By Ahmed Al-Rimh
Summary:
This paper delves into the transformation of Hamas, a movement that initially advocated for Palestinian national liberation, driven by a religious ideology, into a pawn manipulated by Iran to demonstrate its expanding influence, transcending geographical boundaries. Iran’s strategic support transformed Hamas into a tool to exert its authority not only on the outskirts of Israel, but within its borders.
In this analysis, we will examine how Hamas became an extension of Iranian policy, implementing its agenda through a combination of financial backing and propaganda. We will also shed light on the pivotal role of Yahya Sinwar in steering Hamas toward a cozy relationship with Iran, discussing the pragmatic approach of Hamas that went beyond the Palestinian cause, culminating in a catastrophic outcome for Gaza’s people and land, particularly following the events of October 7.
Our discussion will revolve around the following key points:
Key Points:
- From Ambiguous Relationship to Subservience to Iran
- The Role of Yahya Sinwar in Hamas’ Embrace of Iran
- Hamas’ Pragmatic Stance
- Unraveling Hamas’ Loyalty Shifts
- Why Did Hamas Lean Toward Iran?
- Hamas And the Assad Regime: From Opposition to Alliance
- Disappointments and Reassessments
- The Iranian Vessel That Sunk Hamas
- The Future of Hamas: Where Will It Head Next?
From Ambiguous Relationship to Subservience to Iran
The relationship between Hamas and Iran remained ambiguous, with a tendency to wait for military developments on the ground in Syria. Until the start of the Israeli war on Gaza on July 8, 2014, the relations between the two sides were cautious in terms of media releases, but on the ground, they had come to a halt. Iran had stopped all its support for the Gaza government, in addition to its special financial support for the Al-Qassam Brigades. After the war, a notable event was a press conference held by Abu Ubaida, the spokesperson of the Al-Qassam Brigades, who stated that the victory achieved in Gaza was primarily due to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
With this statement, Hamas was attempting to rekindle its relationship with Iran, especially as the war in Gaza had left huge economic disasters in its wake. Hamas was in need of rebuilding this relationship, which had been the subject of a long-standing internal debate, particularly within the camp led by Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahar, who was inclined to settle this debate.
Until the beginning of 2015, Hamas was struggling with a severe financial crisis, and internal leaks suggested that the military wing wanted to restore relations with Iran. The starting point came at the end of March that year, when conflicts erupted between armed factions in the Yarmouk camp, ultimately resulting in the control of the Islamic State (ISIS) over much of the camp. The fighters of the Aknaf movement were forced to retreat to the entrance of the Yarmouk camp, where they eventually sought refuge with the militia of Ahmad Jibril, their former enemies who had been besieging the camp.
Following this, the fighters of the Aknaf movement were transferred to areas under the control of the Syrian regime, while their families were relocated to secondary schools for girls near the Al-Bashir mosque, which was under the control of the Syrian regime. Later, everyone was moved to areas near the town of Yalda, which was subject to reconciliation agreements, except for the commander of the Aknaf brigade, Al-Mashir, who was arrested and appeared on Syrian television, confessing to the role of Hamas in the formation of the Aknaf movement.
The real controversy began immediately after this incident when Ahmed Jibril announced that Khaled Meshaal had personally contacted him and requested protection and assistance for the Aknaf fighters. Jibril made this statement in front of Palestinian faction leaders in Damascus, in the presence of Ahmed Majdalani, the Palestinian Authority minister responsible for the Yarmouk camp file, who subsequently went to the media with this information. This revelation indicated a significant shift in Hamas’s stance—from opposing the regime to having this brigade within regime-controlled areas.
However, on April 13, Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri, according to several agencies, denied this claim. Later, Mushir al-Masri, the official Hamas spokesperson, also denied any connection between Hamas and the Aknaf Brigades. This statement clarified Hamas’s stance and defined its future steps, signaling at the time that Hamas was beginning to distance itself from military involvement in supporting the Syrian uprising.
The Role of Yahya Sinwar in Hamas’ Embrace of Iran
On February 14, 2017, the Arabi 21 website published a report titled, “What Does Hamas Electing Sinwar as the Movement’s Leader in Gaza Mean?” The report presented various opinions, emphasizing that the coming period would witness a strong revival of relations between Hamas and Tehran. Sinwar himself later confirmed this in a press conference, declaring the restoration of ties between Hamas and Iran to their former state. However, the reality of this relationship was not as Sinwar described. By the end of May that year, financial ties were still strained, impacting even Iranian-funded media outlets such as Al-Quds TV, and leaving Gaza’s government without financial support. Hamas attempted to offset this through increased taxes on Gaza’s residents.
