We had the honour of talking to Guillaume Ancel, a former French officer and writer who has written a number of stories about war, including Rwanda, Sarajevo and Cambodia, where he served. His latest book is “Saint-Cyr, à l’école de la Grande Muette”, published by Flammarion. The interview was conducted on 24 April 2024 by Denys Kolesnyk, a French analyst and consultant.
Last week, Iran and Israel exchanged strikes. In your opinion, what objectives were they pursuing and what goals were achieved?
This exchange of strikes is complicated, because the aim of Israel’s allies in particular was to prevent a regional escalation. If we go back a little, first of all, Israel has proof that Iran helped Hamas to prepare its terrorist attack on 7 October. So, with a very important historical background, these are two countries that are fundamentally hostile, but which do not share land borders.
The only way to fight is either by exchanging airstrikes, or go through an intermediary, I was going to say practically Iran’s creature, Hezbollah, which has an army right on Israel’s border. Confrontations between Israelis and Iranians are very frequent, but they always go through proxies. For example, the Israelis have killed Iranian officials in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. But then, on 1 April, Tsahal made a mistake at the behest of Benjamin Netanyahu, by striking directly an Iranian consulate building in Syria. And for the Iranians, that was far too much.
In other words, they consider that it was as if Israel had struck directly on Iranian soil, given the diplomatic status of the consulate?
Yes, because the consulate and the embassy are considered national territory under international law. And for the Iranians, it was a real provocation. I don’t think the Israelis appreciated the impact. They thought they were in the usual “I’ll kill you, you kill me” dynamic, but discreetly. Except that this was a miscalculation.
Then, on 13 April, Iran organised a massive strike against Israel, with more than 300 vectors launched with the aim not of causing irreparable damage, but of impressing Israel. They warned Israel’s allies, in particular the United States, three days in advance, giving them plenty of time to set up a bubble to protect Israel. And these allies intercepted more than two thirds of the vectors. In addition, there is the Israeli air defence system, which is often wrongly called the “Iron Dome”, but which is in fact made up of several layers, the David’ Sling and Arrow. And the Israelis were actually able to intercept 85%, and not 99% as they have been a little hasty to say, of the vectors that arrived in their space.
But it all went very well, because they had been warned that the strike would have take place at night, and that the 15 missiles that landed on Israeli soil hit military targets of little importance, and from which the Israelis had in any case withdrawn their teams.
If the strike had been carried out in a different way, for example in the Russian way, for instance attacking civilian targets during the day, saturating air defence capabilities with much more complex flight profiles than those the Iranians used to fool the Israeli ground-air defence, the interception rate would, without doubt, have been between 60% and 80%. That would mean practically a third of the missiles arriving, as it is the case today in Ukraine.
So out of a wave of 300 vectors, it’s conceivable that a hundred or so could hit Israel. And then there would have been massive destruction. This is absolutely not what the Iranians were trying to do.
Given Netanyahu’s decision, Israel felt obliged to retaliate. And in fact, the Americans’ whole game, which for once worked well, probably in return for the American aid that was to be voted through Congress, the Israelis calibrated their response so that it would be very quiet. In the end, if you look closely, the Iranian attack was choreographed, in the sense that it spectacular and had to be seen by the whole world.
And the Israeli response was “calibrated” to de-escalate the issue. They sent drones to presumably military targets around Isfahan, a city in centre of Iran. The drones probably took off from Iranian territory, so it was not an attack from Israel. And the damage was relatively limited, as there were virtually no images insofar, so we can presume, no civilians were hit. We’re a long way from what Netanyahu had threatened to do, to try to strike Iran’s nuclear production capacities in particular.
And in fact, from 19April, both the Iranians and the Israelis agreed that it should stop there. And the Lebanese Hezbollah, whom I heard again this morning, clearly said that they would only fight if Israel returned to Lebanese territory.
We can see that the tension, which was very high, and to some extent a crucial objective for Vladimir Putin, to have a regional escalation in the Middle East to keep the Americans busy, has failed. Because the Israelis, under pressure from the Biden administration, agreed not to go any further, particularly in their desire to wage war against the Lebanese Hezbollah. All the more so because to get involved into such a conflict they would absolutely need American support, which they didn’t have at the time. I think Biden has done a very good job of de-escalating the situation in Israel and the Middle East.
