turkey, the country that hosts its cadres and enables its continued existence. Today, the Islah Party is closely aligned with prominent figures in Turkey’s Islamic movement, particularly President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkey, under Erdoğan, has provided a haven for Islah leaders as well as some of their Yemeni political and military rivals.
However, members of the Islah Party in Turkey find themselves torn between their loyalty to Erdoğan’s regime and the domestic dynamics of the country, while also grappling with the party’s struggles in exile and the risk of slipping into irrelevance.
These concerns stem from Erdoğan’s approach, which has largely been opportunistic in his dealings with Islamic movements—embracing them for influence and discarding them when they become a liability. Since 2015, Turkey’s stance on Saudi and Emirati involvement in the Yemen war has fluctuated depending on its troubled relations with both nations. After the rift with Saudi Arabia and the UAE over the Qatar blockade in 2017, Erdoğan called for an end to the Yemen wars. When relations with Saudi King Salman improved, he condemned Iran’s role in the conflict.
Ankara’s political system is now working hard to restore its ties with Arab states. Given the evolving regional dynamics, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Egypt would push so far as to deprive the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates of one of their last safe havens. Instead, both Turkey and the Gulf nations appear to prefer allowing Islah and other Islamists to maintain a presence in Istanbul, where they can be more easily controlled when needed, compared to if they were based in a Western capital.
Meanwhile, regional Qatari funding for television channels sympathetic to the Brotherhood is decreasing. After easing tensions with Saudi Arabia, Qatar requested that Belqees TV—initially funded by Doha—tone down its coverage. In 2023, the channel laid off 20 employees and reduced its broadcasting schedule from 24 hours a day to a single broadcast period.
MB’s Luck in the Maghreb and Libya
In Tunisia, much like in Egypt, the MB has faced significant setbacks. The movement failed to offer credible economic alternatives, resorting instead to old tactics like mass recruitment of its followers into government administrations. Perhaps more damaging was the public’s disappointment when they realized that the religious leaders they had hoped would bring integrity and honesty to power were not immune to material wealth.
The experience in Tunisia demonstrated that the MB’s embrace of electoral democracy was a tactical move rather than a genuine endorsement. Once in power, the group revealed a stark contrast between its rhetoric and its actions. The organization’s long-term goal remained unchanged: the re-Islamization of societies that, in their view, were not sufficiently Islamic, as they imitated the West, which venerates the state.
Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement (the Brotherhood’s affiliate), has been sentenced to three years in prison and fined in connection with his party’s acceptance of foreign donations. A Tunisian court ruled that both Ghannouchi and his son-in-law, former Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalem Bouchlaka, serve three years in prison after being found guilty of receiving foreign funding.
In 2023, Tunisian authorities banned meetings at all Ennahda offices and closed the headquarters of the Salvation Front, an opposition coalition that serves as the political face of the Islamist movement. Ghannouchi, who has been imprisoned since April 2023, faces multiple charges, including those related to terrorism and conspiracy against state security. The Tunisian judiciary has issued three detention orders against him.
In Libya, the MB’s trajectory has also been fraught with challenges. After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the group initially gained influence, especially through its political arm, the Justice and Construction Party. However, as Libya’s civil conflict dragged on and external actors became more involved, the Brotherhood struggled to maintain its footing. The group has been marginalized in the face of a more complex political landscape dominated by military factions, tribal alliances, and the influence of foreign powers such as Egypt and the UAE, both of which are hostile to the Brotherhood.
In both Tunisia and Libya, the MB’s attempts to project itself as a legitimate political force have floundered. Their inability to address pressing economic issues and the growing public perception that they were more interested in consolidating power than in governing with integrity have led to widespread disenchantment. Consequently, the MB’s influence across the Maghreb continues to wane, as public trust diminishes and regional governments crack down on their activities.
Europe is No Longer a Safe Haven for the Muslim Brotherhood
Europe is increasingly tightening restrictions on the MB, with many politicians raising alarms about the group’s secretive nature and its activities. On May 10, 2024, French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin described the Muslim Brotherhood as an “evil organization.” He noted that while the group does not engage in violent jihad, it employs “softer methods… to gradually lead all segments of society into the Islamic matrix.”
Darmanin’s comments appeared to have the backing of President Emmanuel Macron, who has tasked the Ministry of the Interior with preparing a report on the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. The ministry’s statement highlighted that “Islamic separatism is a theoretical political-religious project…aimed at building a counter-society,” and the Muslim Brotherhood plays a central role in promoting this ideology.
