Following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October, we asked Emmanuel Dupuy, President of the Institute for European Perspective & Security (IPSE), about France’s position regarding this conflict and its repercussions for Paris. The interview was conducted by Denys Kolesnyk, a French consultant and analyst.
On 7 October, Hamas attacked Israel. What were Hamas’ main objectives? Why was this date chosen and who benefited from this attack and why?
First of all, we don’t know exactly why Hamas chose 7 October as the date for its attack. Nor do we know how the plan for this attack was worked out. Presumably, certain well-informed sources indicate that there was a hiatus between the military and political branches of Hamas, the political branch not necessarily being informed of the activities or the desire to undertake this attack by the military branch. We also know this because the political wing is not based in the Gaza Strip, but is rather situated in Istanbul or Doha. This is the case, for example, of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas political bureau who succeeded Khaled Mashal, who was graciously accommodated by the Qatari authorities.
As a result, this operation was prepared in the Gaza Strip to carry out a military operation first and foremost and take advantage of the surprise nature of this attack, which was probably not anticipated by the Israeli authorities either. Several intelligence agencies, particularly the American ones, which have looked into the way this operation was carried out, have realised several things.
The first point is that the Israeli security forces were not expecting an attack from the Gaza Strip, but rather an attack from Hezbollah on the northern border, in particular the border with Lebanon and specifically the Shebaa Farms above the Golan Heights, which is why the Israeli armed forces were heavily mobilised in the north and north-east of the country.
Secondly, with the Netanyahu government, which is a government that can be described as extreme right-wing, the military pressure has been stepped up and, as a result, the security forces in the West Bank have been more focused on “protecting” the “settlers” from whom many of the government ministers come, particularly one we hear a lot about, Itamar Ben-Gvir, the Minister for National Security, who is arming civilians and settlers in an attempt to take advantage of the situation and try to reconquer new territories.
We are faced with a shock effect, a surprise effect that has thwarted the resilience or passive protection capacity, the maritime blockade that had been put in place by the Israelis since their last intervention in 2021, and then of course the famous Iron Dome system, which was unable to stop all the missiles. Again, this is a saturation effect: 5,000 rockets are sent out, with a success rate of 80% to 90%, and a few get through, causing several casualties.
Then, in the configuration of this attack, you always have to have a tactical vision and a strategic vision. The tactical vision is the stunning effect, taking advantage of the fact that we were at the end of a religious festival, so inevitably a certain number of reservists and soldiers were not in their barracks.
And this partly explains the date?
I think that explains a lot the date. The fact that Hamas could have chosen a week later, but there would have been more soldiers. That’s when the soldiers were killed, and we moved on to a time when the defences were reduced.
Once again, a tactical objective, a successful tactical mission, notwithstanding the horrific violence and unspeakable consequences that accompanied this attack. 1,400 dead, 300 Israeli soldiers killed and more than 300 hostages, of whom it is not entirely clear whether they are still alive, is a staggering effect.
Then there is the strategic dimension, the regional context and the timing of the attack. Despite the radical nature of its statements, the Israeli government was continuing to normalise relations with a number of its neighbours, just as it had done for a long time with Egypt in 1978, for a shorter time with Jordan in 1993, and more recently with Sudan, Morocco, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.
The next major symbolic step was a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. Many local and regional players did not look favourably on this rapprochement. Especially Turkey on the one hand, which is itself seeking to reduce the spiritual influence and to compete about the leadership in the Arab-Muslim world, which is seeking to conquer the hearts and minds of Muslims. And then, of course, the other player who had no interest in this rapprochement between Tel Aviv and Riyadh is Iran.
Firstly, because Tehran is engaged in a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. Surprisingly, thanks to the influence of China, which last March brought about a singular rapprochement, and made possible President Ebrahim Raissi setting foot in Saudi Arabia for the emergency summit convened by Mohammed bin Salman, bringing together the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, to which Iran belongs.
And this is a regional phenomenon that would suggest that everything possible should be done to limit or even question Israel’s process of normalisation with its neighbours. Moreover, this was partially successful. The Riyadh summit showed that the “Arab street”, in other words, public opinion, is much less inclined to recognise the legitimacy of the process of normalisation with Israel.
