Given the direct Iranian air attack on Israel, we interviewed Emmanuel Dupuy, President of the „Institut Prospective et Sécurité en Europe“ (IPSE), to discuss this issue and the future of the Middle East. The interview was conducted by French analyst and consultant Denys Kolesnyk on 15 April 2024, with details added on 17 April.
The security climate in the Middle East has drastically _deteriorated since the Hamas attack on Israel. And it is possible that the region could be on the brink of a major war after this attack . What measures do you think all the regional and international players should take to avoid the worst?
First of all, they should talk to each other again and return to the negotiating table to try to find a modus operandi, if not a consensus. In any case, in order not to aggravate the situation, the Security Council should be used, as a meeting was held there yesterday at the invitation of the delegation from Malta, which is chairing the UNSC in April, where the international community has unanimously criticised Iran’s actions.
This can also be seen at the level of the Gulf Cooperation Council, since all its member countries have been impacted in one way or another, with some giving Israel greater support than others. Whether within the Arab League or in some of its member countries, Egypt and Jordan have participated – directly in the case of Jordan, and more indirectly in the case of Egypt – in the defence of Israeli airspace.
A new Middle East is emerging.
We had a foretaste of this with the Abraham Agreement in October 2020, when a number of countries sought to normalise their relations with Israel. We have seen, de facto, how this cooperation has been put in place, with the convergence of the partnership between Jordan, Egypt the United Arab Emirates, and to a lesser extent Bahrain. It is a little excessive to claim that this is absolute. They positioned themselves in relation to the attack by closing their airspace, allowing British, French, American and Israeli aircraft to fly over, and even intercepting drones themselves during the attack on Saturday and Sunday. What’s more, although Saudi Arabia has not – yet – signed the Abraham Accords, it seems to be moving towards stabilising, or at least significantly improving, its relations with the State of Israel. This does not, however, question the beginning, albeit in its infancy, of dialogue between Riyadh and Teheran, at China’s facilitation.
So what happens now? We will have to find a way of restoring the balance that existed before 7 October and 12 April.
It will be a question of rediscovering a fragile asymmetrical balance, below the threshold of conflict, which will ultimately bring us back to the situation before 7 October 2023. It is important to bear in mind that the Iranian attack on Israel on 12 April was linked – indirectly – to the operation carried out by Hamas on 7 October against the State of Israel, thus disrupting the regional order, with armed groups acting more offensively and at a much higher intensity than in the past. Iran, along with countries that support it or are its partners, notably Syria, and de facto part of Yemen, under the yoke of the Houthi militias, have allied themselves against the State of Israel, as have a number of Sunni Arab countries since its creation.
So there is a new reality to bear in mind. Iran once again sees itself as the Gordian knot in what it calls the “axis of resistance” to the State of Israel, and on the other side, the Western countries see themselves as Israel’s unfailing partners, facing up to this bellicose front of the Resistance against it. Paradoxically, things are quite simple.
The Iranian regime is seeking strategic autonomy linked to a military nuclear programme that most of the world’s countries are trying to halt, with offensives carried out indirectly by so-called ‘proxies’: the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias, the Yemeni Houthis, and for the past two days now, directly against the State of Israel. This is the worrying new aspect: not only is this the largest drone operation ever launched against a country, with almost 185 armed drones, 36 cruise missiles and 103 ballistic missiles, but it is also a paradox that this operation, which represents almost 99% according to Israeli figures, or more likely between 95% and 85%, has been halted.
To sum up, it’s important to say that we are in a situation where the leadership of all the countries is required, intelligent leadership that will enable everyone to return to the negotiating table in order to return to the situation that existed before 7 October. Everyone must, according to their means, strive to eradicate the armed terrorist groups, first and foremost Daesh, which threaten the security not only of Iran but also of other countries such as Israel, as well as the ability of the international community to remain relevant in the convergent struggle of 82 nations engaged against the Islamic State.