On the other hand, what is quite distressing is that, in return, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is acting as if this had no impact on his policy on the Gaza Strip. Week after week, he continues his offensive to devastate the Gaza Strip. And it’s clear that American pressure is having absolutely no effect, as if in fact a regional non-escalation had been exchanged for Netanyahu being able to carry out his plan to destroy the Gaza Strip.
It’s clearly a de-escalation from a regional point of view, but the situation in the Gaza Strip remains absolutely appalling, because week after week, while leading us to believe that there are negotiations for a ceasefire, we see that Netanyahu continues to bomb the whole region, and not just the southern part where he claims Hamas has taken refuge, whereas there has never been any organised military structure in Hamas.
He is pursuing a plan that was never his stated aim. Netanyahu stated on 7 October that his offensive consisted of destroying Hamas militarily and freeing the hostages. In fact, it is impossible to destroy a terrorist organisation militarily, as anyone who has tried, including the French in the Sahel, knows. What’s more, hostages have never been freed with 250 kg or 500 kg bombs. It’s clear that his objective is totally different, and the objective that Netanyahu is really pursuing is the one he wrote about in his book “Bibi: My story”, which is to make the Gaza Strip impossible for the Palestinians to live in.
What he wants is to achieve a level of destruction such that the Palestinians no longer have any infrastructure enabling them to live socially and collectively in the Gaza Strip. So he is systematically destroying all the buildings, schools, hospitals and mosques. This is in fact what Netanyahu is trying to achieve, and he has very probably started to do this in the northern part of Gaza, around Gaza City, and we are witnessing an absolutely unprecedented level of destruction there. He’s even bringing in bulldozers to erase the presence of the Palestinians, and very probably he’ll hand it over to the settlers as soon as he can.
We know that Israel and Russia have relations, not very warm, but still quite close. How has Russia been able to benefit from this escalation, starting with 7 October? And what role has Russia retained in the region?
We need to go back to the Russian-Ukrainian war to understand what is happening in the Middle East at the moment. At the beginning of October, the front in Ukraine was on the verge of turning in favour of the Ukrainians. The counter-offensive launched by the Ukrainians during the summer was laborious, but it was clear that the Russian defence line, particularly in the Zaporijia region, was about to fall.
At just the moment when the front line could collapse, Hamas launched its terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October, triggering a major conflict and, above all, an international shock in the Middle East. The immediate effect was that the Americans virtually halted their delivery of arms and munitions to the Ukrainians.
Why did they do this? Because they wanted to concentrate on Israel. They had always protected Israel’s existence and at that point they considered that Israel was in real danger. And as a result, wanting to protect Israel, the Americans, who do not have extensive means of defence either, stopped their massive aid to Ukraine.
This was a considerable advantage for Putin, who had also managed to find external sources of supply to continue his war, at the moment when he was losing the momentum. I’m thinking in particular of the millions of shells that arrived from North Korea and then the help from Iran. Because Iran is probably Russia’s closest ally in this war.
As a result, the launch of the Hamas terrorist attack on 7 October is, of course, linked to the war in Ukraine, with Russia and Iran. The Israelis have overwhelming evidence that Iran helped Hamas to prepare and organise this attack, which was completely out of their hands. Let me remind that Hamas does not have a structured army and technically it cannot carry out such an attack without a great deal of help, particularly in the IT and cyber domains.
Therefore, it’s clear that the link is very strong and now it’s reversed. In other words, the fact that the situation in the Middle East has not escalated is a major disadvantage for Russia, all the more so because, miraculously, the US Congress has just confirmed a major aid package for Ukraine, worth almost 61 billion dollars, which is a considerable amount. Above all, the deliveries are going to be immediate, since the equipment is ready, it is already pre-positioned on the Ukrainian border, and it is going to be delivered very quickly.
On the other hand, the Europeans have finally got to act together after two years of war – it’s about time, you might say – but to get moving, to produce something to help the Ukrainians, even if the Americans pull out with the election of Donald Trump, which is unfortunately possible between now and November.
