Executive Summary
The Islamic State (ISIS), a Salafi-jihadist organization, represented the peak of extremism within jihadist movements. It adopted the slogan “The rule is for none but Allah” in a radical interpretation of the verse, which has continued to produce its effects over successive decades. This led to an expansion of excommunication (takfir) among the ideologues of jihadist movements, particularly ISIS, which transformed religious doctrinal concepts to establish its political presence. This was pursued through its efforts to overthrow existing regimes in both Syria and Iraq and establish a global Islamic system. This paper, after outlining the ideological foundation stages of the organization, aims to analyze and study the factors contributing to the disintegration of the organization, the disputes among its leaders, and the chances of its resurgence in multiple locations. This is particularly relevant in Syria and Iraq, where the organization still maintains sleeper cells, in addition to armed groups operating in the Syrian and Iraqi deserts.
Introduction
The Islamic State (ISIS) has sparked numerous questions in international circles at both intellectual and political levels, primarily due to the significance of its ideological aspect, which extends from the ideology of the Salafi-jihadist movement. It further developed a “savage ideology,” presenting itself as the sole representative of Islam to justify its brutal actions, such as excommunication (takfir), beheadings, mutilation of corpses, implementing hudud (Islamic punishments), enslaving women, and carrying out executions and floggings.
Ideological Structure
The ideology of the “Islamic State,” like that of “Al-Qaeda,” is based on the principles of global jihadist thought in both its foundations and branches. This includes the “establishment of Islamic rule,” which can only be achieved through jihad. From this definitive principle, all the concepts, details, and procedures established by the global Salafi movement have evolved. Thus, the ideological roots of both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are unified. Both originate from the religious currents of the “migrant jihadists,” encompassing a wide range of groups and individuals symbolized by Al-Qaeda and representing its ideology. The Islamic State is, therefore, a split or outgrowth from Al-Qaeda on one hand, but also a natural evolution of it on the other. This provides a general ideological framework for the organization’s thought but does not reveal its specific characteristics. Particularly, its practical course shows clear divergences from Al-Qaeda. Through some distinctive religious and jihadist themes, ISIS managed to expand and attract tens of thousands of fighters to its ranks, something Al-Qaeda did not achieve or did not pursue at least to the same extent.
The Islamic State (ISIS) adopted the strategy of “savagery,” characterized by three comprehensive principles that do not differ from the ideology of Al-Qaeda and the global Salafi-jihadist movement. These principles are as follows:
The principle of Hakimiyyah (Sovereignty of God):
This principle involves the implementation of Islamic Sharia law and the excommunication (takfir) of governments that do not adhere to Islamic law. With this ideological content, ISIS aims to distinguish itself from others in our societies by embodying within itself and its structure the framework of God’s sovereignty. It views itself as the city of God, while others are cities of the devil. This logic grants the movement the legitimacy to act in the name of God and His sovereignty. Consequently, it sees justification for all means to achieve its goals, deeming the taking of lives, shedding of blood, and seizing of property permissible with complete peace of mind, as every action is believed to be implicitly legitimate in the face of disbelief and ignorance (jahiliyya).
Abul A’la Maududi is considered the first to give this concept a doctrinal dimension by linking it to the concept of divinity. He states: “The first foundation of religion is the belief in the sovereignty of God. He is the owner of the heavens and the earth, and everything within them belongs solely to Him, based on His saying: ‘To Allah belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth. Whether you show what is within yourselves or conceal it, Allah will bring you to account for it.’ (Al-Baqarah: 283).”
Following the same methodology, Sayyid Qutb continued the Islamic declaration of liberating humanity from servitude to other humans on earth by declaring the sole divinity of Allah. This signifies a comprehensive revolution against human sovereignty in all its forms, systems, and conditions. It represents a complete rebellion against any system on earth where human beings hold authority in any form. Its essence lies in dismantling human kingdoms to establish the kingdom of God on earth.
“The kingdom of God on earth cannot be established except by abolishing systems and governments based on human sovereignty,” and “breaking or subduing ruling political systems until they pay tribute, declare surrender, and submit among their masses.” This creed is either embraced or rejected freely.
