Summary
This paper offers an analytical examination of the presence and influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, represented in Lebanon by the “Islamic Group” (Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya), and explores the implications of its participation in military operations against Israel from within Lebanon.
Will this involvement lead to a long-term increase in the Brotherhood’s influence within the country?
The discussion is structured around the following key points:
- Introduction
- History of the Political and Religious Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon
- A look at the political and religious activities of the Brotherhood in Lebanon.
- Strengthening Political Presence Through Military Action and Alliances with Hamas and Hezbollah
- How military alliances shape the Brotherhood’s role in Lebanese politics.
- Alliance Between the Islamic Group and Hezbollah in Lebanon
- An exploration of the strategic partnership between the Brotherhood and Hezbollah.
- The Position of the Islamic Group Among the Sunni Community in Lebanon
- A consideration of the Brotherhood’s standing within Lebanon’s Sunni population.
- Conclusion
Introduction
The Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon has found a strategic opportunity to expand its activities and reinforce its presence following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, launched by the Islamist terror Movement “Hamas” on October 7, 2023. In Lebanon, the Brotherhood is represented by the “Islamic Group” (Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya), founded by Faisal Mawlawi and Fathi Yakan in 1956, with a stated mission of “protecting values and individuals within the Islamic community.” This renewed activity has also coincided with the recent conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon.
For years, the group focused primarily on religious outreach, charitable work, and political involvement. However, it has recently resumed military actions, with its military wing, the “Forces of Dawn” (Quwat al-Fajr), launching rocket strikes against the Israeli military and vowing to retaliate against any aggression in southern Lebanon.
Many Lebanese Sunnis have long resisted the Brotherhood’s calls for jihad, but the group seems to be banking on a shift in sentiment due to pressures from the Gaza conflict, the ongoing economic crisis, and the local political vacuum, alongside the current war between Hezbollah and Israel. Since the outbreak of the Gaza conflict, various Sunni branches of the Muslim Brotherhood across the Middle East have renewed calls for jihad, with some reviving their military cells. In Lebanon, the Forces of Dawn coordinated attacks with Hezbollah, resulting in Israeli strikes that killed several Brotherhood fighters, including prominent commander Sharhabil Ali Sayyed in an airstrike near Majdal Anjar.
History of the Political and Religious Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon
The “Islamic Group” (Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya) was established in Lebanon in the 1950s in Tripoli, marking the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Officially founded in 1964 by Faisal Mawlawi and Fathi Yakan, a young Tripoli native of Turkish descent, the group drew inspiration from Mustafa al-Siba’i, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, and Sayyid Qutb, one of its key figures in Egypt.
The group launched its Islamic magazine Al-Shihab in 1964 and later founded Al-Jinan University in 1988, spearheaded by Fathi Yakan and his wife, Mona Haddad. Faisal Mawlawi played a significant role in the group’s establishment, and Ibrahim al-Masri was later appointed as its secretary-general.
When the Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975, the Islamic Group established the “Mujahedeen for the Sake of God,” a militia aimed at defending Sunni areas in northern Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon. Politically, the group achieved notable success in 1992 when Fathi Yakan won a parliamentary seat representing Tripoli, joined by two others representing Danniyeh and Beirut. However, their influence began to wane in the subsequent elections, securing just one seat in Akkar in 1996, and losing their parliamentary presence by 2000 amidst Syrian influence in Lebanon. The group re-entered the electoral scene in 2009, but with limited success, winning only one seat.
The Brotherhood’s military wing, the “Forces of Dawn” (Quwat al-Fajr), emerged after Israel’s 1982 invasion, comprising youth from the Islamic Group in areas from southern Sidon to the border villages of Arqoub. Following a wave of arrests of its members and leaders by Israeli forces in Sidon, the group relocated to Tripoli and Beirut, establishing safehouses and organizing attacks along the Sidon-Beirut route. During this period, they coordinated with Hezbollah, which was then in its nascent stages.
Following the liberation of Sidon on February 16, 1985, the Islamic Group maintained a symbolic presence within Hezbollah’s ranks in southern Lebanon, operating under its command. The group receded from view after 2006, only to reappear recently following the Gaza conflict, announcing military operations in southern Lebanon. This re-emergence suggests a potential role as an alternative force to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon under a mutual agreement. On October 21, 2023, the Islamic Group issued a statement declaring a series of new, focused rocket strikes on Israeli positions in southern Lebanon, reportedly achieving direct hits.
The actions and stances of the Islamic Group in Lebanon have often mirrored those of its regional counterparts. For instance, during the Syrian Revolution in 2011, a notable rift emerged between the Islamic Group and Hezbollah over the latter’s support of the Assad regime, reflecting the Brotherhood’s support for the Sunni opposition in Syria.