And then, of course, there is the historic pressure from countries that have never recognised the State of Israel and that have taken up the cause of Hamas, arguing that Israel can never be recognised because of the radicality, the brutality, some would say, of the violence, or at any rate the disproportionate nature of the Israeli response. The bombardments on Gaza for more than 40 days now, the military land operation launched on 27 October.
Algeria, Tunisia and Somalia, which have never recognised the State of Israel, will use this argument, saying “you should have done what we did” to Moroccan or Sudanese public opinion. Sudan, moreover, has turned its back on Israel somewhat, since, even though it signed the Abraham agreements, it was one of the first countries not to support Israel.
And then there is an even wider phenomenon, an even more peripheral strategic vision, which is that of a conflict between Hamas and the State of Israel, which suits a certain number of players. Russia sees itself de facto relieved of media pressure on Ukraine at a time when the Ukrainian counter-offensive launched in June is stalling. Some would say that it “failed” or that “it did not achieve the desired results”, given the immensity of the military support provided by the international community.
The Hamas attack on Israel de facto allows the Ukrainian conflict to be marginalised or to become a conflict covered by media to a lesser extent. All this serves Moscow’s interests. This is why it should come as no surprise that Moussa Abu Marzouk, Hamas’ number 2, was received by Sergei Lavrov and Mikhail Bogdanov, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister for the Middle East. Under the guise of Russia wanting to play the role of mediator, which allows Russia to implicitly give a sort of discharge or thank Hamas, dare we say it, for this.
And then there is another impact, the one felt in Washington. The United States, which until now has found itself somewhat marginalised by several countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, but also other Gulf states, is tending to look for other strategic alternatives.
Closer ties with China, closer ties with India, and a desire not to be symbiotic or harmonious on the oil question. Mohammed bin Salman has refused to increase the number of barrels of oil produced to be able to negotiate with the United States. In a way, Saudi Arabia is also looking for new polarities.
So this whole context means that the moment was, to put it mildly, alas well chosen, with an Israeli government itself weakened by three months of constant demonstrations over institutional and constitutional reform, and judicial reform, which did not go down well. We have to remember that President Herzog said that Netanyahu’s government was dangerous for Israeli cohesion.
So there is a real gap between Israeli society, which is much more liberal than a government that is the most right-wing since Ben Gurion and the creation of the State of Israel in May 1948.
On November 10, the French President declared that “Israel must stop killing babies and women in Gaza”. While Netanyahu said that “world leaders must condemn Hamas and ISIS, not Israel”. How can you explain Macron’s statement? Who was he targeting? What could be the consequence of his statement?
The President of the French Republic found himself a little trapped in his “at the same time, at the same time”. On this crisis as on many others, perhaps less so on the Russo-Ukrainian war, President Macron has an unfortunate tendency to say black or white, port or starboard, to do what I call “regatta politics” or “regatta diplomacy”. This consists of saying the opposite of what you said the day before to please your immediate interlocutor.
Let’s take some very concrete examples. President Macron boasted of having made a triumphant tour of the Middle East, visiting Tel Aviv, Ramallah and then Cairo. If we look closely at the tone, I mean what he said to Benjamin Netanyahu, Mahmoud Abbas, what he said to Abdallah II of Jordan and Abdel Fattah al-Sissi is the opposite of what he said the day before.
He arrived in Tel Aviv with a reminder of Israel’s legitimate right to self-defence, or the ability to invoke Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In other words, Israel has the right to defend itself in the face of an attack from an organisation that the European Union, like the United States and Canada, classifies as a terrorist.
Hamas is on the blacklist of organisations that we classify as terrorists. There is consistency. I’ve come to Israel to see for myself and, above all, to express my feelings in Israel, as President of the French, which is home to the third-largest Jewish community in the world.
After Israel, of course, and the United States, which shows that the President is also thinking of people with dual nationality. 30 people died in the attack on 7 October and it is estimated that there are about 9 Franco-Israeli hostages to be counted among the 230 who were taken hostage.
