Amid rising geopolitical tensions, we had the privilege of interviewing Mr. Witold Rodkiewicz, a specialist in Russian foreign policy at the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw. In addition to his analytical work, Mr. Rodkiewicz teaches at the University of Warsaw’s Center for East European Studies. The interview was conducted by Denys Kolesnyk, a French consultant and analyst, for MENA Research Center.
On March 20 after a brief ceasefire the Israel-Gaza conflict escalated once again with Israeli airstrikes and ground operation. We also know that Israel and Russia had quite cordial relations regarding Syria and the regional affairs. And since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Israel refused to deliver weapons and had quite favorable stance towards Russia. How would you explain why this conflict has been resumed and what are the interests and positions of key world and regional powers?
This renewed offensive against Hamas reflects the desire to finish the work that was started earlier. I think the Israeli leadership is not willing to tolerate or put up with the survival of Hamas in Gaza. And this is a reflection, or rather a result, and a consequence of the support that this policy line has gained in Washington D.C. under the Trump administration. The United States clearly gave a green light to this operation, and it also reflects a shift in focus in American policy.
We can see this as a clear reflection of a shift in the US administration’s interests. Looking at Europe and the Middle East, it’s clear that Middle Eastern issues are taking priority. From that point of view, the Trump administration’s willingness and desire to end the conflict, to end the Russo-Ukrainian war, and to withdraw its support for European security, while at the same time intensifying pressure on Iran, are all part of this shift. As you know, the renewal of military action against the Houthis in Yemen also reflects this approach.
In the Middle East, Moscow has always played a rather complex game. Or rather while it was complicated on one level; on another, it was simple. It was simple in the sense that its strategic aim has been, and still is, to weaken the position of the US and create problems for it. But Russia has played very skilfully with various actors, leveraging its position effectively. Its relationship with Israel is one of the successful exemples of Russian Middle Eastern policy. There has been a widespread belief in Israel that it should maintain a pragmatic relationship with Moscow, as Israel must not by its actions alienate Russia so as not to provoke its hostile actions against itself.
And when it comes to Israel, I think there are two layers behind their approach to Russia. First, there is a rational calculation based on a narrow view of Israeli national interests. But there is also another factor. When I was in Israel and spoke with different experts, officials, and journalists, I noticed an underlying element: the presence of a large Russian-speaking community of Israelis — immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Russia — who are culturally Russian and hold many illusions about Russia, often due to a sentimental attachment. I have even encountered a popular belief that Putin would not allow anything to seriously harm Israel. And these two elements are still at play.
And we are smoothly transitioning to our second question. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria marks a significant shift in the region’s power dynamics, especially concerning Iran’s strategic influence. How does this development reshape alliances in the Middle East and impacts the Russian influence?
These things are interrelated, especially when we talk about Russian interests. Clearly, for Moscow, the loss of a client regime was a major blow. It also affects the delicate balance between Russia and Turkey. The Turks have gained the upper hand again, strengthening their position in the region relative to Russia. A previous development that also benefited Turkey was Azerbaijan’s successful reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh.
But it is also interesting to see how pragmatically the Russian leadership has reacted to this. Now, they are trying to determine which actors have an interest in keeping Russia involved, including the new leadership in Damascus. The Russians have made several important gestures. For example, they delivered the currency that had been printed in Russia for Assad’s regime but was still in Moscow. By handing it over, they effectively treated the new HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) administration as the legal successor, entitled to the benefits of contracts signed by the previous government. The clear objective here is to secure the Russian military bases, which remain strategically important. However, it is unclear how operational they currently are.
I suspect the Russians are prepared to renegotiate the treaties governing their basing rights. These treaties were essentially neocolonial in nature, heavily favouring Russia. Now, they will have to be revised. Strangely enough, the current leadership in Damascus appears to be willing to maintain ties with Russia rather than sever them outright. They seem to be exploring ways to preserve and even leverage their relationship with Moscow against other regional players. This is precisely the kind of diplomatic game that Russian officials excel at. As a result, discussions about the continuation of Russian bases are ongoing. The Russians have lost ground, but not entirely. They are working to salvage what they can and maintain a presence at the negotiating table, even though their influence has clearly diminished.