What is also noteworthy since the attack of 12-13 April is the return of the United States as the “hegemon” of the region, something that was not evident just a few months ago, as well as a questioning of the growing role of Russia in the region, which had played on the disappearance of the United States to try to counter the American position. However, Russia was somewhat hesitant in this situation; it could not support Iran, nor criticise it, given the military and economic rapprochement linked to the “orientalisation” of the Russian war economy since 24 February 2022, but neither could it defend the State of Israel, supported by Western countries. So it found itself in a delicate position.
Moreover, Turkey is increasingly weakened, especially its President since his landslide defeat in the municipal elections last month. He is now concentrating on stabilising his domestic situation and is much less inclined to give lessons, whether to his NATO partners or to his neighbours, notably Syria, Lebanon and Israel.
And how would you explain the fact that the attack was also launched from Syria and Iraq, for instance from countries that are de facto not part of this war, but which may de jure become co-belligerents if a war ever breaks out? Secondly, how can we explain the position of Jordan and Saudi Arabia regarding the fact that they shot down the missiles and drones launched by Iran?
Iraq is undoubtedly the priority, or should be the priority, of the international community for several reasons. The main one is that Iraq is caught between two strategies, between two sponsorships and between two subordinations. On the one hand, there is the Western presence, American and French, as well as the Western troops still present, British, Italian and those who have left, following the example of the German and Canadian forces, to train the Iraqi special forces and artillery, which orientates Iraq towards Washington. The proof of this is that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Al Sudani, was present in Washington at the time of the attack.
But at the same time, the Iraqi political regime is also looking towards Iran, given that some of its political leaders are Shia, like Mohamed Al Sudani and the religious leader Muqtada al-Sadr. What’s more, the powerful Shia militias, Hachd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Forces) and Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), which previously fired on American and French military installations, prompting France to take part in the raid from its bases in Iraq and Jordan, particularly the 4 Rafales jets which are taking part in the fight against the Islamic State as part of Operation Chammal, bear witness to this Iranian influence. In a way, Iraq is caught in the crossfire, and Iran is playing on this situation.
One might legitimately wonder why the Iranian drones were not shot down as soon as they left Iranian territory. One might have thought that if Iraq had been completely stabilised since 2004, it would have been a potential ally against Iran. That’s my first point.
Secondly, Iraq and Syria have become proto-states that follow the Iranian agenda. This is particularly true for Syria, but less so for Iraq, for the reasons I mentioned earlier. We could also include Yemen, although it has split into several factions, including the Islamic State in the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab forces fighting the Houthis, notably Saudi, Sudanese and Emirati, and the Houthi militias themselves.
This means that there is not necessarily a mobilised front around Iran, but rather points of support that Iran can use to its advantage. The presence of 25,000 Revolutionary Guards (IRCG) in Syria, including the powerful and feared Al-Quds Brigade, is the best proof of this. It is important to note that Syria has changed considerably since 2011, becoming fragmented and more Shia with the arrival of settlers from Iran and Pakistan, which has profoundly altered support for the Alawite regime of President Bashar al-Assad. As a result, Syria and southern Lebanon are areas of direct confrontation between Iran, via the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah militias, and the State of Israel.
Therefore, the question arises on two levels: should we continue to weaken Bashar al-Assad’s regime or find ways to make it less dependent on Iran? Similarly, is there an urgent need to stabilise the political situation in Lebanon in order to weaken Hezbollah?
The United States have expressed an “ironclad” support for Israel, and we have seen that the Americans, along with the French and Germans, have helped the Israelis to shoot down Iranian missiles and drones. However, it seems that the White House has dissuaded Tel Aviv from retaliating. What do you think the American arguments might be, and would avoiding retaliation be a good strategy?
It is difficult to say with any certainty. At present, heated discussions are taking place within the Israeli war cabinet. Some members want an immediate response, while others prefer to wait. Some advocate a direct military response, while others opt for a hybrid approach. Some believe that there is no need to retaliate, considering that Iran has been weakened. Some even envisage taking advantage of the situation to further weaken or even overthrow the Iranian regime. Finally, some believe that it is crucial to listen to the Americans, as they will need Washington’s support and vice versa.
