MENA Research & Study Center continues to take interest in the European analysis of the MENA region and we had a chance to discuss it with Sara Nowacka, analyst covering Arab states at the Middle East and Africa program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). The interview was conducted by Denys Kolesnyk, French consultant and analyst.
What are the main geopolitical challenges facing the Middle East today?
The fact that we start with this question isn’t surprising at all, because geopolitics is the first thing that comes in mind when we talk about the Middle East. And for a good reason, since there are indeed numerous challenges, many of them overlap with each other. The main challenge, however, is a multitude of actors, and it’s extremely difficult to find even one question to which they would all agree.
Moreover, multiple rivalries in the region also overlap with each other. With this regard, I would distinguish two blocs: the “counter-revolution bloc”, which emerged in 2011 following the Arab Spring and was led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and maybe at that point Egypt. And on the other side, the bloc consisting of Türkiye and Qatar, for instance.
And within these blocs, the states support either other state actors or non-state actors, depending on ideology or idea of a system that, in their opinion, the Middle East should follow. For instance, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE usually oppose the Islamist parties and pro-democratic movements.
A good illustration of this was the recent smooth rise of President Kais Saied in Tunisia, who received support from the actors from the UAE and Egypt, albeit unofficially. Right before he took over, the Ennahda Party ruled in Tunisia. And this party was Islamist, even though not very radical, supported by Qatar and Türkiye.
Another line of division is Iran and the actors opposed to this country. More precisely, Saudi Arabia and Israel oppose Iran and the non-state actors supported politically and financially, but also through training by Tehran. And this division also produces consequences in the kinetic conflicts in Yemen, first and foremost.
Here adds growing tensions in Lebanon, home for the Hezbollah, with the population becoming more and more aggressive towards Israel. And of course, the same happens on the other side. Israel has more and more grievances towards Lebanon. This situation opens the door for below the line interventions that are breaking the agreements that followed the last war between Hezbollah and Israel.
On top of that, there are global actors and rivalries, such as China, Russia, the US and the West in general, present in the region. They support different local countries in the framework of the rivalries we’ve touched upon earlier and use this to advance their own larger scale agendas.
For instance, China and Russia try to use the anti-democratic front in the Middle East because it plays in their favor and they build the relations with Saudi and Egyptian leaders. While these leaders try to diversify their relations, distancing them from the West and trying to look more independent, neutral players. This logic drives them closer to Russia and China.
I’d like to stress that geopolitics itself is a very important threat for the Middle Eastern stability. I mean that the regional state and non-state actors are rather interested by geopolitical challenges, then socio-economic issues that are being often disregarded. Here we can mention important demographic challenges, significant unemployment rate, corruption and bad governance, which go largely unpunished.
Let’s talk about Türkiye where Erdoğan got recently reelected. This country together with Iran and Russia, was and remains engaged in Syria. Could you share your thoughts about how the reelection of Erdoğan may influence the dynamics in Syria, especially given the closer ties between Russia and Iran driven by the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
I think the most important dynamic is turning around the recent inclusion of Syria back to the Arab League and the general idea of normalization with Assad. This also coincides with a certain warming between Ankara and the Arab countries.
After the Arab Spring, there was the rivalry between Türkiye and the counter-revolution bloc I’ve mentioned before. But recently, a certain rapprochement happened between Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye. Most likely the agendas of these actors are coming closer, and Syria is probably one of such issues.
As far as I am concerned, Erdoğan made some suggestions as well, hinting to an idea of normalizing relations with Assad to a certain extent. And it is for obvious reasons, for instance Ankara obviously wants to get rid of the refugees, wants to maintain the buffer zone and limit the influence or the spread of the Kurdish actors in Syria.
Moreover, there is a growing understanding that there is no future of Syria without Assad, whether we agree with it or not. Most likely most of the Middle Eastern actors came to realize this. And they try to find a way to advance their interests in Syria through relations with Assad.
And Iran should be triomphant, isn’t it?
Iran was the first country who supported Assad and they have a long-time relationship that dates back to the time before Bashar Assad, for instance ties with Hezbollah and the previous Syrian regime of Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad. For Tehran it is a continuity of its policies.
The previous approach undertaken by the regional powers aimed at isolating Assad don’t work anymore. Therefore there is a growing need to cooperate with him and try to limit Iranian influence, as well as to present themselves as tangible alternatives through this cooperation. In other words, the question here is whether it’s going to work or not. And, in my opinion, it probably won’t, even though it’s difficult to predict anything when it comes to the Middle East.
One thing is clear, however, is that Syria will not become a strong actor able to have a say in the regional dynamics it used to be prior to 2011. And no matter whether Iran would preserve its strong influence in Syria, this country will probably remain a devastated state as it is at the moment for a long time to come.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has drastically reshaped the Euro-Atlantic space and influenced different states all around the globe to a certain extent. But did it influence the Middle Eastern regional dynamics?