Recently, however, the Islamic Group has pivoted towards a robust political alliance with Hezbollah and Hamas, a shift marked by the reactivation of its military wing, the Forces of Dawn, during the ongoing Gaza conflict. This alignment traces back to 2022, when Mohammad Takkoush led the Islamic Group’s pro-Hamas faction to victory in its internal elections, subsequently pursuing a formal alliance with the Hezbollah-Hamas axis.
In the same year, reports indicated that the Islamic Group garnered 22,978 votes in the Lebanese parliamentary elections, nearly doubling its 11,442 votes from 2018. This surge in support is largely attributed to a leadership void within the Sunni community, with the group’s popularity continuing to rise after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.
According to an informed source, the Islamic Group possesses moderately advanced military capabilities, though not on par with Hezbollah’s technology. It’s evident that the Forces of Dawn possess Kornet missiles, a weapon effective in battle; however, the origin of these missiles remains unclear, despite Hezbollah’s considerable stockpile of them.
Strengthening Political Presence Through Military Action and Alliances with Hamas and Hezbollah
The Forces of Dawn (Quwat al-Fajr), estimated to have around 500 fighters, represent a relatively small and militarily limited force. However, their political significance far outweighs their size, providing notable political advantages to Hezbollah and Hamas. Hezbollah has long sought to extend its reach into Sunni areas, where its policies have faced longstanding resistance, especially since its support of the Syrian regime.
Hezbollah has previously attempted to penetrate the Sunni-majority northern region by inviting Sunni religious figures to its events to endorse its narrative. However, Hezbollah’s influence in the north remained limited until Lebanon’s economic crisis exacerbated living conditions, creating an opening for Hezbollah to enter areas like Akkar, Tripoli, and Minieh, offering economic relief. Following Saad Hariri’s withdrawal from politics, Hezbollah seized the opportunity to build connections with Sunni leaders and institutions.
The Gaza conflict further bolstered Hezbollah’s standing among Sunni communities, which sympathize with any faction supporting the Palestinian cause. The Islamic Group similarly seized this moment, aligning with Hezbollah’s stance and adopting a more passionate rhetoric compared to the more moderate tone of the Future Movement. Reports suggest that while most Sunni youth were unfamiliar with the Forces of Dawn prior to October 7, a significant number are now expressing interest in joining the group to fight against Israel.
The strategic interests of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah have converged with the Forces of Dawn’s involvement in military operations. Hezbollah, in particular, benefits from having a Sunni faction involved in the fighting, countering the perception that it is leading the conflict alone on behalf of all Lebanese. Meanwhile, the Islamic Group sees this alliance as an opportunity to revive its popularity in areas where it once had a strong parliamentary and public presence. Cooperation with Iran also grants the Brotherhood and its allies enhanced leverage, providing support that reduces political and financial pressure in the absence of Arab allies. This alignment reinforces the concept of a “unity of fronts,” serving as a shared strategic framework for Islamist groups.
Alliance of the Islamic Group with Hezbollah in Lebanon
Hamas’ growing influence on the Islamic Group in Lebanon is indirectly assisting Hezbollah’s efforts to deepen its reach within Lebanon’s Sunni community. This push comes as Hezbollah’s Christian ally, Gebran Bassil, showed weakness in the 2022 elections, driving Hezbollah to seek new allies amid the Sunni community’s vulnerability and the retreat of traditional Sunni leaders from politics. Reports indicate that the Forces of Dawn receive financial allocations from Hamas.
Regarding its relationship with Hezbollah, Mohammad Takkoush noted that ties have fluctuated, with tensions over conflicts in Syria and Yemen but ultimately a shared focus on “resisting the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory.” Takkoush stated, “Our relations with Hezbollah are strong and growing, especially as we face this war.” He emphasized that their weaponry, from bullets to missiles, comes from their own stockpile, adding, “We have not received a single bullet from any external party.”
The Islamic Group in Lebanon maintains connections with Qatar, as well as with Turkey and its political and humanitarian institutions. Prominent Brotherhood figures are active in both countries. According to the group’s former Secretary-General, Azzam al-Ayoubi, “Lebanese Sunnis are looking for any power that can support them to restore the lost balance in Lebanon.”
In this context, Iran’s cultural advisor in Lebanon assured Takkoush of Tehran’s support for all liberation and resistance movements “to achieve justice and liberate Palestine.” Iran’s ambassador to Beirut, Mojtaba Amani, previously praised the ties between Iran and the Islamic Group. However, some analysts downplay the depth of this connection; Carnegie Middle East Center’s researcher, Mohanad Hage Ali, asserted that the group is not subordinate to Hezbollah, despite some Islamic Group leaders acknowledging that they are “in the same trench on the Palestinian issue.”
The deepening connection between the Islamic Group and Hezbollah in Lebanon is now undeniable. As Ali Abu Yassin, the political official within the Islamic Group, stated, “All forces operating in southern Lebanon coordinate with each other.” However, this relationship is complex, particularly given the lingering tensions over Syria. The strained relationship between Hamas and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since 2011 has also impacted ties between the Islamic Group and Hezbollah. Yet, the election of Mohammad Takkoush as Secretary-General of the Islamic Group in 2022 marked a period of improvement, despite the ongoing challenges in reconciling differences over Syria. Takkoush noted at the time, “We and Hezbollah are alike.”
