Continuing the cycle of interviews with experts, we spoke to General François Chauvancy, editor-in-chief of the quarterly review “Défense” of the auditors’ associations of the Institut des Hautes Études de la Défense Nationale (IHEDN, Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence), author of the book “The Qatar Blockade: The Failed Offensive” and geopolitical consultant on the French news channel LCI. The interview was conducted on 23 April 2024 by Denys Kolesnyk, French consultant and analyst.
Last week, Iran carried out strikes on Israel, but they were not successful. Israel decided to retaliate despite American attempts to dissuade Tel Aviv. Some targets in Iran were targeted. What objectives did the two belligerents achieve?
First of all, it is very difficult to know which targets were actually aimed at and which were actually hit. This is partly because the Iranians do not want to admit whether or not sensitive sites were destroyed, and partly because the Israelis have not openly claimed responsibility for the strikes, nor have they wanted to say what they were aiming at. In short, there was no reason for the Iranian or even the Arab crowds to be outraged.
Based on the informations coming from the outside observers it is clear that the strikes specifically targeted non-nuclear sites, even though it seems that some of them had been quite close. Generally speaking, the aim was not to destroy. There has been no official information about loss of life and no significant destruction of infrastructure. We can therefore deduce that these moderate military actions were part of the strategic communication of the two states.
In fact, once Israel had declared that it would take revenge for the Iranian retaliation, which was itself revenge for the strike on Damascus, once one had politically and publicly expressed on a global level his own intention to retaliate, how could one not take this action? These are political messages conveyed through military means, thus with the notion of a physical balance of power, with very targeted and limited military effects on both sides, which should not provoke further retaliations.
But on the other hand, I can see another interpretation. Wasn’t it also a message to the Iranians, telling them, “We can come to you, we can strike wherever we want”? There is also an additional objective: these strikes enabled the Israelis to assess the real capabilities of the Iranians to defend their airspace. In fact, Iran is vulnerable to airstrikes.
To summarise in a few words, there have been limited but significant political effects and limited, even very weak, military effects.
And what about Iran and its attack on Israel? Their attack was not successful.
Yes, but when you announce that you’re going to attack, what do you expect the attacked country to do? It’s going to expect it, and because it’s going to expect it, it’s going to prepare for it.
It seems that the Iranians have used fairly old military equipment, unlikely to cause major destruction. However, 300 drones and missiles represent a considerable number despite their revealed inefficiency in this attack. Strikes targeted military targets, including an airbase housing F-35s, American-made fighter jets, considered today as the most advanced in both America and Israel, thus a symbol in itself. Only one casualty was reported, a child from the Bedouin community.
The Iranians implemented their call for retaliation, but they didn’t want things to get out of hand. So they wanted to show that they had the means to carry out a strike, and indirectly we may well wonder about Iran’s real military capabilities, given the poor results of strikes involving 300 missile and drone, virtually all of which were destroyed before ever hitting their targets.
Another potential cause for concern for the Iranians is the coalition of states that have contributed to the defence of Israel, including in Arab airspace. Whether it was the Israelis, the French, the Americans or the Jordanians, there was a convergence to use Iraqi and Jordanian airspace to counter Iran. This is also a very strong message because Iran might have assumed it could use Arab territories.
So, I would say that Iran suffered a military setback that subsequently led to Israeli retaliation.
Iran’s direct attack on Israel represents a change because previously Iran did not dare to act directly. What were the factors behind this decision to attack Israel directly? Why did the Iranians dare?
It’s a change for us, it’s true, but do you really believe that Iran can confront Israel directly through a war waged by conventional forces, especially as they are geographically separated by several states? As a result, today we are limited to a confrontation in airspace using missiles, drones, and perhaps a few Iranian planes, but given their condition it is unlikely, and Israel, its planes and its anti-missile capabilities.
In the end, this is more of a bombardment war between the two states. There will be no ground confrontations of the kind seen in other conflicts today, except probably by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps deployed in Syria, which is regularly targeted by the Israelis, but without officially resorting to formed units.
So, the conflict today is limited to long-distance destructive capabilities on both sides, with relative effectiveness. For the moment, it seems that the Israelis have superior strike capabilities, as they have demonstrated, while it is not the case for the Iranians despite their numbers, as they have also demonstrated.
Therefore, direct war is unlikely today unless the Arab states between Iran and Israel were to suddenly side with Iran. On the other hand, it was necessary to show determination and a degree of consistency between Iranian rhetoric and the use of force in order to avoid losing face. However, the poor result may also force Iran to change its position and, of course, opt for the use of proxies, a war that has been waged for years so to say.
