The end of the year was marked by the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. We spoke to Nathaniel Garstecka, a journalist working for the Polish opinion periodical “Wszystko co Najwazniejsze”, to look back on the most significant events of the past year. The interview was conducted by Denys Kolesnyk, a French consultant and analyst based in Paris.
This year has been rich in important events, and among the most significant were the European elections and the legislative elections in France. How would you analyze these results in terms of their impact on both the European Union and France?
As far as the European elections are concerned, I can say that there were no major upheavals in the overall political balance. The EPP, Renew and Social Democrat coalition, although weakened, retained an absolute majority. This made it possible to reappoint Ursula von der Leyen as President of the European Commission, despite some internal dissension. I would like to note that there has been no political earthquake on an EU scale, although the loss of some seats reflects a gradual questioning of traditional alliances among the populations of certain member states.
As far as France is concerned, the situation is far more critical. The legislative elections, triggered by the results of the French political parties in the European elections, particularly those of the Rassemblement National, which recorded a historic score, marked a significant turning point in national politics.
By dissolving the National Assembly, Emmanuel Macron took a considerable political risk, hoping for a “clarification” that ultimately failed. The move cost his bloc, which had already lost its absolute majority in 2022, its relative majority as well, plunging France into an unprecedented political crisis. Frustrated by a stagnant economy and an administration perceived as out of touch with reality, voters expressed their discontent in a “sanction vote.”
The French political landscape is becoming increasingly polarized. Traditional parties, once dominant, are now relegated to marginal roles. Here we can mention Les Républicains (RN) and the Socialist Party (PS). This situation reflects a profound crisis of representation, with the center struggling to meet the expectations of a population increasingly disillusioned by broken promises and policies deemed ineffective. This dynamic, coupled with economic uncertainty, creates fertile ground for bolder, anti-establishment alternatives, thus explaining the support for Rassemblement national and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France insoumise (LFI).
Furthermore, the European implications of the French results cannot be underestimated. The rise of eurosceptic parties, even if limited to certain countries, could weaken the European Union’s ability to make progress on crucial issues. Internal tensions within the EU, exacerbated by divergent national election results, reinforce the idea of a multi-speed Europe. This raises fundamental questions about the future direction of the European project and France’s place in it.
But how could you explain such a result from Rassemblement National on the right and La France Insoumise on the left? Was it purely a “sanction vote” as you’ve already mentioned, or were there other factors at play?
Let’s say all speculation is allowed, but we’ll probably never know. In any case, it doesn’t really matter now since Emmanuel Macron has lost the legislative elections that he himself imposed. Even before, he lacked an absolute majority after losing it in 2022, but this time, he has even lost his relative majority.
The central bloc is no longer the dominant force. The left has surged ahead, creating a new political crisis, with total opposition from this camp. Today, we are now facing the consequences of a dissolution that failed to yield a clear majority in the National Assembly, preventing the formation of a natural coalition.
To govern, the center and center-right had to ally themselves, negotiate and, in the process, compromise with the Rassemblement National to obtain its tacit abstention. They placed themselves under the thumb of Marine Le Pen, who, in a position of strength, was able to decide the fate of this government. She chose to bring it down by giving it the thumbs down, even before the budget vote.
Everyone expected the Barnier government to fall after the budget vote, but not before. However, in December 2024, the fall came sooner than expected, due to the country’s catastrophic economic situation and the impossibility of presenting a satisfactory budget. The deficit hovers between 6% and 7%, with the national debt reaching 3,200 billion euros, or 110-115% of GDP. We are paying the price for 60 years of socialist policies, excessive regulations, taxes and dirigiste management.
We can’t blame the European Union alone. While the standards imposed by Brussels add to our own, much of our economic stagnation is self-inflicted. This sclerosis, the result of decades of management on credit, has made cuts in public spending and tax hikes inevitable. However, these measures have consistently failed to gain political acceptance.
The RN seized the opportunity to bring down the government, and we are now plunged into a new crisis, with a Bayrou cabinet that is not expected to be very successful. But how did we get here?
To analyze this situation, we need to go back to 2017, when Emmanuel Macron won. The Fifth Republic is designed to favor a bipartite system between Socialists and Gaullists. But in 2017, Macron exploded this system. He created a powerful central bloc, isolating the extremes, namely LFI and the RN, while trying to build a coupling between center-left and center-right. This model couldn’t last forever, and it barely lasted a full term.
