We discussed the Middle East, Iran, and the US’ fragile position in the region with Serhiy Danylov, Vice Director and one of the founders of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (Ukraine). The interview was conducted by Denys Kolesnyk, a French consultant and analyst.
Joe Biden’s State of the Union speech mentioned Israel and Ukraine more than any other countries. What could this mean? And, in general terms, how do you assess the foreign policy of the Biden administration?
To answer your question in short, yes, it says a lot. It is a significant thing, and we need to pay attention to it, so I agree with you that even just a mechanical count of mentions of a country, in this case, is a suitable methodology to assess the importance of these countries or events in and around these countries for the current US administration.
Currently, there are two key regions – Eastern Europe (Ukraine) and the Middle East (Israel) – where the Biden administration sees threats. Undoubtedly, the mention of Israel is related to the 7 October attack and the spectre of a major war, which is now being transformed into a confrontation with Iran. We all remember the end of autumn, when the ground operation in the Gaza Strip was being discussed, and how much everyone was afraid of a major regional war. We were afraid that, firstly, all of Iran’s proxies would be involved, and as a result, Iran itself would be involved.
It would be a blow to the global economy and the security of the United States’ allies, and it would test the United States’ role in the region and, therefore, in the world. Last but not least, it would certainly be a blow to the energy markets and, accordingly, to the position of the Biden administration in the United States, which is highly dependent on the price of a gallon of petrol at the pump.
But Ukraine is the main challenge. For all the importance of what is happening in the Middle East, the real large-scale war is in Ukraine, and it threatens the stability of the whole of Europe, which has every chance of escalating into a nuclear confrontation, a regional war, and eventually into World War III.
Another reason the Biden administration has been talking so much about Ukraine is the internal American debate around aid to Ukraine and the actions of the Trumpists, some Republicans, who have politicised this issue and put it on a completely different track than it was before when there was bipartisan support, which now exists only in the vague. And this is another reason why the administration has focused so much attention on the Ukrainian issue.
The Biden administration’s Middle East policy is very similar to Obama’s. This applies not only to the Middle East but also to relations with Ukraine and the general direction of foreign policy. Many of the policymakers serving under Obama still remain influential in shaping foreign policy, its approaches and strategies.
One of the key characteristics of this policy, in my deep conviction, is the diminishing US presence in the region. This has forced traditional allies, like Saudi Arabia, to pay more attention to their own security. This strategy is reflected in the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, mediated by China. We also remember Obama’s “red lines” on chemical weapons in Syria, but when Assad crossed them, nothing concrete happened.
With Iran’s position strengthening, Saudi Arabia finds itself in a difficult situation. They would like to return to the times when the US guaranteed their security. But now their security is under threat, and they understand that they have to provide for their own security. Riyadh has experienced attacks with Shahed drones and ballistic missile bombardments of its eastern provinces, as well as Houthi attacks on other targets in the country. Also, we should remember that Saudi Arabia essentially lost the war in Yemen.
Of course, the fact that the Iranians have gone beyond their borders in the Middle East is something that everyone is used to now. We remember the Obama-era JCPOA nuclear deal, which Trump later withdrew from. However, the Israelis insisted during the preparation of the nuclear deal that not only the nuclear industry but also long-range ballistic missiles should have been covered by the agreement. And Iran would undertake not to interfere or use its proxies. However, the Obama administration has not achieved any of this.
Instead, in 2021-2022, there were secret negotiations with the Iranians, mediated by Qatar and Oman, to return to the nuclear deal without a deal. In other words, to agree that the Iranians do what was written there, and the sanctions are lifted. This resulted in an amnesty for three American citizens in exchange for $6 billion or more of the Central Bank of Iran’s money frozen in South Korea.
In parallel, these same negotiations peaked in May 2022, when the Iranians simultaneously negotiated with the Russians to supply the Shahed drones. And the Americans, in the same negotiations, again set a condition that Iran should not become an arms supplier to Russia, but Iran became such a supplier. And the whole story of the Obama administration repeating itself, making concessions to the Iranians, and as a result, the Iranians continued to do everything they were doing and even a little more.
And how do you assess the Biden administration in general?
First and foremost, his administration is judged by the American citizens who elected him. From the point of view of the United States, Obama and Biden’s policy is a policy of aligning their efforts with resources, with the resources they have. They have been withdrawing from Afghanistan, reducing their presence in the Middle East, not because they want to, but because they are faced with the fact that the resources for all this are running out. In addition, there is a great fatigue in American society from the Middle East wars – Afghanistan and Iraq.
