Syria has long been a country of diverse ethnicities and religions, with its various communities experiencing significant shifts in population and distribution throughout history. One of the most impactful of these changes occurred during the recent war that followed the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2010. During this time, the Syrian regime and its allies targeted areas with a Sunni majority—regions that had become centers of protests and weapons proliferation after security forces imposed a tight grip on major city squares, which, at the beginning of the revolution, had been gathering points for a diverse mix of Syrians from all sects and ethnic groups.
As a result, large rural and urban Sunni communities were subjected to forced displacement outside Syria. This led to a notable decrease in the number of Sunni Muslims, who constitute the majority of Syria’s population. Observers argue that this process was deliberate and aimed at orchestrating a major demographic shift, largely under the patronage of Iran. Iran actively supported the spread of Shi’ism within Syria and facilitated the relocation of Iranian and Afghan Shiites to the country—some of whom were granted Syrian citizenship.
To date, there is no official or confirmed census regarding the total number of Syrians or their sectarian and ethnic distribution. However, World Bank estimates from 2023 suggest that Syria’s population stands at around 23 million people. The Jusoor Center for Studies reported that in 2023, the total number of Syrians was approximately 26 million, with around 16 million residing inside the country and roughly 9 million outside of it, in addition to 897,000 killed or missing.
Alongside the Sunni population, Syria is home to other Islamic groups, including Alawites, Ismailis, and other Shiite sects. According to U.S. State Department estimates, these groups collectively make up around 13% of the population.
Syrian diversity goes beyond sectarian lines to include multiple ethnic groups such as Kurds, Armenians, Turkmens, Circassians, and others. Arabs form the overwhelming majority, followed by Kurds. While there are no official figures for the Kurdish population in Syria, most estimates suggest their numbers range between 2 to 3 million, predominantly residing in the Hasakah region, the city of Qamishli, Ayn al-Arab (Kobani), Afrin, and neighborhoods in Damascus and Aleppo, according to the Jusoor Center.
The U.S. State Department’s 2022 report on religious freedom indicated that 74% of the population identifies as Sunni, with ethnic diversity among them—primarily Arab Sunnis, but also Kurds, Circassians, Chechens, and some Turkmens.
In 2020, a report by the French strategic research site Orient XXI noted that the war had significantly altered Syria’s demographic composition. Sunni Arabs, who once made up the majority, now represent only half of the population.
Syrian Society Leans Toward Moderation
The predominant Sunni legal school in Syria is the Hanafi school, whose followers make up more than 60% of Syria’s Sunni population. The Shafi’i school ranks second in terms of prevalence. Historically, the Shafi’i school was dominant in Syria before the rise of the Ottoman state and remained so into the 18th century, despite efforts by the central Ottoman authorities to grant special privileges to the Hanafi legal tradition.
The Hanafi school is widely recognized as one of the more moderate schools in Islamic jurisprudence, known for using analogical reasoning (qiyās) and juristic preference (istihsān) to derive legal rulings. This approach reflects the school’s flexibility and its ability to address contemporary issues and evolving realities.
The Sunni component of Syrian society has been well known for its moderation. In the Levant, there are also adherents to the Maliki school. The Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf) used to have four official muftis representing each of the four Sunni schools of thought, in addition to the Grand Mufti of the Republic. Lessons in Islamic jurisprudence following all four schools were held in mosques, with each imam teaching according to the school he followed.
Sufism is also widespread in Syria and is practiced in varying degrees of moderation, reflecting the diversity of Sufi orders. One of the most prominent orders is the Qadiriyya, named after the Sufi Sheikh Abdul Qadir al-Jilani. Several branches have stemmed from this order.
Another major order is the Naqshbandiyya, attributed to Bahauddin Naqshband al-Bukhari of Uzbekistan. This order achieved extensive influence across Central Asia and branched out in Syria into several sub-orders. One of the most notable is the **Naqshbandiyya Khaznawiyya, which runs several religious schools, including the Irfan Institute for Islamic and Arabic Sciences in Hasakah. This institute operates branches both in Syria and Turkey. The Khaznawi order is particularly active in Deir ez-Zor, as well as in rural areas of Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama.
This order came under attack by ISIS in late February 2014, when its fighters entered the town of Tal Marouf and attacked its mosque, citing its association with a Sufi order as justification.
