At the end of February, French President Emmanuel Macron made a significant move, shaking up his European and NATO allies with declarations hinting at a potential French troop deployment to Ukraine. This declaration was followed by several others from Macron himself, his Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné, and Minister of Defence Sébastien Lecornu. Even though Macron’s initial statement was explicit that there was no consensus among the allies, it would not be an exaggeration to say that it steered a lively debate in political and military circles, the media, and civil society. A month after his declaration, „Le Figaro“ published five scenarios under which the French troops could be deployed to Ukraine.
The first scenario provides for Paris to establish arms factories in Ukraine and send its troops to defend those factories. France and Germany have already announced the establishment of joint production of weapons in Ukraine, and this would most probably require partnering with a Ukrainian joint venture. This scenario, however, looks improbable because, firstly, there is no need to deploy troops to provide security to such an installation, and, secondly, the security can be done with the help of private military companies or even with local Ukrainian National Guard units.
Under the second scenario, the French troops could be deployed to Ukraine for demining and training missions. It is worth noting that Paris provides training to the Ukrainian soldiers in Poland and France. So far, nearly 10000 Ukrainian troops have been trained by the French Armed Forces. Given that prior to the full-scale invasion, several countries were training the Ukrainian soldiers on Ukrainian soil, the training at the Yavoriv training facility in West Ukraine or in some undisclosed location should not be ruled out, but it won’t produce an important effect on the Russians, nor it would make a difference in this war. But the presence of the French troops, let’s say, at Yavoriv may dissuade Russians from launching missile attacks on that facility, and despite some warmongering declarations from the Russian officials, such as Deputy Chairman of the State Duma, Pyotr Tolstoy, Moscow rather would fear killing the French troops and dragging France into the conflict. Demining assistance looks plausible as well.
The “defence of Odesa” is mentioned as the third scenario, and it seems at this point to be an alarmist scenario, where the front line gets shattered with the Russian troops rapidly advancing in the South and East of Ukraine and manage to advance up to the Dnipro river. As of today, there is no indication of this happening anytime soon, even without US assistance. However, under such a disastrous scenario for Ukraine, defending Odesa would make sense since Ukraine is not economically viable without access to the sea. Moreover, the presence of a strong French or French-led contingent would make it impossible for Russia to advance further without risking a wider conflict with one or several NATO states, if not with the whole of NATO. Therefore, in theory, such a scenario seems possible, but only under extreme circumstances.
The fourth scenario provides for the establishment of so-called “safe zones” in Ukraine. Under such a scenario, we can imagine French or French-led troops securing, for instance, the border between Ukraine and Belarus, thus making additional troops available for the Ukrainians to fight the Russians in the East. This could also significantly decrease the probability of a new Russian offensive using the Belarusian territory. In addition, such safe zones could also be established in strategic locations to dissuade the Russians from launching an attack or missile strikes there. Such a deployment, as well as in the third scenario, would steer fear within the French society, coupled with the Russian efforts in the information sphere to boost anti-war sentiment and orchestrate protests in France. Such a scenario could also be envisaged in the event of the Ukrainian victory, where they would liberate their territory and reestablish territorial integrity according to 1991 internationally recognised borders; the foreign contingent could help to secure those borders, dissuading the Russians from launching new attacks, but difficult to imagine without strong public support.
Finally, “fighting in the trenches” is mentioned as the fifth scenario, and it seems impossible under current circumstances. Even though shapable, public support is now unfavourable regarding sending the troops to Ukraine. For instance, according to multinational market research and consulting firm IPSOS, 51% of French do not support sending troops to Ukraine, and only 24% are favourable. According to international polling and market research firm IFOP, 27% of French citizens support sending the French troops in the framework of an EU coalition, and only 22% support such a decision if France goes alone. It is safe to say that such a scenario can only be imagined in the event of a Russian attack against one of the NATO member states, and troop deployment to Ukraine to fight in the trenches would be an option in the framework of a broader conventional conflict with Russia.
This being said it is important to understand that, at this point, all of these scenarios are speculative and cannot be seriously considered, with the exception of demining and training missions. It is, however, worth mentioning the non-military aspect of President Macron’s declarations and what he may have achieved.
Primo, previously, it was mainly Russia that was accustomed to rising stakes and acting proactively, while the Western states were mostly reactive, whether it concerned the cyber domain, information operations, Africa, or Ukraine. Moscow had the initiative and confidence that there was no risk of confrontation with the West if Russia decided to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We all remember the messaging coming from the White House that the US won’t militarily intervene in the conflict. We also remember Emmanuel Macron’s attempts to talk to Putin, which led to nothing good. Therefore, the change of approach, at least in rhetoric, introduces a certain degree of strategic uncertainty for the Russians since they are no longer bulletproof sure that the French would not dare to make such a move, previously completely ruled out by the Kremlin.
Secundo, these discussions have been taking place under closed doors among the allies, and no consensus has been reached so far. However, by bringing the subject into the public domain, Macron not only attempted to raise stakes but also appeared as a possible leader of Europe — the place the Élysées strives to have. It also was positively perceived in Central and Eastern Europe, even though those states didn’t voice support for such actions, except for the Baltic states. However, it helped improve France’s image in the eyes of that part of Europe.
Tertio, in the wake of the European elections, Macron appeared to be the only serious leader ready to defend Europe, its values, and security, especially in the context of the US election approaching and the looming uncertainty about the American role in Europe’s security. However, although Macron has paid with a one-point decrease in popularity, according to an IFOP poll of March 2024, such declarations and a change of stance may potentially help his party mobilise more support closer to the election date.
And, quarto, bringing this issue into the public domain may also be considered as a part of preparing public opinion for a possible scenario of a future confrontation between Russia and NATO. At this point, nobody knows what kind of information is at the disposal of the French intelligence services, and Russia may be preparing hybrid scenarios, for instance, in the Baltic states, that would require a muscled response.
In all circumstances, such declarations should be welcomed since they decrease the Russians’ decisiveness, but if they go unsupported with concrete steps in the long run, they may produce an opposite effect, only rooting confidence in the Kremlin regarding the West’s inability.
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