In other words, this exchange of strikes changed nothing?
It has changed in terms of its “global” image because, for the first time, Iran has shown its determination to officially strike Israel, something it has refrained from doing until now. On the other hand, when a state attacks a consulate in a neighbouring country, a consulate that is part of the embassy and therefore considered to be Iranian territory, as Israel did, how could Iran not react to this strike on its territory and wonder whether Israel’s challenge of Iranian retaliation had not been a trap set for Iran?
Iran could not fail to react. If this meeting had taken place outside the embassy, outside the consulate, it would hardly have been mentioned, people would have said “Yes, two Iranian generals are dead”, and moved on. In this case, this compound is considered under international law to be Iranian territory. Of course, there are nuances: an embassy is inviolable, a consulate a little less so, but in any case, it’s Iranian territory. So Iran could not fail to respond.
And I would say that Israel took a calculated risk — I can’t imagine them not calculating the risk — of striking a diplomatic compound, knowing that there would be a reaction. In the end, it was a way of testing Iran’s capabilities and challenging it to align its actions with its rhetoric.
But the question can be reversed: why did Israel dare?
Firstly, diverting attention from the fighting in Gaza was undoubtedly one of the objectives.
Secondly, to eliminate all those who support and organise the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist movements against Israel. The Israelis had a unique opportunity in terms of military effect by eliminating Iranian military officials. So this is what we call a high added value target. The stakes were high enough to take this risk while preparing for the next move by asking the question: what are the Iranians capable of doing militarily today in support of their rhetoric and their threats?
Apart from the success of the physical elimination of senior Iranian officials, the 300 drones and missiles have not demonstrated their ability to threaten Israel, and that’s excellent news for Israel. The reality is that the Iranians can’t do much today, but we’ll see how their capacities evolve in 2, 3 or 5 years’ time. The Iranians will undoubtedly develop their military capabilities.
For Israel, on the other hand, it means first and foremost reassuring its population about the reality of Iran’s non-nuclear threat and also reassuring it about its military capabilities. The Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 anti-missile systems and the air force have shown that they can intercept missiles and drones, as described in The Time of Israel newspaper, the Israeli pilots attacked drones with their fighters at night. No doubt new tactical skills will also be taught.
It is also a concrete expression of collective defence by both Arab and Western states. In the current context of the war in Gaza, this gives the Netanyahu government some breathing space. Military lessons will also be learnt, as potential Iranian targets are a long way away. This will have an effect on military strategy.
And perhaps just before moving on to the third question, a quick question about France, because we know that France helped Israel to defend itself. So there are a lot of questions now, especially from the Ukrainians, about why the West didn’t help Ukraine, but helped Israel. How could you explain France’s involvement in Israel’s defence, given that there is no mutual defence agreement?
What struck me was the rather convoluted way in which the French officials said “No, no, we didn’t do it, we did it to defend our base against potentially hostile elements that had arrived near our base”, implying that the French forces had reacted when they felt threatened. A few days later, the story had changed. France had indeed taken part in this collective defence of Israeli airspace.
Let’s talk about the Houthis in Yemen, who have been disrupting shipping for six months now. The American-British coalition and the European operation Aspides have apparently not produced satisfactory results. How does this Red Sea crisis can be resolved?
Yemen, after all, has seen 300,000 deaths since the beginning of the war in 2015. This certainly proves that the fighting has been significant overall and that indeed the northern part of Yemen did not surrender, and despite the cessation of hostilities, some degree of normalcy might have been expected to settle in.
Following the attacks by the Houthis on merchant ships as a result of the Israeli operation in Gaza, we discovered that they had an army and resources such as helicopters to seize ships, marine and aerial drones and missiles. That’s a lot for a terrorist group.
And there hasn’t really been any fighting between the Saudis and the Yemenis for some time now. And for a country that has no arms industry as such, the question arises: where does all the weaponry come from?
Iran?
It could be, especially as several ships have been boarded by the Americans. They were carrying not only small arms but also missile parts. So Iran is indeed supplying war material despite the previous sanctions against the embargoed Houthis. As a result, this is an additional proxy for Iran to disrupt world trade and put pressure on states to take action against Israel.
