The 25,000-inhabitant commune of Heppenheim in Germany has been at the centre of a new national debate since May 31 on how to deal with Islamist-motivated terrorists. On that day, a 25-year-old Afghan man attacked anti-Islam activist Michael Stürzenberger with a knife in nearby Mannheim, injuring a total of six people. One of them, a police officer, died two days later from his injuries. Since then, many have been asking who this man was and, since authorities are considering him an Islamist lone wolf, why no one noticed his radicalization. Not his neighbors, nor the security authorities.
The man lived with his wife and two small children in a high-rise building in the western part of Heppenheim. Despite having a doormat with the word “Welcome” printed on it in front of his apartment door, one could live quite anonymously there. Those seeking company did not do so in the gray hallways of the apartment block but rather at a small kiosk down the street.
Theoretically, security agencies are aware of the potential for radical Islamist attackers and can even provide official figures. As of the previous month, German criminal statistics counted a total of 480 Islamist threats, i.e., people whom the police believe are capable of committing an attack at any time. This is according to the federal government’s response to a minor inquiry from the AfD parliamentary group. Islamist Sulaiman A. was not among them.
If someone does not attract attention until they commit an act, it becomes difficult for the police or intelligence services to notice them. Sulaiman A.’s file at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees appeared unremarkable: in Germany since 2013, married to a German citizen since 2019, father of two German children, and therefore, despite initially having his asylum application rejected, in possession of a valid residence permit, currently valid until 2026. He was reportedly a martial artist and had sometimes been involved in refugee aid. According to security circles, Sulaiman A. was considered “well-integrated” by authorities.
Baden-Württemberg’s Interior Minister, the state in which Mannheim is located, stated that it was likely a case of an Islamist-radicalized lone wolf. Such individuals are particularly dangerous because they often resort to easily accessible weapons like knives or vehicles and are difficult to apprehend. “Where there is no communication, no communication can be monitored.”
However, the saying „practically no one radicalizes completely alone and isolated” also holds true. Investigators reportedly found no suspicious chats on A.’s smartphone that could have raised alarms before the attack. This does not mean there were definitely none – he reportedly deleted data from his phone before the attack. According to information from the Süddeutsche Zeitung obtained from security circles, investigators found indications that Sulaiman A. or someone in his personal environment may have sent money to Islamist circles, possibly in small donations. “An Islamist terrorist is only a lone wolf when it comes to the act itself,” says an expert from the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) think tank. “Practically no one radicalizes completely alone and isolated.” There is always a social environment that notices something, propaganda forums where Islamists exchange ideas, and in most cases, chat groups with like-minded individuals.
In the past, there were more physical meeting points where Islamists gathered, mainly scene mosques. For observation teams, it was not an insurmountable task to keep an eye on those who met there. Despite this, Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the attack at Berlin’s Breitscheidplatz, slipped through their net, though they had him in their sights. This has become much more challenging. “Social media are the new backyard mosques.” Experts from research and security agencies report that most Islamists now radicalize much more strongly through Telegram forums or other chat groups than they did a few years ago.
Some intelligence agencies have established special units in recent years to specifically monitor such Islamist internet forums. They also use “virtual agents” who infiltrate the groups under false identities. Despite this, much remains undetected, simply due to the sheer volume of forums and groups. And German security agencies are not allowed to monitor the internet and especially private chats as extensively as the FBI, for example. Germans often rely on their foreign partner agencies, especially the Americans, to alert them to suspicious chats. In the Mannheim case, however, it appears there was no tip-off from the FBI.
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