Psychologically, Israeli politicians, who faced two massive attacks on 7 October last year and a few days ago for several hours, are inclined to fight back. However, it is important to remember that this in no way justifies the operation carried out by Israel on 1 April in Syria. Although it was described as a strike on a diplomatic building (in reality, the annexe of the Iranian Consulate in Damascus), it nonetheless provoked an Iranian reaction, undoubtedly more massive than the Israeli and American services would have thought.
Without this attack, there would likely have been no retaliation from Iran. However, I am not here to judge the appropriateness of eliminating the commander of the Al-Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon, General Reza Zahedi. If the Israelis did it, they probably had good reasons to do so.
One of the reasons given is the suspicion or the accumulation of evidence suggesting that the Revolutionary Guards are transferring weapons to the West Bank to create a second front, after Gaza, in a possible operation this month from the Palestinian territories on the West Bank of the Jordan.
For the moment, nothing has been decided. From Washington’s point of view, there is no good solution, but the best would obviously be to wait for the elections on 5 November.
I think that’s the main thing to bear in mind: neither the current administration nor the next one wants the Palestinian question, the Israeli-Iranian question or even the Ukrainian question to interfere with their agenda, which is above all a domestic agenda. So we need to talk to the Americans.
President Donald Trump talks about a powerful America, but above all, he wants that power to be domestic so that it can then radiate out into the world. So I don’t think that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump have any interest in the American armed forces being at war and even less in American soldiers returning to American soil in coffins. That’s the first point.
Secondly, I also believe that the Americans have no great interest today in weakening the Iranian regime. They have an interest in limiting or slowing down its nuclear potential, which they are doing through sanctions and by letting the Israelis exert maximum pressure on Iran’s nuclear research programme. But they have no interest in seeing the Iranian regime fall, for a number of reasons.
If the current Iranian regime was to fall, it is by no means certain that the democrats or liberals would win in Tehran. In fact, it is almost certain that this would not be the case, but rather alternative forces that would not necessarily be allied to the Americans. You understand that the Mullahs’ regime is not an ally, but at least we know who we’re talking to. And in a way, the dialogue has been going on for 30 years now. It is complicated, but it does exist, particularly since the first easing of sanctions in 2006.
Thirdly, I think it is particularly important to bear in mind that Prime Minister Netanyahu is facing extremely strong internal pressure. Not a day goes by without demonstrations outside the Knesset, not a day without opposition politicians such as Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett, both former prime ministers, or Benny Gantz, former defence minister and most influential member of the War Council, calling for early elections to change the political configuration and weaken the Likud and, above all, the nationalist parties.
But that was before the attack. Because obviously, after 7 October, a national consensus was created. Since the attack several days ago, no one wants to question the legitimacy of the current Prime Minister, temporarily or otherwise. So all these factors mean that, for the time being, Israel will probably only respond symbolically.
Israel does not want to enter a new phase where until now it has been able to control attacks carried out by proxies, a few rockets fired by Hezbollah, a controlled action by Hamas until 7 October, which has grown in scale since 7 October. And the worst thing of all would be if, in the end, there were no longer indirect attacks by Israel on Iran, where Iran targeted Israel, but direct attacks. In that case, we would be entering a conflict that would lead to a threshold being crossed and to a regional war. And I don’t think it’s in the interests of Israel, Iran or the United States.
So there will undoubtedly be a strike, or at least a symbolic retaliation. What kind of strike will it be? There are several options. Firstly, there are 25,000 members of the Revolutionary Guards in Syria who could not be hit. So they won’t be striking Iranian territory directly, but we will be striking the armed forces, a paramilitary militia that is de facto linked to the Hezbollah regime and that some, like the United States, would like to put on the list of terrorist organisations.