Thus, the ideological roots of the Islamic State organization trace back to the discourse of contemporary Islamic fundamentalist movements associated with the idea of sovereignty. This idea reached its extreme in the organization’s excommunication (takfir) of Muslims and contemporary societies opposing this ideology. It’s evident that the notion of rulership being directly derived from Allah, a notion alien to Islamic conception, is confirmed by the inclination of Islamic jurisprudence to consider imamate among the benefits sent down, and the rejection by the mainstream of Islamic thinkers from the “Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jama’ah” of the idea of guardianship.
The principle of loyalty and disavowal:
This principle entails allegiance to the Muslim community and enmity towards polytheists, apostates, and implicitly, anyone who opposes it. According to the creed of “loyalty and disavowal,” non-Muslims or followers of other religions deserve only hatred and enmity. The essence of enmity lies in religious differences and divergent paths. It is either the religion of God and adherence to His law, loyalty to His believing servants, or the religion of falsehood, following desires, whims, and Satan, joining the party of Satan.
ISIS integrates ideas such as loyalty and disavowal and apostasy with religious penal laws to form a political ideology and a viewpoint that effectively excommunicates other Muslims. In this sense, revolutionary religious ideas derived from political Islam appear essential in the ideology of the Islamic State organization, much like fundamentalist ideas.
The principle of armed action as the grand strategy for change:
The evolving ideological transformations of the Islamic State (ISIS) are built upon three fundamental strategies that stand in contrast to all other Salafi-jihadist currents. This can be highlighted as follows:
“The Charisma of Zarqawi”:
Zarqawi’s ideological vision was steadfast and uncompromising, prevailing over the doctrinal aspect (specific to the movement) in overall political stances and relations with others. The roots of savagery trace back to Zarqawi, as the early confrontations between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State stem from clashes between him and Osama bin Laden. They differed when they were in Afghanistan in the 1980s, as do their successors today, regarding the use of excessive violence and targeting Shia civilians. According to the Islamic State, the most dangerous enemies of Islam are internal enemies.
The organization argues that focusing on the distant enemy (the West) and ignoring the near enemy (Muslim enemies in the region, especially the Shia) is futile. According to its vision, the distant enemy will be lured into the region, as Osama bin Laden planned, but through attacking the near enemy. This scenario has been evident since ISIS fighters seized control of Mosul in northern Iraq in June 2014, drawing more than 60 countries into the battle against it. Zarqawi warned of the dangers of “scenes of slaughter” in the media battle, which is a “race for the hearts and minds of our nation.”
The ideological proponents of brutality in the Islamic State organization can be traced back to two main figures:
Firstly, Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir (Abdul Rahman Ali). Zarqawi was greatly influenced by al-Muhajir and studied under him the book “Issues of Jihad Jurisprudence,” which is a book on “blood jurisprudence” authored by its owner “for Muslims to adhere to the law of God; such as the submission of the dead to the one washing him, or even more, and in it, “al-Muhajir” determines that a country ruled by law is a disbelieving country and migration from it is obligatory, and consensus is reached on the absolute permission of killing non-Muslims unless they have legal protection, and that “supporting polytheists and demonstrating against Muslims is major disbelief”. And that Islam does not differentiate between civilians and military personnel, and that “what is intended by beheading in killing is severity and harshness, rather it is beloved to God and His Messenger.”
Al-Muhajir is an Egyptian who graduated from the Islamic University in Islamabad, participated in Afghan jihad, and taught in mujahideen camps in Kabul. He assumed teaching duties in Zarqawi’s camp in Herat and was a candidate to lead the scientific and legal committee in Al-Qaeda. He was arrested by Iran and then released; he returned to Egypt shortly after the revolution.
Secondly, Abu Bakr Naji and his book “Management of Savagery” are among the most important books and literatures for extremist groups in recent times. Its main idea is based on exploiting the state of chaos in failed states to establish what is called the “Emirate of Savagery” in the areas controlled by this trend, and applying Sharia law in them, which precedes what is called the “Empowerment Emirate”, that is, the establishment of the Islamic state with full sovereignty. Abu Bakr Naji believes that jihad is one of the most important ways to guide people, and that it involves “severity, brutality, terrorism, displacement, and impoverishment”, and that “shedding the blood of the Cross-worshippers and their supporters, and their allies, is one of the most obligatory duties”. According to him, the current situation resembles the incidents of apostasy or the beginning of jihad, so we need impoverishment and actions similar to what was done to the Banu Qurayza (killing the men, enslaving the children and women, and taking their wealth), so it is necessary to “follow the policy of severity, and if the demands are not met, the hostages are brutally executed to instill terror”.