Meanwhile, Iran resumed its financial support—albeit sporadically—for the Qassam Brigades. This selective funding raised questions in Gaza about why Iranian aid was directed exclusively toward the Qassam Brigades, bypassing other Hamas-affiliated institutions, including those tied to the movement itself. Was this an Iranian tactic to pressure Hamas’s political wing for more concessions? Or was it part of Iran’s broader strategy, akin to its methods in Syria and Iraq? Iran’s approach often involves building multiple militias loyal to Tehran, ensuring greater control over these groups while preventing their unification to avoid creating a force that could challenge its authority.
For Iran, the Palestinian issue is merely a tool to justify its deepening influence in Arab countries, perpetuating chaos, sectarian conflict, and destruction.
Hamas’s Pragmatic Stance
Hamas operates in Gaza as though it were a small sect, not as a movement with broad geographical roots. By this, we mean that the core philosophy of Hamas centers on the survival of the movement itself, placing the nation and its people as the least of its concerns. In fact, the nation and its citizens are not off-limits to being sacrificed for the sake of the movement’s continuity—exactly what transpired after the “October 7 Raid.”
A stark example of this came from Mahmoud al-Zahar, one of Hamas’s leaders, who spoke of Palestine in a manner that revealed an inherent inferiority complex. His statements highlighted the pragmatic foundations of Hamas, which some mistakenly believe to represent a broader national or Islamic project. In reality, the movement is singularly focused on its own survival and perpetuation.
This pragmatic approach has turned Hamas into a pawn serving Iranian policy in Palestine. The culmination of this was the ill-fated adventure of the “October 7 Raid,” orchestrated under Iranian influence. Iran exploited Yahya Sinwar’s recklessness and Hamas’s financial desperation to initiate the raid, based on the flawed assumption that Arab nations would rally behind Hamas, turning it into the long-dreamed “liberation battle.” Arab governments, however, saw through the ploy, refrained from intervening, and left Gaza devastated, displacing its already beleaguered population under Hamas’s rule.
While Gaza suffered catastrophic destruction, Iran remained passive, instead directing its more powerful proxy, Hezbollah, to engage with Israel. Hezbollah, too, faced severe consequences, including the dismantling of its military infrastructure and the elimination of key leaders, leaving it almost entirely incapacitated militarily.
Hamas’s alignment with Iran under Sinwar’s leadership transformed the movement from a self-proclaimed liberation force into a tool of Iranian geopolitics, sacrificing its original mission and the Palestinian cause in the process.
Unraveling Hamas’ Loyalty Shifts
The philosophy underpinning Hamas’s behavior remains elusive to some. How can a movement undergo such dramatic shifts in its political stance without its leaders showing any sense of embarrassment? Even more striking is the blind adherence of its core base to these transformations, with little to no significant internal dissent recorded throughout the movement’s history. There has been no widespread or impactful opposition, nor any substantive critiques capable of pushing Hamas toward meaningful internal reviews to safeguard its structural integrity.
This can be summarized by noting that Hamas has built its internal framework on a “herd mentality” approach. Within this system, the individual member is stripped of independent thought, reduced to a mere receiver and recorder. From the outset, members are indoctrinated into a state of intellectual inferiority, convinced that those above them are infallible and immune to error. This phenomenon is not unique to Hamas but is characteristic of all Islamist jihadist organizations.
As for Hamas itself, the root of its erratic and peculiar behavior lies in its functioning more as a small sect rather than a movement, despite its geographical reach. At its core, Hamas’s philosophy centers on the survival of the movement, with the nation and its people becoming secondary concerns—if considered at all. As previously noted, this survivalist mentality prioritizes the interests of the movement over any broader national or humanitarian considerations.
Why Did Hamas Lean Toward Iran?
Small political entities, upon their emergence, often seek an audience willing to listen to them. For Hamas, Iran was the closest party willing to lend an ear. At the time, Hamas was merely a group of individuals with a bundle of ideas, completely unaware of political frameworks. Consequently, it threw itself into Iran’s embrace. This move was also a result of its inability to take control of the Palestinian project, which was globally recognized as being led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Hamas, under the illusion that Iran was a rising power to which it could attach itself, believed it had found a means for its survival and continuity. This highlights the opportunistic nature of Hamas. It was fully aware that Arab states had never sought to take hold of the Palestinian file. Thus, from its inception, Hamas presented itself and its project as the Islamic Palestinian alternative. However, there is more to the story.
Since its early days, Hamas positioned itself as a replacement for the PLO, particularly after Yasser Arafat’s exit from Damascus. It entrenched itself in rhetoric that vilified the organization while glorifying the Assad regime—a regime with a history of atrocities such as the Tel al-Zaatar massacre and numerous other camp wars, including those led by Amal Movement, alongside sieges, starvation, and displacement.
