In September, we had a chance to examine Bulgaria’s relations with the Middle East from current and historical standpoints. Denys Kolesnyk discussed it with Vladimir Chukov, Bulgarian university professor and researcher in the field of Middle East politics, Islamic studies and conflictology. Since 2007, professor Chukov has been a professor and has taught at several Bulgarian universities, currently at the University of Ruse (Bulgaria) and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.
The Middle East is quite a dynamic region, with many overlapping regional and extra-regional interests. What are the main changes in the region, and how would you explain them?
The concept of the Middle East is primarily geographical, but it is a collection of several sub-regions, which themselves have different profiles in political, economic, military-strategic, social and demographic terms. In recent years, it has become synonymous above all with the rich countries of the Persian Gulf, which have begun to play a supra-regional role thanks to the enormous material assets they have accumulated. At the same time, the understanding of the Middle East also includes poor states, often torn apart by internal conflicts, such as Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and Sudan, in stark contrast to the rich countries of the region. If we were to briefly describe the processes that have dominated in recent years, it would be a strong polarisation along the following axes: “rich-poor”, “stable-destabilised”, and “regional centres – regional periphery”.
All of this has led to the transformation of the Middle East into several local centres with mutually exclusive functions. So, for example, from the 1980s until around 2015, when the current Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman became head of Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf region became “the world’s oil pump”. Around two-thirds of the world’s deposits of black gold are located there and, in the 1980s, former US President Ronald Reagan overthrew the communist bloc in Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union.
Today, the region can be described as a “huge cash box” that has become “the place to be for money hunters from all over the world”. It is no coincidence that the world’s largest electronic real estate platform is located there. This has happened because the tool of flexible foreign policy has been added to the weapon of oil, which has been measured and put into practice by the two Mohammeds – Mohammed bin Salman and his political teacher, the current President of the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed. My personal view is that the latter adapts in a very flexible way the principles of traditional British foreign policy, namely “there are no eternal friends and there are no eternal enemies, there are eternal interests”.
Yet we cannot speak of democracy as we understand and apply it in the Euro-Christian world. For two consecutive years, 2022 and 2023, US President Joe Biden organised what is known as the “Democracy Forum”, applying American criteria for a democratic regime. From the Middle East, only Iraq and the State of Israel were invited. Even countries with a tradition of party pluralism and permanent parliamentary elections, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Türkiye, were not invited.
Mohammed bin Salman’s interview with Graeme Wood, a journalist with the American magazine “Atlantic”, in April 2022 will remain significant in this respect. In it, he explains very fully and logically why the models of political regimes in Europe and America are not applicable in societies like Saudi Arabia. These differences of principle have greatly “inflated” the tensions between Riyadh and Washington, and in particular, on a personal level, between Bin Salman and Joe Biden.
In addition to the Arab “ideal state” built by the countries of the Persian Gulf (to use Aristotle’s expression), we can also observe processes characteristic of failed states, such as those of the peripheral countries of the Middle East. The combination of a turbulent demographic profile, lack of natural resources, crushing corruption and dictatorial rule has turned the periphery into a volcano of migrants seeking happiness in Europe, but also of religious radicals who see the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism as a tool for the revenge of authoritarian regimes. The younger generation, who suffer most from unemployment, blame local leaders for their social misfortune and personal despair. They are faced with the dilemma of “radicalisation or migration”.
The Middle East’s importance is also heightened by its geographical proximity to Europe, which has been the arena of world politics for over two millennia and is currently (following the creation of the European Union) one of the world’s major political and economic centres. The Middle East and Europe are two sides of the same coin. The Mediterranean Sea, with the exception of the colonial era, is destined to stimulate the creation of a mutually beneficial partnership and cooperation.
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we are seeing a more independent stance from the countries in the region and the emergence of a de facto leader: Saudi Arabia. What is Bulgaria’s involvement in the region? What are Sofia’s foreign policy priorities in the MENA region?
