Decoding China’s Global Strategy: An Expert Interview

China is one of the major countries in the world and basically challenging the United States. We all remember that pivot to Asia of Obama administration, we see that the current administration also is pretty much preoccupied with the Asian region, Asian Pacific region, but how could you describe in general terms Beijing’s foreign policy and foreign policy approach?

Beijing’s foreign policy has a long-standing tradition, which has experienced relatively few changes throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China. Initially, Mao Zedong established key guidelines, followed by Deng Xiaoping’s principle that China should avoid provoking conflicts and instead adopt a mild approach to garner global favour.

This approach became the cornerstone of China’s current policy, characterised by the nation’s expansion of influence abroad primarily through soft power. Upon assuming the presidency, Xi Jinping launched a significant initiative known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This project aims to engage countries worldwide, including those in Africa, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe, by providing assistance in developing their infrastructure through Chinese loans.

However, the BRI has distinct features. Firstly, it often requires loyalty to Chinese political agendas, both domestically and internationally. Secondly, it typically lacks political conditionality for the recipient countries. Thirdly, there are concerns worldwide about its debt policy. While China provides loans and assistance, it is intolerant of delinquent payments. Consequently, countries facing difficulties in repayment may encounter Chinese assertiveness, potentially resulting in the appropriation of state and sovereign assets as payment for debts.

Indeed, China has been notably active in Africa, implementing this approach of providing loans to different countries without necessarily adhering to democratic standards. And how actually Beijing sees the United States, because we know that the United States sees China as a main rival somehow, but how does Xi Jinping sees Biden administration and in general terms, the United States?

Indeed, the pivot of the American presence in Asia was a crucial aspect of the relationship between China and the United States. At that time, Xi Jinping and China seemed prepared for negotiations, with a notable historical anecdote recounting Xi’s remark to President Obama that the Pacific Ocean was vast enough for both nations.

However, the dynamic shifted dramatically following President Trump’s election. Trump’s unpredictable nature and assertive behaviour posed challenges for the Chinese government and establishment. His scrutiny of Chinese exports, subsidies to local producers, and other issues prompted China to respond, leading to the introduction of the so-called Wolf Warrior policy.

The Wolf Warrior policy, characterised by assertive and sometimes confrontational statements towards the American and European establishments, backfired in some respects. While many countries, particularly in the UN, were closely monitoring China’s economic activities, the policy’s aggressive stance caused relations to deteriorate.

This tension was exemplified by a significant scandal between the European Parliament and China, where European parliamentarians faced sanctions from China. Additionally, the failure of an investment agreement was a consequence of strained relations with Europe, which were intertwined with dealings with the United States, as Europe sought to navigate the demands of the Trump administration.

Similarly, with Huawei and its 5G technology, the situation is complex. Huawei offered technology at a significantly lower cost compared to other providers. However, the United States raised concerns about potential national security threats associated with Huawei’s technology, a stance that many European countries adopted. In Beijing, there is a perception that Washington is the primary instigator of these troubles.

Nevertheless, Beijing continues to offer Europe opportunities for close economic relations, despite the European Commission labelling China as a systemic rival. European leaders maintain communication with the Chinese administration, driven by both economic interests and the necessity to engage with China on global issues such as climate change, where China plays a constructive role.

We may witness this dynamic during Chancellor Scholz’s visit to China. Additionally, maintaining contact with China is important regarding global matters, including the situation in Ukraine.

Since you’ve mentioned Ukraine, let’s discuss China’s position regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war. Beijing de facto supports Russia, even though it played a positive role in signalling Moscow about the unacceptability of using nuclear weapons. Where do we stand now? How have things evolved since 2022?

So, Beijing de facto supported Russia and continues to do so, despite previously playing a constructive role in signalling Moscow about the unacceptable nature of using nuclear weapons. In 2022, during the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, there was Russian blackmail regarding the potential use of nuclear assets in Ukraine. China, among other stakeholders, exerted pressure on Russia, stating that such actions were unacceptable.

However, the current Chinese position regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war emphasises China’s disinterest in any violation of the non-proliferation regime or the taboo on using nuclear weapons. This stance is motivated not only by concern for humanity but also by the risk of a chain reaction. China fears that the use of tactical nuclear weapons by one party could prompt other nations, such as South Korea and Japan, to become nuclear states, exacerbating regional tensions. India, for instance, cited the Chinese nuclear threat as justification for its own nuclear program.

