By Roger Balman, London
More than three months ago, the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad in Syria fell. Millions of Syrians hoped for a better future—but it has yet to arrive. Following massacres, particularly against the Alawites along the Mediterranean coast with around 1,000 dead, other minorities such as Druze, Christians, and Kurds now also fear for their safety. The security situation remains difficult, as does the economic one. Interim President Ahmed al-Scharaa has yet to raise public sector wages as promised—most workers earn less than 100 euros per month. Syria’s failure to recover and the lack of a reconstruction plan are also due to the fact that global and regional powers have entirely different visions for the country’s future. Here is an overview of those interests:
Turkey’s Interests
After the fall of the Assad regime, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was initially one of the biggest winners. Turkey had supported the victorious rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) for years, and interim President Ahmed al-Scharaa maintains close ties to Turkish intelligence. Just days after the regime change, Turkish lira could be used in Damascus, and Turkish goods flooded Syrian markets. For Ankara, Syria represents a large market for its domestic economy and a key piece of Erdoğan’s ambition to become a major regional power in the Middle East. The Turkish president envisions a stable Syria dominated by a Sunni-Islamist HTS-led government. The Turkish military is reportedly already establishing bases in the country.
However, Erdoğan and al-Scharaa are not always aligned—especially regarding the Kurds in northern Syria. The HTS government signed an agreement with the local SDF army to integrate them fully into the regular Syrian military. This has angered Turkey, which views the SDF as an extension of the terrorist group PKK and continues to bomb them regularly.
Israel’s Interests
For Israel, neighboring Syria has long been a problem. Assad’s regime only survived as long as it did due to weapons from Iran and fighters from the Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah, who led the charge against the rebels. In return, Tehran and Hezbollah used Syria as a supply line into Lebanon to threaten and attack Israel. With Assad’s fall, this route was severed, allowing Israel to successfully weaken Hezbollah to a degree not seen in decades. In Beirut, disarming Hezbollah is now a real possibility, and Israel is currently negotiating with Lebanon over future borders.
As for Syria’s future, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu sees only danger, not opportunity. In Jerusalem, there’s a belief that Syria will either fall into chaos and again become an Iranian satellite, or be governed by Islamists who cannot be trusted—especially ones supported by Israel’s regional rival, Turkey. Netanyahu therefore wants a weak Syria, one that poses no threat. Its military should lack air defenses capable of stopping Israeli airstrikes. In the first days after Assad’s fall, Israel destroyed nearly all of Syria’s air force and navy. Netanyahu has offered support to the Kurds in the north, if only because they are Erdoğan’s enemies. He even voiced support for the continued presence of Russian forces in Syria, who maintain two bases there, as a counterweight to Turkey. In southern Syria, Israel has occupied more territory and established at least nine military bases. Many Syrians fear that Israel may try to connect Druze areas in Syria with those in the occupied Golan Heights and cut them off from the rest of the country.
Critics, including in Israel, argue that Netanyahu’s policy may bring about exactly the chaos he claims to want to avoid. Syria’s economy is on the brink of collapse, not least because U.S. sanctions have largely cut the country off from the global financial system. Netanyahu continues to pressure U.S. President Donald Trump to maintain those sanctions.
U.S. Interests
The U.S. position will be crucial to determining Syria’s future. But for President Trump, the issue holds little importance. That could be good for Syria—or not. On one hand, after Assad’s fall, Trump made it clear that he sees Syria as a lost cause: “Syria is a mess, but it’s not our friend,” he wrote the same day on his social network, Truth Social. On the other hand, he has not, as many feared, withdrawn the roughly 2,000 U.S. troops still in northern Syria who protect the oil fields, the detention camps for captured ISIS fighters—and the Kurds from Turkish attacks.
What happens next in Syria will depend partly on which side Trump aligns with: Israel’s or Turkey’s. Erdoğan called him again just a few days ago, urging the lifting of sanctions. The Turkish president stressed “how important it is to work together to lift the sanctions on Syria in order to restore stability, make the new government functional, and support normalization.” Trump has yet to comment publicly on the call.
Interests of Syria’s Muslim Neighbors
Countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar supported the opposition to Assad for many years, but in recent years lost hope that he could be overthrown and even welcomed him back into the Arab League. Interim President al-Scharaa also seeks good relations with the Gulf states and aims to sever Syria’s ties with Iran—his first trip abroad was to Saudi Arabia. However, little support has come from there so far, neither financially nor in the form of a clear plan for Syria’s future.
For Tehran, Assad’s fall was a traumatic blow that significantly weakened the so-called “axis of resistance” against Israel. But the mullahs have not given up on Syria. There is strong evidence that the recent attacks by Assad-loyal Alawites on the new regime’s security forces were supported by Iran. A weak and unstable Syria is in Tehran’s interest, as it could once again serve as a smuggling corridor into Lebanon.
Russia’s Interests
President Vladimir Putin is one of the clear losers from Assad’s fall. He had supported the regime for years and used his bombers to level entire cities. Now, Putin is at least hoping to retain control of his two military bases in Syria, especially the airbase near Tartus. From there, Russian military aircraft fly missions to Libya, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, where Russia is exploiting vast natural resources.