Secondly, they could obviously try to target Iranian interests around the world, in particular embassies, diplomats or officials linked to the Iranian regime. The Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, could be a target. It would be a symbolic target that would be equivalent in terms of intensity to the massive strikes carried out by 300 vectors or effectors, as they say, that travelled 1500-2000 kilometres.
The third option, which I think is the most logical, is that the Israelis, who had been dissuaded by the United States from eliminating Iranian scientists, could resume the campaign of elimination that they have been waging for some twenty years now, which has severely limited and even significantly slowed down the Iranian research apparatus, particularly in the nuclear field.
We could also see, or see again, massive cyber attacks that reduce or even jeopardise the operation of a number of Iranian power stations and research centres, whether at Natanz, Bushehr, the Thiamine power station at Arak or Fordo, slowing down Iran’s ability to acquire enriched uranium, tending towards 90%, which would potentially make it sufficiently fissile to be used in ballistic delivery systems. This prospect would, de facto, trigger an immediate Iranian response.
The French took part in protecting Israel by shooting down air targets launched by Iran. How would you explain France’s involvement in defending Israel and its refusal to close the skies when Ukraine asked, particularly at the start of the large-scale Russian invasion? And what is France’s position on this new crisis?
To answer your question, yes, France did take part in the military operation. This has been the subject of some controversy. I raised this issue on a TV programme yesterday, and my co-debaters didn’t believe it. I explained to them: “But that’s not possible, how can you think that France, which has bases in the path of missiles and drones in Iraq and Jordan, would have let missiles and drones through whose aim was to cause potential Franco-Israeli victims?”
It is entirely logical and understandable that France should have contributed in its own way to avoid casualties on Israeli territory. In fact, it was more a question of staging or choreography, skilfully measured, because the Iranians had planned that they were going to strike, had more or less indicated where they were going to strike, and knew that the Israelis and the Americans would intercept the missiles they launched. So it was a kind of well-orchestrated choreography.
However, France, which has bases in Jordan, has four Rafales as part of Operation Chammal, aimed at eradicating Daesh, and has been doing so since 2015. It also has bases in Iraq, notably in northern Iraq, and in Iraqi Kurdistan, for training special forces, in particular those who helped liberate Mosul. It is also deploying an artillery training task force. The Iraqis have shown a keen interest in purchasing CAESAR howitzers, and France is currently training Iraqi artillerymen in this area.
There were bases in the path of the ballistic missiles, as well as Shahed 136 and 238 drones that flew over this territory. So France played its part by shooting down the drones that passed overhead. The official justification was that they represented a potential risk to French troops flying overhead, which is true, even if they were not specifically targeted by these drones.
The second element to take into account is that the international community has de facto shown solidarity with the State of Israel by setting up a second operation. This is the European operation EUNAVFOR Aspides, the aim of which is to ensure the safety of the maritime flow through the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. This transit has been disrupted daily by attacks carried out more intensively by the Houthis since December 2023, and France has fired 30 Aster missiles to intercept drones flying over these ships, including the multi-mission frigate Alsace and several ships engaged or sometimes directly targeted.
So France has been de facto militarily involved in protecting Israel since 7 October. However, there are different levels of involvement. The Americans are much more involved, having deployed a carrier battle group in the Red Sea, as well as the 6th Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. That’s two carrier battle groups, two aircraft carriers and around six US frigates in the region.
In addition, there are the two French frigates (Alsace and Languedoc), British and Italian frigates, Danish and Dutch ships and British aircraft taking off from their bases in Cyprus under the NATO flag. This coalition therefore includes not only Israel and the countries mentioned, but also neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Egypt and others, which have contributed by sharing intelligence, following the example of Saudi Arabia, to consolidating an Israeli-Arab-Western front unprecedented in its composition and robustness. Jordan normalised its diplomatic relations with Israel in 1994, and Egypt in 1978, and since October 2020 other countries such as Sudan, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have also established or re-established economic and diplomatic relations with Israel.
So now I’m going to answer the second part of your question. It’s an excellent question that I addressed myself in an article published in the Revue politique et parlementaire. In the days, if not hours, to come, we will inevitably see the question of “double standards” raised.