Saudi Arabia has unquestionably been the region’s leader since Mohammed bin Salman took power in Riyadh. He has taken his country from the Islamic twentieth century to the twenty-first century of progress, tolerance and very skilful defence of national interests. We can see that Riyadh is directly involved in every major international event, or that its shadow is visible there.
At the same time, Bulgaria and Bulgarian diplomacy have needed sufficient time to adapt to the new global and regional realities. Above all, the reform of the Bulgarian government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was essential, and from then on it was necessary to slowly and gradually change priorities in the MENA region. Until the fall of the communist regime, under the dictates of Moscow, Bulgarian diplomacy focused on active relations with so-called “revolutionary regimes and organisations”.
We are talking about Gaddafi’s Libya, which became the world’s largest labour market for Bulgarian workers, Syria, Iraq, where the Baath parties reigned, Algeria, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and the PLO. The links were mainly ideological, while trade and economic relations developed on this basis. At the same time, it was a disaster for our foreign trade, because Bulgarian organisations worked on credit and many of the loans granted were not repaid or were considerably reduced.
After 1990, Sofia slowly adapted to the so-called “moderate regimes” in the MENA region, which became the main priority of Bulgarian diplomacy in the region. The same year saw the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the State of Israel, the severance of which had been a huge diplomatic blunder. On Moscow’s instructions, Bulgaria withdrew its diplomatic staff and thus severed its historic ties with the small but influential Bulgarian Jewish community. This was because Bulgaria was the only country in Europe (along with Denmark) that had saved its Jewish population from deportation by the Nazis during the Second World War. Slowly and rather timidly, Sofia established diplomatic relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf (with the exception of Kuwait), depending on the ideological cliché imposed by the communists on these countries’ support for radical Islam. This was due to the one-sided interpretation of the Soviet army’s invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989), which was explained as an expression of “proletarian internationalism”.
Logically, the reform also had to involve the staff, since the majority of Bulgarian Arabic-speaking diplomats were graduates of Soviet universities and had great difficulty getting rid of the ideological clichés taught in Communist universities and academies.
How would you characterise bilateral relations with the main regional players – Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh and Doha?
Bulgaria practices the principle of compulsory differentiation in its relations with the various Arab countries. This is due not only to historical accumulations but also to the economic relations that have shaped the political level. Bulgaria has special relations with Türkiye, as we are neighbours and there is a large Turkish minority.
The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) party, the main defender of the interests of this ethnic group, plays an active role in Bulgarian politics. I won’t hide the fact that relations with Türkiye over the last few decades have ebbed and flowed. They started almost from scratch after the so-called “renaissance process”, when, between 1984 and 1989, the leaders of the former Communist Party changed the names of hundreds of thousands of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin. This crime disrupted good neighbourly relations for, let’s say, a period of 10 to 15 years.
Things changed when the DPS came to power (in coalition governments) in the first decade of the 21st century. All this warmed up bilateral relations. However, they were not entirely normalised. There may have been a short-lived tension in the first few years after Recep Erdoğan’s election victory when certain circles in the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) dreamt of restoring the Ottoman Empire. They even went so far as to expel diplomats from both countries when a former Turkish ambassador dared to help set up political parties in Bulgaria (the Dost political party).
In my opinion, Ankara is now well aware that this approach is counter-productive, especially given that the DPS does not share the AKP’s Islamist vision. For the moment, I would say that relations are normal and that the most pragmatic forms are being sought at the economic, commercial, educational and cultural levels. I’d like to remind that the Bulgarian-Turkish border is the busiest land border in Europe. The war in Ukraine has greatly mitigated the escalation of potential bilateral problems, as Russian aggression is a test case for the two Black Sea states. The main problem remains migratory pressure, which comes mainly from Türkiye. We are working together to resolve it.