So, how do we resolve this? We won’t see any ground troops. The Saudis, with all the resources they had, were unable to suppress the Houthi resistance. So, we’re not going to be the ones to do it. Several fleets have been deployed with different missions. The European Aspides mission, in which France is participating, only provides protection for merchant ships, particularly against drones and missiles. A more aggressive mission is being conducted under the authority of the United States with the British support. Precise and limited ground strikes on military targets are intended to send a message of “moderation” in the Houthi attacks, but the Houthis have a strong regional capacity to cause harm.
Now, I can’t see any resolution to this crisis. “North Yemen” wants its independence. It wants to return to the situation that existed between 1962 and 1990, with the Yemen Arab Republic and, it seems, religious foundations, particularly through Zaidism, a branch of Shia Islam. The only response, at least temporarily, is not to target the Houthis, but to strike or destroy them when they threaten military or civilian vessels. 12% to 15% of international trade passes through the Suez Canal. I believe that the only reasonable solution, because we won’t go to war in northern Yemen, is to divert at least some of these trade flows to southern Africa, with a high cost, thus impacting our economies and supply chain timelines.
It also has an impact on Egypt, which depends on the royalties paid for crossing the Suez Canal and on which the Egyptian economy is heavily dependent. The Egyptian army is careful not to intervene given the regional context of the conflict in the Gaza Strip. Above all, it does not want to return to Yemen. The war from 1962 to 1970 under Nasser caused major losses without any real military success.
Today, the only country really being held hostage is Egypt. What would happen to this country, which already has many socio-economic problems, if it became even more fragile because of a lack of financial resources? Indirectly, would it not be Iran’s strategy, not just to disrupt international trade, but to force Egypt to take sides in the war in Gaza? But in what form? It’s hard to say. Clearly, Gaza refugees will not be accepted in Egypt, at least for the time being. Will Egypt act as a mediator in the conflict? For now, it’s not Egypt that is on the front line, especially since it fights the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus, by extension, Hamas. Pressuring Israel through Egypt by questioning a military alliance, a neighbourhood alliance?
So there are a number of hypotheses, but one fact remains: the Houthis are being used by Iran to weaken the Middle East, in particular by acting on Egypt, which would be the main target of these Houthi strikes.
Can we say that there is no way out of this crisis?
Yes, I think so. This crisis will continue as long as we have not found ways of putting pressure on the Houthis to neutralise them. The fact remains that the “non-Middle Eastern” states concerned with securing international trade have taken action. It is probably a long time since European navies faced a military threat. As in Ukraine, lessons will have to be learned.
There is, however, a military threat to the Houthis. They are not immune, but if ships are taken hostage or destroyed, this insecurity will have to be reduced to a minimum. It could be based on a cordon sanitaire thanks to the continued presence of the Anglo-Saxon and European states, despite a number of warships that appear insufficient for them, but also on the states of the region. Let’s not forget that the United Arab Emirates set up naval bases all around Yemen a long time ago. Saudi Arabia is also on the northeastern border. So, that’s a cordon sanitaire. But that doesn’t mean neutralising the threat, it means mitigating it.
Russian influence in the region is waning, and the rapprochement between Israel and the Arab states has stalled since the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October and the Israeli response in the Gaza Strip. However, Iran’s attack on Israel seems to be giving renewed hope for a rapprochement between Israel and the Gulf States. What do you think the consequences of this exchange of fire between Iran and Israel will be for the region? Are we witnessing the emergence of a new Middle East, with Iran even more isolated and the Arab states pursuing the path of rapprochement and stabilisation of the region with Israel? Or am I being too optimistic?
It’s difficult to say. I can’t see Iran becoming a real regional power, despite its aspirations. It is de facto, with its 80 million inhabitants, but so is Egypt. Given their ailing economies, it is in neither of their interests to wage a war, the cost of which we all know.
Will the rapprochement between Israel and the Arab countries continue? For the moment, it is not officially in question. The Abraham Accords still exist between Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, which have not closed their embassy in Tel Aviv, Morocco and Sudan. Only the rapprochement with Riyadh has been put on hold because, since 2015, Crown Prince Mohammed ben Salmane has wanted to draw closer to Israel. The King of Saudi Arabia, his father, opposed this. The 2002 agreement — the two-state solution — was the sole focus of Saudi diplomacy.
However, this support for the Palestinians began to gradually disintegrate in a discreet way, as the absence of solutions persisted. Little by little, the Arab states put aside the Palestinian question, economic interests becoming a strategic objective, as witnessed by the rapprochement in sight between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The terrorist attack by Hamas on 7 October called this into question, at least temporarily.