While the Americans did emerge victorious in Iraq, the images from Afghanistan will remain for a long time. The only thing Putin did was to help a little by launching a large-scale war against Ukraine so that that period would be forgotten. Trump wanted to withdraw troops from Afghanistan the most, and he had the most conflicts with the military on this issue. But as a result, he increased the contingent there.
Of course, we can say that Democrats and democratic administrations are more ideologically dependent. We remember that the problems with Saudi Arabia began after the murder of journalist Khashoggi and the accusations of the Crown Prince, who is the ruler, of this crime. And it all happened at the same time. A violation of rights, a crime that did take place.
So, I would say they are saving resources and are marked by fatigue from the Middle East in general. Also, the idea that existed prior to 7 October is that Israel is not in danger. Israel has a government with which it has a rather conflictual relationship. Both now and then, it was the Netanyahu period. The result is a situation where traditional partners do not feel confident.
On the other hand, restoring Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic relations with Iran does not mean the Saudis will not seek to return to that status during the next administration. How realistic this is is another matter. Well, for them, it is more a matter of diversifying their partners now.
Recently, the Red Sea crisis endangered maritime navigation and made the Israeli port of Eilat useless. What are Iran’s interests in the Red Sea crisis?
Iran’s interest now is to preserve Hamas, or rather to prevent Israel from finishing off Hamas. And the Houthis are simply an instrument of pressure on Egypt, first of all, and on the West as a whole, to tie Netanyahu’s hands and prevent him from finishing off Hamas. But it is also worth remembering that Iran does not completely control Hamas. It is not Hezbollah, after all. Nevertheless, a weakened Hamas will be three times more likely to listen to the Iranians, despite the grievances that the Palestinians have with Iran.
So, the first goal is to keep Hamas alive. Blocking maritime navigation in the Red Sea, which is 12-15% of total global traffic and 30% of global container traffic, is one of the leverages. And when Netanyahu promises to stop the military operation on the ground, and the south of the Gaza Strip is not completely occupied, it will be possible to restore navigation. Then, the bargain over who will be sent to the Gaza Strip will begin. For example, they may bring Dahlan from the Emirates or someone closer to the Iranians since Dakhlan is clearly not an Iranian creation.
The second goal is an investment in the image of the Houthis, who have become much more popular and better known in the Middle East and worldwide. They are no longer a sectarian armed group that controls 40% to 60% of the state of Yemen but are now fighters for the Palestinian people. We forget that this is a Shia branch of Islam, although it is closest to the Sunnis. There are very few differences, but still. We forget about cross-sectoral problems, and they are perceived as the real heroes, the only ones who have stood up and are not afraid to fight with the whole world for the Palestinian cause. Hence, the Red Sea crisis is also beneficial for them.
Why did the US fail to leverage support from Riyadh in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
First of all, as I have already said, the Saudis feel much less obliged to Washington and, therefore, have much more freedom of action. There is no dependence, no personal relationship between the administrations, between the prince and the administration. And there is resentment in Saudi Arabia for the almost betrayal, as they put it, especially not publicly.
But they are pragmatic people; in principle, this is not a politics of resentment. However, the first thing is that the Saudis are much less dependent on the United States. First of all, because they don’t feel that at a given time when they need to, the Americans will kill for them, this is the first thing.
Second, the Saudis did not want to go along with the US, hoping to make money from the war. The prince has very ambitious economic projects. He was going to sell Aramco, as you know, to get rid of these oil revenues and put the country on completely different sources of income. Although this hasn’t been done yet, but he has very big plans and needs money. By the way, this only partially worked because later, after the first shock, after the Russian invasion, they had another problem: how to prevent a significant decline in the oil price.
Third, they were thinking not only about the price but also about the markets. In Saudi Arabia, they hoped that Russia would be pushed out of the markets much more than it eventually did. Market share is lost in one-third of cases but won in two-thirds of cases. One can even take a bigger share by dumping after the refineries switch to their oil, and then they will have to spend resources to return to the previous supplier. They wanted to take the Russian niche but thought they could do it without dumping prices. Well, it didn’t work out so well. But they made money on it, and that’s pretty much the end of the story.
So, we shouldn’t think of any struggle for leadership, or should we?
There are different opinions, of course. But we also can’t dismiss the fact that Mohammed bin Salman wants to increase his country’s leadership. In this way, he also demonstrates ambition by diversifying these security partnerships to rise on the “global chessboard”. So, they see the Russian-Ukrainian war as a chance to move into a different league.
In fact, they had no foreign policy; roughly 20 years ago, before the war in Kuwait, they had no foreign policy at all. After that, certain processes began, but there was a rather limited foreign policy. But now they want to change their hierarchical level. They want a seat on the Security Council. They want a completely different positioning, but how realistic that is is another matter.
In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Israel took a neutral position, refusing to support Ukraine. How has the situation changed since the Hamas attack on Israel?