According to Naji, the only project qualified for this is the project of “Jihadi Salafism”. It is noticeable that the smell of blood pervades the entire book, and it is clear that he has provided the jurisprudential justifications that suit the transformation in the nature of these organizations, and has removed the jurisprudential obstacles from them. There is now complete harmony and integration between three main aspects: the nature of the sectarian conflict escalating in the region, the new version influenced by the hardline personality of Zarqawi, which tends towards greater violence, and jurisprudential and intellectual literature that surpasses the traditional literature of Al-Qaeda, shocking even the sheikhs of jihadist ideology and its contemporary founders, such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada al-Filistini, and Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The ideology of the organization after its collapse
Differences and divisions escalated within the ISIS organization before the killing of their caliph “al-Baghdadi,” encompassing doctrinal and methodological disputes that resulted in various splits and alliances within the organization. This produced competition and conflict between two main factions within the organization, namely:
- The Hazeemiyah Faction, named after Ahmed bin Omar al-Hazimi, who was one of the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence residing in Saudi Arabia and was arrested in 2015.
- The Binali Faction, named after “Turki al-Binali,” a Bahraini sheikh and one of the disciples of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who was killed in Syria in 2017 in a coalition airstrike on Raqqa.
In this context, the two groups, “Hazeemiyah” and “Binali,” represented the two main orientations within the ISIS organization. It can be said that the two groups largely agree on most of the issues that dominate the structure of ISIS thinking and its discourse, such as excommunication of others, governance, and the stance on politics in its modern civil concept and the issues that arise from it, such as elections and democracy.
Divisions in the issue of “Ignorance as an Excuse”
As divisions began to surface within the organization, the issue of “ignorance as an excuse” started to crystallize. The Hazeemiyah faction believes that in matters of monotheism and polytheism, there is no excuse for anyone. They assert that anyone who commits or engages in acts contrary to religious principles is considered a disbeliever, without the need to consider the fulfillment of conditions or the absence of impediments. According to them, anyone who does not excommunicate these individuals is also considered a disbeliever and apostate, adhering to the Salafi principle stating “whoever does not excommunicate the disbeliever is a disbeliever.” On the other hand, the other faction agrees that there is no excuse for ignorance in matters of monotheism and polytheism but rejects the absolute notion of “whoever does not excommunicate the disbeliever is a disbeliever.” This led to the excommunication of the first faction, “Hazeemiyah,” by the second faction, “Binali,” along with significant divisions that arose within both factions due to the complexities and differences resulting from this issue.
The significance of this escalation is tied to its timing, as it coincides with the current leadership’s efforts within the organization to present a facade of strength. This was manifested in a series of recent attacks carried out by the organization, as well as the recent documentary film released by ISIS titled “The End and the Beginning,” which carried various implications contrary to its title, primarily conveying a message that the organization is making a powerful comeback.
Transition from territorial to virtual Caliphate in Hashimi’s strategy
The “Caliph” Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi endeavors to rebuild the organization, confront its divisions, and overcome them. However, the challenges he faces are manifold, such as the killing of al-Baghdadi, the territorial collapse of the organization, its ideological divisions among various factions, the killing of the majority of its founders in the international coalition campaign, and the retreat of what remains of its elements in the deserts of Syria and Iraq.
Faced with these transformations, al-Qurashi works to impose his ideological vision forcefully and change the strategy by abandoning the “territorial caliphate” and transitioning to a networked (virtual) ideological organization. This organization consists of Qatari, regional organizations, and cells that engage in what is known as “war of attrition.” This is followed by the outlining of a new strategy that aligns with the current situation of the organization, which has lost its territorial foothold. Hence, a restructuring process begins, relying on a military-security strategy based on secrecy that fits the circumstances of the new phase the organization is going through, especially in its traditional presence areas in Syria and Iraq, in addition to other steps.