The problem is that the next day, President Emmanuel Macron is going to tell Mahmoud Abbas, then Abdellah II of Jordan, then President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, exactly the opposite, saying that the State of Israel must stop bombing Gaza, that the response is disproportionate and that, above all, we must obtain a humanitarian truce.
That’s more or less what he said on November 10, isn’t it?
On November 10, he went a little further, saying that not only was a humanitarian truce needed, but also a ceasefire, which is not the same thing, and that France was offering to act as a mediator and facilitator for the urgent release of the hostages and the provision of medical supplies.
It should be noted that since 24 November, as part of the truce negotiated under the aegis of Qatar, with the support of Egypt and the United States, 60 Israeli hostages have been released in exchange for the release from prison of 180 Palestinians held in Israel. In addition, 21 Thai hostages were also released by Hamas. It now remains to be seen whether the extension of this truce for a further 48 hours will lead to a consolidated ceasefire, a prerequisite for the resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
France, in its turn, offered to provide two ships, known as PHAs (amphibious helicopter carriers). These are not maritime hospitals, but helicopter carriers that can transport medical equipment. And the PHA Dixmude recently arrived in Egypt. The problem is that neither of them is allowed in Gaza’s territorial waters, which are under a literal blockade by the Israeli naval forces.
So, the second problem is that President Macron says everything and then the opposite, but he also says things that are not true. For example, France’s ability to offer aid, from the €20 million initially proposed to the €100 million ultimately finalised at the humanitarian conference on November 9, is wishful thinking, a catch-all phrase, a magic word. These are words that have not yet been put into practice.
As we speak, no injured Palestinians have been treated by French medical teams. So the idea that we are at the head of a humanitarian coalition does not exist. Once again, this is a projection. It’s also a way of saying “where are the medical supplies?” But no. They say they have, but they haven’t done it. Once again, it’s a little biased and a little cynical.
It’s the double standard that Abdallah II of Jordan and his wife Rania reproached us for, saying everything and its opposite and above all relying, when it suits us, on a certain number of principles.
Let’s take the example of international humanitarian law. In the interview you referred to on November 10 with a BBC journalist at the Paris Forum, the day after the humanitarian conference, President Macron said that we were very attached to international humanitarian law, and I think he was quite right.
Under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocol of 1977, ambulances are not fired on, hospitals and schools are not targeted, and therefore are protected and placed under sanctuary.
So Abdallah II of Jordan, Rania of Jordan and even Bashar al-Assad of Syria reminded us that in Aleppo in 2016, we were not entirely opposed when it came to justifying the fact that ambulances were being shot at and hospitals targeted at least by the Americans. And several others were doing so as part of the coalition against Islamic movements in general, not just ISIS but also the Al-Nusra Front.
In the same way, as for the war in Ukraine, we could also have denounced the use of these means or the targeting, as the President of Russia did, of a certain number of objectives. So thrdr double standards are, I think, quite rightly intolerable to some of the world’s public opinion.
So at some point, President Emmanuel Macron has to say things. The problem is that he said this on November 10, and that’s why I come back to my point by saying that President Macron only listens to the last person who speaks to him.
A few hours after Isaac Herzog, the Israeli President, called him to express his astonishment, President Emmanuel Macron again reiterated Israel’s right to self-defence and that Israel should continue its operation to eradicate Hamas.
And what are the consequences of this type of statements?
There are two quite serious consequences. The first is that it polarises French public opinion. Between those who feel that the French President is defending the state of Israel too much and those who feel that the French President is not defending Israel enough or is defending the Palestinian cause too much by calling for this humanitarian ceasefire.
The second element is the undermining of the credibility of the UN. There has been one resolution, and if you count, one resolution that has been passed. On October 17 a resolution was passed that clearly stated the facts. 120 States are calling for a humanitarian ceasefire on the assumption that this humanitarian ceasefire will stop the bombing and allow a political solution to be found.
The problem is that of the 120 States, i.e. a majority of the 194, 14 voted against and 45 abstained. However, there was a gap between the European countries and no cohesion between them. France and Spain called for a humanitarian ceasefire. Spain is important because it still holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union until the end of December.