Therefore, China remains committed to preventing any actions that could lead to nuclear attacks and subsequent chain reactions. Regarding support for Russia, while there is often talk of a strategic partnership between China and the Russian Federation, China has not aligned itself with the policy of the G7 states towards Russia and maintains contact with Moscow. However, some Chinese banks refrain from close cooperation with Russia due to concerns about secondary sanctions.

And, finally, regarding the strategic partnership between China and Russia, it’s important to note that Chinese strategic documents do not explicitly define such a partnership. Therefore, when China declares a partnership with Russia, it’s clearly pursuing its own interests.

In this regard, China’s interest lies in neither a strong nor a weak Russia. China benefits from Russia’s situation under European sanctions, as it explores alternative routes and markets, which China can leverage for its own gain. Additionally, China doesn’t want Russia to suffer defeat in the war, as it understands that a defeated Russia might align more closely with the West, depriving China of the opportunity to utilise Russia.

This approach reflects a long-term strategy, characterised by what some term “pro-Russian neutrality.” However, China’s stance may evolve depending on developments in the conflict. If there are signs of a resolution influenced by China, it may become more active to demonstrate its influence. Conversely, if there is no indication of progress or compromise, China may refrain from involvement to avoid association with potential failure, as it typically avoids initiatives that could lead to unfavourable outcomes.

By the way, there has been recent information indicating that China is one of the largest, if not the largest, suppliers of necessary equipment for Russia’s armament production and microchip manufacturing. It seems they are leveraging this situation in Russia, where there is a demand for such materials, which are difficult for Moscow to obtain. Simultaneously, China is assisting Russia in maintaining its production capabilities.

This dynamic appears to be intertwined with relations with the European Union as well. China’s support for Russia not only strengthens ties between the two nations but also provides China with leverage in negotiations with the EU. Essentially, if the EU were to ease sanctions on Chinese companies and increase trade with China, China could potentially be more cooperative on the issue of Ukraine, which is of significance to Europe.

Therefore, it’s not just about the bilateral relations between Russia and China; it’s about the dynamics within the triangular relationship involving the EU, Russia, and China.

Thank you for clarifying this issue. But let’s jump to the Middle East, where Saudi Arabia is looking to diversify its partnerships. China has recently facilitated reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. What is Beijing’s game in that region? How can its position regarding the Hamas-Israel conflict be explained?

Firstly, when discussing Saudi-Chinese relations, it’s essential to recognise that while Saudi Arabia is a major producer of oil and gas, China ranks among the world’s top consumers of these resources. This mutual dependency explains China’s keen interest in the region, particularly its relations with Saudi Arabia.

The relationship between China and Saudi Arabia is notable, with certain nuances influenced by American interests. As a significant partner of Saudi Arabia, the United States often considers the political landscape in the kingdom. There have been instances where Washington rejected Saudi requests for assistance, such as in the case of drones. China, on the other hand, was willing to fulfil these requests, providing what Saudi Arabia needed.

Another aspect is the utilisation of 5G technology in Saudi Arabia’s flagship initiative, the City of Neom, spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS). China offered Huawei technology, which was accepted by the Saudi prince. This exchange underscores the close ties between the two nations, as evidenced by frequent visits by MBS to Beijing and Chinese officials to Saudi Arabia.

China also played a role in fostering reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, showcasing its position as a global player. This involvement was a long-term strategy, with China monitoring developments in the region and intervening when it saw an opportunity for success.

It’s important to note that China doesn’t have strategic partners in the traditional sense. Therefore, it can maintain relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran, as another important supplier for China, factors into China’s considerations, particularly regarding fuel for its development. China’s policy in the region is driven by its desire for stable prices. However, if there is a shift in demand, potentially due to increased supplies from the Russian Federation, China may reassess its approach in the region.

Still, I believe that the concept of prestige holds significance for Beijing, and successfully mediating conflicts contributes to this notion of prestige. Indeed, recent instances of conflict mediation are viewed as elements enhancing Beijing’s prestige.

Regarding the peace plan for Ukraine, there’s debate about whether it was brokered by Turkey or China. Regardless, the plan’s details and origins are not the focus here. Expanding on this topic, examining Chinese involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations reveals a significant growth. In the 1990s, only five Chinese officers served in such missions. Presently, this number has risen to approximately 2,500. Additionally, in 2021, Xi Jinping pledged that China could deploy up to 8,000 soldiers if necessary. China ranks as the second-largest contributor to financing peacekeeping operations, trailing only the United States.

While many of these peacekeeping efforts are concentrated in countries where China has direct interests and foreign investments, they also seek to contribute positively, particularly garnering favour among nations in the Global South.

