A few days ago, the Turkish daily newspaper Sabah, which traditionally maintains close ties to President Erdoğan, published an article that could be interpreted as a certain offer to Europe. The background of this article was the participation of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in the Ukraine talks in London, where key players from various countries gathered to discuss the war in Ukraine and possible diplomatic solutions. Fidan traveled from Ankara to represent Türkiye’s position and its perspective on developments in Ukraine.
During his stay in London, Fidan emphasized that Türkiye plays a key role not only concerning Ukraine but also in ensuring geopolitical stability in Europe and beyond. He stated that Türkiye was actively interested in taking on a central role in a “new European security architecture” that responds to the changing security landscape. He made it clear that this was not just a short-term goal but part of a long-term strategic vision pursued by President Erdoğan. “As you know,” Fidan said, “our President has a great vision for this,” hinting that Ankara is working towards a significant restructuring of Europe’s security architecture and its surrounding regions.
Interestingly, Sabah also pointed out a striking contrast that shaped the diplomatic stage in recent days. The newspaper highlighted the “strong contrast” between two important political meetings: the meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and former U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington and Zelensky’s later visit to Ankara. The newspaper seemed to draw attention to the different orientations of diplomatic relations and the respective influence of the involved actors on the Ukraine crisis. This could be understood as a subtle reference to the geopolitical tensions and the competition between Western and Eastern powers in the region.
Through this portrayal in Sabah, it becomes clear that Türkiye does not just want to be seen as a neutral actor in the Ukraine conflict but is actively trying to position itself as a decisive voice in the European security debate. At the same time, the close connection between Turkish foreign policy and President Erdoğan’s long-term visions, which extend far beyond the current crisis, is emphasized.
Erdoğan has managed to maintain contact with both sides. Alongside Viktor Orbán, he is the only NATO head of state or government who has repeatedly met with Putin since the war began. He calls him a “good friend.” From a Turkish perspective, this makes him the ideal mediator between Ukraine and Russia—especially after the recent press conference at the White House.
Türkiye is indeed gaining new significance these days. On the one hand, diplomatically, thanks to its connections in all directions. Ankara would have liked to host the first American-Russian talks on Ukraine, which took place in Saudi Arabia. At the very least, Erdoğan managed to schedule Zelensky’s visit to Ankara on the same day—while the foreign ministers from Moscow and Washington were meeting in Riyadh, Erdoğan received the Ukrainian president in what felt like a counter-event. Now, Türkiye is offering itself as a venue for negotiations involving the invaded country. “Our region has had enough of bloodshed,” Erdoğan said. He is ready to help in any way possible.
Beyond diplomacy, there is the military aspect. After the United States, Türkiye has the second-largest army in NATO, making it the largest among European member states. Additionally, Erdoğan has been building up a domestic arms industry for years, which also benefits Ukraine. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense buys ammunition for the war in Ukraine from a Turkish manufacturer. Türkiye has built up capacities that the West depends on in these times.
Right now, Erdoğan appears to be seeking closer ties with Europe. A Trump-Putin deal that strengthens Russia must also be a concern for Türkiye. First, the country has always benefited from NATO, and second, an expansionist Russia—despite all the friendly words—poses a threat to Turkish interests in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus. So, Erdoğan strategically placed an issue back into the center of European-American tensions that had long faded from the headlines: Türkiye’s EU membership. “Only Türkiye,” he said, “can save the European Union from the deadlock it has fallen into.”
He painted a picture of a decaying, aging union of states where Islamophobia is spreading and which is shifting further to the right. Erdoğan had already expressed his concern about the rise of right-wing politics in Europe when the German president recently visited Ankara. Now, he claimed that Türkiye could be the “lifeblood” that Europeans desperately need.
That Türkiye will soon become an EU member is unrealistic. However, what Erdoğan likely envisions is a form of elevated partnership. On one side, there is economically strong but geopolitically and militarily weak Europe; on the other, Türkiye, which is still struggling to escape its perpetual economic crisis but could offer military support to the continent. According to the Global Firepower Index, the Turkish army is the ninth strongest in the world, with the German Bundeswehr ranking 14th. Additionally, Türkiye holds influence in the Middle East—especially in the new Syria—as well as in Ukraine.
Erdoğan has already put forward a concrete idea by proposing Turkish peacekeeping troops in Ukraine. He presented this idea both to Zelensky during his visit and to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who came to Ankara just a few days later. Russia rejects any presence of NATO troops in Ukraine, but Moscow has yet to respond to Erdoğan’s initiative.
Türkiye’s position is clear: In these times of crisis, it sees itself as an asset to the EU—provided that Europe also reaches out to Türkiye, particularly in economic matters. For instance, Brussels has so far avoided criticizing Türkiye’s military campaign against Kurdish regions in northern Syria.
A new peace process with the Kurds appears to be emerging in Türkiye, initiated by a recent message from Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This development could make it easier for European leaders to re-engage with President Erdoğan’s government. European politics has traditionally maintained an ambivalent stance toward Türkiye, particularly due to human rights concerns and the Kurdish issue. If the peace process continues to advance, it could shift the political dynamics and pave the way for closer cooperation between Türkiye and European states.
However, it will likely take a considerable amount of time before relations between Turks and Kurds are truly stable and characterized by mutual trust. The peace process remains fragile, and it is yet to be seen how substantial the agreements will be. The deeply ingrained mistrust between both sides—rooted in decades of conflict and violence—will not be easily overcome. The dialogue between the Turkish government and the Kurds is delicate, and it could take years before a true, lasting peace is achieved.
A key factor influencing the course of this peace process will be President Erdoğan’s stance. The Turkish leader does not currently seem willing to make significant concessions necessary for a sustainable political solution. One particularly sensitive issue is the question of a potential amnesty for Kurdish prisoners. Erdoğan has repeatedly emphasized that such a step is not a priority for him and has so far shown no willingness to support demands for amnesty for PKK members. This contradicts the expectations of the Kurdish side and many international observers, who believe that such measures could play a crucial role in the peace process.
For Erdoğan, Öcalan’s call to lay down arms is a symbolic act that he interprets as the PKK’s capitulation. He sees himself as the one who has achieved victory in the decades-long conflict, which shapes his stance on further concessions. This perspective represents a significant challenge, as it suggests that Erdoğan views the Kurdish issue primarily as a military confrontation in which the state has ultimately prevailed. This triumphalist approach could complicate dialogue with the Kurds and hinder genuine reconciliation.
Overall, it is evident that the peace process with the Kurds in Türkiye is still in its early stages and fraught with uncertainties. The path to genuine, lasting peace—based on mutual respect and trust—will likely be long and accompanied by numerous political and societal obstacles. The international environment, particularly Europe’s stance, will play an important role, but Türkiye’s domestic politics under Erdoğan remains the decisive factor.