At the same time, four countries – Austria, Hungary, Croatia and the Czech Republic – supported the Israeli position, and two countries, not least Germany and Italy, abstained, giving the impression that they were ultimately supporting the Israeli position so as not to have to criticise this position about this resolution.
Once again, another resolution on November 9 showed, with 145 countries supporting it, that we must denounce the illegal colonisation of territories that are normally Palestinian, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
So once again, giving the impression that we are on the right side and that we support international law or international humanitarian law. The problem is that later because Benjamin Netanyahu said that President Macron was wrong, we said the opposite again.
The first consequence is that we are losing legitimacy in the eyes of public opinion of the so-called “Arab street”, which does not appreciate our diplomatic bipolarity.
The second factor is the polarization within French society. It’s clear that at demonstration after demonstration, two France’s are clashing. France supports the Palestinian cause and the two-state solution. And the France that denounces anti-Semitism, and anti-Zionism, which is a reality. Anti-Semitism is on the rise, with 4,300 acts of anti-Semitism identified and claimed in the 40 days since the attack on October 7.
And so theoretically, what should not be opposed, the two-state solution and the support and right of Israel to exist, has become a polarization that is expressed, for the moment not violently on television or in the street.
And then the third element and I think this is perhaps the most serious element in depth, is that what is supposed to be our diplomatic channel, our ambassadors, our diplomatic tool, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have made it known, and this is a rare occurrence, I even think it’s the first time it’s happened, in a letter that was made public by Le Figaro, through the excellent colleague Georges Macbruno, a rebellion of ambassadors explaining to President Macron that he is mistaken, that his erratic positions are putting us in danger, and that incidentally we are creating two or three generations of young Arabs, young Muslims who do not understand French policy and who will make us pay for it in one way or another.
Either by being Francophobic, by cutting us off from our historic relationship with this region, or even worse, by opposing us head-on, like the previous generation of terrorists, using our double standards on the Libyan question, the Syrian question or the Sahel.
France was very active in this region at the beginning of the 20th century and is still trying to be involved. What role is Paris prepared to play in the war between Hamas and Israel?
First of all, we must remember our historical responsibility. In particular, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the fact that we supported the idea of creating the Jewish home on the West Bank at the same time.
In the spirit and support of the initiative led by the British Foreign Office at the time, Balfour, and then the Sykes-Picot agreements of 1916, which foreshadowed what was to be achieved in 1920, i.e. a dual responsibility, a dual Franco-British sponsorship through mandates ensuring the stability of what is now Syria, northern Iraq, and Lebanon of course as far as France is concerned. And for Great Britain – Mandate Palestine, a large part of the Persian Gulf, the current state of Saudi Arabia, and southwest Iraq. So we are talking about a dual Franco-British historical responsibility for the stability of the Near and Middle East.
But our responsibility is also much more recent. We were among the first to recognise the need for dialogue within a political space on the question of two States. For example, we were the first to vote in favour of the UN resolutions, in particular Resolution 181 of 1947 and Resolution 242 of 1967, which was a moment of great strategic climax, the first war following the creation of the State of Israel in May 1948.
So 1947 was the idea that in Judea-Samaria there would be two states – one for the Arabs and one for the Jews. In 1967, the need to remind the State of Israel, which had just conquered Jerusalem, which had just conquered part of the Sinai and which had just reclaimed a territory that did not belong to it, that belonged to Syria, just had to be reminded that no, there was a separation plan under which 44% of the territory of Judea-Samaria would revert to the Palestinians.
And so France staunchly supported these two resolutions, just as it supported the 200 or so resolutions, which were aimed at seeking the need to work towards stability and peace.
France supported the Camp David Accords, normalisation with Egypt, the Wadi Araba Accords, and normalisation with Saudi Arabia, but perhaps a little less so the Abraham Accords, for one reason: they were proposed by Donald Trump, and it was very complicated to give him the go-ahead, who also wanted to make peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians, without the Palestinians.
And so France, in 1980 at the Venice Conference, was the first among the Europeans to affirm the need to support and give status to the PLO. We recognised the PLO in 1974. We ensured that the PLO had observer status at the UN from 1984. We helped prevent Yasser Arafat from being eliminated by the Israelis in Lebanon, by moving him to Tunisia. We supported the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Oslo Accords, and so on. So, in the end, France has always been a balancing power, a mediating power.