The speed, fluidity, cooperation and effectiveness of international cooperation to ensure the virtual impermeability of Israeli airspace was achieved in a matter of hours, with an uncoordinated but convergent political decision by the United States, the European Union, NATO, of course, Israel and its Arab neighbours!
The “double standard”, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has suggested, is that if the same determination had been shown from the start of the conflict to secure Ukrainian airspace, many of the first missiles fired over two years ago would not have reached Ukrainian territory. Assuming that most of the missiles and drones were shot down outside Israeli territory, in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, this means that the same thing could have been done to secure Ukrainian airspace, particularly those fired from Russian ships in the Black Sea.
So the question of double standards will inevitably arise. I don’t have an answer to that, but since these are the same types of effectors, the same types of air-to-ground or ground-to-ground missiles, with similar ranges, between 1,500 and 2,000 km, the same drones, precisely the same Iranian Shahed drones, which Iran has sold in large numbers to the Russians.
It is therefore perfectly legitimate for every Ukrainian to ask the European Union: “You are prepared to supply the military equipment and capabilities that Israel needs to protect its population, but why don’t you do it on a daily basis to protect the Ukrainian population?” The deployment of such measures raises many questions and will undoubtedly be a real political issue that needs to be addressed. We should also be honest enough to point out that Kyiv could just as legitimately ask the same question of Tel Aviv, which is refusing to deliver the Iron Dome lower layer system to Ukraine.
Let’s also see how the Ukrainians will take advantage of this situation to try and get more help. We had a late response last night when Volodymyr Zelensky called for an international coalition to fight Russia and Iran jointly. Let’s assume that these are two regimes – let’s add China – three regimes that have become adepts of the same strategy aimed at saturating, in a kinetic and “hybrid” way, the European and Western democratic space.
Let’s talk about the Maghreb: France and Morocco seem to be back on the right foot. What are the factors and the driving force behind this rapprochement?
I’ve been a little less optimistic over the last few days. Firstly, because the precursory signals that we were all waiting for, namely a rapprochement, even a stronger reaffirmation and better communication between French and Moroccan diplomacy, which had been somewhat tarnished for about a year and a half, seemed to indicate renewed interest.
The visit by Franck Riester, the French Minister Delegate for Foreign Trade, to Morocco a few days ago, encouraged French companies to take advantage of the public-private partnership and funding from Proparco, the private finance arm of the French Development Agency, to try to win contracts in the southern provinces, also known as the Western Sahara, was a necessary but not definitive step. Indeed, it was a clever way of not taking a position on what the Moroccans wanted us to affirm, namely the Moroccan nature of the Sahara, in order to move away from the status quo. It should be remembered that France proposed this option in April 2007, suggesting that autonomy was one of the solutions that the international community, in particular the UN, should consider.
However, this is no longer the case, as a number of countries now consider that autonomy is the only viable solution for these territories, which they consider to be de facto, if not de jure, part of Morocco. This is a major change in the diplomatic position, marked in particular by the decision of the United States to open a consulate in Dakhla in December 2020, under President Donald Trump.
In addition, recent pronouncements, notably from Spain and Germany, are worth mentioning. It is important to remember that Spain is now ahead of France as Morocco’s leading economic partner. This situation could partly explain the worsening diplomatic tensions between France and Morocco. Thus, the French will was put to the test as to whether or not this gesture would be implemented. Secondly, it should be noted that President Emmanuel Macron and the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, are the only ones entitled to speak on this issue, at least in terms of protocol.
So, yes, I was optimistic some time ago when we discussed this. However, in recent weeks, or even days, we have learned that the French President’s famous symbolic trip, which was initially planned “urbi et orbi” by Stéphane Séjourné himself, has been postponed until September, after the Olympic Games, using the Olympic Games as a pretext for such a postponement.
In Rabat, people are beginning to wonder whether the French position isn’t essentially aimed at stalling or even avoiding making a decision, to delay this gesture that everyone, especially the Moroccans, is waiting for as a sign of goodwill. If the postponement takes place in September, it is highly likely that, given the international tension, the French position and decision will not be taken before 2025.