Israel’s policy in the Gaza Strip, which consists of razing it to the ground, as you have just said, making it unliveable for the Palestinians. There’s one country we don’t talk about much, and that’s Egypt, which on the one hand is afraid of a massive influx of migrants and is building a wall to protect itself. What potential impact do you think this crisis will have on Egypt? And secondly, we know that the Houthis in Yemen have been disrupting shipping in the Red Sea for about six months, with the help of the Iranians, since we know that the Iranians are supplying them with military capabilities. This is also disrupting Egypt’s economy, because fewer ships are passing through the Red Sea, and therefore the Suez Canal. Can we say that Egypt is also being targeted by the Iranians?
Egypt is indeed very worried, because it knows that if there were a major migration of Palestinians, their first destination would obviously be Egypt, which is the only country neighbouring the Gaza Strip apart from Israel. And they don’t want the Palestinians back, for historical reasons, but also out of opposition to the “Muslim brotherhood” from whom Hamas originates, and who are considered mortal enemies by the current Egyptian government. So, the Egyptians will do anything to avoid having to take the Palestinians in.
I would say that given the level of destruction in the Gaza Strip, it is likely that the Palestinians will try to go much further, for instance to cross the Mediterranean, or possibly, if the Egyptians let them cross parts of Egypt, to reach other countries. But the Egyptians won’t take them in, or at least they won’t take in a massive flow of migrants.
The other point is that Egypt, like all Israel’s neighbours, needs regional stability. Why do they need this? Because Egypt is suffering from chaotic economic development and cannot afford to have serious economic problems on top of that, which will immediately worsen the social problems. Let me remind that Egypt is a major regional power, and an Egypt destabilised by war in the Middle East would not be good news for the whole world.
Everyone is trying to help Egypt, and Egypt is very active in all the peace and ceasefire talks between the Israeli authorities, the Netanyahu government and Hamas. There is one point that Egypt often makes, and that is that Netanyahu favours Hamas as the interlocutor to ultimately represent the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip, whereas Egypt believes that it is not Hamas that should represent the Palestinians.
It should also be said that the Egyptians have put a lot of pressure on the American administration and the Israelis to release from prison those who could represent an alternative to Hamas, and above all to break the sterile deadlock that consists of making Hamas the sole representative of the Palestinian people, which is an ignominy desired by Netanyahu, who has found his own best enemy, since he can only stay in power through war, and Hamas’ only objective is to maintain a permanent war with Israel.
To summarise it in one sentence, Egypt is doing everything it can to get out of this dialogue that has absolutely no future between these two co-belligerents who thrive on war.
At the start of our conversation we talked about Iran and Israel, and I’d like you to talk more about Iran’s regional policy. What are Teheran’s objectives and how does it intend to achieve them?
Iran has always played a very complicated game. Let me remind, of course, that Iran is Shia, while the Hamas is Sunni. So if it supports them, it’s only because they hate the Israelis even more. But Iran, or rather the Mullahs’ regime, plays a role, like Russia, in destabilising the existing world order. It is clear that Iran is a major disrupter in the region.
I would say that one of the most worrying points is the fact that Iran is making considerable efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. The day this country actually acquires a nuclear weapon, the situation in the region will be even more complicated because we can see that the Iranian regime is prepared to do anything to destabilise the Middle East.
As was mentioned earlier, it is Iran that is supporting the Houthi separatists, who are attacking the maritime traffic that is vital to the European economy. But the solution was found fairly quickly – most of the traffic was diverted via the Cape of Good Hope. This increased travel time, but above all it penalised Egypt because it disrupted Suez Canal traffic. Fortunately, however, they have not succeeded in completely banning traffic to Europe.
But it’s clear that the Houthis are a complicated issue because Saudi Arabia could be destabilised and everyone is trying to calm things down.
Above all, Iran has a very close relationship with Putin’s Russia. And that is undoubtedly one of the most worrying points. Firstly, Iran is a very large country with an extremely large population of around 90 million. It is a real regional power with considerable resources, but with very serious internal problems because the Mullahs’ regime is increasingly being challenged, particularly by the youth who can no longer stand the rules from another century, not to say the Middle Ages.
Moreover, society is suffering enormously from this permanent state of war against virtually all its neighbours, which means that instead of being a prosperous and wealthy power, Iran is a country that is now close to underdevelopment because of the permanent war effort and the sanctions from which it suffers for years, sanctions imposed by different countries, including the European Union and the United States.