The Assad regime became Hamas’s first Arab ally for one primary reason: Hafez al-Assad was the only Arab leader who openly antagonized Yasser Arafat. This was precisely the opportunity Iran seized upon, especially given Arafat’s rejection of Iranian demands prior to his departure from Beirut. Hamas, on the other hand, was willing to offer everything—absolutely everything.
Over time, Hamas turned a blind eye to the atrocities committed by Iranian-backed militias against Palestinians in Iraq, including killings, rapes, and other documented violations. This marked the beginning of an unholy alliance between Hamas, presenting itself as an additional militia ready for service, and Iran, the creator and backer of such militias.
Hamas And the Assad Regime: From Opposition to Alliance
The question that puzzles everyone: Why did Hamas stand against the Assad regime? The answer is simple and clear—it’s the “survival complex” that drives the movement. Hamas believed that Assad’s regime was on the verge of collapse, similar to what happened with the regimes of Mubarak, Gaddafi, al-Bashir, and Saleh. This indeed seemed likely at the time. However, Hamas failed to realize that its involvement in the Syrian conflict, along with the emergence of extremist factions, would ultimately prolong the Assad regime’s survival.
This same illusion persists in the mindset of Hamas’s leadership today. The experimental nature of their actions, typical of many Islamist movements, lacks precise political awareness. Now, Hamas seeks to return to Assad’s embrace, much as it previously believed its survival depended on contributing to his downfall. Today, Hamas lives under the same delusion, believing that aligning with the Assad regime will ensure its continuity, especially under the assumption that the world is working to rehabilitate Assad’s regime.
This mirrors Hamas’s perception of Iranian power, which it imagines to be an immutable force resistant to international will. The oscillation in Hamas’s behavior becomes clearer when viewed through this lens: a trajectory based on illusions that align solely with the interests fabricated in the minds of its leaders. This very approach was openly acknowledged by Sinwar in one of his public speeches, recorded and documented.
Disappointments and Reassessments
When Khaled Meshaal announced Hamas’s review document from Qatar, the movement expected the world to embrace it the very next day. Hamas failed to grasp that it would not succeed in establishing a new political entity in Gaza. The document could have held some value had it been presented within the Palestinian framework, aiming to unify Palestinian efforts under a single political project. Such a project would pursue the Palestinian demand for statehood through a peaceful process under international sponsorship.
However, Hamas’s document was detached from this vision. Instead, it sought to compel the world to open its doors to Hamas, which was never going to happen. This is where Hamas turned again toward the Iranian axis, despite the fact that communications between Iran and the Qassam Brigades were never entirely severed. The Qassam Brigades, too, operate under a political philosophy rooted in a grand illusion: their belief that their existence and continuous development of military capabilities in Gaza is a divine mission that will ultimately lead to a military victory over Israel.
This delusion mirrors the mindset seen in other Islamist movements, which view their triumph as inevitable based on their perception of themselves rather than the realities around them. From Afghanistan to Algeria, Somalia, Mali, Syria, and Gaza, the shared obsessions and outcomes are evident. These Islamist groups remain isolated within their own conceptual worlds, detached from the broader geographical, historical, and international realities.
The Iranian Vessel That Sunk Hamas
If Hamas operates as a sect focused solely on its survival and fearful of its surroundings, it is only natural that it clings to the leaking Iranian boat. It is also unsurprising that Hamas aligns itself with the Assad regime, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, or that it shuts down movements like Harakat al-Sabirin in Gaza, taking on its role instead. This allows Hamas’s media to present Iran as the only state capable of leading the so-called Islamic Ummah project.
Thus, Hamas finds itself trapped between the mindset of an isolated sect, alienated from the Arab world and fearful of the future, and the illusion of protection through Iran’s grand, yet hollow, project.
The Future of Hamas: Where Will It Head Next?
Hamas has undeniably led Gaza and its people to the brink of disaster and is steering Palestinian refugees in Syria toward a new catastrophe. Under Assad’s regime, Hamas’s expected role is no different from that of other militias like Ahmad Jibril’s faction—serving as yet another tool for the regime. Hamas has little time left to hesitate; the Palestinian cause, which Hamas handed over to Iran, has reached a dead end. This has fragmented the Arab public and left Hamas’s leaders with no choice but to return and grovel at Assad’s feet—a fate shared by all those who exploit religion for political gain.
It is worth reminding Gaza’s leaders, who cry out _Wa Mu’tasimah and invoke tales of al-Mu’tasim’s army riding on white horses, that they have ignored the voices of Palestinian women detained and raped in Assad’s prisons. The names and locations of these women are well known to Hamas’s leadership. From their tunnels, these leaders failed to witness the suffering of Gaza’s people, victims of Yahya Sinwar’s reckless decisions that brought total devastation to Gaza.
As for Syria’s wounded people, or those in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere, there is no point in asking Hamas’s leaders. They abandoned their own people—so whom do they claim to represent?
