Robert Czulda, Assistant Professor at the University of Lodz (Poland)
The collapse of the long-standing regime of Bashar al-Assad, and with it the Syrian Arab Republic, has been viewed by many commentators as a positive development. In reality, while several benefits can indeed be identified, it is impossible to ignore the dangers associated with it.
Bashar al-Assad, who ruled Syria since 2000, was undoubtedly a brutal and ruthless dictator. There is no doubt that even before the Arab Spring, he frequently violated human rights. During the civil war, the Syrian Army committed war crimes, including torture and executions of regime opponents. From this perspective, it is hard to sympathize with the dictator fleeing into exile. One can only regret that he will likely never face an international tribunal, and his family will live in luxury from wealth stolen from the Syrian people.
From a Western perspective, the failure of a key ally of both Russia and Iran – two countries openly opposing the current international order – is advantageous. A notable example of their confrontational stance is their active cooperation in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
When it comes to Iran, the failure in Syria is both undeniable and significant. Just a few years ago, when Tehran, alongside Russia, actively supported Assad, Iran was promoting a vision of dismantling the regional order and forming a 150,000-strong Shia force to combat the “global arrogance” under the U.S. leadership. At that time, Syria was referred to by Iranians as the “35th Province of Iran,” and various media outlets warned of Iran’s unprecedented influence in four regional capitals: Damascus (Syria), Beirut (Lebanon), Baghdad (Iraq), and Sana’a (Yemen). Iran invested tens of billions of dollars in Syria, and many soldiers, both Iranians and Shia volunteers from across the region, lost their lives or health in the war.
Now, Iran watches helplessly as its embassy is looted in Damascus. Decision-makers in Tehran have every reason to fear that Iran is now on the defensive and losing its reputation in the Muslim world and on the so-called “Arab street”. Until recently, Iran portrayed itself as an efficient advocate for the Muslim cause and the Oppressed. However, both Hamas and Hezbollah, key components of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, have been significantly weakened. It is not unlikely that now Israel will seek to exploit this opportunity to increase direct pressure on the Islamic Republic. In the longer term, Iran may also face a rise in jihadist activity, which has already led to several attacks in recent years. Internally, greater repression is to be expected, as the regime feels more threatened than ever.
Assad’s downfall in Syria is also a significant blow to Russia, which, like Iran, engaged militarily and invested heavily to strengthen its position in Syria. It was Russia’s influence in Syria that recently brought it closer to Israel, which sought close ties with the Kremlin for its security needs. Now, Russia’s significance in Israel’s eyes has diminished even further.
For Russia, the losses are not only reputational but also very practical. Military facilities in Syria, especially the Khmeimim Air Base southeast of Latakia, are crucial for Russia’s operations in Africa. In recent years, the “African front,” including operations in the Sahel, has become pivotal for Russia in building regional influence and impacting Europe (migrant waves from Africa have long been inspired and coordinated by the Russians). In Africa, Russia has effectively undermined the position of France (its withdrawal from the Sahel is the best example). Moreover, Africa is vital for Russia and particularly the Wagner Group for financial reasons, as they have secured mining contracts in various African countries.
If Russia loses access to the Khmeimim Air Base, its logistical network connecting Russia to its forward bases in Africa will be severed. The Khmeimim Air Base is a critical transit point, and without it, supplying bases and exporting resources from Africa will become significantly more difficult. Losing the Tartus Naval Base, on the other hand, would mean that Russia no longer has permanent facilities in the Mediterranean Sea. Any operations in the area would then have to rely on distant bases in Crimea (Black Sea).
It is likely that Russia will attempt to counter this situation. It is currently too early to assess whether they will indeed lose access. According to unconfirmed reports, the Kremlin is already negotiating with Syrian fighters to maintain access to the bases, which is not an impossible scenario. Speculations suggest that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) might agree to such a deal if Russia hands over Bashar al-Assad. Alternatively, it is also possible that negotiations will allow the Kremlin to secure favorable terms, such as maintaining the bases in exchange for economic assistance.
On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the negative aspects of the fall of the Assad’s regime. Firstly, a previously stable and relatively moderate state near Europe is collapsing before our eyes. In its place, a black hole of internal chaos is emerging. The likelihood of another phase of civil war is very high. There is a significant risk that Syria will become another Libya.
Another wave of violence, which is more likely than a new, peaceful Syria, would mean another wave of migrants. Since Europe has created no defensive mechanisms and remains utterly incapable of action, it is highly likely that these migrants will head for Europe, further contributing to destabilization.
Moreover, power is now in the hands of insurgents, primarily the aforementioned Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist and jihadist group. It cannot be ignored that its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, was previously the head of the Al-Nusra Front, a Salafi-jihadi organization responsible for numerous atrocities in Syria. Al-Julani has changed his appearance in recent years, portraying himself as moderate, but it is hard to expect that he has changed his views.
The two phenomena – the chaotic zone in Syria and the victory of jihadist-dominated groups in Syria – pose a mortal threat to countries such as Jordan. But there is also a broader risk that cannot be ignored. The rise of anti-government groups in Syria, including Islamists, will serve as an inspiration for such movements worldwide, not just in the Middle East. It will motivate and encourage new fighters, with the impact likely to be long-term rather than immediate. The fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979 and the subsequent Soviet defeat in Afghanistan a decade later were factors that inspired countless individuals to embrace jihadism.
