We have discussed the current developments in the Middle East with Dr Witold Repetowicz, assistant professor at the War Studies University, collaborator at the Pulaski Foundation and the Defence24 portal, journalist. The interview was carried out by Denys Kolesnyk, French consultant and analyst.
The security climate in the Middle East has drastically deteriorated since the Hamas attack on Israel. According to different sources, the risk of a wider war is looming. How can you characterise the main trends in the region in general terms? Are things as disastrous as they seem?
Currently, there is widespread attention on the events unfolding in the Gaza Strip and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran. It’s worth recalling that about a year ago, in early 2023, some believed the Middle East was entering a period of stability.
Several symptoms or factors seemed to support this notion. For instance, there were positive signs such as the Abraham Accords and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, though the latter’s repercussions were less than smooth. But that is another issue. Additionally, there were notable developments like the normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the resolution of disputes within the GCC, the thawing of tensions between Turkey and Arab states, and a decrease in hostilities in the Syrian war. Despite these seemingly positive developments, they collectively painted a misleading picture of normalisation and stabilisation in the region, which was completely false and illusory from the beginning.
This outcome could definitely have been foreseen, given the unresolved problems, such as the Palestinian issue. While Arab governments displayed diminishing interest in it, public sentiment, particularly the so-called “Arab street,” remained engaged. This disconnect underscored a significant potential for escalation, highlighting the fragility of the situation.
Secondly, when we examine two ongoing conflicts — the wars in Syria and Yemen — we find not only are they unresolved, but there’s a glaring absence of genuine efforts toward negotiation for a political resolution.
A glance at the map reveals the intricate complexities of the situation in Syria, where Assad retains control in Damascus, the war rages on with various factions fighting for power. Al-Qaeda holds sway in Idlib, while Turkish forces occupy parts of northern Syria, exacerbating the Kurdish issue and posing a threat to Kurdish communities in the region. This paints a picture that is not even distantly close to stability.
Similarly, the conflict in Yemen has resulted in one of the most severe humanitarian crises of our time, yet it often falls off the radar due to its geographical distance and the perception of its insignificance. However, recent events, such as the Huthis’ blockade of the Red Sea, have put Yemen back into the global spotlight.
Furthermore, even if the crisis in the Red Sea was to be resolved, Yemen’s internal situation would remain unresolved. The Kurdish issue poses another significant risk of escalation. Additionally, the lingering presence of the Islamic State represents an ongoing challenge, and despite efforts, it has not been eradicated entirely. For instance, the situation at the Al-Hol refugee camp underscores this issue. Regrettably, it has faded from the world’s attention, dismissed as just another refugee camp in Syria. But once this camp, which is practically a nest where the ISIS ideology develops and prospers, no longer exists, they may migrate to Europe. And that would be another enormous security challenge to face.
Concerning long-term destabilising factors, we must consider the looming challenges of climate change and water scarcity in the Middle East. Particularly, the issue of water management in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers presents a significant risk for escalation. Turkey’s construction of dams upstream exacerbates tensions in the region.
In Iraq, a growing population coupled with diminishing water resources and increasing pollution poses a substantial threat. This imbalance in water availability versus demand sets the stage for potential conflicts. Additionally, Iraq faces unsustainable population growth, far outpacing that of Turkey and Iran. Without a coherent plan to address this demographic surge, the country risks further instability.
Moreover, a million Iraqi citizens add annually to the country’s population and constitute the urgency of this situation. And if these people don’t have prospects, they will either migrate to Europe or become militarised, leading to some kind of war, or a revolution to erupt.
The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has negatively impacted security not only in Europe but also overseas. How did the Russo-Ukrainian War affect the Middle East?
I would say that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has positively and negatively impacted the situation in the Middle East. On the positive side, the reduction of Russian presence in Syria due to their involvement in Ukraine is beneficial, as diminished Russian involvement tends to improve situations. However, this is where the positive impact ends.
However, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict doesn’t directly influence the dynamics in the Middle East. Issues in the region live on their own, and it’s inaccurate to attribute crises in Gaza or conflicts between Iran and Israel to Russia. However, Russia does capitalise on these conflicts, exploiting escalations for its own interests.
It’s rather the opposite; the situation in the Middle East has more influence on the Russo-Ukrainian war than this conflict affects the situation in the Middle East. The greater the escalation in the Middle East, the better for Russia, and Moscow benefits from it.
Of course, another issue is Russia’s disinformation and cognitive actions in the Middle East, which aim to provoke hatred of the Muslim and Arab world towards the West. Moscow tries to disinform the local population about the reasons for the war it wages against Ukraine, creating and exploiting certain resentments existing in the Middle East towards the United States. This allows to create a false image as if the Ukrainians were Russian “brothers” and this war was not against Ukraine but against “aggressive” NATO and the US, and Ukrainians, like Russians, are “victims of NATO’s invasion”. By the way, I witnessed firsthand the Russian ambassador to Iraq, a skilled diplomat, during a conference in Baghdad in the summer of 2022. Worth noting, however, that while some Iraqis don’t buy into this, some of them do.
Russian propaganda efforts in the region are robust and persistent, yet they often face insufficient opposition from the broader Western narrative. It’s worth noting that counter-narratives from Eastern European nations may carry more credibility in this context than those from Western countries. So, that’s the second issue.
the food security challenge, particularly evident in grain-importing nations like Egypt, adds another layer to the complexities of the region. It’s well understood that instability in the Middle East, coupled with economic crises, would play into Russia’s interests. Any escalation that sparks a migration crisis would further serve Russia’s agenda.
The Iranian proxies – Huthis – have been disrupting international maritime navigation in the Red Sea. Despite the US-led coalition and the Chinese efforts, there was no significant result on the ground. In your opinion, why didn’t those efforts bring any fruit?
I wouldn’t overestimate China’s efforts here, because China has no reason to solve this situation. Beijing’s only interest is to prevent the Houthis from attacking their ships and states associated with them. However, beyond this, China aims to undermine the credibility and prestige of the United States.
The ongoing conflict in Yemen has roots in unresolved grievances. While there was a temporary de-escalation in early 2022, no lasting political solution has been reached. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has been embroiled in a violent campaign there, drawing increasing criticism from the United States since 2017 due to its severity and contribution to a vast humanitarian crisis.
Pressure has been applied to Saudi Arabia, and to some extent, the United Arab Emirates, although the latter had differing interests in de-escalating the situation.
It was evident from the outset that limited airstrikes on Houthi arms depots in Yemen would prove ineffective, and indeed, they have failed to produce the desired outcome. So this American-British operation Prosperity Guardian, or the EU operation in the Red Sea, will not solve the problem.
At this point, we are faced with a dilemma: either a greater military involvement in Yemen or refrain from further engagement. It’s worth noting that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have no intentions to support such operations, given the Houthi’s demonstrated capability to effectively target objectives within their territories.
Moreover, these Arab states will not engage further, considering the United States’ previous support for the conflict and subsequent withdrawal of backing. Additionally, the United States has not explicitly stated its goal to overthrow the Houthis, signalling a reluctance for total war, which does not align with the interests of the Arab states.
As such, only two options remain: either pursue a total war strategy to eradicate Houthi influence and control over Yemen or seek alternative approaches to address the conflict. This involves the need for a ground operation or unconditional support for other regional players who may want to jump in.
So, it would probably require the deployment of US troops and allies. And it is not an option in the current situation, because Yemen would be another Afghanistan. It would even be more challenging terrain than Afghanistan.
Therefore the option of negotiations remains. But right now, circumstances are not favourable for this option so it is doubtful if this can be solved anytime soon.