Moreover, even if there is a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia thanks to China, mistrust still exists. The states of the Arabian Peninsula continue to buy numerous fighter planes, munitions and armoured equipment. On the other hand, there is no alignment with American policy. They have taken on a degree of autonomy, if not independence, from the United States. They have freed themselves from American control. They don’t want war. They want development and trade.
In short, Iran is undoubtedly a nuisance power, but it is an isolated power that does not have the means to wage war. What’s more, Iran’s domestic problems would not make it easy to mobilise the Iranian people, who are subject not only to multiple sanctions but also to multiple vexations by their leaders. A war could weaken the Ayatollah’s regime because waging war against an enemy can be a useful way of staying in power in the name of nationalism that unites the whole of society. Whatever the circumstances, I don’t feel that today the Iranian people would be behind the ayatollahs, especially as Iran is also multi-ethnic society, subject to Sunni terrorism, with major tensions in the Baluchi region with the Kurds. If you don’t have a nation that is prepared to wage war in the name of any kind of nationalism, it is difficult for any government, however authoritarian, to commit itself to a war in which it is likely to perish.
There are also “hybrid” actions that need to be taken into account. Let’s not forget that Iran carried out attacks in France in 1985-86, and attempted attacks in Villepinte in June 2018, and also in Argentina. It has also seized foreign nationals on its territory to use them as bargaining chips. This is the behaviour of a terrorist state.
In the 20th century, France was a major player in the region. What remains of this influence? What is our country’s role in the processes shaping the region?
France has had no influence in the region for a very long time. The mandate in Syria — I have a relative who commanded a Meharist company in 1919-1921 to ensure the security of communication routes in the Deir ez-Zor region — was a time when Syria was effectively kept under French control.
But apart from Lebanon, we can see what kind of state that country is in today, and what influence we have, especially after the decolonisation of the Maghreb. We should also remember the events of 1956, when Franco-British and Israeli forces temporarily regained control of the Suez Canal, before having to withdraw under pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union. Although this operation was well-planned and successful, the major powers of the day clearly told the former colonial powers to withdraw. Finally, France supported Israel, in particular with aid for access to nuclear weapons, until at least 1967, when General De Gaulle decided to impose an embargo on French arms following the Six-Day War.
At the same time, American influence was growing. The United States and the Soviet Union demonstrated that they were the dominant players in the region. At the same time, the Algerian war distanced us somewhat from the Arab world, and the events of 1967 reinforced this dynamic. To sum up, our loss of influence dates from this period, I would say from 1956 to 1967. Gradually, the old powers were thrown out, and new powers took their place, at the same time as the rise of independences was asserting itself.
However, we had support agreements with Iraq until 1988, when the war with Iran came to an end. We supported Baghdad because of substantial arms contracts and access to oil. France had privileged relations with Iraq, while those with Syria were practically non-existent and those with Israel were considerably weakened. So, at that time, we still retained a certain influence, but it gradually diminished. It is true that foreign policy cannot be based solely on military power and arms supplies. But Saddam Hussein was not necessarily an ally of France, as the first Gulf War showed. We tried to establish ourselves in Saudi Arabia, but the 1945 agreements between the United States and Saudi Arabia clearly showed that this country was under American influence.
France finds itself at the height of what it represents, in other words, it does not occupy an important place. The only truly credible country in the region is the United States. The United States is not only an economic power but above all a military power which, at least theoretically, ensures regional security. Since the Obama administration, the United States has provided over 3.5 billion dollars worth of military equipment each year to Israel, and 1.5 billion to Egypt and Jordan. Regional peace is also built through a balance of military forces aimed at preventing the predominance of one side over the other, while protecting Israel.
The only remaining influence regards Lebanon and is a tradition dating back to Napoleon III, aimed at protecting the Maronite Christians. Our ties are more sentimental because of the presence of a large Lebanese community in France. However, even in this context, French efforts have met with little success. Since 2020, President Macron has sought to restore political stability there, but the results have been mixed, with many words and few concrete actions. In general, with the exception of small states such as the United Arab Emirates, where a military base has been set up, and Qatar, which shares certain security and economic interests with France, our influence in the Middle East is very limited.
However, it is time to recognise that French diplomacy can no longer be based solely on promoting the French language, which is often the sole objective. Today, France has little direct power in the Middle East, except through the United Nations Security Council, which is currently paralysed by the crisis in Ukraine. What’s more, China’s rise to power in the region, albeit focused primarily on trade, could also change things in the future. Overall, if the Security Council remains deadlocked, it is likely that our influence will continue to diminish, at least in the Middle East.
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