But one particularly unexpected and counterintuitive development involves Israel. According to reports, which may or may not be accurate but sound credible, Israel urged Washington not to pressure the new Syrian government to expel Russian bases. It appears that Israel sees Russia’s presence as a counterbalance to Turkish influence. Turkey, after all, has been the biggest beneficiary of the regime change in Damascus, given its ties to the HTS and their ideological and religious connections.
The situation remains dynamic, and the Russians still have some cards to play. One key issue is the Kurdish autonomous or semi-autonomous region that emerged during the Syrian civil war. It remains unclear what the Americans intend to do, as they were the primary backers of this entity. The Russians, however, have a firm stance: they believe the Kurdish region should remain part of Syria. This gives them a bargaining chip. They can either assist the new Syrian government or choose to restrain themselves from supporting the Kurds. This, in turn, could be used as leverage against Turkey.
However, the most pressing issue right now is not Syria, but Iran — specifically, what happens between Iran, the Trump administration, and Israel. The Russians are actively trying to influence the US against an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Just yesterday there was a statement from the Kremlin affirming that they believe Iran is not attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Of course, it is unlikely that Washington will be satisfied with such assurances, but the point is clear.
Russia is reverting to a familiar strategy that has worked for the past 25 years: positioning itself as a useful intermediary between Tehran and Washington. Iran hopes that Russia will deter the US, while Washington hopes that Moscow will influence Teheran. The Kremlin, in turn, seeks to maximise its leverage and diplomatic advantage from this triangular dynamic. This is a classic Russian approach, but the Trump administration presents a new variable. Unlike previous Democratic administrations, which would not have considered a full-scale attack on Iran, the Trump administration is seen as more willing to take drastic action. This perception alone changes the strategic landscape.
As for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I don’t believe there is any real risk of escalation. The Arab states have no intention of intervening to defend the Palestinians in Gaza or elsewhere — that is simply out of the question. Iran, weakened as it is, is also not in a position to take action. A strike on Iran, however, could be a major destabilising event.
Returning to Russia’s interests, this instability in the Middle East actually works in their favour. Since February 2022, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian foreign policy has been entirely subordinated to the needs of its war against Ukraine and the West. Everything else is secondary, serving only to advance the central goal: subjugating Ukraine to Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions. And give a bloody nose to the West in the process.
So, from that point of view, the escalation in the Middle East and US military engagement against Iran would be quite advantageous for Russia. The perceived need for Israel to maintain good relations with Russia is also a plus, as it prevents Israel from providing any military aid to Ukraine.
From this perspective, things are looking favorable for the Russians — not because they manufactured or orchestrated this situation, but because it is an objective reality that they are skilled at exploiting. They have a knack for taking advantage of such opportunities and broader geopolitical trends.
Given recent geopolitical shifts and US policy changes, including Marco Rubio’s statements at the Munich Security Conference and Trump’s provocative stance toward the EU, how would you describe the American position in negotiations with Russia regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war? What are Russia’s objectives, given that Ukraine remains independent despite its initial aims? And with the EU taking a more active role — through initiatives like “Rearm Europe” — how do key players like France, Germany, and Poland position themselves in these negotiations?
Let me start with what I think is the most important issue here. Following your lead, it’s really difficult to determine the objectives — especially the medium-term objectives — of the Trump administration.
Taking a broad view, it seems that the overarching philosophy of its foreign policy is to reduce the financial burden on US taxpayers. In simple terms, this administration appears to be pursuing a retrenchment strategy — scaling back America’s role as the key global power that has structured, policed, and enforced the international order since World War II.