Since the 7 October Hamas attack against Israel, the West has been supporting Israel. However, its land operation in the Gaza Strip was highly criticised. The Biden Administration recently pledged an “ironclad” support to Israel. But how far the US may go in supporting Israel?
First of all, there are two different issues here: the conflict with Iran, or rather, the ongoing tensions, and the conflict in the Gaza Strip. While those issues are strongly interconnected, particularly from the perspective of the US support, they are separate issues.
Regarding the conflict with Iran, it’s clear that Israel’s actions, whether retaliatory or otherwise, will have significant implications. While there are indications that Israel may not retaliate directly on Iranian territory due to limitations without US support, any failure to effectively respond could be seen as a humiliation for Israel.
In my opinion, Israel made a serious mistake right after Iran’s strike against Israel. The Israelis had an opportunity to claim victory, as suggested by American officials because it was a victory. And I’ll explain why, Israel’s targeted strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus resulted in casualties, including three generals, while Iran’s attack caused no casualties or damage. This could have been framed as a clear victory for Israel, but the opportunity seems to have passed.
By framing Iran’s attack as a necessary provocation that demands a response, Israel risks losing the upper hand in this confrontation. If Israel’s response is perceived as inadequate, Iran may gain the advantage and dictate terms. In my view, Israel’s handling of the situation may have been a misstep. The consequences of this decision remain to be seen.
In any case, it’s unsurprising that Americans are reluctant to support attacks on Iran. As mentioned earlier, Yemen may represent the same challenge for Americans as Afghanistan, since engaging in ground combat in Yemen or invading Iran would be unimaginable madness.
Even if the outcome of such a conflict resulted in the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, it would come at a significant cost. Ukraine would be left without assistance, and Taiwan could face potential Chinese aggression, resulting in enormous consequences. Moreover, such a conflict would offer little solace to the Islamic Republic if the result of the invasion is its downfall, so it too seeks to avoid such a confrontation.
Returning to American involvement, it’s certain that Americans will stand by Israel in this defensive dimension, regardless of Israel’s actions. However, if the current Iranian attack was significantly more impactful, causing casualties, it could present greater dilemmas for the United States concerning Israel’s response.
So, Israel can rely on US support regardless of the circumstances, and it can also expect neutrality from Arab states, though not outright support. Arab states have no incentive to back Iran, but they also have no desire to expose themselves to potential retaliation by supporting Israel’s actions.
However, the situation concerning the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian issue presents a different scenario. While US support exists, there is growing pressure on President Biden from within Democratic Party circles and public opinion in the United States for this support to be conditional. If Israel were to strike Rafah again, as criticism of Israel’s actions has been somewhat overshadowed by the Israel-Iran confrontation, the situation could shift, and the Biden administration would face pressure to rebuke Israel.
Nonetheless, Israel knows it can rely on Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, where Republicans, who hold the majority, are more inclined to support Israel over Ukraine. Thus, while this poses a challenge for Biden, Netanyahu’s predicament appears less severe from this perspective.
Nevertheless, the stance of Arab states would also change in such a scenario. An attack on Rafah could jeopardise the entire normalisation process between Israel and the Arab world.
The Middle East is quite a complicated region, with different local and international stakeholders engaged. How would you characterise the US, Russian and Chinese policy in the region? And what are Iran’s, Saudi Arabia’s, Turkey’s and Egypt’s ambitions?
Yes, when it comes to the United States, it’s a fact that Washington has aimed to reduce its engagement in the Middle East for at least a decade. However, it encountered obstacles due to the fact that the Middle East is a complicated region. A withdrawal would leave a security void swiftly filled by Russia and the Chinese, a scenario unacceptable to the US given the strategic importance of this region.
Despite the growing significance of the Indo-Pacific for the United States, it remains unable to disengage from the Middle East entirely. Thus, maintaining a military presence in the region remains a necessity. Moreover, the US allies — Saudi Arabia and Turkey — asserting their own interests more aggressively constitutes another problem.