Therefore, it can be said: The ideological foundation of the Islamic State (ISIS) is based on a legacy of arbitrary violence steeped in wounds, born out of historical and contemporary events where rebellion, rejection, and revenge intertwine. The issue of arbitration between Ali ibn Abi Talib and Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan in the year 37 AH stands out as the most notable and impactful of these bloody events, which ISIS continuously invokes and recalls through its inflammatory rhetoric, symbolized by the excommunication of Muslims, killing of children and women, and fighting against other Salafi jihadist groups for forcible seizure of power.
The structural development of ISIS from the first to the third phase went through several stages. The first phase, under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, saw the organization operating as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, under the name “Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia.” After al-Zarqawi’s death on June 7, 2006, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was chosen as the organization’s leader, with Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, also known as Abd al-Munim Azdawi, from Egypt’s Sharqia Governorate, appointed as his deputy and defense minister. Al-Baghdadi then declared the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq, marking the beginning of the first phase of the organization’s construction, which ended with the deaths of both men on April 18, 2010.
The second phase began with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assuming leadership of the organization and declaring the caliphate. This phase concluded with his death on October 27, 2019.
ISIS stands out as one of the most evolved jihadist organizations in terms of structural cohesion and ideological rigidity. It reached a peak of unprecedented evolution in the activities of global jihadist groups, with its structure and ideology demonstrating innovation in many of their characteristics and strategies.
Upon seizing control of Mosul and proclaiming the caliphate, the organization restructured itself by establishing ministries, councils, and institutions. This was a deliberate move to create an alternative entity after overthrowing the existing political system in the territories it captured.
The organizational structure of ISIS relies on a hierarchical pyramid with the caliph at its head, directly overseeing the “councils.” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi introduced the term “councils” instead of ministries used by his predecessor, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. These councils are the essential organs of the state, forming the “central leadership.” Al-Baghdadi has broad powers to appoint and dismiss council heads after consulting the “Shura Council,” whose consultation appears advisory and non-binding. The final decision rests with al-Baghdadi, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai, an Iraqi national, who, thanks to his extensive “religious” authority, controls most strategic matters, serving as the ultimate authority in making crucial decisions.
On the administrative level, the Islamic State organization adopted a division of its influence areas into administrative units called “provinces” (Wilayat), which is a historical Islamic term for demographic geography. Each province is overseen by a group of governors, a designation commonly used in historical Islamic political heritage. The organization inaugurated several provinces within its sphere of control in Iraq and Syria, establishing joint provinces between the two regions. In Iraq, these provinces include Salah al-Din, Anbar, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Fallujah, Baghdad, Jazeera, and Diyala. In Syria, they include Homs, Aleppo, Al-Khair (Deir ez-Zor), Al-Barkah (Al-Hasakah), Al-Badiyah, Raqqa, Hama, and Damascus. Additionally, the organization established the Euphrates province, encompassing the Syrian city of Al-Bukamal, the Iraqi city of Al-Qaim, and the surrounding villages.
These provinces affiliated with the Islamic State are further divided into “sectors” that include cities, based on their pre-existing names before the organization’s control. For example, the Aleppo province is divided into two sectors: the Manbij sector, including the cities of Manbij, Jarabulus, and Maskanah, and the Al-Bab sector, including the cities of Al-Bab and Deir Hafer. Each province’s highest authority is a governor appointed by the Islamic State organization, bearing the title “Wali,” assisted by a group of officials bearing the title “Amir,” such as the military Amir and the legal Amir who heads the Sharia Authority. The security Amir represents the highest authority within each sector. Additionally, a group of princes assists in military, legal, and security matters. This hierarchical structure extends to all cities, with governors and their assistants overseeing sector princes and their deputies, who, in turn, supervise city princes and their assistants.
After the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in December 2019, and prior to that, the territorial defeat of the organization in Syria and Iraq, the organization remained intact and committed to tactics of retaliatory warfare against all regimes it deemed unacceptable. It had already begun a new phase of reassembly, recruitment, and attrition in preparation for its return. This was not done haphazardly but through a carefully crafted plan that resisted the difficulties encountered after the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The organization underwent reconstruction and restructuring of its multiple apparatuses, altering its positioning map, transitioning from concentration to dispersion and expansion, and engaging in wars of attrition.
The new strategy of ISIS is based on the following:
- Adopting a proactive approach, meaning choosing the place and time to carry out more violent terrorist operations that claim the most lives.