Iran is a large country that is becoming impoverished in a permanent war waged by the Mullah’s regime. It could even be said that Iran bears a certain resemblance to Russia, especially in its modus operandi. It should also be remembered that Russia’s second greatest ally in its war to destabilise the world order is North Korea, which cannot really be said to be a model.
Let’s talk about France and the reaction of the Ukrainian President Zelensky, who criticised the fact that the West was able to protect Israel without a mutual defence treaty, at least as far as France and Israel were concerned, even though we refused to “close” the Ukrainian skies when Kiev begged us to. Firstly, how would you explain the fact that France is committed to helping Israel shoot down these vectors? And secondly, how do you explain the fact that the West, especially at the start of the war, did not want to help the Ukrainians with air defence?
I’m going to do a technical analysis, since I’m a former artillery officer, so I’m fairly familiar with these systems. I would like to remind you of one basic fact: Ukraine is 30 times larger than Israel. So the fact that Israel has over-invested billions of dollars, much of it financed by the United States, to protect itself with what is known as the Iron Dome, is not possible on the scale of Ukraine. Or it would require absolutely colossal investments.
In the same way, moreover, that Iran discovered in the Israeli response that it did not have air defence on a par with that of Israel. The attacks were intended to target Israel, but if Israel retaliated, it would be Iran that would find itself in trouble, not the other way round. And the same applies to Russia.
It’s clear that ground-to-air defence is often a rather frustrating system, because there is no really watertight umbrella. And even when the Israelis over-communicate about their Iron Dome and give the impression of being invincible, as I said earlier, even in the face of an attack that was announced three days in advance, with a protective bubble provided by the allied countries, the actual performance of the Iron Dome was 85%.
So it’s clear that we mustn’t play the game of “I’m invincible, I can attack anyone because I’m not afraid of anything”. Because in fact, we are always afraid, even when we have a super anti-aircraft system.
The question actually arises between the two situations where the Americans in particular, but also the British, the French and other countries, helped to intercept the Iranian attack on Israel. However, this is absolutely not what we have been doing since the start of the war to preserve the Ukrainian airspace.
Technically, we could set up a “no-fly zone” in which there would be an interception when possible, because we are somewhat at the limit of the range of ground-air systems, including the most powerful system, the Patriot, with a range of 250 km. We could therefore protect a third of Ukrainian territory. We could also imagine Air Force aircraft intercepting a certain number of unmanned vectors, because obviously the objective of the allied countries, of the Ramstein group, is not to go to war directly against Russia, although at some point the question will inevitably arise.
The Ukrainians are right to say that, compared with Israel, little has been done to protect them. But in fact, if we go back a little further, it was the Americans who immediately delivered the surface-to-air missiles, essentially Stingers and other MANPADs that enabled the Ukrainians to stop the first Russian offensive, which at the very start of the war, in February 2022, was designed to decapitate the Ukrainian government.
And if the Americans had not delivered this equipment on a massive scale, which is relatively easy to use, the war would unfortunately have ended with Ukraine, like Belarus, subjugated by Putin. However, the arrival of heavier anti-aircraft systems has been very gradual. Why did this happen? Because Western countries have few of them and use them to protect a number of sites.
In France, this is the case with the so-called Mamba systems, which are a not very effective copy of the Patriot system, medium-range interception systems with a range of around 150 km. In France, they are used to protect the most sensitive strategic sites. It’s the same in Germany and Poland, and therefore in all the countries that have them. And there must be 6 or 7 nations in Europe that have Patriot systems. Giving a Patriot unit to the Ukrainians inevitably means parting with it.
And that was very distressing for the European countries, because we remember how many times those close to Putin threatened Germany or Poland, for example, which host the transit of military equipment going to Ukraine, with a strike. So it’s always tricky to say “I’ve got a shield and I’ll give it to you, but I haven’t got any more”.
These are heavy weapons that are extremely expensive; for example, a complete Patriot system costs around a billion euros. Clearly, this is not a trivial investment, especially if it takes several years to build and deploy. As a result, a consensus has slowly emerged around the need to deliver systems to Ukraine.
But Ukraine faces another problem, because of the huge size of this country, which is even bigger than France. The Ukrainians are forced to make a choice: they will never have enough air defence systems to protect both the major cities and the front line, which is more than 1,000 km long. And it’s clear that it’s because the Ukrainians have pushed a number of ground-to-air defences onto the front line that more Ukrainian towns have been targeted by Russian bombing.