In this case, economic factors do play a significant role. If we compare the US share of global GDP in 1945 to today, the difference is staggering — it was 40–50% back then, whereas today it’s around 15%. Hence, despite Trump’s personal traits of character and unconventional behaviour, there is a certain logic to this approach.
Part of this strategy involves reducing confrontation with Russia to cut costs and refocus on other priorities, such as the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, there’s a deeply entrenched but, in my view, fundamentally mistaken belief in some US circles that it’s possible to break or loosen the Russia-China partnership — essentially pulling Russia away from China in this growing rivalry between two global powers.
In the short run, Trump’s motivation seems to be fulfilling his electoral promise to end the war and claim a PR victory. What remains unclear is how far Trump personally — and his administration — is willing to go in making concessions to Russia to achieve this.
And this brings us to the key issue, which I think is still widely misunderstood in the West: the radical nature of Russian objectives. This is not about territorial disputes over a few regions in Ukraine. Russia’s fundamental goal is to end Ukrainian independence and integrate Ukraine into its neo-imperial vision.
From that perspective, Trump’s hope for a compromise is completely unrealistic. Russia has only entered these negotiations because, at best, it has a faint hope — though likely not a strong belief — that it can pressure Trump into conceding everything it wants and then force Ukraine to accept the terms. More realistically, Russia is using negotiations as a cover —a veneer of diplomacy — while continuing its military operations.
Another key objective for Russia is to exploit divisions between the US and its European allies, driving a wedge between them. It also hopes to extract concessions from Washington, such as improved relations, partial sanctions relief, or a weaker U.S. commitment to enforcing existing sanctions — something we’re already seeing signs of.
The Russian terms in these negotiations are completely unrealistic and unenforceable, which further suggests that Moscow is using them as a smokescreen. Moscow understands that to achieve its true objectives, it must break Ukraine’s spirit — both among its leadership and its people — convincing them that submission to Russia is a lesser evil than continued resistance.
To accomplish this, Russia aims to achieve a total military victory, destroy Ukraine’s capacity to fight, and ultimately impose regime change in Kyiv. Given this, a ceasefire is unlikely — Russia has no interest in stopping the war. If it believes it is winning, why would it agree to a ceasefire? It is far more advantageous to continue negotiations while maintaining military pressure, using battlefield gains as leverage.
It’s such a basic common-sense issue that I find it very difficult to understand how, in Europe, we’ve been having discussions for a year about sending troops after a ceasefire. What ceasefire? I always wonder.
The assumption that there will be a ceasefire is absurd. The Russians have a phrase for this — “pink pony world”. It’s a fantasy world in which European elites have lived, continue to live, and seemingly refuse to leave.
This whole situation serves as a cover for Russian operations — an attempt to divide Europeans and Americans while extracting concessions from Trump in exchange for vague promises of cooperation against Iran or China. But these promises are difficult to translate into concrete actions. It’s obvious that Russia will not act against Iran in any way that harms its relationship with Tehran. And even less likely — completely out of the question — is that Russia would help the US against China or weaken its ties with Beijing, which have only grown more beneficial since the start of the war.
I recently came across something notable for the first time in a semi-official Russian publication — the latest issue of International Affairs, a journal published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An article co-authored by the Deputy Rector of the Diplomatic Academy discusses US-Russia relations and contains a striking statement: if there is a conflict over Taiwan between China and the US, Russia will not remain neutral. The article explicitly states that Russia will not forget the “helping hand” China extended after the start of the so-called “special military operation”. I must say, unless I missed something, this is the first time I have seen such a clear declaration in a Russian publication.
By the way, yesterday there was a European Council meeting, and the plan put forward by the Estonian High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs, Mrs. Kallas, was shut down — blocked by a very unlikely coalition: Italy, France, Slovakia, and Spain. Speaking of the European Union ramping up its defences, based on previous experience, I’m very skeptical. I’ve watched the EU attempt to establish various military defence mechanisms since 1999. That year, at the Helsinki summit, there were “headline goals” about creating a military standby force capable of being deployed at short notice — but nothing happened.
