By Frederic Mayne, London
The downfall of the Assad regime in Syria after decades of brutal dictatorship will fundamentally change the geopolitics of the region, as Syria is indeed central to the Middle East. This is partly due to the country’s geographic location, bordered by Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon—essentially in the heart of the Middle East. It is also due to Syria’s weakness, which has made it the subject of regional power struggles and influence. The civil war that began in 2011 has allowed Russia, since its intervention in September 2015, to regain a significant role in the region as the protector of the Assad regime. It has also enabled Iran, the second protector of the dictatorship in Damascus, to establish a strategic corridor of influence—from Iraq, where Iran holds considerable sway over militias, through Syria, and into Lebanon, where Iran has invested heavily in Hezbollah for many years. Thus, the power vacuum created by the civil war in Syria has been filled by two ambitious regional players. Both Russia and Iran seek to replace the United States as the dominant power, as the long-time hegemon looks to withdraw from the region following major frustrations over a failed transformation policy, particularly in Iraq.
When Barack Obama first set a red line in Syria but later backed down and refrained from intervention, it signaled American weakness to all players in the region. At the same time, under both Obama and Biden, the U.S. turned a blind eye as Iran aggressively pursued its regional hegemony and armed its proxy militias—from Hezbollah to Hamas and the Houthis, as well as various militias in Iraq. Washington remained focused primarily on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. To make progress on this front, Obama and Biden eased sanctions, which funneled enough money into the Iranian regime’s coffers to allow it to continue its regional dominance strategy.
Until recently, it seemed that Iran was succeeding. Not only did it steadily advance its nuclear program—taking two steps forward and one step back—but it also developed advanced missiles to equip its proxy militias. The possibility of overwhelming Israel’s missile defense system through a concentrated multi-front attack began to appear more realistic. At the same time, Iran strengthened its ties with Russia and China. Tehran supplied drones to Russia for its war in Ukraine, while China became Iran’s primary, almost exclusive, oil buyer. Moscow and Beijing also integrated Iran into their geopolitical blocs—Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in July 2023 and became a BRICS member on January 1, 2024. This significantly reduced the West’s ability to isolate Iran with sanctions. Instead of operating as a lone actor, Iran is now closely aligned with two other powers—Russia and China—that also seek to counter U.S. influence in their respective regions.
The U.S. largely stood by as Iran expanded its regional power. Washington focused on protecting its primary allies: Israel first and the Gulf states second. During his first term, Trump attempted to facilitate reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Biden continued this effort. Negotiations on a trilateral agreement between the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia were reportedly progressing well. It seemed that the region was moving toward a Cold War-like dynamic: on one side, a U.S.-backed bloc; on the other, Iran and its spheres of influence. The events of October 7, 2023—the Hamas attack on Israel—upended this trajectory. It set off a chain reaction of events. As a result, Iran lost much of its regional power after Tehran directly and indirectly attacked Israel through its proxies. Israel has emerged militarily victorious, significantly weakening Iran in the process.
Iran’s weakening, in turn, has strengthened Turkey. Erdogan was one of the main backers of the rebels in the Syrian civil war. He enabled them to establish a quasi-state in northwest Syria, in Idlib, near the Turkish border. This area now appears to be forming the core of a post-Assad Syria. From Idlib, the rebels have advanced, facing little resistance. With both of Assad’s protectors—Russia and Iran—unable to save him again, Assad was forced to surrender.
The collapse of the Assad regime is redefining the power landscape of the region. No one knows how the situation in Syria will evolve. The events caught everyone by surprise, likely even the rebels themselves. It was clear that the regime was weak, but not that it was so fragile. Most key regional players had, to some extent, come to terms with the Assad regime. The Gulf states were on the path to normalization. Even Turkey had sought to find common ground, particularly concerning the return of the millions of refugees it had taken in. Even the U.S. had recently hoped to persuade Assad to reduce Iranian influence.
In the completely new situation following the fall of the weak dictator, every actor is now trying to safeguard their interests. Iran is in the weakest position. It is deeply unpopular in Syria, and Israel’s military operations have already significantly weakened it. The likelihood that Iran will secure access to Lebanon through Syria to rebuild its oldest proxy ally is extremely low.
Russia also supported Assad and has even given him refuge. Russian airstrikes against the rebels, including attacks on hospitals, were brutal and feared. However, it remains uncertain whether the new rulers might strike a deal with Moscow that would allow it to maintain its military bases in the country. Russia could be valuable to the new government, as it has the power in the UN Security Council to block the removal of the rebel organization HTS from the terrorist list. Additionally, since 2017, Russia has worked with various armed groups in Syria as part of the Astana Process and has therefore established many connections.
The clear winner is Turkey. In the end, Erdogan’s support for the rebels has paid off. Turkey’s influence on the new Syria is likely to be significant. It remains to be seen whether the conflict with the Syrian Kurds, who have established an autonomous region in northern Syria, will escalate. This is where the Americans come into play. They not only protect the Kurds but are also deeply concerned that thousands of radical Islamist ISIS fighters, currently held in detention, could be released.
For Israel, the overall development is positive. Iran has been weakened, and its connection to Hezbollah has been severely disrupted. Israel has reaffirmed itself as the region’s leading military power. However, Israel had also reached an understanding with the Assad regime, securing its interests through regular military strikes against Iranian activities in Syria. The situation had seemed stable. Now, there is concern in Israel that a radical Islamist regime could take power in Syria. To reduce the risk of Syria turning militarily against Israel in the future, Israel has recently carried out massive airstrikes that have significantly diminished Syria’s offensive capabilities. Additionally, it has occupied the strategically important buffer zone between the two countries in the Golan Heights.
It remains unclear where the Trump administration will position itself. The U.S. remains the external power with the greatest potential to shape the region’s future. At the same time, after its failure in Iraq, Washington has been cautious and would prefer to disengage from the region sooner rather than later. Whether Trump will implement a strong U.S. Middle East policy that includes investment in regional security is uncertain. It is likely that negotiations on the trilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia and Israel will continue. It is also probable that Trump will attempt, in some form, to strike a deal with Iran. For Syria, Trump’s stance could be summed up by what he proclaimed in capital letters on social media late last year: America should not get involved.