At present, France is playing small. For example, a humanitarian conference is not a peace conference. A humanitarian conference calling for a cease-fire, calling for a humanitarian truce is not a cease-fire, calling for a peace agreement which itself will require the involvement of more than France, more than the European Union, but the entire 1954 International Committee – the States of the United Nations. We’re not there yet, and we’re very far from it.
And I’m not sure that France still has the means to lead Europe towards a united position on the State of Israel. I would like to mention the latest resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, which shows that Europeans are not united and are not in tune with this issue.
Secondly, a lot needs to be done to ensure that the French position is seen as credible on both sides. Firstly, because we have only very weakly supported the Palestinian position, based on the principle that Mahmoud Abbas and this is unfortunately a dramatic reality, is not very legitimate to speak on behalf of the Palestinians.
Our difficulty is that we have very few means of exerting pressure on the Palestinians. But our leverage with Likud and with Israel is just as weak. As much as we have kept links with Hezbollah for reasons of our strategic interest or our historical legitimacy in trying to get Lebanon out of the financial rut in which it finds itself.
And we have no links with Hamas since we consider Hamas to be a terrorist organisation. Our interest is in fact to support countries that may have a relationship with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and so on. These countries are limited to two – Turkey on the one hand and Qatar on the other.
We are trying to talk to Emir al-Thani in Qatar, trying to forget that it is he who is funding Hamas. And we find it much more difficult to patch things up with Erdogan, given that we are opposed to him in all the other conflicts where there is tension, notably Libya, Syria, and especially Ukraine when he plays into Moscow’s hands. So we have very little room for manoeuvre.
Islamist terrorism and migration from outside Europe are major challenges for Paris. What measures is France taking to combat terrorism and extremism in the Middle East, and how do these efforts fit in with French national security?
That’s the whole point of the debate currently taking place around immigration law. I am not one of those who link immigration and terrorism. We are continuing to fight terrorism. Since the attacks of November 13, 2015, the DGSI (Interior Intelligence Service) has thwarted 73 attacks or planned attacks. So our services are effective.
Now, unfortunately, the assassination of professors, the assassination or attempted knife attacks against several nationals and several anti-Semitic acts motivated by frontal opposition to the French position on the Palestinian question, mean that we are in a state of weakness or terrorist peril.
Until now, we have tended to say that instability in the Sahel could have an impact on the safety of French nationals in Africa and Europe. The main point made was that the terrorist threat in France was projected by young French citizens who had left to wage jihad in Syria and Iraq.
The creation of endogenous terrorism, inherent in societal shortcomings or the blockage of the French republican engine, was highlighted above all, with the result that there are still areas of exclusion in our territory where a certain number of French people feel less French than others.
But the phenomenon of claiming jihadism through the desire to “liberate” Jerusalem and to claim an ideological struggle driven by Islamism to liberate the Al-Aqsa mosque is somewhat recent. The Islamic State’s statements evoking causality or the link with Palestine date back to 2021.
As for the migratory challenge, it is a facilitator or an accelerator. Firstly, about the flow of migrants transiting through European territories, through Spain, Tunisia and Libya, or Turkey and Bulgaria. This automatically entails the need to ensure that these terrorist groups do not infiltrate. Several countries are much more concerned about this than we are, whereas we tend to play down the phenomenon.
Then there is another phenomenon, which is the pragmatic use of the migration weapon as an element of pressure on our policies in the region. And here, Turkey has mastered it more than others. We have seen this with the accelerated opening of the migration tap at Lampedouza, Lesbos and the border between Bulgaria and Turkey. But we also saw it in Belarus, when President Lukashenko did the same thing on the border with Lithuania and Poland.
It is important to understand that migration is becoming a de facto weapon that can destabilise societies, in the same way that terrorism is designed to destabilise or undermine our societies.
The war between Hamas and Israel has had repercussions on French soil. The number of anti-Semitic acts has increased significantly. How can you explain the divisions within French society and political groups? And what are the consequences for France of this extrapolation?