The short answer is yes. The most important influence on the region was the one that we felt globally – economy. This was especially felt in this region given the fact that most of the Middle East states are not doing well economically, except for the GCC states of course.
But even rich Gulf countries have certain vulnerabilities. And one of such vulnerabilities is food. But the rapid growth of grain prices was particularly felt in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, where the financial wellbeing of their citizens is already, I would say, disastrous.
As for the political impact, there were already certain tendencies that the Russian aggression against Ukraine exacerbated in the region. For instance, and we have already touched upon it briefly, is the will that exists among the regional powers to diversify their relationships. And to diversify them in a way to diminish the dependency on the US and the West in general, as well as to forward their own agendas, mostly anti-democratic ones. And the Russian invasion of Ukraine gave them such an opportunity, where adds the China’s drive to establish a multi-polar world, and certain MENA countries see themselves as important players of such a world.
For instance, Mohammed bin Salman sees Saudi Arabia as a country that has the potential to become one of the global leaders, mostly due to their role in the oil markets. And he tried to use this momentum provided by the Russian aggression. The Saudis felt their importance for the world and for the oil market, that grew even more, and decided to stick to this idea and use it for their own benefit.
Saudi Arabia is trying to disconnect itself from the partnership with the US. The partnership that was taken for granted for many years. And it has done so through, first of all, the OPEC agreement and cuts of oil production, but also through some political and symbolic gestures. For instance, Mohammed bin Salman had no particular desire meeting Biden. And when they finally met, the meeting was visibly cold, not bringing any positive outcomes. The Western leaders made certain requests, but most of them remained unfulfilled.
Another interesting aspect is that not only the West tries to influence the events in smaller countries, but also we’ve witnessed certain information operations carried out by the Saudis. For instance, if we look at the Saudi segment of Twitter, we’ll find numerous accounts, most of them obviously bots, spreading different pro-Russian, and sometimes pro-China narratives. In my opinion, Riyadh also wants to establish itself as a more assertive actor in this field as well.
Muhammad bin Salman is using the information space to make his image even stronger among the Arab population in order to unite the Arab youth, already skeptical of the West, behind Saudi Arabia as a future leader of the region, that is not only able to be independent, but even tries to influence the politics in the West. There are several initiatives coming from Saudi Arabia with the aim to support the Republican Party in the US, and obviously Trump, as their most favorable candidate. And the Saudis don’t even hide it. This phenomenon of Saudi Arabia trying to influence the internal politics in the United States is something new.
In addition, there were some reports implying that Egypt had an intention to support Russia militarily. Even though it didn’t happen, Cairo allowed the Russian aircraft to fly over Egyptian territory and deliver arms for the Russian army fighting in Ukraine. This was not necessarily something new, but I think the Middle Eastern states became more bold in the way they expressed their skepticism towards the West that boosts the desire to diversify their relations with the foreign states.
_And it goes through, in this case, basically aligning with Russia to some extent?
To some extent, yes. I don’t think their goal is to become really close partners with Russia, since this country is not an attractive partner. There is not so many financial gains from cooperating with Moscow because it is not strong economically. Russia is not carrying out significant development aid projects, nor it has an input in the mega projects that Egypt, Saudi Arabia or the UAE are implementing, for instance the Neom city or New Cairo.
But Russia remains an important country for them from political standpoint. By cooperating with Moscow they can chose their own partners and that they are no longer not so depend on the West. In other words, they don’t want to be treated as an object of international relations anymore, but rather a subject and they see the growing global competition as an opportunity for them as well.
I understand the logic. The regional powers want to assert their place under the sun. Does the reintegration of Assad’s Syria into the Arab League goes in the same line? And what are the possible implications of this decision for the region?
The first Arab state who launched the idea of cooperating with Assad was the UAE. The first concrete step in this direction was the reopening of its embassy there, paving the was for the process of bilateral normalization with Assad.
However, the decisive factor influencing the normalization with Assad was obviously Russia and its support to the regime. Without it Assad would most probably fall. The survival of Syria’s regime allowed by the Russian intervention shifted the course of events, because before the Russian military intervention, almost all Arab countries were supporting the Syrian opposition.
There was no exception on deciding that Syria cannot be a member of the Arab League anymore with Assad as its leader, because the extent of the crimes committed there was too big even for authoritarian leaders such as king Salman. But the understanding came that it’s going to be too difficult to put an end to the Assad’s regime, especially given the Russian support and the lack of the US tangible reactions, even after the infamous “red line” crossing by using chemical weapons by Assad. It became too obvious that the US does not want to get seriously involved in Syria.
Therefore, the UAE was the first actor who presented an idea that it’s time to admit that Assad is here to stay. Consequently, in order to carry out its agenda in achieving own interests in Syria, it is important to cooperate with Assad because there is no point in further isolation and sanctions, that do more harm than good and prevent the refugees to come back. Other regional leaders followed by adopting this approach.