It has not changed at all. We have seen some changes in the degree of rhetoric of certain representatives of Israel. But the policy itself remains the same – no military cooperation with Ukraine.
But how do you explain Israel’s categorical refusal to help Ukraine?
In 2015, I travelled to Israel with a delegation, met people at think-tanks, and talked to the former Israeli ambassador to Ukraine. I was a little emotional, and I said, “You supply combat attack drones – Lancets – which are Israeli drones that are fighting against us”. He said no, Russia has been producing them for a long time. Moreover, Israel did not coordinate strikes on Syria with Ukraine but with Russia, after Russian air defence systems appeared there. The main thing for the state of Israel is its security. Security means freedom of action in Syria against Hezbollah and the Iranians. And we are coordinating this with the Russians.
There is also the factor of Netanyahu, a very close, personal friend of Putin. And here is a situation where personal relationships matter. Netanyahu is the prime minister who has visited Putin the most often of all prime ministers and world leaders. And after 2014, he did not hesitate to decorate his office in Jerusalem with a huge poster of him shaking hands with Putin. Also, we should not forget about Russian money in Israel and Russian-Israeli businessmen – this is not the most important thing, but it is also a factor that plays a role. But on the whole, Netanyahu’s position has always been pro-Russian, and it will always be. Nothing has changed.
We can say that Russia’s weight in general and in the region in particular has increased since it entered Syria. Moscow still determines, in a sense, Israel’s willingness or unwillingness to help Ukraine. We have to admit that this was a strong step on the part of Russia, which allowed them to have leverage over several countries in the region, including Israel, Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan.
Considering the diminishing influence of the United States, what does the situation in the region look like and will look like in the future, and how do other external actors influence events in the Middle East?
The situation is dynamic and will largely depend on the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war. If it ends in a Russian victory, then this is one option. If it ends in a victory for Ukraine, that’s quite another. Then, the issue of Iran will come to the fore. Not China, but Iran itself. And we are likely to see a lot of unexpected things in the Middle East.
The Iranians are now very active in the region. And what does the weakening of the United States mean? On the one hand, there are no firm guarantees, and on the other hand, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and all the structures it has spawned throughout the region feel much freer.
But I can’t say that the future is set in stone. I think we are going to see a lot of changes in the Middle East, a lot of unexpected things. For instance, I’m not sure that the Iranian regime, in the medium term at least, will remain as it is now. And that Iran will remain the same. There are elections, and the IRGC is pushing out the Iranian oligarchs. There is not only a confrontation between big cities and the regime, as well as national groups and the regime, but there is also serious tension within the regime between the oligarchy and the IRGC. So we will see.
As for China, it is overrated in the Middle East. The Chinese are passing on the cost of higher freight to the consumer. However, the industry will still run away from China to Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. In other words, to countries that are not friendly to the Chinese. This process will not be quick, but the Chinese attempts to resolve the situation in the Red Sea have not yielded results. As in previous crises, China’s voice does not count for much, even despite the PR campaign following the Saudi-Iranian deal.
Turkey has been in confrontational relations for the past eight years. In fact, with all countries in the region, except Qatar. First of all, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This policy brought nothing good. And now, after the election last year, Erdogan went to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates to ask for money. He did not promise them protection, but he asked them for money. He brought the money, and they opened credit lines for him. However, he was forced to recognise Marshal Sisi. Turkey’s role was very high during the Qatari crisis when a Turkish brigade was deployed there, and Turkey guaranteed Qatar’s security. But now this role is also decreasing.
Therefore, I think that the decisive factor shaping the region will be the United States policy and Iran’s internal political dynamics.
Well, let’s speculate a bit. If Trump wins the election, how might the United States change its approach to the region under his administration?
It depends on whether Kushner is there. First, Trump’s foreign policy is unpredictable. In other words, sharp 180-degree turns are possible. Second, it is personalised.
If Kushner returns, we can expect the lobbying for the Abraham Accords to continue. The Trump administration will turn a blind eye to human rights violations and abuses there. The Saudis will start buying three times more weapons. He will talk about how wonderful these people are. And he will receive the prince in the White House. I am sure of it. If he wins, the deal for $200 billion will be sealed.
And then there’s the issue of the Saudis having already announced their position on the Abraham Accords, that the return to them is possible only after the Palestinian state issue is resolved. And there is also the question of whether Netanyahu’s cabinet will survive this year. If it does, will Trump be able to force his friend Netanyahu to create a Palestinian state? Then, a completely different story opens up, and they must deploy additional troops to protect Saudi Arabia. In any case, we can expect a more decisive foreign policy under Trump. And Iran is very much afraid of his victory.
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