The riots in several British cities, where mosques, asylum centers, and police stations were attacked by mobs shouting racist and anti-Muslim slogans, were not the first this year. They were triggered by a knife attack in Southport, in which three children were killed. The attacker was initially mistakenly identified as a Muslim asylum seeker. To understand why these riots erupted, one must realize that they were not the first serious disturbances in the days following the parliamentary elections. And it is necessary to not only focus on the far-right circles within the British population but also on its migrant and particularly its Muslim minorities.
It all began with the uprising in Leeds on July 18. After the social services took away four children from a Romani immigrant family, buses were set on fire, a police car was overturned, and officers were pelted with objects. Although chants of “Allahu Akbar” could be heard in videos of the riots, the media and authorities remained persistently silent about the ethnic identity of the rioters. However, the following two weeks made it clear that the new government would be confronted with even more ethnically charged challenges: On July 23, a brutal confrontation occurred between police officers and two British-Pakistani brothers at Manchester Airport. On July 25, a young Black man stabbed a soldier in Kent, leaving him in critical condition. This attack, which may have been racially or religiously motivated, received little attention in the news or from the government, but a lot of coverage on social media. On the same day as the Southport massacre, a machete fight broke out between masked youth gangs in Southend. These incidents fueled the narrative among the protesters and their supporters that their country was falling apart.
Nothing excuses the violence of the far-right protesters. But to prevent future outbreaks of violence, it would be wise to examine the factors that may have motivated the protesters and explore why they enjoy a certain degree of passive support among the population. In Westminster, however, there is little appetite for such an inquiry. The rioters’ affiliation with the white working class, coupled with misinformation on social media about the origin of the Southport attacker, suffices as an explanation. The government’s main response was to call for stricter regulation of language and expression – even though existing laws are already strict enough to send a protester to prison for singing “Who the fuck is Allah.” But the fact that the riots erupted where they did is a clear indication of deeper, long-simmering issues.
One key factor in explaining the current riots is the state’s neglect of the white working class. And the fact that it has chosen the most disadvantaged areas of the country to house migrants. In these areas in particular, concerns over the massive increase in immigration over the past 26 years have grown. In 2023 alone, 1.2 million legal immigrants and an unknown number of illegal immigrants arrived – without public debate or a democratic mandate. This changes a society. And although there is no infrastructure for assimilation here, the United Kingdom has been more successful in receiving and integrating immigrants from developing countries around the globe than many other European states. This success has led to a certain complacency among the elite regarding the impact of mass immigration on weaker native communities. The effects of accepting people with intolerant or socially regressive views on society have been overlooked, as has the potential abuse of the asylum system by individuals who are more economic migrants than genuine refugees.
Public unease is explained as racism and prejudice. But this approach is not enough. Ordinary people see what is happening in their cities and communities. They are frustrated that local authorities are providing emergency housing to asylum seekers while British citizens have been waiting for better housing for generations. Due to a series of scandals, many now associate the asylum system with reports of convicted sex offenders, Albanian crime bosses, and ISIS fanatics. At the same time, they don’t understand why Afghan interpreters who worked with British forces in Afghanistan are being denied entry. Successive governments have promised to at least make mass immigration more orderly – but have taken few effective measures. If the political class sees mass immigration as a problem at all, it is only because of the pressure “net migration” places on resources such as housing. There is no recognition that migration from societies with very different attitudes toward politics, religion, education, or sexuality can also create non-economic problems.
Whoever expresses concern about the negative effects on social cohesion or social capital, such as trust, risks being vilified as far-right. And this happens even though even Britain’s ethnic minorities themselves oppose uncontrolled immigration: the biggest donor to the populist Reform Party in the last election was the Pakistani-British businessman Zia Yusuf.
Finally, there is another very specific factor contributing to the riots: the so-called “Muslim problem.” The tensions underlying this issue in society were made evident by the attacks on mosques by far-right rioters and the subsequent counter-movements of Muslim men, some of whom were masked, carrying Palestinian flags, and also attacking uninvolved white people. It is easy to dismiss these issues as a result of “Islamophobia.” But uncomfortable incidents during the recent elections and the threatening antisemitism observed at major anti-Israel protests in London since October 7 have raised sensitive questions about Britain’s Muslim population and its relations with other communities.
In many ways, Britain and its Muslim communities represent a remarkable success story of integration. The list of British Muslims playing important roles in business, entertainment, politics, media, arts, or sports is long. There are 24 Muslim peers in the House of Lords and 25 Members of Parliament in the House of Commons. Many of the country’s most popular personalities are Muslims, including the hijab-wearing baker and author Nadiya Hussein. Four out of five British Muslims believe that the UK is a better place for Muslims than France, Germany, or the Netherlands. Generalizations about the British Muslim population are inevitably misleading. It is highly diverse in terms of social class, education, religious preferences, and political orientations. It includes the most assimilated Muslims in the Western world, but also its opposite – fervent traditionalists who adhere to the most reactionary versions of Wahhabi and Deobandi teachings. These traditionalists have become more influential than many people realize.
In some Muslim communities in Britain, Sharia courts are developing into a parallel legal system that disadvantages women in matters of domestic violence, divorce, and polygamy. Additionally, “no-go areas” for homosexuals have emerged, such as in the London borough of Tower Hamlets. Along with this comes the constant cultural censorship through the threat of violence. This phenomenon began with the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, which many British Muslims publicly supported. No British publication dared to reprint the Danish Muhammad cartoons. And when a teacher in Yorkshire showed his class a drawing from the French magazine Charlie Hebdo in March 2021, he had to go into hiding – to this day.
Another difficult issue is the import of subcultural practices from South Asia and the Middle East: child marriage, female genital mutilation, forced marriage, cousin marriage, or the obligation for prepubescent girls to wear a hijab. None of these practices are inherently or exclusively Islamic, but they are justified by their followers as religious practices. Unfortunately, the British state is not inclined to enforce existing laws: genital mutilation, for example, has been illegal since 1985, but until 2019, no one had been convicted of it. The fear that enforcing the law might be seen as anti-Islamic outweighed the duty to protect predominantly Muslim women and girls. Thus, the British state bears significant responsibility for the persistence of such practices.
Since the first Islamist terrorist attacks in 2005, the British establishment has chosen an old imperial model for dealing with problematic communities: making a deal with self-proclaimed community leaders. In exchange for cooperation in counterterrorism efforts, the state allows them to run their communities as they see fit – even if that means disregarding British law. The agreement also ensures that no public debate occurs on difficult questions related to immigration. It would be unthinkable for a debate on a minaret ban like in Switzerland to take place here, or for a serious politician to propose restrictions on the burqa like in France or Denmark. The same goes for tolerating so-called hate speech: pro-Hamas demonstrators in Whitehall calling for the killing of Jews were neither arrested nor prosecuted.
As an anti-terror strategy, the deal has not been successful. Islamist terrorist attacks still make up the majority of terror incidents. In some communities, the strategy has even fostered fundamentalism: visitors from Muslim countries are often shocked to find that hijabs and niqabs are more widespread in England than in their home countries. The resentment over the state’s double standards extends beyond the policies or practices of some British Muslims. White workers have not failed to notice that they are the only group allowed to be subjected to ethnic slurs – and that it is acceptable for media commentators to mock them as “Gammons” (a slur aimed at a white person’s complexion when passionately expressing their opinions).
These resentments have built up. Their impact was evident in the violent protests, which also included people with no connections to the far-right or sympathies for it.
All publishing rights and copyrights reserved to MENA Research Center.