There is also the Rifa‘iyya order, attributed to Ahmad ibn Ali al-Husayni al-Rifa‘i (d. 578 AH / 1182 CE), who is considered one of the most prominent Sufi figures of the 6th Islamic century. He was established as one of the four grand spiritual poles of Sufism. The Rifa‘iyya order has many branches in Aleppo and northern Syria, each led by a sheikh followed by his disciples. Rifa‘i followers were also targeted by ISIS, which blew up several shrines of Rifa‘i Sufi sheikhs in Deir ez-Zor in September 2014.
Another well-known Sufi path is the Sa‘diyya order, which is particularly present in the city of Homs. The Sa‘diyya al-Jabbawiyya zawiya, located in the Bustan al-Diwan neighborhood of Homs, is one of the oldest religious structures associated with this order.
Modern Religious Currents
The Salafi currents, to which some of the groups currently ruling parts of Syria belong, are relatively new phenomena in the Syrian religious landscape. Salafism first emerged in Syria in the late 19th century, particularly in two of the country’s most prominent historical centers: Damascus and Aleppo. Initially, this movement resembled the “reformist Salafism” that developed in Egypt under Sheikh Muhammad Abduh. Its early proponents in Syria were both intellectual and religious figures such as Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi, Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, and Muhammad Rashid Rida.
From this reformist Salafism arose several influential societies that played roles in Syria’s cultural, social, and political life. Among the most notable were Al-Jam’iyya al-Gharra (The Glorious Society), founded by Abdul Ghani al-Daqar, and the Islamic Civilization Society established by Ahmad Mazhar al-Azma and Bahjat al-Bitar in 1930.
However, Salafism failed to deeply penetrate the conservative Syrian society, which remained closely tied to traditional religious scholars. Its influence stayed largely confined to a segment of the educated class exposed to modern educational methods and the urban middle class. Later, Salafism reemerged in a new form known as “scientific” or “theoretical” Salafism through two prominent Hadith scholars: Sheikh Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914–1999), a student of Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar and influenced by Rashid Rida’s Salafi and Hadith-oriented writings; and Sheikh Abdul Qadir Arnaout, who was deeply impacted by the works of Ibn al-Qayyim, a student of Ibn Taymiyyah. This theoretical Salafism focused on correcting belief (ʿaqīda) and fighting religious innovations (bidʿa), without promoting a political project.
During that same period, Salafism also found its way into Syria through Syrian laborers in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. Many adopted Salafi thought due to their exposure to the conservative Wahhabi society there.
During the regime’s conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, the government used the confrontation as a pretext to suppress all independent Islamic movements, including Salafism. Sheikh al-Albani was exiled to Jordan, prominent Salafi figures like Abdul Qadir Arnaout were imprisoned, and all daʿwa (Islamic outreach) activities outside state control were shut down.
However, with the onset of the Syrian uprising, Salafi thought rapidly spread in rural areas with foreign financial support. Armed Salafi brigades entered the fight against the regime, shifting Salafism from a purely daʿwa-oriented trend to a powerful military force.
Salafism in Syria is now generally divided into three main currents:
- Scientific/Traditional Salafism: Focuses on religious education and daʿwa, and avoids politics and jihad. This includes the approach of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani.
- Activist Salafism: Engages in political activism or seeks political reform, like the Sururi movement.
- Jihadi Salafism: Advocates violence and jihad as tools for political change, declares existing regimes apostate, and includes groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS.
This third current also includes Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, led at one point by Ahmad al-Sharʿa (Abu Muhammad al-Julani), who was considered the interim president of Syria by the group. HTS was established in 2017 from a merger of various jihadist factions, the most prominent being Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly al-Nusra Front), which had been al-Qaeda’s official branch in Syria. Other factions like Nur al-Din al-Zinki Movement, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Liwa al-Haqq also joined.
HTS advocates armed violence to achieve its objectives but avoids attacking Western targets, unlike al-Qaeda or ISIS. This divergence caused rifts with traditional jihadist groups. In 2016, HTS severed ties with al-Qaeda and rebranded itself from Jabhat al-Nusra to Jabhat Fath al-Sham, and later to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in 2017. This move angered figures like Ayman al-Zawahiri, who saw it as a betrayal of al-Qaeda’s path.
In recent years, HTS has tried to present itself more as a local authority than a global jihadist group, although it still espouses jihadi-Salafi ideology and attempts to adapt to Syria’s evolving political landscape rather than focusing on global jihad.
What Is the Impact of Salafism on the Ground Today?
While Salafi thought existed in Syria prior to the revolution, its explosive growth post-2011 was not natural but rather the result of political, regional, and international factors. Foreign powers were looking for local forces to fight the Assad regime and serve their interests. At the same time, the regime benefited from portraying the revolution as Islamist and extremist to justify Russian support and Western tolerance.