A senior Islamic Group leader described the group’s return to the resistance front as a natural progression, noting that confronting Israel became an organizational priority following the brutal assault on Gaza. The Islamic Group is pursuing this goal “through full coordination with Hamas, supporting all armed forces, and ensuring that Lebanese territory remains an active front against Israeli occupation.”
An Islamic Group leader confirmed that the Forces of Dawn are now engaging in “joint operations with Hamas.” The Deputy Head of the group’s political bureau, Bassam Hammoud, stated, “We and Hamas are two sides of the same coin in facing the Zionist enemy.” Imad Hout, the Islamic Group’s sole representative in the Lebanese parliament, added that the size of the Forces of Dawn is “calibrated to respond as necessary to aggression and is funded through its own resources.” For Hout, “As long as there is aggression, the group will continue launching rockets against Israel.”
Recently, the Islamic Group has attempted to further integrate with Hamas. For example, after the assassination of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in an Israeli strike in Beirut in January, the Islamic Group issued a condolence statement declaring that “Lebanese and Palestinian blood has merged to carry on the path of liberation.” Additionally, the group released a memorial announcement following the death of Shahrabil Ali al-Sayed on May 18, honoring him as a leader of both the Forces of Dawn and Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.
The Status of the Islamic Group Among Lebanon’s Sunni Community
While the Islamic Group currently holds only one parliamentary seat, it maintains significant influence within Lebanon’s Sunni community. With a network of supporters across Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, Sidon, Tripoli, and Arqoub, some sources claim it ranks second in popularity among Sunni factions, following the Future Movement led by Saad Hariri.
However, certain Sunni segments are increasingly concerned about the group’s military involvement, especially its collaboration with Hezbollah and Hamas, as it raises fears of a shift towards extremism. Since Hezbollah and Hamas are labeled as terrorist organizations by several Arab and Western countries, the Islamic Group’s cooperation with them could risk alienating it from Sunni moderates. This partnership also reflects a growing Sunni alignment with Iran, a contentious move considering Iran’s influence on Lebanon’s political landscape and diminishing Saudi and broader Arab support for Lebanon’s Sunni community.
In February 2024, Saad Hariri voiced these concerns, stating, “If I sense that the Sunnis in Lebanon are leaning toward extremism, I will intervene.”
Sunni Leaders’ Concerns and the Islamic Group’s Position
Many saw Hariri’s statement as a green light from Gulf states for him to reclaim his political role, which he withdrew from in 2022, should other Sunni factions, including the Islamic Group, gain significant support among Lebanon’s Sunni population.
For around two decades, Sunni leaders and institutions, including the Future Movement, Sunni politicians, and Dar al-Fatwa—the Sunni religious authority in Lebanon—have opposed Hezbollah and its allies. This resistance began with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, for which many Sunnis blamed the Syrian regime and Hezbollah. It solidified further with Lebanon’s division into the March 8 and March 14 camps, Hezbollah’s brief control over several Sunni areas in Beirut in May 2008, and its intervention in Syria against a popular uprising supported by most Lebanese Sunnis. Consequently, the Islamic Group’s recent alignment with Hezbollah marks a shift from a key element of contemporary Sunni political identity in Lebanon.
Former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, a close associate of the late Rafik Hariri, has long opposed dragging Lebanon’s Sunnis into the Gaza conflict. Additionally, respected Islamic thinker Ridwan Al-Sayyed urged the Grand Mufti and Dar al-Fatwa to take action against clerics supporting Hamas and Hezbollah. Given this backdrop, the Islamic Group initially took a cautious approach to avoid alienating segments of the Sunni community. When it announced its involvement in the southern front against Israel, it emphasized that its operations were not coordinated with any other group, making a pointed reference to Hezbollah.
Conclusion:
- It is clear that the Islamic Group has succeeded in attracting the support of some Sunni citizens and a number of prominent figures within Dar al-Fatwa, capitalizing on the enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause, which resonates with both Arab nationalism and Islamic sentiments in the Sunni Lebanese community.
- Saudi Arabia has significantly withdrawn from the Lebanese political arena in recent years and has greatly reduced its financial support, partly due to changing priorities and the increasing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Nevertheless, this moment may present an important opportunity for Washington to convince the Saudis to re-engage with the Lebanese file, especially given the rising danger of Sunni extremism in Lebanon and its potential impact on Saudi national security and the region as a whole.
- A large portion of the Sunni community in Lebanon remains inclined toward the relative moderation represented by Saudi Arabia, compared to the extremist ideas espoused by other groups. However, the absence of Saudi Arabia from the Lebanese scene in recent years has opened the door for the Islamic Group and other extremist factions to expand and gain influence among the Sunni audience.