Beyond the cleavage within French society, there is increasingly not a cleavage between left and right, but within left and right. From this point of view, it’s quite clear, for example, between the left of the government and the more radical left, which was united in the last legislative elections around the NUPES.
A real gap has opened up between Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who is often portrayed as lax by his opponents, or as very tolerant of what is known as Islamo-leftism, and a number of his MPs, including Daniel Guiraud, Mathilde Panot and Danièle Obono, who refuse to recognise the terrorist nature of Hamas, using sophistry and talking about acts of terror. This goes against France’s official position because Hamas has been considered a terrorist organisation by the 27 countries of the European Union since 2001.
On the other hand, the Greens and the Socialist Party are much more moderate, and much more ready, for example, to denounce acts of anti-Semitism. The NUPES refused to do so on the pretext that it was a demonstration in favour of Israel or organised by the CRIF, thereby giving the impression that it was a political demonstration.
And it’s the same on the right. There is a national right or extreme right which, paradoxically, to my astonishment, is becoming the best spokesperson for the Jewish community in France. And what they denounce most is acts of anti-Semitism. When we remember what the French far right has been like, for example here we can remember the words of Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1986, emphasising the fact that the gas chambers were a detail in history, or downplaying the importance of the Shoah, or simply being anti-Semitic, or even anti-Zionist, we have a hallucinating shift in position.
The far-right and the far left are anti-Zionist by nature, but anti-Semitism, which is in a way – I don’t want to use too blunt words – not criticised as it should be, nor sufficiently criticised by the far left, in this case, the NUPES, is something very worrying because it is undermining French society.
What we wanted to avoid, i.e. an exploitation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is de facto taking hold in France, face to face rather than side by side. And de facto, it’s not the Palestinian cause against the Israeli cause, it’s the Muslims who feel legitimately grateful for the idea of defending the two-state solution, and this gives the impression that by fighting against the masses, we are fighting against Palestine, and that we are fighting against the very idea of these two states.
Even a certain number of Israeli political racists, who de facto support Netanyahu because they have no other choice because once again there is a difference in timing between the tactical and military character and the political declension, who unfortunately support Netanyahu like the rope supports the hanged man.
How much influence does the ‘street’ in France have in shaping the French government’s policies towards the region, including in the context of this crisis?
It has to be said, and I’ve already mentioned, that the weight of the street is not as important as what is known as the Arab street, where public opinion matters a great deal. King Mohamed VI is chairman of the Al-Qaeda committee in Morocco, and he has normalised relations with the State of Israel through the Abraham Accords, against the wishes of his people. We have to be very careful, and he is very careful, to adopt a measured policy. And so should we.
The problem is that in France, from the moment that Parliament no longer plays its regulatory role, with the Assembly or the Senate driven by the polarities of a Senate majority that is not the majority of the Chamber of Deputies, there is a logical head-on opposition between the two. A President, Emmanuel Macron, wants to emphasise national unity when it suits him, he wants to emphasise the fact that parliamentarians must be united to support his policy when it suits him, on the other hand, the use of Article 49.3 for the seventeenth time gives the impression that the choice and vote of parliamentarians matters little and that it is necessary to force through.
I believe, and to answer your last question in a nutshell, that you cannot talk to the world and propose mediation or facilitation solutions, or be a disinterested or balanced player, and at the same time be criticised for not doing so at a national level. In a nutshell, foreign policy derives from domestic policy.
And if the first among us, the President of the Republic, is criticised because he is not leading us towards a policy of national cohesion, how can we then convince others of our ability to ensure national cohesion in other countries?
We cannot advocate democracy, advocate alternation, and say nothing about countries in Africa that go beyond comprehension when they call the Constitution into question. We cannot criticise military coups because they call into question an inclusive political process and ourselves being caught out for not conducting this inclusive policy, the pension reform, the ‘Yellow Vests’, or the avoidance of using Parliament.
So, to sum up, I think that France must above all look, manoeuvre in front of its door, to use an expression that knows the situation well, that the French government can hardly propose credible solutions if it is caught at fault in this credibility.
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