This month, European government representatives met in Cyprus for a special migration summit: the issue was the designation of “safe zones” in Syria, where large numbers of Syrian refugees could then be deported. The demand for “safe zones” was also raised again when EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced an aid package for Lebanon in Beirut, where, according to estimates, around one and a half million Syrian refugees live. A decline in violence, as observers in Syria, experts and Western diplomats emphasize, does not mean security. UN special envoy Geir Pedersen painted a bleak picture during the Security Council on April 25: “Indeed, there are no signs of calm in any of the theaters in Syria – just unresolved conflict, simmering violence and violent flare-ups of hostilities, each of which could be kindling for a new conflagration.” There is no improvement in sight, the trends are going in the “wrong direction”.
The war has not yet stopped in northwest Syria, which is controlled by opponents of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Assad has vowed to bring all of Syria back under his control – using military means if necessary. There are regular battles and mutual shelling along the front in Idlib province. Civilian infrastructure is repeatedly hit by Syrian or Russian air strikes. The fighting also affects areas that are in the so-called de-escalation zones, which were agreed in 2017 under Turkish-Russian-Iranian leadership. The province is ruled with a heavy hand by an alliance of radical Islamists. the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Golani, has tried to present himself as a pragmatic statesman who is driving development forward. But he increasingly shows his kleptocratic, paranoid and brutal side. The HTS security apparatus tortures and murders and has arrested thousands of political opponents. The jihadists have gone so far that the people who once took to the streets against Assad are now protesting against a full-bearded tyrant. Golani’s empire is also suffering from economic decline and is hopelessly overpopulated. The Northwest Province is a repository for internally displaced people and people deported there as part of surrender agreements. Before the war, around 1.3 million people lived in Idlib; this number is estimated to have almost quadrupled to 5.1 million.
The situation is not significantly better in other parts of northwestern Syria, where pro-Turkish Arab militias are in charge. Here too, the tent camps of internally displaced people stretch through the landscape like giant wyverns. There are already tensions between Syrians from different areas. Even if some of the militias that rule under Turkish protection and the umbrella of the “Syrian National Army” (SNA) may behave in a somewhat state-supporting manner, the people are threatened by the arbitrariness of the warlords. Türkiye is omnipresent in the border region: there are Turkish post offices, local administrations receive budget support from Ankara. A permanent repatriation of Syrian refugees would also require permanent Turkish patronage in northern Syria, which is problematic not only in terms of legal issues. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would have a powerful political trump card in his hand. There is also fear among Assad opponents who live in the Turkish-dominated cantons that Erdogan and Assad could come to an agreement at some point – and that the Syrian regime could reach for these regions again.
In the Syrian northeast, where the autonomous government’s territory extends beyond the Kurdish settlement areas, there are tensions with Arab tribes, which also erupt into violence. In addition, the terrorist organization “Islamic State” (IS), which is slowly resurgent underground in Syria, is a threat, not least in the eastern province of Deir el-Zor. Likewise the confrontation with Türkiye and its Syrian Arab loyalists: Turkish artillery shelling or drone attacks occur again and again. When President Donald Trump withdrew US troops from northeast Syria in 2019, Assad’s Russian allies stepped into the vacuum. At that time, Ankara led an invasion, the new edition of which hangs over the Kurdish areas like the sword of Damocles. A permanent American presence is not assured, and in the event of a withdrawal, the Kurds could, as on other occasions, seek salvation in an arrangement with Assad.
In the rump state ruled by the dictator Assad, the war is largely over. But there is still unrest. Syria special envoy Pedersen reported to the UN Security Council about fighting between regime forces and former rebel groups in Daraa province, where the Druze minority in the town of Sweida is currently rehearsing an uprising. But it is not just the war that is perceived as a factor of insecurity, but the regime itself. Another threat is persecution by the security apparatus, which can largely rule as it pleases. This includes not only the secret services and the armed forces, but also a wide variety of militias, some of which are subordinate to local warlords. There is no general amnesty that guarantees impunity for all Assad opponents. The implementation of announced partial amnesties was delayed by the apparatus. The circumstances are therefore not clearly clarified. According to several experts, UN employees and diplomats, some Syrians could return to their country without any problems. Not least for those who fled primarily for economic reasons. It is known that refugees are now returning to Syria to visit. On the other hand, there is always the risk of becoming a victim of collective punishment because you come from a certain area or belong to a certain population group.
The power struggles within the regime are primarily distributional struggles in which there is less and less to distribute. And the repressive apparatus is apparently increasingly focusing its energy on squeezing people out. Sources in regime areas report regular raids on companies and speak of a “closed cycle of organized plunder.” They say simply bringing Syrians into Syria will not solve the problem. There is no guarantee that they will stay in Syria. “At the moment we should be more concerned with slowing down further migration.”
All publishing rights and copyrights reserved to MENA Research Center.