Bulgaria has traditionally had good political and economic interests with Egypt. It was as if they were more intense under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, but this was driven by the ideological relationship of the former communist bloc with anti-Western leaders such as Nasser. We now have a pragmatic relationship in which there is sufficient economic potential to exploit. In my opinion, the bilateral trade figure of $823 million does not reflect this potential, even though by 2022 it has increased by around 40%.
Bulgaria has special relations with the State of Qatar. Relations were established as long ago as 1990, but the impetus was given in 2009 by Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov (former leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party). He overcame his fear (as a former communist) of “opening the door” to the Persian Gulf. His internal political thesis on Bulgaria’s “great energy coup” (the South Stream gas pipeline with Russia, the Belene nuclear power plant again with Russia and the supply of liquefied gas to Qatar) was linked to the development of Bulgarian-Qatari economic relations. In the case of Qatar, the traditional sporting links between the two countries played an important role. In 2001 the Qatar weightlifting team, made up of Bulgaria’s “B” team, brought glory to the small country on the world podium. The former communist country, in the midst of an economic crisis at the time, was in urgent need of Qatari money. For a sufficiently long time, Bulgaria has privileged its relations with Qatar as the representative of this region rich in oil and gas. Even in 2017, at the height of the rift between Doha and its opponents in Riyadh, Cairo, Manama and Abu Dhabi, Sofia appeared to side with Qatar. However, that has passed, as Qatar has also quickly returned to the Arab family.
The pattern of development of relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is similar. They were established as early as 1995 but only materialised with the opening of embassies in 2015. The most active party in this process was Saudi Arabia. The ideological clichés of the past have long prevented certain Bulgarian institutions (apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) from overcoming the prejudices of communism and giving the “green light” to mutually beneficial political and, above all, economic relations. Some circles in Sofia continue to regard Saudi Arabia as a bastion of Islamism rather than an active developing country with a considerable strategic political, economic and military stance in the fight against religious radicalism and extremism. Sofia’s hesitation in developing relations with Riyadh shows a lack of flexibility compared to that shown by Bucharest, with which we are trying to resonate. Unlike Bulgaria, Romania has never severed its relations with Israel and at the same time sent its ambassador to Riyadh almost 20 years earlier than Sofia.
Bulgaria is currently developing priority economic and political relations with this Middle Eastern kingdom, and the level of trade is constantly increasing. In 2021, it stood at the unsatisfactory level of 313 million dollars, despite having increased by 90% in just one year.
During the Soviet era, Bulgaria played an active role in regional affairs. For example, in the 1960s Bulgaria sent workers and advisers to Iraq, while in 2003 the Bulgarian contingent participated in the American invasion of Iraq. Is Sofia using its links with the region created during the Soviet era? If so, could you explain how?
We have already talked about Bulgaria’s economic presence in the countries of the Middle East during the communist era. The focus was on Libya and Iraq because these two countries, with their large oil deposits, were best placed to pay the wages of Bulgarians working in their companies. However, trade with these countries was conducted on credit, and many Bulgarian companies were unable to obtain the money they were owed when the country needed it most.
At the end of the 1990s, Libya owed Bulgaria around $800 million, which it gradually paid off, according to Tripoli. The remaining $54 million was deducted from the so-called “blood tax” of the Bulgarian doctors who were unjustly convicted by the Benghazi court of infecting 300 Libyan children with AIDS. At the time of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s debt to Bulgaria totalled more than 1.3 billion dollars. After the overthrow of the dictator, Bulgaria managed, thanks to numerous efforts, to recover around 370 million dollars.
This is largely thanks to the favour of the new authorities in Baghdad and the fact that Bulgaria has sent a military contingent to Iraq as part of the “coalition of the willing”. In Iraq, there are too many local residents who have graduated from Bulgarian universities. In 1993 alone, over 1,000 Iraqi students defended their doctoral theses in Bulgaria. According to my modest calculations, up until 1989, more than 10,000 young Arabs had obtained their university degrees as Bulgarian state scholarship holders.