- Transitioning from the physical caliphate to the virtual state through social media platforms and harnessing them to serve the organization. This is an attempt to reorganize, boost morale, and appoint new leaders to replace those killed or fleeing.
- Calling for the unification of the jihadist movement under the leadership of Al-Hashemi in an attempt to seize control of the organization’s management and mend ideological divisions.
- The final pillar addresses those who prematurely declared victory over ISIS, emphasizing that the battle is not yet over and that the organization is still present and active, albeit in changed forms and methods.
Recruitment Strategies
During less than a decade since the emergence of the “State” organization, its media machinery emerged as a parallel army or an adjunct to the organization’s military, penetrating the world according to a media plan that achieved the ambitions of its founders, which outlined its details as “the real and great leap that ISIS brought about, reaching the level of global propaganda and its immense recruiting capabilities, shifting from an elitist approach to a populist one, from complex selective methods to rapid recruitment and operational planning, from specific and limited goals to a wide range of objectives, and from organized planning to loose individual action. There are multiple factors, not a single one, behind the unprecedented efficiency in recruitment on the level of terrorist groups.”
One of the most prominent factors is the political factor (sectarian incitement):
The failure of political systems in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and other Middle Eastern countries to build a national state created fertile ground saturated with rigid extremist ideas. The “State” organization absorbed thousands of young people into its ranks to confront the sectarian war declared by the ruling regimes in Damascus and Baghdad under Iranian auspices. “Sectarianism” has become a key and effective tool used by regimes and groups to achieve ideological and political goals. The Assad regime, from the outset, worked to promote sectarian fear-mongering to redirect the course of the conflict from a revolution against the corruption and tyranny of the regime to a sectarian conflict between the Sunni majority and Christian, Alawite, and Druze minorities, to attract Shiite Iranian support. Similarly, various Salafist jihadist forces capitalized on sectarianism to characterize their conflict and the nature of their war against the regime.
In this context, Nouri al-Maliki, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, fueled sectarianism. In one of his speeches, he declared that the confrontation between the “Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces” and the “State” organization “ISIS” is ongoing, stating that those who killed Hussein have not yet finished, and Hussein is still present. The confrontation between the supporters of Yazid and the supporters of Hussein continues. The crime committed against Hussein has not ended; they have prepared to target visitors to the shrine of Hussein and disrupt the atmosphere of the visit. This is one of the most important reasons for attracting young people to join the organization.
The economic factor
The corrupt rentier nature of state policies and the decayed neoliberal systems led to the collapse of the middle class, the absence of transparency, the dominance of nepotism, and the loss of equality. This resulted in a lack of economic opportunities and weakened social care systems provided by the state. Arab citizens turned to alternative entities outside the state and legal economic sectors.
When Arab countries implemented economic liberalization programs, existing social care systems were delegated and guarantees of employment in the public sector were abolished without providing alternatives. Arab governments did not enhance investments in productive sectors, nor did their economies generate a sufficient number of required and necessary jobs. Currently, the highest levels of unemployment are recorded among individuals with higher education degrees.
Thus, ISIS exploited the desire of marginalized individuals to seek revenge against society, especially those who did not have access to education or job opportunities and had lost their families. Many of the areas they inhabited lacked a sense of community. Therefore, young people find these extremist groups that open their arms to them, offering them a sense of belonging, acceptance, camaraderie, and instilling in them self-confidence, importance, and distinction. As a result, these marginalized and oppressed groups become affiliated with the aggressor, becoming hostile towards the society they perceive as violent, thus mimicking the aggressor to whom they belong.
Factors of failure and opportunities for resurgence
The organization’s failure and its achievements, as well as its current strengths and weaknesses, can be examined as follows:
Politically, after declaring its statehood in 2014 accompanied by an antagonistic discourse towards all nations, the organization entered into an open conflict with neighboring countries and with a group of internationally active states, which managed to form an international military alliance to combat it. The organization currently exploits regional states driven by intertwined interests as a factor in its resurgence.
Militarily, after gaining control over vast geographical areas in Iraq and Syria, the organization managed to impose its will, authority, and laws on a society that suffered for half a century under the yoke of poverty, high prices, and low living standards. It eliminated its participation in political life, along with the security pursuits associated with it. The organization pursued the same exclusionary dramatic scene by disposing of military leaders and civilian activists of the revolution in Syria.
