On February 19, 2024, the European Union launched the Aspides naval force, a new maritime mission organized to address the increasing instability in the Red Sea and complement ongoing operations led by the United States. This launch followed the escalation of Houthi attacks on global shipping amidst the war in the Gaza Strip. The mission’s mandate balances differing approaches among European nations, with some participating in air and missile strikes against Yemeni Houthis, while others prefer a more defensive stance. Beyond the current crisis, the mission aims to enhance the EU’s long-term maritime strategy (which prioritizes the northwest Indian Ocean), strengthen diplomatic efforts to maintain robust relations with Arab countries, and support the EU’s ambitions towards establishing an independent defense strategy.
Despite varying stances on the Gaza war and other issues, European countries reached an agreement in January 2023 to establish this naval mission, amidst increasing disruptions to navigation in the Red Sea. Ships owned and operated by European companies (e.g., Denmark’s Maersk) have been targeted by the Houthis since the outbreak of the conflict. The Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf are critical, accounting for about 12% of global trade and 40% of trade between Asia and Europe. Continued disturbances could threaten European strategic interests.
Seven EU countries are participating in the mission, headquartered in Greece due to its significant role in global shipping. However, Italy and France, which hoped to lead the mission, are contributing only one ship each instead of the initially proposed three. Similarly, Spain decided not to participate in the mission, citing extensive commitments to overseas missions.
This initiative runs parallel to the current U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian, which includes several European countries, notably Denmark, Greece, and the Netherlands. France and Italy are also part of this mission, although they operate in the region under their national command.
The mission is led by Commodore Vassilios Gribaras, while Italy appointed Admiral Stefano Costantino as the force commander. Rome has a notable record of advanced naval deployments in territorial waters, with its warships frequently contributing to European naval missions in the northwest Indian Ocean. Interestingly, Costantino served as the commander of the European Maritime Awareness Force in the Strait of Hormuz mission between June 2022 and January 2023, showcasing his familiarity with the operational environment in the region.
The Aspides fleet aligns with the mission’s focus on anti-air warfare. The French frigate Alsace, the Italian destroyer Caio Duilio, the German frigate Hessen, and the Greek frigate Hydra are all equipped with advanced weapon systems, including short- and long-range surface-to-air missiles. These versatile warships are capable of countering a wide range of threats posed by the Houthis. They also have strong early detection capabilities and helicopters, enhancing their ability to conduct aerial and surface surveillance operations.
The mission covers a maritime area twice the size of the landmass of the 27 EU countries. A journey between the farthest points of this space takes ten days. Therefore, the naval forces focus on the “high-risk area” off the coast of Yemen, specifically in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea. Ships travel here for approximately two days when heading to the Suez Canal to enter the Mediterranean Sea. Sources revealed that the budget for the European mission’s fleet, Aspides, is 8 million euros, funded by the EU treasury.
Why Europe decided to participate in the security mission
Freedom of navigation has long been a priority for the European Union. With increasing disputes over key checkpoints and essential maritime routes, the EU designated the northwest Indian Ocean as a “maritime area of importance” in 2022, covering a vast expanse from the Strait of Hormuz to the Tropic of Capricorn and from the Red Sea towards the central Indian Ocean. This necessitated increased European maritime coordination through a mechanism known as the “Coordinated Maritime Presence” (CMP).
This aligns with the EU’s sustained interest in the northwest Indian Ocean since the beginning of its maritime integration efforts. In 2008, amidst rising threats and instability in the Horn of Africa, the EU launched Operation Atalanta, a naval mission with a current mandate to combat piracy, drug and arms trafficking, and protect World Food Programme shipments and other vulnerable shipping operations.
In the Arabian Gulf, France led eight other European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal) in launching a dedicated maritime surveillance mission in 2020 aimed at ensuring safe passage in the Strait of Hormuz. This initiative, headquartered at the French naval base in Abu Dhabi, includes a diplomatic track (EMASoH) and a military track (Operation Agenor). Paris has sought a more active role in regional maritime security since the “Tanker War” of the 1980s when it independently deployed a carrier strike group to the Gulf, making its leadership in EMASoH/Agenor and other initiatives significant.
Concerned about the economic repercussions of ongoing instability, some EU member states initially supported Operation Prosperity Guardian, sending a Greek frigate to the Red Sea together with Dutch and Danish staff officers. However, some early European supporters withdrew from the U.S.-led task force once the EU established its own security mechanism, Operation Aspides. A major reason driving Brussels to design a qualitatively different response, emphasizing restraint while ensuring strong defensive guarantees, was the concern that escalating U.S.-led air raids in Yemen could lead to a broader regional war.