Darmanin aims for the report to serve as a “wake-up call” to the Brotherhood’s tactics. He pointed out that the group infiltrates various areas of society, creating networks in fields such as sports, education, healthcare, justice, student organizations, trade unions, NGOs, politics, associations, and culture. “They provide voting instructions, support community businesses, use anti-France rhetoric, launch petitions, surround local elected officials, and sign economic partnerships with major brands,” Darmanin explained.
One of the Brotherhood’s most successful achievements, according to Darmanin, has been the introduction of a new term to Western discourse: Islamophobia. He noted that when students arrived at school in September wearing Islamic attire, it was a direct challenge to France’s secular laws. This challenge, he said, was distorted by some to portray Muslims as victims.
Darmanin’s remarks were welcomed by experts on the MB, such as Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, who has been studying the group for three decades and now requires police protection. In her 2023 book on the Brotherhood, she wrote, “Their goal is not to adapt Islam to Europe, but to adapt Europe to Islam.”
Austria banned the MB in 2021, but no other European country has followed suit. Darmanin admitted that banning the group in France is “simply impossible” due to its secretive nature and lack of a clear hierarchical structure. He stressed that what is needed is a “European awakening” and expressed satisfaction in seeing this happening in Germany and Sweden.
In addition to growing restrictions, the MB has lost several influential leaders in recent years. Among them were Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who passed away in 2022, and Ibrahim Munir, the acting Supreme Guide of the group who lived in London and died recently. Al-Qaradawi was particularly active in promoting political Islam through his religious and political speeches, often broadcast on Qatar’s Al Jazeera network, and played a crucial role in rallying support for the Brotherhood, especially during the Arab Spring. His death, alongside Munir’s, has weakened the group’s leadership and diminished its prominence on the global stage.
Does Muslim Brotherhood Still Pose a Threat?
To assess the global power of this organization, a recent study analyzed the political and security strength of the Muslim Brotherhood, along with its economic, media, and social influence. According to researchers from the “Trends” Research and Advisory in Abu Dhabi, the University of Montreal, and the academic platform “Pluralism” that focuses on Islam, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which stood at 64% in 2021, decreased to 49.3% in 2022 and further declined to 48% in 2023.
Despite this decline, the Muslim Brotherhood still maintains branches in several countries around the world, reflecting its widespread influence and regional presence. In Jordan, the Brotherhood retains a strong and influential presence, with the Islamic Action Front, its political arm, being one of the largest opposition parties. In Gaza, the group is prominently represented by Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip and is rooted in the Brotherhood’s ideology.
The Brotherhood also maintains a tangible organizational and political presence through the Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait, which participates in the political and parliamentary life of the country. In Libya, the group has influence through the Justice and Construction Party, which is part of the internationally recognized government in Tripoli. However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in Libya has waned due to the ongoing political changes in the country. After the Libyan revolution, the Brotherhood became politically active through the Justice and Construction Party, but it now faces significant challenges due to the ongoing conflicts between various factions and the differing regional support.
The Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, which is supported by Turkey and Qatar, stands alongside the Brotherhood, in contrast to the support provided by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Russia to the eastern-based government. The Brotherhood in Libya also faces challenges in maintaining unity among its ranks and its popular base amidst the political and armed conflicts gripping the country. Additionally, the military and political gains made by forces in eastern Libya have contributed to the Brotherhood’s diminishing influence in certain regions.
In Algeria, the group is present through the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), which participates in the political process. Following the Arab Spring, Islamist movements in Algeria experienced some growth in political influence. However, similar to other countries in the region, there has been a struggle between Islamist and secular parties, with the latter receiving support from foreign states. In Algeria, the government has resisted the Brotherhood’s influence, leading to restrictions on their activities.
Conclusions:
- The future of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East and North Africa is marked by several aspects related to the internal and external challenges it faces. Currently, Egypt’s administration, led by President Sisi, views the Brotherhood as a significant threat, tightening measures against it.
- Under these circumstances, the Brotherhood faces significant difficulties in reorganizing its leadership structure, recruiting new members, and enhancing its capacity for mass mobilization.
- The organization still maintains branches in various other countries, such as Jordan, Palestine (Gaza), Kuwait, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and Sudan.
- The Brotherhood is actively seeking safe havens, including the Balkans and Afghanistan. However, while these locations may provide some protection and space for spreading extremist ideas, they do not compensate for the strategic importance of being present in key capitals like those in Europe, Turkey, or Arab countries, where the Brotherhood ultimately aims to seize control of power.