As for the factions of the Free Syrian Army and tribal groups that resisted it, they were subjected to mass killings and collapsed in the face of the organization’s fighters, while some surrendered without fighting. The organization monopolized weapons with its soldiers, who wielded excessive force and carried out sovereign acts. After disposing of its local opponents, however, the military airstrikes and ground operations by the international coalition resulted in the loss of dozens of its leaders, becoming one of the main reasons for its contraction and field retreat.
- Socially, after transforming into a “state” authority, it began to face significant social problems following the enactment of a series of laws. Violators face punishment according to the type of offense. Therefore, civilians often face public floggings in markets for offenses ranging from smoking to carrying weapons to criticizing the behavior of the elements. The organization increasingly relied on a strategy of intimidation and coercion to subjugate people to its authority. One of the biggest problems it faced was the issue of religious and sectarian minorities. The organization’s authoritarian style and the scale of the injustices it committed, along with the popular rejection of its practices, turned the areas under its control into the most hostile territories, causing it to lose its most important asset after losing popular support.
- Economically, the organization lacked diversified financial resources after losing its energy centers, leaving only its trade with the Assad regime and Iran in the Syrian desert. It also lost all border crossings with Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, negatively impacting its field movements.
Opportunities for resurgence
Following the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS faced challenges and difficulties that threatened its unity after the elimination of its territorial caliphate. Its new leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, attempted to confront them with a new strategy to re-emerge under the following circumstances:
- The political conditions represent one of the most significant opportunities in delineating the future prospects of the ISIS organization. The complex and intricate reasons and conditions behind its spread and rise are evident in Iraq and Syria, where the Sunni crisis serves as a primary key to understanding the strength and roots of the organization. In confronting the growing Iranian influence after the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the organization exploited the feelings of anger and marginalization among Sunnis to recruit thousands. It also attracted former leaders in the Iraqi army and the Ba’ath Party, creating a fusion between the disgruntled Sunni actors and the global jihadist ideology in the mold of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Moreover, the stances of parties in regional and international alliances and blocs, much like being one of the main reasons for the organization’s defeat, also give it an opportunity for resurgence. It is known that its defeat came through the collusion of everyone: Americans, Russians, Iranians, Turks, local governments, and Kurds. The irony, for example, in Iraq was that American planes bombed from the sky while Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Quds Force, fought under the American umbrella on the ground. Yet, he was killed by a US missile strike at the beginning of 2020. Everyone agreed to end the ISIS state, but the same policies returned to differences and conflicts in both Iraq and Syria. The Iranian American tension is severe, the Russian-Turkish relations in Syria are troubled, and the Kurds and Turks are at odds, meaning a return to the previous conditions and circumstances that ISIS exploited and contributed to its rise. This does not necessarily mean a repetition of the experience, but it means giving the organization a better chance to restructure, adapt, and reconsider its future strategies.
- Strategic circumstances, related to the international and regional alliances, were exploited in explaining its military defeat and utilized in a sectarian manner to arouse the sentiments of the marginalized and disheartened individuals angry at the despotic authorities in the region in an attempt to attract and recruit them.
- The ideological legacy of the organization, represented by the “Caliphate Cubs,” a generation of Syrian, Iraqi, and other children from various countries, underwent indoctrination and military training over the years. Thousands of them are now languishing in detention camps or other detention facilities, with no suitable solutions found by the countries and organizations concerned with counterterrorism for rehabilitating this generation and addressing their future prospects.
Recommendations
The collapse of the State organization cannot be discussed after its military defeat, despite signs of its decline, as long as the reasons that gave rise to the organization persist. These reasons include being one of the drivers of conflict in the region, represented by the escalating sectarianism fueled by religious states like Iran and Islamic radical organizations. The continued existence of dictatorial regimes in power with all their heinous crimes, and the West’s prioritization of its own interests over the interests of other peoples, further exacerbates the situation.
The resolution of the ongoing conflict is now governed by power, not by justice, at a time when the authority of so-called international legitimacy is waning. Therefore, the region will remain like barrels of gunpowder that could explode gradually, with the resurgence of ISIS or the birth of another organization. Perhaps ISIS will serve as a measure, maybe more merciful and less extreme.
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