Given the recent messaging from the Trump administration regarding NATO, the EU, Ukraine and Russia, we decided to discuss it with Lieutenant General (retired) Ihor Romanenko, PhD in Military Sciences, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor. Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2006-2010). The interview was conducted by Denys Kolesnyk, French consultant and analyst.
The latest declarations coming out of Washington have puzzled both Europeans and Ukrainians. Trump has called for an immediate start of negotiations, but the administration’s concrete steps and strategies for achieving peace remain unclear. How would you characterise the current dynamics? In your opinion, what can we expect from the change in the US approach to the Russia-Ukraine war and how might it affect the achievement of a ceasefire or peace?
The Americans are trying to change the situation by moving to a new level of strategic vision and revising the distribution of influence in the world. This process is likely to involve only three key players – the US, Russia and China. At the same time, the main confrontation plays out between Washington and Beijing, and one of the important goals of US policy is to break the alliance between the Russian Federation and China. Based on this strategic approach, Washington is ready to give up certain security issues in Europe, including Ukraine’s interests, in order to achieve global geopolitical goals.
While Russia’s strategic priorities focus on several key aspects. First of all, it seeks to undermine the stability of the West and NATO. The second goal is to split the United States and European countries, which could weaken the unity of the Alliance. The third important direction is to regain control over Eastern Europe, which includes strengthening its influence on post-Soviet states. To this end, Russia has been actively organising diplomatic events, including recent telephone talks, consultations in Saudi Arabia and so on.
And the United States is primarily addressing the issue of changing the global balance of power through renewed relations with Russia, which is a priority for it. The cessation of hostilities between Moscow and Kyiv and the establishment of peace in Ukraine are considered only as a secondary aspect. Discussions have already begun at a preliminary level on future global changes that should form the basis for a new format of relations between the White House and the Kremlin. A possible algorithm for implementing this plan has also been identified. The first stage involves the cessation of hostilities, which could take place between 20 April and 9 May. The second step is the organisation of elections in Ukraine, tentatively in autumn, which should form the basis for the next stage. By the end of the year, the relevant ceasefire agreements are expected to be signed, but it should be noted that the interpretation of this process differs: for Ukraine, it is a ceasefire, while Russia and possibly the United States see this issue in a broader context as a peace agreement on their own terms.
Russia continues its offensive operations, while Ukraine is forced to retreat from some positions. This trend has been going on for at least six months. How do you see the evolution of hostilities in the Donetsk theatre? What military objectives are currently being pursued by the Russian political leadership? And what is Ukraine doing and what can Ukraine do to stop the advance of Russian troops? How did the operation in Kursk region affect the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and how can the territory controlled by Ukraine in Kursk region be used in future negotiations?
The Russian Federation continues to use the situation on the frontlines in its favour, while carrying out massive shelling across Ukraine to increase pressure and achieve its strategic goals of the war. For almost 18 months now, it has been conducting a large-scale offensive operation, suffering significant losses, which has deprived it of the ability to simultaneously conduct active hostilities in all areas. The current priorities are the battles in the Kursk region, where Russian troops are trying to dislodge the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and further advancement on the Eastern Front, particularly in Donetsk, Luhansk, and in South — Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. In addition, Russia has systematically targeted military and economic facilities deep inside Ukraine’s territory, seeking to undermine its economic stability and defence capabilities.
As for the use of the territory of Kursk by Ukrainian forces, this factor can be seen as an additional lever in the negotiations. It is already clear that after Trump’s statements, the issue of Ukraine’s accession to NATO has been effectively removed from the agenda, so it is strategically important to have as many such ‘cards’ as possible that can be used in diplomatic negotiations to exchange for the territories temporarily occupied by Russia. This could become one of the key arguments in negotiations on further settlement of the conflict.
The decisive element that could fundamentally change the course of the war remains a powerful and timely supply of weapons from the allies. Europe should step up its efforts in this regard, and the United States should provide Ukraine with the opportunity to purchase the necessary weapons in sufficient quantities. At the same time, Ukraine should carry out a large-scale mobilisation, in particular by lowering the conscription age to 18, which will allow not only to man up existing brigades but also to create reserve units. The decision to switch to a corps-based system, which has already been approved at the level of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, is also important. However, its implementation is currently hampered by political risks associated with mobilisation. If decreasing the mobilisation age is further postponed, it will not only make it impossible to achieve strategic goals, but will also significantly weaken Ukraine’s defence capability in the long run.
Yesterday in Paris, under the auspices of Emmanuel Macron, a conversation was held with key EU countries on Ukraine. There were declarations from London about the possible deployment of British troops in Ukraine after the ceasefire is signed to ensure security. In your opinion, what are the real security guarantees for Ukraine from the EU countries, given that NATO membership remains an unattainable goal for Kyiv? What mechanisms can be used (both political and military)?
Given that during the three years of full-scale war, Ukraine did not use the opportunities that opened up during active offensives, such as the Kharkiv and Kherson operations, it can be said that there was a more favourable moment to conduct the negotiation process on more favourable terms. However, several factors prevented this from happening.
First and foremost, the Biden administration pursued a strategy of ‘controlling the situation’, which was reflected, in particular, in delays in arms deliveries – in some periods, the pause lasted up to six months. European countries, for their part, were too slow to rebuild their own defence industries, resulting in insufficient and delayed supplies of equipment and ammunition. In addition, Ukraine itself failed to fulfil key mobilisation tasks, which also limited its capabilities. As a result, favourable chances to influence the course of the war were lost, and now Ukraine and its partners find themselves in a different strategic reality, given the situation at the front and the overall international situation.