Could you elaborate a bit more on the 16+1 initiative you mentioned earlier and the interests Beijing is pursuing through it? Also, what methods is China using to influence and support its policies, as well as leverage its influence within these countries? Lastly, how do the countries involved in the initiative generally view Beijing and its objectives in this context?

The initiative itself was an endeavour _by the Chinese government to foster cooperation with the region as a whole, rather than with individual countries within the region. However, many of my colleagues from countries participating in the initiative — such as those from the Baltics, the Visegrád Group, the Western Balkans, as well as Romania and Bulgaria — complain that while there were numerous promises made, there have been relatively few tangible results on the Chinese side.

This is because China’s primary interest lies in Western Europe, which represents a lucrative market and a significant field for cooperation. As a result, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states are of lesser importance in Chinese foreign policy considerations. Nonetheless, China has established various instruments to finance projects in the Central European states. The key among them is the CEE Fund, created specifically to finance projects within the 16+1 initiative. Another notable instrument is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which wields considerably more influence than the CEE Fund due to its substantially larger funding capacity, amounting to hundreds of billions of euros.

Some countries, particularly those in the Western Balkans with a focus on Serbia, have benefited from these instruments. Hungary, situated in our immediate neighbourhood, has also been a recipient of such funding, albeit to a lesser extent. Additionally, there have been projects financed in Romania and Poland, despite both states proclaiming to be key allies of the United States in the region.

However, in recent years, particularly after 2022, there has been a notable shift in the dynamics of the initiative. Romania rejected Chinese proposals in favor of American alternatives for projects such as the Cernavodă nuclear power plant and prohibited the participation of Chinese company Huawei in the development of its 5G network. Similarly, Poland declined Chinese proposals to contribute to an airport hub near Warsaw.

The most significant decline has been in the relations between Lithuania and China. Lithuania, formerly part of the initiative, has since withdrawn. This withdrawal is primarily due to Lithuania’s increased investment in relations with Taiwan, which is considered a sensitive issue for China. China tends to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of other states without conditions, but it adamantly opposes any interference in what it perceives as its internal affairs, including matters concerning Taiwan. Consequently, Lithuania’s efforts to develop relations with Taiwan have strained bilateral relations with China.

Currently, diplomatic relations between Lithuania and China are at a standstill, with no ambassadors exchanged between the two countries. This sudden decline underscores the complexities and challenges within the 16+1 initiative.

We still observe some inertia in project financing, with several projects nearing completion, such as the Belgrade-Budapest railway, which China co-sponsored. However, there has been a decline in relations between China, and Central European states. I believe that policymakers in both Beijing and Central European capitals will reassess the priority of this dimension in their policies.

_And somehow, since you mentioned 2022, I believe, maybe you correct me, so the Russo-Ukrainian war and the Chinese approach to this war also have had some part of influence on the grading of relations and the grading of the level of the cooperation within this project. Am I correct?

Yes, we cannot overlook the impact of this engagement, particularly on the perception of China. Despite declarations regarding the importance of adhering to the UN Charter, China’s alignment with Moscow and ongoing communication with Putin has been a red line for many Central European states. These states view Russia as a clear and obvious threat and, to put it mildly, do not comprehend the necessity of maintaining contact with Putin.

And there’s also, since at the beginning of our conversation, it was mentioned that the Chinese were and still are quite active in Africa in terms of rare minerals, maybe you could tell a few words also about it? And how do the Chinese work to get those rare earth minerals?

Well, first and foremost, we must recognise that this is a long-term strategy, which also involves the EU as a significant player. The European decision to prioritise green transition has fuelled the demand for alternative energy sources, which in turn has heightened the importance of rare earth materials.

China anticipated this scenario, as evidenced by its strict control over rare material sources within its territory for the past 30 years, effectively establishing a state monopoly on production. Additionally, China has invested heavily in other countries that possess such resources. Regarding Africa, trade with the continent amounts to approximately 200 billion per year, with notable turnover, such as the 10 billion figure with Ukraine, which stands out as one of the highest among individual countries in Ukraine’s trade portfolio.

Moreover, there are approximately 10,000 Chinese companies registered in African countries, underscoring China’s significant presence on the continent. Furthermore, China holds considerable influence over the processing of rare earth materials, with 60% of production occurring within its borders and up to 80% of processing companies registered in China.

While the monopoly is showing signs of decline due to increased exploration and production in countries like the United States, Myanmar, Australia, and India, China maintains a dominant share in the global market. As the demand for green transition intensifies, Chinese influence is poised to grow further, setting the stage for a long-term strategic competition between the EU, China, and the United States.