Speaking of refugees, this issue is of outmost importance for Lebanon that sheltered over a million Syrian refugees, that constitute almost 20% of the population at the moment, while Lebanon itself is in a huge crisis. Here adds another million of Syrian refugees in Jordan and yet again this country is not doing well economically. From their point of view, it becomes obvious that the priority is to stabilize Syria to the extent that would allow them to push the refugees out of their countries without any major controversies. And, of course, there is Türkiye that is not against the normalization with Assad, because Ankara also want to get rid of the refugees.
Another driver behind the normalization logic is the exponential growth of drug smuggling in the region, which started to grow in size in 2016-2017. The main producer and the main smuggler of these drugs is no one else but Assad himself and his family, broadly speaking the Syrian elites. Hence, another significant problem for the regional countries bordering Syria is the influx of drugs. And since they are unstable politically and financially, they don’t have enough tools to counter the smuggling and the growing use of drugs.
But when the drugs reached Saudi Arabia, for whom it became an important problem, especially among youth, Mohammed bin Salman rightly perceived it as a factor that can influence the stability of this country. Given that he has tools and influence, making Saudi Arabia the only actor that can effectively impact the general order in the Middle East. Hence, his decision to include Syria back into the Arab League.
Frankly speaking, I remain skeptical about this decision in terms of bringing a real change in the Syrian situation because the drug issue is not something new. We can trace it back all the way to the Civil War in Lebanon and the Assad family benefiting from drug smuggling and production even back then.
Another aspect of this normalization is hope that this would also help to if not decrease but to limit the Iranian influence in Syria. Here the Arab leaders can even seek help with the West. However, the plausibility of such a scenario remains uncertain, because the support from Tehran has existential importance for Assad. The Iranians also helped him to survive and they keep doing it. Many paramilitary actors have more trust towards Iran or their own small leaders than towards Assad.
The drug production and smuggling will remain high on Assad’s agenda since it help him to have certain leverage over the Arab states and it may also help him to create the same perspective for many European leaders. Given that certain EU countries, for instance Hungary and Italy, are already thinking about normalization with Assad, because they are first of all against accepting more refugees in Europe.
Speaking of European countries, what is the place of the MENA region in Polish foreign policy and who are the key partners for your country?
To put it short, the MENA region doesn’t occupy the central place in the Polish foreign policy. Obviously, the most important places for us are our immediate neighborhood, in other words our partners in Eastern and Western Europe.
But throughout the last five years, the importance of the MENA region has been growing. First and foremost because the Polish government wants to diversify our imports of energy away from Russia. And the key potential actors in this domain are Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
According to our statistics for the last year, the growth of oil from Saudi Arabia was extremely dynamic. And on top of that, even almost two years ago, we signed an agreement with Aramco about the usage of our refineries. There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia will be much more present in the Polish business landscape.
There is also this growing understanding in Poland that we need to diversify our economic relations by trying to look more East and Southward. And this comes from the general dynamic in the economic situation in the world. The so-called Global South countries and the Arab states are those emerging economies and there are growing opportunities for our business over there.
But not only the Polish business shows a growing interest in the region, but our politicians also understand that we cannot simply ignore those opportunities. Different Polish ministers expressed their wish to create stronger economic partnerships with Arab countries and African countries. I think that our relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia set an example.
The Russian aggression against Ukraine also helped the Polish leaders to understand that there is a perception problem related to this conflict, and we were wrong in our expectations of the Middle Eastern and African countries rather siding with the West. Unfortunately it did not happen.
This reality pushed our political elites to be more involved in these regions not only economically or energy-wise, but politically and diplomatically as well. We see that there is the lack of trust regarding the West, there is a growing skepticism, and those countries sadly see the Russian invasion of Ukraine through the Russian lens, as well as through the experiences the MENA countries had, for example, with the US invasion of Iraq.
The is an understanding and agreement amongst the Polish elites that this situation has to be addressed through diplomatic relations. The intensification of such efforts can be seen through the growing number of visits and meetings between the Polish and MENA politicians and diplomats.
And one of the goals of the Polish foreign policy at the moment is an attempt to change this perception of the West as being that actor that only strives assert its hegemony and that has double standards. Unfortunately when we read the Middle Eastern press, this perception and feeling towards the West is an important topic for them. It became visible especially at the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that translated into many negative comments about the West.
Such comments, for instance, concerned the perceived “double standard” approach by the Western countries regarding Ukrainian and Middle Eastern refugees. Here also adds the grievances related to a perceived low interest to the conflicts in the MENA region, whereas there is a lot of European political unity when it comes to Ukraine.
I think there our political elites understand this problem and there is a political will to make an attempt to help improving the well-being of the Arab populations through certain initiatives, for instance aimer at building more trust and connections. And it is worth noting that Russia is quite effectively in this, especially when it comes to creating image of itself as being this anti-Western, anti-imperial actor, and such messaging works well in the MENA region, unfortunately. Even though we know it’s not true, but over there, sad to say, their perspective is a bit different.
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