The Red Sea region is becoming increasingly important globally, especially with the increasing tensions in the Middle East, which has negatively affected global shipping traffic. It seems that Russia, despite its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, will not neglect its old project to establish a naval base on the Red Sea, specifically in Sudan, as the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister recently confirmed the ongoing talks on this, but indicated that the agreement is not final yet.
Returning to talk about the agreement that was first proposed in 2017 gives a strong indication that Russia views Sudan as a long-term ally, despite the ongoing war there, where the so-called “African Corps”, close to Russia, supported the Rapid Support Forces during the current conflict.
On the other hand, Sudan seems more prepared today for rapprochement with Moscow, as the army intends to enter into an alliance with Russia, which was visited by the Sudanese Minister of Defense, Major General Yassin Ibrahim, to participate in the “Army-2024” forum and the 10th Moscow Conference on International Security in August 2024, while a Russian delegation visited Port Sudan, the headquarters of the interim government, in the same month. This study sheds light on the transformation in relations between the Sudanese army and Russia, and its impact on the continuation of the war in Sudan and the developments of the conflict there, while reviewing the mutual Russian and Sudanese interests that the two parties are trying to secure as a result of the joint alliance.
Russia is reportedly playing a double game in Sudan, supporting the RSF through the Wagner paramilitary group, which provided them with military training, and in return concluded agreements to exploit gold mines in Sudan. This relationship was based on common economic and military interests. Recently, Russia began to diversify its support in Sudan and change its strategy. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov visited Sudan and announced that Russia recognizes the government controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces as the sole legitimate government. In return, Russia promised to provide military and security support to the Sudanese army. Media sources indicated that the Sudanese side has already brought new weapons supplies from Russia in exchange for agreeing to establish a Russian naval base, although Moscow refuses to announce this. The discussions also included a demand from the Sudanese Armed Forces to end the support of the “African Corps” for the RSF. Russian representatives then discussed the presence of Ukrainian soldiers on the side of the Sudanese Armed Forces. It is not yet clear whether the participation of the “African Corps” in Sudan will actually end. Sudan and Russia appear to have agreed to establish a Russian naval base near Port Sudan. This is a key element of Russia’s strategy in Africa, and one that the West has yet to answer.
For much of the conflict, mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group have fought alongside the RSF, which in turn has led to the deployment of Ukrainian special forces alongside the Sudanese army. According to US intelligence agencies, between February 2022 and 2023, more than $1.6 billion worth of gold was smuggled to Russia from Dagalo’s private mines.
But Moscow appears to have been delaying its support for the RSF since the spring. In late April, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov described the military-backed transitional body, the so-called Sovereignty Council, as the only true representative of the Sudanese people. The Russian ambassador to Sudan had previously reached out to the military and offered to supply it with weapons. The first explicit resolution was issued by the UN Security Council since the war broke out in mid-June 2024. Russia abstained from voting on the text calling for an end to the siege of the Rapid Support Forces and fighting around the city of El Fasher, West Darfur. The Russian Federation’s representative said the text “contradicts the reality on the ground” and includes questionable decisions regarding the country’s sovereignty and unity. “We cannot agree with the proposed call for all Sudanese parties to ensure free access for humanitarian aid,” he said, reminding the council that the issue of monitoring national borders and the passage of any goods “is a sovereign matter for the relevant authorities.” For its part, the Wagner Group announced that it had suspended all its military activities in Sudan. The Institute for the Study of War, which is close to the US defense industry, believes that Russia could withdraw mercenaries to strengthen the Ukrainian front and that the change of parties could represent a harmony with Iran, which has long supported the Sudanese Armed Forces.
The importance of the Russian base in Sudan
At first, the establishment of a small Russian base was discussed only for logistical purposes, but it will be equipped for possible use by the Russian Navy in the future. Specifically, up to 300 troops will be stationed at this base, and up to four Russian military ships will be able to dock.
It used to be said that Central Asia was the new great game in international politics, but the facts on the ground indicate that the interests of many other actors have culminated in a very small area on the Red Sea. There are many actors outside Sudan that focus on the Red Sea. The Houthi attacks on merchant ships have had consequences, including military ones, and have led to increased American and European involvement. There are likely to be other conflicts in the region given the importance of this geographical hub for trade between Europe and Asia.
Today, Russia has a naval base on the Mediterranean in Tartus on the Syrian coast, which it obtained because of its support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the war against his opponents. Russian ambitions do not stop there, because Russia’s main goal seems to be to strengthen its influence in Africa, where Russia continues its military operations in Africa. It uses the port of Tartus as a launching point for delivering logistical supplies to Africa, for example to Libya, which in turn serves Moscow as a bridgehead for reinforcements and supplies to sub-Saharan African countries. As a result, Sudan represents another piece of the puzzle in Russia’s African strategy, and this applies to the arms trade, but also to other Russian presence in Africa, especially in the west of the continent, where the Russian presence in Sudan provides an opportunity to balance American, European and Chinese influence in the region, and to strengthen Russia’s position as an influential global power. This also helps Moscow facilitate access to valuable natural resources in Sudan, such as gold and other minerals, and economic cooperation is strengthened. Russia’s military presence also provides an opportunity to expand its arms exports and provide training and military assistance to African countries, which strengthens its defense industry and strengthens its security relations. Ultimately, all of this will expand Russia’s network of allies in Africa, giving it greater leverage to influence regional issues, mediate conflicts, and advance its diplomatic interests. In short, by establishing a military base in Sudan, Russia seeks to strengthen its international presence and secure its strategic interests in a region of great geopolitical and economic importance, contributing to its long-term regional and global goals.