I understand. _And where do they extract those minerals? What are the regions or countries where they extract those minerals, the Chinese companies?

Well, there is significant interest from many countries in Africa, with Nigeria being particularly noteworthy. Additionally, Chinese presence along the eastern coast of Africa is evident, exemplified by the Chinese military base in Djibouti, underscoring China’s strategic interest in the region.

While the main production of rare earth materials is indeed in China itself, the issue also pertains to the processing of these materials. It’s worth noting that all the companies and enterprises involved in the processing are located in mainland China.

And _since you have just mentioned the Chinese base in Djibouti, could you explain what is the exact purpose of that base, because it is the only overseas base that the Chinese have? What do they need this base for?

I wouldn’t characterise China’s involvement in Africa as intending to conduct any sort of intervention operation. From China’s perspective, it’s primarily about economic interests rather than geopolitical ambitions.

A significant example of Chinese infrastructure projects in the region is the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, which is one of the main initiatives under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This railway project costs billions of dollars and represents a substantial portion of both Ethiopia’s and Djibouti’s national budgets. Its construction serves the interests of the Chinese BRI, facilitating the transportation of goods between China and Africa.

The profitability of such infrastructure projects depends largely on Beijing’s demand for goods transported through the railway. If there is a demand, it becomes economically viable, enabling Djibouti and Ethiopia to repay their debts.

Furthermore, the need for security presence in the region is essential to safeguard these investments. While there is speculation about balancing Russian interests, particularly given the presence of Russian private military companies, it’s important to note that China’s primary concern is ensuring the security of its business ventures and the safety of Chinese citizens working in Africa.

This strategy is similar to China’s approach in Pakistan, where the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a significant regional project. The presence of Chinese security services in Pakistan is aimed at protecting Chinese citizens and property, highlighting the priority of safeguarding economic interests.

The US-China rivalry seems only to accelerate with the US losing influence worldwide. How do you see the future of Chinese influence and position evolve in Europe and the Middle East? It’s indeed a speculative question, but let’s try to envision a possible scenario for how things could evolve.

Four years ago, there was widespread belief that China’s economic growth trajectory would continue, positioning it as an attractive partner for countries worldwide, including many in Europe. Even Italy expressed interest in participating in Chinese initiatives, and China has already secured significant shares in European ports such as Thessaloniki in Greece, Trieste, Rotterdam, and has expressed interest in obtaining shares in Hamburg.

However, the COVID-19 pandemic proved to be a black swan event for the Chinese economy, leading to a decline in economic growth and exposing vulnerabilities in global supply chains. This setback significantly impacted China’s initial plans, particularly regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Initially, the BRI was projected to receive support of about $2 trillion for its development. However, economic challenges and the pandemic have led to delays and slowdowns in BRI projects and processes. In response, China is exploring different approaches. While maintaining interest in EU relations, China is increasingly investing in relationships with the growing Global South, including countries in Africa and Latin America.

Furthermore, there has been a shift in focus within the BRI towards smaller projects supported by Chinese brands. Previously, the BRI was primarily co-financed or co-sponsored by the Ministry of Economics, but now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken on a more prominent role in deciding which countries receive grants for infrastructure projects. This shift has political implications, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also a member of the Chinese Politburo, indicating a strengthening of its influence. Consequently, smaller projects supported by grants could have broader political consequences.

In light of these developments, China closely monitors American politics and prepares for various scenarios, including the possibility of the United States withdrawing from the global stage or adopting assertive policies. China is adaptable, seeking to secure its position as a global player or focusing on regional dynamics depending on the prevailing circumstances.

Taiwan is a huge issue and there were a lot of speculations and ambiguity coming from the West and China. What is current Beijing’s approach towards Taiwan?

China has never ruled out such a possibility because it considers Taiwan to be an integral part of its territory. Xi Jinping himself once stated that Taiwan will reunify with mainland China within his lifetime. However, as some European scholars have pointed out, Xi Jinping appears to be in good health, suggesting that this reunification may not occur in the immediate future.

Recently, there was a project on trends and scenarios for the international system in the coming years. Most of my colleagues who were interviewed regarding Chinese issues, including Taiwan, assured us that we shouldn’t expect any significant developments by 2030. Therefore, we have at least a couple of years to find solutions. China is still experiencing growth, and it is unlikely to jeopardise this economic progress for the sake of a small, victorious war, given the potential consequences that would inevitably follow.

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