The Salafi current—particularly its jihadist wing—became an accessible option due to its zealous fighters and their readiness for jihad, combined with large-scale financial support from external actors. Furthermore, moderate factions lacked the ideological and organizational strength of the more radical Salafi groups.
The Sunni-Shi’a sectarian divide across the Middle East intensified the sectarian polarization in Syria, giving rise to the prominence of extremist organizations. With Syria turning into a battleground for proxy wars, Salafist groups received substantial funding and arms from regional players.
However, once geopolitical priorities shifted and the importance of armed jihad declined for foreign backers, many of these states began to reduce or halt support altogether, leading to a significant weakening of Salafi groups.
Internal splits within Salafi movements in Syria further eroded their influence. One major example is the conflict between HTS and Hurras al-Din (a newer branch of al-Qaeda) over Julani’s separation from al-Qaeda. HTS also clashed militarily with ISIS due to ideological and tactical differences.
Despite temporary military successes, Salafi factions lacked deep social roots. In regions they controlled—such as Idlib, Eastern Ghouta, and parts of Aleppo—there was no broad popular support for implementing shari‘a in the strict Salafi fashion. When they attempted to enforce such rules—such as mandatory veiling, gender segregation, and hudud punishments—they faced social resistance.
Most jihadist Salafi groups relied on external funding rather than local popular support. When that funding dried up, they weakened, confirming that they were not deeply rooted societal movements.
Jihadi Salafism also diverges in its jurisprudential approach from traditional Sunni schools like the Hanafi and Shafi‘i madhhabs. It often interprets sacred texts literally, emphasizing jihad as a primary tool of change. This contrasts with the more flexible methodologies of the four classical Sunni schools, which use tools like analogical reasoning (qiyas) and scholarly consensus (ijma‘).
Jihadi Salafis also hold strict views on various issues where other Sunni schools are more lenient, which creates friction between traditional religious practices in Syria and the more rigid, literalist interpretations of Salafi jihadism.
Today, Salafi jihadism in Syria faces a new reality. Salafism has seen notable decline in its strongholds, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, due to shifting regional dynamics. In Saudi Arabia, the adoption of Vision 2030 has aimed to modernize society and reduce reliance on traditional Salafi doctrine. This policy has weakened Salafi religious institutions and promoted a more moderate religious discourse. The kingdom has also curtailed its support for Salafi movements abroad.
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) today primarily receives support from Turkey and Qatar. Turkey aims to achieve several strategic goals through its backing of HTS, the most significant of which is countering the Kurdish threat. Specifically, Turkey supports Islamic factions to curb the influence of the YPG (People’s Protection Units) along its southern border.
Qatar, for its part, supports HTS as part of its broader regional strategy to increase its influence by backing political Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood. This support serves Qatar’s political interests and helps expand its role in the region.
However, such support has its limits. Turkey, for instance, has been grappling with a prolonged economic crisis. Meanwhile, Western and regional powers have placed clear conditions on any new Syrian regime: it must take serious political steps at the domestic level, such as ensuring the participation of various societal groups in political life. These are seen as essential prerequisites for supporting reconstruction efforts and lifting sanctions imposed since the previous regime.
Conclusions:
– Syrian history demonstrates that Salafism, as a religious movement, has never enjoyed widespread influence or broad popular acceptance within Syrian society. Traditional Islamic schools of thought, such as the Hanafi and Shafi‘i madhhabs, have historically dominated the religious landscape, along with strong currents of Sufism and Ashʿarism. This traditional orientation has played a key role in limiting the spread of Salafi ideology, which remained confined to specific daʿwa circles.
– With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, some armed Salafi factions emerged, exploiting the political and security vacuum. However, these factions failed to gain wide acceptance among the diverse components of Syrian society. On the contrary, their rigid interpretations and practices provoked objections and resistance from many Syrians of varied religious and cultural backgrounds.
– It can be said that Syrian society, with its religious and cultural diversity, generally does not lean toward accepting a Salafi-style system of governance. Historical and contemporary experiences suggest that Salafism has been unable to establish a broad grassroots base and that attempts to impose a Salafi approach on Syrian society are likely to face resistance and rejection from large segments of the population.
– A failure to take serious steps toward inclusive political participation for all Syrian groups will result in a form of minority rule over the majority. In such a scenario, HTS and other jihadist Islamist groups will likely become more insular, relying on violence and external support to maintain their grip on power.