However, this contingent remains in passive reserve for the implementation of an active policy in these countries. Sofia, perhaps fearing for the safety of its diplomats, has not raised the level of its diplomatic representation in Baghdad since before 2003. At present, there is one embassy building, one diplomat below ambassadorial rank and local security. At some point, by way of reciprocity, Baghdad also lowered the level of its representation in Sofia. We still have no diplomatic representation in Libya. Such a policy is totally contrary to the policy of the European Union’s partners, who have long been developing active economic relations with these OPEC member states.
Economic ties often facilitate better political engagement. How would you describe economic cooperation between Bulgaria and the MENA countries? Who are Sofia’s main partners in this region?
I’ve touched upon it already, but generally speaking, I would like to stress that the level of economic cooperation between Bulgaria and the MENA countries is not satisfactory. Some Arab experts are right in saying that by joining the European Union, a large part of the flow of Bulgarian goods, capital, services and workers has been directed towards it, and the old channels and traditional partners have been forgotten. The volume of trade with the EU is similar in percentage terms to that which Bulgaria had with the USSR and the Arab countries before the political changes. This is a mistake that I hope the Sofia government will quickly correct.
People in the Middle East still remember the wonderful Bulgarian dairy products (cheese, yellow cheese, etc.), tomato purée and other agricultural products. Even Hungary, for a time when Bulgarian products had completely disappeared, tried to imitate the qualities of Bulgarian cheese. Turkish traders also tried to sell “Bulgarian cheese”, but Arab consumers quickly discovered the difference. The main partners in the region are Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (home to the largest Bulgarian community in the Arab world – over 65,000 people), Kuwait, Algeria and Morocco. Trade with Saudi Arabia is expanding. Major efforts are being made to restore old markets.
Bulgaria has been one of the first countries to deal with the migration crisis since 2015. The migration issue remains important, particularly with most Middle Eastern migrants transiting through Türkiye via your country to other EU countries. How is your government managing illegal migration? Are there any bilateral or multilateral initiatives to combat illegal migration from the Middle East?
This is a very sensitive issue for Bulgaria since illegal immigration is cited by the Netherlands and especially Austria as a reason for maintaining their veto on our country’s accession to the Schengen area. In Bulgaria, we are taking this very badly, because the accusations of easy crossing of the Bulgarian-Turkish border do not correspond to the truth.
In this respect, it should be noted that several Bulgarian police officers and border guards have been killed while carrying out their duties while stopping migrants. Since 2011, Bulgaria has met the technical criteria, but for purely domestic political reasons, the two governments persist. Furthermore, in her latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stressed that “Bulgaria and Romania belong to the Schengen area because they represent a model in the fight against illegal immigration”. Bulgaria is working with its European partners and the relevant institutions, including FRONTEX, to find the most effective formula for stopping or reducing the intensity of the flow of migrants.
In 2022, the EU granted Bulgaria additional financial aid for the purchase of more advanced technical equipment, as well as for the construction of new roads around the wall on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. The big problem, however, is that the EU itself has no unified policy on this issue. Bulgaria is strictly fulfilling its obligations under the 2016 agreement between Brussels and Ankara for the return of illegal migrants from European territory.
In addition, Bulgaria is working very actively with neighbouring Türkiye, as well as with neighbouring Greece, to ensure the return of migrants who have crossed the border into our country illegally. Periodic meetings between representatives of the law enforcement agencies of these three countries are organised in order to deal as effectively as possible with traffickers and all those involved in the criminal trade of migrants.
In 2023, migratory pressure has increased by more than 100% compared to 2022. This is a huge drain on the country’s material and human resources. It is the most insulting thing for us Bulgarians when governments like those in Amsterdam and Vienna do not respect our efforts and proven results. I don’t want to go into details about this, but it is likely that Romania’s firm behaviour is the best way to resolve this unpleasant situation.
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