The EU is hesitant by nature. It is, at its core, an economic cooperation organisation; it was never designed to handle military or defence strategy. And so far, its actions have fallen well below what is actually needed. We are three years behind — the war started three years ago, and in some ways, it began 11 years ago in 2014. The first real warning should have been in 2008 with the Russian invasion of Georgia. But after that, key European players decided it was time for a reset — Nord Stream 2, a partnership for modernisation, and all kinds of misguided initiatives. Hence, let’s hope this new effort results in something practical — something that actually improves the ability of European armed forces to deter Russia. But I’m not very optimistic.
Could you provide an overview of Poland’s stance on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, as well as its position on the ongoing discussions within the European Union regarding rearmament and strengthening defence capabilities?
In Poland, despite the very polarised political landscape, there is definitely a consensus among the main political forces on a few key points. First, Russia is a fundamental and strategic threat to Polish independence. In the current situation, I think people have finally started to accept that we cannot dismiss the possibility of a direct military attack on parts of Polish territory. This is clearly reflected in Poland’s defence spending, which stands at 5% of GDP — one of the highest in the Western world. And it’s been at that level for a few years already. I think that tells a lot, because we spend more and take this seriously, unlike some of our allies and neighbours.
That, of course, also means that, for us, the resistance of the Ukrainian nation against Russian aggression is absolutely crucial for our own defence and security. It directly contributes to our security because it buys us time to prepare for what may come next. And this ties into another key issue — there is growing acceptance that Russian ambitions extend beyond the former Soviet territory.
This shouldn’t have come as a surprise. The Russians have been saying it openly, at least since December 2021, when they presented their draft treaties to the US and to NATO. Since then, they have repeatedly stated that this is not just a war about Ukraine — it is a war about the security architecture of Europe. Their logic is simple: they claim, “We started this war against Ukraine because you refused our demands in December 2021”. So the question is, once they finish with Ukraine, what stops them from applying the same logic elsewhere? If we refuse to comply with their demands, the next step may follow. At the very least, we have to take this possibility into account.
From this perspective, there is broad consensus in Poland that Ukrainians are fighting in our national interest. This is reflected in Poland’s significant military aid to Ukraine. We have delivered a substantial amount of heavy military equipment in the first years of the war, effectively reducing our own stocks and arsenals. Now, we need to restock, because the longer this war lasts, the more likely it is that there will be further escalation. So, now the question is: what can we afford to give, and what must we keep in case of what comes next?
It’s important to remember that Russia doesn’t need to go through Ukraine to reach Poland. We share a direct border with the Russian Kaliningrad enclave. Belarus, now fully integrated into Russian military planning, hosts Russian forces on its territory. Securing and preparing for the defence of our northern and northeastern borders is therefore a practical necessity. This means building up forces, stockpiling ammunition, and strengthening defence infrastructure.
Like many other European countries, Poland spent years focusing on building expeditionary forces for missions in Afghanistan, rather than preparing for a large-scale conventional war in our own region. For two decades, no one was shaping their armed forces for traditional, large-scale conflicts. We now have a lot of catching up to do. I’m not privy to classified information, and I’m not a military specialist, but it’s just common sense that we have a lot of homework to do to be fully prepared.
The hope is that if we demonstrate that we take defence seriously, it will influence decision-making in the Kremlin. Despite its aggressive behaviour, Russia’s leadership is rational in certain respects and responds to hard facts. Showing strength is the best way to avoid the worst-case scenario.
That’s why Poland is also actively supporting every effort within the European Union and other international forums to push our partners to provide military and financial aid to Ukraine. This has become a routine part of Polish diplomatic efforts. I’ve seen firsthand that Polish embassies in Europe and beyond are working daily to shape public opinion and advocate for continued support. Spain, for example, is one such case, among others.
And finally, I’d like to stress that there is an awareness that we are all in the same boat. The Ukrainian part of the boat may be burning now, while Polish is still intact — but we are all in it together.