I would like to stress one point, because it is important from the point of view of international law, and that is that the Russians systematically target civilians in their bombardments. And this is a crucial point because it’s called a war crime and it’s not accidental or marginal, but 90% of Russian bombings are aimed at civilian targets. The Russians have a fairly classic policy of terror, which even consists of firing missiles in successive salvos, so that the second or third salvo hits the rescuers and survivors of the first attack. Which is, how shall I put it, an absolutely sordid way of proceeding. It’s really to inflict as much damage as possible on the population and to terrorise people by telling them that, even if you have survived one bombing, you may be hit by the next.
The question of air defence is important for Ukraine, but in my opinion it will never be resolved, given the vastness of the country. On the other hand, the fact that European countries have agreed to deliver additional Patriot batteries is one thing. But another thing is the cost of a missile launched by the Patriot system, which costs around 1 million euros. It is designed to intercept equivalent missiles, such as ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, but not a drone.
The Patriot is the top layer of an air defence bubble. And then there’s the lower part where it’s more portable missiles or guns like the German Gepard system against drones.
So we do have the question of how we can help the Ukrainian air defence, but the question is totally inadequate, just because the Ukrainians have a significant air defence does not mean that they can prevent the Russians from advancing. And here we have a very serious issue with the fact that for the last three months the Russians have been systematically bombing with glide bombs.
We need to take a few moments to look at these glide bombs because technically they pose a problem. Hovering bombs are old bombs that practically date back to the Soviet Union, bombs weighing 500 kilos or a tonne, sometimes certain models are a little heavier, but they are very difficult to transport and are of absolutely no use. They are smooth bombs that are totally unguided, very difficult to drop and scatter over the ground when the Russian air force wants to use them as they are.
But since the end of 2023, they have developed kits that can be added to the bomb and transform it into a guided glider. This gives them a very long range of up to 80 km if the plane is high enough, and the bomb no longer moves inertially and falls with the speed of the plane, but literally glides through the air like a glider. And there are very few air defence systems that can hit an aircraft 80 km beyond the front line, apart from the Patriot. And above all, these bombs are very powerful.
We have to remember that a conventional artillery shell weighs 45 kg, but these bombs are 10 times heavier, so it’s the equivalent of artillery fire concentrated on a single point, whereas artillery fire is generally scattered over the equivalent of a football pitch. This means that when a 500 kg gliding bomb is fired at a target, it creates a crater almost 10 metres deep and devastates everything.
As a result, it is absolutely essential to intercept these bombs. The problem is that at the moment we don’t know how to intercept this type of bomb very well, especially as they have no propulsion system, they are gliders, they have no heat signature and a very weak radar signature. Then firing a missile that costs several hundred thousand euros against a glider bomb that costs nothing because it comes from Soviet stocks, apart from the kit, makes no sense.
The only way to intercept them is to shoot down the carrier aircraft or prevent them from reaching within 80 km of the front line. And that can be done with F-16s and Patriot systems. This means that the F-16s would not only be used for deep ground bombing, but also for interception. It’s entirely possible, depending on the weapons we equip them with.
And that’s where the question of American aid is crucial, because the European countries have a few medium-range missiles with very good technology, but they don’t have large stocks. The only ones with sufficient stocks to arm the F-16s are the Americans.
And I think that in the pack, which the Americans will say a little later, there must be a fairly powerful armament for the F-16s which are going to arrive in operation, and which are also likely to change the situation, because if the Russians no longer know how to bomb in this way with bombs in very large numbers, as opposed to the missiles of which they have a few hundred, if they can no longer approach the front line, because their artillery is very inaccurate, and they are obliged to fire practically six shells to do the same job as a single Ukrainian shot, so they have to fire six times as many, that puts them in difficulty. The Ukrainians will receive shells as a priority, but high-performance shells with very accurate artillery, so they will be able to counter-battery and attack the Russian howitzers.
The Ukrainians will receive mainly light armoured vehicles, which are very useful for protecting troops when they counter-attack, and above all the Ukrainians will obviously receive a large batch of ATACMS missiles, which are ground-to-ground missiles with a range of up to 300 kilometres, These will enable the Ukrainians, even if they don’t have many aircraft, to carry out deep strikes using multiple rocket launchers, the equivalent of a gliding bomb, but with a range of 300 kilometres rather than 80 kilometres.