As a result, I’m much less convinced that relations between the two countries are now at an all-time high. Admittedly, they are improving, which was necessary. However, the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, and the President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, have not seen each other for a year and a half, and diplomatic relations were rather strained, if not very cold. In the background, there’s the case of suspected espionage with the Pegasus spyware, in which a number of French ministers were allegedly bugged by Moroccan authorities.
There’s also the widespread corruption scandal in the European Parliament, unfairly dubbed “Qatargate”, but involving many other countries, including Morocco, the alleged initiator of largesse towards certain MEPs in exchange for their proselytising and affirmative stance in favour of the Moroccan Sahara, or else, to avoid evoking or mentioning the question of the Western Sahara.
In short, although the situation is improving, France seems to be caught in the trap of “regatta diplomacy”. It is sailing between contradictory positions, one to port and the other to starboard, in order to avoid upsetting the Algerians while sending positive signals to the Moroccans.
Once these signals are rejected by Algeria, we tell them that it’s contrary to their perceptions, and once the Moroccans point out that it’s impossible to be both complacent towards the Algerian authorities and cooperative with Morocco, we find ourselves in an untenable “at the same time” policy which, at some point, will have to be resolved.
We are no longer in the same situation as in 2003-2004, when President Chirac sought to improve relations with Algeria, which he could do much more easily than President Macron because relations with Morocco were excellent.
This is no longer the case, and yet we are seeking to warm relations, to have better relations with Algeria. Today, the Algerians are implementing their strategy of regional destabilisation, which now consists of clashing with all their neighbours: Tunisia over security issues, Libya because of Marshal Haftar’s agenda, which differs from that of the regime in Tripoli, linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, characterised by a certain complicity between Algiers and Tripoli.
They are also at loggerheads with Niger over the migration issue, and with Mali over the support that the Algerian military and services are currently giving to imam Dicko, housed in Algiers and involved in the negotiation process with the terrorists, and even upstream actions against certain Tuareg jihadist terrorists whom we fought during the Serval and Barkhane operations.
There are also tensions with Mauritania, as Algeria is experiencing a free-fall in its growth rate, while Mauritania boasts the highest growth rate on the African continent, at 14%, according to the latest figures released by the IMF. Algiers and Nouakchott are now in competition with the discovery of oil and gas deposits off the coasts of Mauritania and Senegal, which will reduce the unilateral nature of the African gas power currently assumed by Algeria, which holds 29% of proven gas reserves on the African continent.
Until 14 April 2024, Iran had never directly attacked Israel. Why did Teheran dare to break this taboo? Does this mean that, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the use of force is becoming increasingly acceptable?
The answer is implicit in your question, but I’ll expand on it. Today’s world is less and less protected by international law. The universality of norms, established by the international community with the San Francisco Charter in June 1945, the subsequent creation of the UN in October 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1948, and all the ensuing international governance (UN system, Bretton Woods financial institutions – IMF and World Bank), although centred on the West, dominated global relations for some 75 years. However, the balance of power has shifted.
We are now in a dynamic where the universality of values and standards is being called into question in favour of regional particularism. Values are regionalised, essentialised, and adapted to each governmental model, each so-called civilisational space, claiming to have its own standards. In this way, we are witnessing a regression of the idea that the same rights should be defended everywhere.
Human rights, democracy, the rule of law, freedom of expression, gender equality, non-discrimination, secularism, the inviolability of borders, the right of peoples to self-determination and, of course, the international recognition of borders have all been called into question. Ukraine is just one example.
For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is challenging treaties, notably the 1947 Treaty of Paris, by claiming that the Greek islands should be Turkish. Similarly, China is making excessive claims to a number of territories which, according to international law, do not belong to it. This was the case with Tibet in the 50s, Xinjiang in the 70s and 80s, and has been the case with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan since almost 1921. China follows the same logic of questioning established borders.