According to the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, Operation Aspides is based on a purely defensive stance. Grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2722, which calls for a complete halt to Houthi attacks and affirms the right of ships to self-defense against imminent threats, the mission’s mandate revolves around three core de-escalation tasks. First, it provides close protection for commercial vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz Straits. Second, it enhances maritime situational awareness in and around the Red Sea by providing military and civilian vessels with an accurate understanding of activities that could affect security, safety, economy, or the environment. Third, it conducts defensive kinetic actions against diverse threats to freedom of navigation.
Challenges facing the mission
One of the primary challenges for the new mission, Operation Aspides, lies in its rules of engagement. These are designed to support a policy of de-escalation and freedom of navigation with a defensive mandate. This reflects widespread European caution regarding the cost-benefit ratio, requiring the mission to maintain a delicate balance between its goal of de-escalation and the use of military force. As a result, the campaign’s impact may be limited, targeting only drones and missiles rather than the sources of fire.
Coordination presents another operational challenge for Aspides, as participants will need to communicate with two other European naval missions in the region (Atalanta and Agenor) as well as US-led initiatives. The creation of Aspides partly stems from Spain’s reluctance to expand the Atalanta mission into the Red Sea amid the current regional crisis. Once the situation stabilizes and political risks diminish, it may be easier to reorganize existing initiatives, potentially merging Atalanta and Aspides.
The EU fleet may face challenges in performing continuous force protection duties, especially in high-intensity combat scenarios involving multilayered attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. The potential increase in the number of Houthi missiles and drone swarms could quickly deplete ammunition stocks. The scarcity of EU naval assets ready for rapid deployment and the complexity of rearming warships far from home ports strain the coordination activities undertaken by the EU command.
Additionally, militarizing the waters of the Red Sea and its surroundings does not guarantee comprehensive and effective defense of maritime trade routes, as evidenced by the sinking of the UK-owned cargo ship Robimar and the death of three sailors aboard the Greek ship True Confidence, which was hit by a Houthi missile. With an operational area spanning several thousand nautical miles and a mission limited to four warships, Aspides is likely to focus on escorting vessels through regional chokepoints.
Politically, Operation Aspides remains vulnerable to the complex interaction between the often-competitive behavior of EU member states and the political agenda pursued by Brussels. Despite no member objecting to the creation of the naval mission, differing perceptions within the EU bloc about the best tools to counter the Houthi threat could undermine efforts to build an effective long-term EU naval force. The fact that some EU member states with proven naval capabilities have so far refrained from contributing military assets to the operation highlights this risk.
Furthermore, Brussels needs to communicate the mission’s end goals effectively to regional actors. Fearful of Houthi retaliation targeting high-value local targets and jeopardizing the fragile thaw with Iran, the EU’s traditional security partners in the Arabian Peninsula, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have sought to distance themselves from any political association with foreign naval forces. However, Gulf states have much to gain from the restoration of freedom of navigation, as the success of ongoing economic reforms and ambitious “vision” plans largely depends on a stable regional maritime environment. To this end, the EU needs to convince regional partners of the non-escalatory nature of its military presence while addressing their concerns about specific threats.
Conclusions
- Although Operation Aspides is unlikely to fully restore deterrence and prevent all Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, it demonstrates that the European Union possesses the naval capabilities and political will to pursue its geostrategic interests independently of US-led military engagements.
- The Houthis are likely to remain a significant force as long as Israel’s war in Gaza continues and regional tensions persist. Thus, Brussels must address the shortcomings of Operation Aspides if it aims to meaningfully enhance its credentials as a reliable global naval power.
- Operation Aspides is relatively risky. German Naval Inspector Jan Christian Kaack notes that Houthi attacks with missiles, drones, and remotely controlled “suicide boats” pose significant threats. He recently described this as “the most dangerous deployment of a German naval unit in many decades.” However, these risks are manageable. Kaack stated, “No unit in the German Navy is better prepared, trained, and equipped for this purpose.”
- The EU’s Aspides mission has provided escort to 68 vessels and repelled eleven attacks in its first seven weeks. Nine drones were shot down in the air, one on water, and four anti-ship ballistic missiles were intercepted, according to the operation’s commander, Greek Admiral Vasilios Gryparis.
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