Impact on the conflict in Sudan
Given Russia’s previous experiences in Syria and Africa, we find that the Russian presence has not led to an improvement in the political and military situation in those countries. On the contrary, there are experts who believe that the Russians are exploiting the power of chaos they enjoy in various African countries, not only in Sudan, but also to support other coup leaders, namely Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso and Niger. There, cooperation with the coup leaders does not contribute to achieving stability, but rather contributes to the exacerbation of internal conflicts, which may lead to an exacerbation of the refugee crisis for Europe, because many Africans whose countries are experiencing unrest will be forced to migrate, especially with the prolongation of the conflict. This will push Western countries to intervene, and this may lead to linking development aid in countries controlled by coup leaders to certain conditions. For example, military cooperation with the Russians could have consequences for development cooperation or perhaps even humanitarian cooperation. The fact that Moscow has now reached an agreement with state representatives in Sudan marks a significant change in the course of the catastrophic conflict that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of the regular army and the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Moscow initially supported the RSF group. This was mainly because the Russian paramilitary Wagner Group agreed on mining rights to Sudanese gold deposits. This is the remaining source of foreign currency for Russia, which has been under Western sanctions since the start of the war in Ukraine. The military situation in Sudan remains unclear according to many analysts, but it seems that Russia now wants to diversify its support in Sudan. Moreover, Port Sudan is located in the area controlled by the SAF. Whether Russia wants to establish a naval base there will depend on talks with the SAF. It is still unclear what consequences this will have on the military development of the conflict, but the facts suggest that Russian support for the Sudanese army will prolong the conflict and may encourage other parties to support the RSF.
In return for the naval presence, Russia will provide military and security support to the Sudanese Armed Forces. The Russian President’s Special Envoy for Africa and the Middle East, Mikhail Bogdanov, promised the Sudanese Armed Forces “unrestricted, qualitative military assistance,” according to the online magazine Understanding War.
In previous years, the Sudanese military wanted Russia to have, among other things, Su-30 and Su-35 fighter jets as well as S-400 anti-aircraft missiles.
It can be said that the longer the conflict lasts, the greater the needs of the Sudanese Armed Forces for weapons. This is especially true for the Sudanese Air Force, which also has to operate in remote areas. In this regard, it can benefit very well from Russian weapons. The same applies to fuel, especially diesel. According to experts, there has been a shortage of diesel for a long time. Conversely, there is a similar export ban to Russia due to sanctions. The Wagner militia used to import fuel via Chad, but in the future, Russia could deliver it via its new naval base in Sudan.
The Sudanese army has suffered from armament problems, and therefore sought rapprochement with Russia, especially with the expansion of the fighting, and the Sudanese government’s feeling that Washington now seems closer to the Rapid Support Forces, as some analyses suggest that the US-sponsored Geneva talks aim to find a political future for the Rapid Support Forces, which the government rejects, so it decided to head towards Russia. Sudan has chosen its alliances away from Washington and the West, as it has restored its relations with Iran, and is now moving towards greater rapprochement with Russia, which means that it does not rely much on the negotiating track, and that it is betting on a military solution. As a result, the Sudanese government is seeking military allies, not economic or diplomatic ones, which it found in Russia. The army has boycotted US-led talks in Geneva since August 14, with the participation of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Emirates and the African Union, to end the war in Sudan, while the Rapid Support Forces delegation attended.
The rapprochement may also appear to be a maneuver to pressure the United States and the West not to provide support to the Rapid Support Forces, but this maneuver is not a surefire one, as it could have severe consequences for the Sudanese government. The international community may decide that the army is not serious about negotiating, and thus turn a blind eye to any external supplies reaching the Rapid Support Forces.
The United States hopes that the arsenal of Sudanese warmongers has been completely exhausted on both sides, making it possible to finally hold substantive negotiations. This is perhaps the biggest difference from previous mediation attempts. While the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” has agreed to participate in the talks directly, the response of the army chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, was a refusal.
Dagalo is clearly moving forward with establishing his own state structures in Darfur, western Sudan, which he now fully controls, and Burhan has flatly rejected negotiations in the past. According to observers, Washington is determined to prevent the spread of the conflict in the unstable region of the Horn of Africa.
Therefore, observers believe that the United States will not easily allow Russia to establish a military base on the Sudanese coast, because the Red Sea region is already suffering from problems due to Houthi attacks on ships, and from its point of view, such a development should not be tolerated. There are several factors that suggest that the relationship between Russia and Sudan may not reach a form of the known alliance, as Russia still deals with Third World countries from the standpoint of its imperial history, and does not tend to ally with African countries, no matter how much cooperation with them. Sudan is also unable to use the card of rapprochement with Russia as a balancing act to neutralize economic and military pressure from the United States, which is pushing to stop the war and prevent the military from rising to power. It is not possible to follow the approach of former President Omar al-Bashir in challenging the West, whose exaggerated perception was revealed when he visited Russia and met Putin in 2017, when he asked him to protect him from the United States in exchange for agreements including establishing a military base in the Red Sea.
Conclusions
- Russia is trying to play with all cards, as it has a solid relationship with the Rapid Support Forces, through direct dealings, or through the Wagner Group. Moscow is exploiting the fact that the Sudanese army needs weapons, and that the Rapid Support Forces are ahead of it on most combat fronts, and therefore will not build a full alignment relationship with it, as it did with the Syrian regime. Russia will maintain its relationship with the Rapid Support Forces, and may supply them with weapons, unless it is sure that the balance of power is completely tilted in favor of the army.
- The coming period will witness intensive American and Western political intervention in Sudan, to prevent Russia from achieving its goals of obtaining a military base in the Red Sea.