Against this backdrop, the question of further security support for Ukraine arises, as the United States has significantly changed its approach. They are no longer ready to provide the required level of military assistance – neither in the form of weapons, nor equipment, nor ammunition, and the deployment of US troops to Ukraine is out of the question. In this situation, we can only hope for Europe, but its position remains heterogeneous, and no final decision has been made on future formats of support. The issue of Ukraine’s accession to NATO has been effectively closed, and the option of fixed contact lines is being discussed, which would mean Russia’s de facto control over the occupied territories, although no one would legally recognise this.
Under these circumstances, Ukraine is looking for alternative mechanisms to ensure its security through the support of Western countries. Initially, it counted on the Americans, seeking to conclude agreements similar to those the US has with Israel, South Korea and Japan. However, the likelihood that the United States will agree to such terms remains low. In this regard, the possibility of deploying foreign military contingents on the contact line is being considered. The Ukrainian side sees the need for 100000-200000 troops, while European partners estimate that 30000-40000 is a more realistic figure. It is quite possible that compromises will be found, but even if such a decision is made, it is not likely that foreign troops will directly participate in the fighting. Their task will be to deter escalation and maintain stability on the contact line.
As part of this approach, the US administration has developed a document with six questions for European countries on what forms of assistance they expect from Washington – political, military or economic. This should determine the extent to which Europe is ready to take on security issues both within the region as a whole and in Ukraine. In this regard, French President Emmanuel Macron held a series of meetings in Paris to discuss possible formats of support. Only a few countries expressed their willingness to send troops to Ukraine, and the United Kingdom even declared its full support for this initiative. At the same time, Germany, Poland, and Spain were very sceptical about the idea. In any case, discussions will continue, as this debate is important for the development of a consolidated decision by the European Union on its role in ensuring Ukraine’s and EU’s security.
Today, negotiations are taking place in Riyadh between the US and Russian sides. Russia’s diplomatic isolation is de facto over. How do you assess the fact that the US prefers to talk directly to Moscow without the direct involvement of Ukraine and the EU? What are your expectations from this meeting?
The meeting in Riyadh showed that the United States has moved away from the approach declared during the three years of war that it is impossible to negotiate on Ukraine without its direct participation. Washington violated this principle on its own, although it justified itself by saying that the main topic of discussion was global issues and the restoration of relations with Russia in the military, political and economic spheres. At the same time, they outlined their initial positions on Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made his position clear: any decisions of this meeting will not be recognised by Ukraine, as the US has broken its own promise.
This situation reflects a change in American strategy. Washington has effectively abandoned the policy of isolating Russia in favour of restoring relations with it in order to weaken its ties with China. However, the price of this approach is the interests of Ukraine and Europe. At the same time, the full implementation of this course in its pure form is unlikely, as an unconditional victory for Russia – with its goals of ‘denazification’, ‘demilitarisation’ and regaining control over Eastern Europe – would deal a serious blow to the reputation of the United States and Trump personally.
One of the key results of the meeting was the development of an algorithm for the negotiation process. Its expected stages: Stopping the war – tentatively in April-May. Holding elections in Ukraine – presidential, parliamentary and local. Russia expects that this process will lead to a change of government, and Zelenskyy will step down. This is one of the political goals set by the Kremlin. The negotiations are expected to be completed by the end of the year, with the new leadership of Ukraine.
The official position of the Ukrainian authorities is that it is impossible to hold elections during or shortly after the war. However, there will be pressure on Ukraine, and given the public mood, this idea may gain some support. Many Ukrainians are in favour of a ceasefire and elections, provided that the military is allowed to participate.
Continuation of the war, both militarily and diplomatically, is possible only if military assistance from the allies – weapons, equipment, ammunition – is significantly increased and full mobilisation is carried out. The latter is an unpopular and difficult step for the Ukrainian leadership. If this does not happen, the situation at the front will not improve, and Ukraine will have to make difficult choices.
And, finally, what can Ukraine do now to avoid losing its subjectivity?
The answer lies in addressing issues in two directions – external and internal. The foreign policy direction implies that Ukraine must clearly identify the global forces that actually support it in this struggle. It is important to distinguish between those who only declare assistance and those who are able to act in critical conditions. The latter include some European countries and some international players. Ukraine should gradually but confidently engage in the negotiation process, while adapting its diplomacy to the specifics of cooperation with different centres of influence. This means separate interaction with the United States, deepening partnership with European countries, building a strategic dialogue with China, and establishing contacts with the countries of the Global South, Turkey, and all states that can influence the negotiation process and support Ukraine.
The domestic policy direction requires a significant increase in mobilisation efforts. First of all, it is necessary to give a powerful impetus to the defence industry by switching them to a full-fledged military mode of operation, which has not yet been implemented during the three years of war. Full-scale mobilisation from the age of 18, in accordance with current legislation, should also be introduced, and the responsibility of citizens in the area of security and defence of the state should be increased. The current legal framework does not provide for an adequate level of accountability due to the lack of an official martial law status that would provide for stricter measures. Ukraine should use the legal norms in force during wartime, including the possibility of applying the most severe sanctions for relevant crimes. This will promote discipline and efficiency in the performance of tasks.
Once the hostilities end, the country will have to undertake large-scale reforms in the economic and social spheres. For them to be successful, it is necessary to implement profound changes in the judicial system, which is currently an obstacle to the development of the state, and to create conditions for the country’s recovery from the devastation of the war, focusing on strengthening military and security capabilities. An important task will be to lay down new foundations for state development that will promote economic growth and stability.
Achieving these goals will only be possible through difficult but necessary work that will be crucial for the country’s future. It must be underpinned by democratic elections, which are due to take place this year.