As for Russia, Moscow seeks to expand its influence in the Middle East, aiming to displace the US dominance and revive its imperial ambitions as a global player. While Russia wields considerable propaganda influence, its ability to shape events in the region remains limited. Although involved in the Syrian conflict, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has diverted attention and resources, reducing its involvement in the Middle East.
Turkish, Iranian, and Arab influences have increased in this vacuum created by Russia. Moreover, in none of the other countries do the Russians have very significant influences. Of course, they are working on it, for example in Iraq, but still, these influences remain limited.
On the other hand, China’s interest in the Middle East is driven by its Belt and Road Initiative, as well as its pursuit of valuable resources, particularly oil. Additionally, China aspires to enhance its global mediation role.
While China celebrated a notable achievement in facilitating Saudi-Iranian normalisation, its role in this process was more symbolic than substantial. China only entered negotiations between the two countries towards the latter stages and cannot claim to be the primary architect of this normalisation. Moreover, the current normalisation remains largely superficial.
Turning to regional dynamics, Iran, through its axis of resistance and proxies, seeks recognition as a regional superpower, a status denied to it by the United States and Western powers.
Egypt, despite its significant territorial expanse and population, struggles with a fragile economy and relies heavily on support from wealthier Arab states and entities like the European Union. The Red Sea Crisis has further exacerbated Egypt’s economic challenges, particularly with the potential blockage of the Suez Canal, resulting in a drastic decline in revenue.
These economic strains contribute to a precarious financial situation for Egypt, with potential repercussions for Europe. Additionally, the completion of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile could exacerbate existing challenges, potentially triggering a massive migration crisis from Egypt to Europe.
Furthermore, any conflict or attack on Rafah could intensify pressure on Egypt, which has historically provided refuge to Palestinians. If Egypt were to open its borders, it could lead to attempts to relocate these Palestinians, posing yet another migration challenge for Europe.
While Egypt boasts one of the largest armies in the Middle East, its role as a primary player in regional dynamics is uncertain. Instead, the potential for destabilisation in Egypt presents significant risks for Europe.
And what about Turkey and Saudi Arabia?
Under the leadership of Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia harbours ambitions not only to be a regional superpower but also to achieve global status. These are very important ambitions; however, Mohammed bin Salman wants to position Saudi Arabia as an independent actor manoeuvring between China, Russia, and the United States.
Meanwhile, Turkey also entertains imperial ambitions, yet Erdogan’s leadership over the past decade has seen minimal progress toward achieving this goal. Turkey’s fixation on the Kurdish issue, despite the possibility of negotiations, has hindered its imperial pursuits. This, obviously, paved the way for divergences with the US.
Moreover, Turkey had strained relations with the Arab states, notably with Egypt, due to Edrogan’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood – an ideological ally of the Turkish ruling party. However, Ankara and Cairo have recently taken a course on improving relations with Erdogan’s visit to Cairo, the first such visit from 2012. Nevertheless, given Turkey’s economic challenges, it lacks the necessary resources to back its ambitions of becoming a regional leader.
And one more question. Who are Poland’s most important partners in this region?
Poland should prioritise the development of its economic and political relations in the Middle East, as they are currently underdeveloped.
Currently, Israel stands as Poland’s primary partner in the Middle East, despite occasional challenges in Polish-Israeli relations. However, the historical potential for close relations, rooted in the Polish origin of Israel’s early authorities, has diminished over time, particularly with the increasing influence of Jews from Russia, which poses challenges for Poland. For instance, the comparison between former Ambassador Professor Shevah Weiss, who was born in Poland, and the current Ambassador Yacov Livne, who was born in Moscow, underscores this shift.
In addition to Israel, Poland should also focus on fostering relations with other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iraq. While there is untapped potential for cooperation with Iraq, opportunities for collaboration were missed in the past. Moreover, despite initial plans for cooperation following the signing of the JCPOA, Poland failed to capitalise on the potential benefits of engaging with Iran.
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