Russia is another example, as illustrated by the question of the South Kuril Islands to the north of Japan. These islands, belonging to Japan, are also claimed and de facto controlled by Russia, under the 1951 San Francisco Treaty.
What we’re seeing is an international system increasingly challenged by particularism and individualism. This idea is embodied in the concept of “sovereign democracy”, promoted by Vladislav Surkov, often referred to as the “Kremlin wizard”. According to this principle, it is not international rights and norms that take precedence, but rather the sovereign rights of individual countries.
Many European politicians also seem to adopt this logic. Countries such as Hungary, under its current leadership, and Slovakia, with President Peter Pellegrini and Prime Minister Robert Fico, seem to be following this trend. However, this phenomenon is not limited to Europe.
Iran is taking a similar approach. Since the Islamic Revolution of February 1979, Iran has been asserting and promoting its own values, notably by attempting to impose its own rigourist interpretation of Shiite Islam and those of Alawite (Syria) and Zaidi (Yemen) Islam. This strategy aims to extend its influence and counter other expressions of Islam, notably those of non-Shiite Arab Muslim populations. In this way, Iran follows the same logic of challenging international norms.
We must therefore assume that if such a risk exists, the international community – made up not only of Western countries but also of those who adhere to the fundamental principles of international law – must react. These principles are defended within the Council of Europe and the OSCE (at least what remains of it), the G7, the G20, as well as by several non-aligned countries.
Among these major non-aligned or multi-aligned powers is India, which should play a more assertive role in stressing that the international community is indeed an open, fluid community, and not a fixed union, front or axis designed to oppose another part of the world.
So, in a way, are we witnessing the collapse of the international system?
Yes, after 79 years, we’re seeing real UN fatigue, and, surprisingly, after 75 years, we’re seeing a definite revitalisation of NATO, but unfortunately in the worst possible way. This revitalisation is taking place in the context of a conflict that is forcing NATO to rearm for war, rather than seeking to avoid it, as was foreseen in the 14 chapters of the Washington Charter creating the North Atlantic Alliance on April 4, 1949. At the same time, many organisations linked to international law, such as the Council of Europe, disappeared off the radar – a direct consequence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948, and the founding principles of the European Convention on Human Rights, between November 1950 and September 1953, when it came into force.
The OSCE has also failed in its role as mediator, whether through the Minsk Group between Azerbaijan and Armenia or via the Minsk Protocol, including Minsk 1 (September 2014) and Minsk 2 (February 2015). We have seen that this has not prevented the invasion of a sovereign country, in this case Ukraine, and that it now also threatens Moldova, as well as other countries bordering Russia, whether the Baltic states or even Kazakhstan.
So, yes, we have now entered a logic where it is necessary to rearm militarily, but it is just as crucial to rearm morally. We need to reaffirm our adherence to a set of values, despite its imperfections, capable of bringing together a certain number of men and women in countries in conflict. I’m convinced that we need to promote not just non-alignment, but above all multi-non-alignment, in the form of polymorphism and pluralism within the international community. States must no longer be the only ones with a say in global governance; we need to rethink this governance with greater balance and solidarity. The more we marginalise certain countries, the more these countries will seek refuge with those who listen to them, even in a biased or artificial way. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reminded European parliamentarians in March 2022, democracy is “no match” for dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. “Too” liberal and democratic, the decision-making process in our democracies is too long, argumentative and abundantly debated. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, decide without this – necessary – consultation…
It’s hardly surprising, then, that certain countries whose legitimacy we question as stabilisers of the international community, enjoy a considerable aura. Take China, for example, countries that seek to be heard by the traditional and somewhat entrenched players in the international community, notably us, the countries of the North, find it easier and quicker to listen.
This is also true for Turkey, Iran, Russia and China. There is therefore a great risk that we will not win in a direct confrontation with these countries, with which we have many reasons to enter into conflict, both economically and diplomatically, but rather that we will lose on the ground where we have traditionally been strong, notably in Africa.
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