This will be a real turning point in this war, because there is renewed hope on the Ukrainian side, with this weaponry that will arrive, in my opinion, on a massive scale, because the Americans have had time to stockpile it in Europe so that it can be delivered to the Ukrainians quickly. In the end, what changed everything in the United States was this vote in Congress, for which there is no explanation to this day for Donald Trump’s change of heart, apart from the fact that the head of the CIA spoke out publicly, which is quite rare, on the situation in Ukraine, making it clear that if the Americans continue to block this aid, we should not be surprised that Ukraine could be subjugated by Russia, and I think that Trump and a large part of the Republicans were not ready to take on such a responsibility.
And coming back to France, we are belatedly realising that each of the 27 member countries of the European Union is no more than a middle powers, that they can do absolutely nothing against Putin’s Russia. On the other hand, at the level of the European Union, we realise that the defence budget of the 27 countries is four times that of Russia.
In fact, our security and our military defence depend on our ability to join forces at European level. And this is where, in my opinion, France is not playing its cards right. It is still talking from a national point of view about a subject that in reality can only be dealt with at the European level.
Joining forces would probably give us the most powerful army in the world, or the second most powerful after the United States, but it would also mean that we could command respect throughout the world and, above all, intervene in any crisis that might threaten our interests, such as the Houthi rebels who are disrupting shipping in the Red Sea.
We note that Russia has begun to challenge the existing world order, with Iran joining in, as well as North Korea and China, which are playing a rather ambiguous game. What action should we, as Westerners, take to avoid the destruction of our order? What are our options and solutions?
For me, the question is complicated, but in the end the answer is quite simple, because we have no choice. We have to win the war in Ukraine. In fact, the central point, the heart of Putin’s attempt to destabilise the world order, is the war in Ukraine. If Putin is forced to back down in Ukraine, it is highly likely that his regime will eliminate him.
As a result, everything hinges on the fact that as long as Putin remains in power, there will be no lasting peace, either in Europe or anywhere else in the world. If we look at the Balkans at the moment, we see that the president of the Serbian entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stirred up by Putin, is once again trying to create a hotbed of tension precisely in the south of Europe.
In fact, Putin is a danger to peace and to the harmonious development of nations. And as long as he is in power, there can be no lasting peace. That’s why it makes no sense to negotiate with him.
We know well that for the last three months he has been trying to put a ceasefire option on the table, through intermediaries, because he needs time to build up his army and resume his offensive. In any case, he is someone who will never stop at his borders. He has no limits, he has no scruples.
And we have seen in the latest offensives he has launched in Ukraine that he has total contempt for his own population. He has thousands of young people killed, but he has no scruples about having them killed to gain two kilometres in the Donbas, which makes absolutely no sense and which, by the way, exhausts his army.
So our only solution is to prevent him from subjugating Ukraine so that Putin backs down and it’s likely to be Russia that gets rid of Putin. And then, of course, we might fear that things will be even worse after Putin. But to be honest, I think that after Putin, it could hardly be worse.
And I would remind that this “we must prevent chaos” argument is how dictatorships have been kept in power throughout the world for years. We have clearly seen that it is a dead end and makes no sense whatsoever. So yes, we have to win the war in Ukraine, and that’s what will undoubtedly enable us to prevent this threatening empire that Russia has become from continuing.
If this empire collapses or grinds to a halt, the coalition it has organised around itself will not hold. The Mullahs’ regime in Iran would find itself in great difficulty and North Korea would be totally isolated. China, as you said earlier, is playing an extremely ambiguous role. In other words, it supports Russia in word, but it does not supply arms and it does not support Russia financially.
The West’s determination to defend Ukraine will no doubt determine its attitude towards Taiwan, and China absolutely needs access to Western markets for its own economic development. So it knows well that if it were to launch an attack on Taiwan and be subject to major sanctions by Western countries, its economy would be ruined. This also explains why China is relatively cautious and if Russia were to fail, China’s attitude would be radically different.
So, the central point of these conflicts is Putin’s Russia and Ukraine. That’s why this war in Ukraine is crucial, and it’s not Ukraine per se that we’re defending, but our future.
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