This partly explains why the French have favored extreme parties – LFI and RN. Many French citizens, disillusioned with the traditional parties (Socialists and Republicans), have been looking for an alternative. Those disillusioned by the centrist Socialist Party turned to LFI. Those who could no longer identify with the moderate center-right (ex-UMP/LR) opted for the RN.
Politically, this polarization is a direct consequence of the creation of a central bloc. Under the old system, those dissatisfied with the left voted for the right, and vice versa. Now, those dissatisfied with the central bloc turn to the extremes, whether left or right.
As far as society is concerned, general discontent is fueled by several factors: an economy in crisis, widening deficits, a medical and social system on the brink of collapse, growing insecurity and a feeling of cultural erosion. Globalization, which favors some but marginalizes others, has left part of the working and middle classes out in the cold, crushed by taxes to finance public deficits.
And it has to be said that this situation is not unique to France. All over the Western world we’re seeing similar phenomena: the AFD in Germany, the Brexit in the UK, Donald Trump in the US, plus the demographic crisis which is further aggravating tensions.
Finally, it’s important to remember that this situation doesn’t date from the Macron presidency. Rather, this presidency is the product of decades of mismanagement, led by socialist and centrist governments, which have brought France to its current state.
Let’s switch gears and talk about the recently elected Donald Trump. What do you expect from his foreign policy?
I think that many of the events that have unfolded in recent weeks, from Russia’s war against Ukraine to the conflict in the Middle East, have been directly or indirectly influenced by the election of Donald Trump. By the way, let’s not forget that Trump was already elected in 2016, and we can draw some clues from his previous administration to try and guess what might happen in the future.
To be honest, back in August and early September, I was convinced that the Democrats were going to win. Then I listened to the first interviews with Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate, and watched as the Republicans set up a polling station surveillance network. It’s worth remembering that in the 2020 election, without talking about massive fraud, there were irregularities that somewhat tainted the legitimacy of the vote in some key states.
From then on, a Democratic victory seemed increasingly uncertain, so Trump’s election came as no surprise. However, contrary to the Republican propaganda that spoke of a “landslide” or an overwhelming victory, this was not the case. A true landslide victory was Ronald Reagan in 1984, winning virtually every state. In 2024, the election was close: it came down to 30,000 votes in Wisconsin, 80,000 in Michigan and 120,000 in Pennsylvania, for a total of just over 200,000 votes. These few votes in three states would have been enough to give victory to the Democrats. It is therefore essential that Donald Trump and the Republicans realize that this was not a plebiscite.
As for Donald Trump’s policies, I’d like to point out that most commentators seem to forget that he has already served as president. While the global situation has undoubtedly changed since then, his style of governance and priorities remain largely consistent.
Trump’s style is based on the “peace through strength” doctrine, a slogan inherited from Ronald Reagan. He does not seek to resolve conflicts by force or start wars, but rather to freeze them through agreements, negotiations and, if necessary, economic pressure. We tend to forget this, but Donald Trump imposed sanctions on Nord Stream 2 and strengthened NATO’s eastern flank in Poland and the Baltic states, contrary to what some people say when they accuse Trump of “selling Europe to Vladimir Putin”. It was the Europeans themselves – the Germans, the French and the Dutch – who signed the Nord Stream agreements.
The advantage of the Trump method is that it favors negotiation to avoid open conflict. During his term in office, he broke the silent embargo on arms deliveries to Ukraine by delivering Javelin anti-tank missiles, while imposing diplomatic pressure on Putin. His strategy helped to contain tensions, without however resolving the problem.
However, this method has one major drawback: it relies entirely on the person applying it. By freezing conflicts rather than resolving them, their reactivation becomes inevitable as soon as the leader in question leaves the White House. This was the case with Ukraine, where a full-scale invasion followed Trump’s departure.
When Joe Biden declared, a few days before the Russian invasion, that a “small incursion” would be tolerated, it sent a signal to Vladimir Putin. Even though the Ukrainian army showed exemplary courage this situation reveals the failure of the Biden approach.
Trump’s supporters claim that he would be able to freeze the conflict in Ukraine again, bringing a certain form of peace. But this solution is not sustainable. Trump, like any president in the US is elected for four years only. And even if his successor shared his vision, this instability remains a risk. As for Putin, he will probably remain in power unless he is overthrown, and there is no guarantee that his successor will be more conciliatory.
As far as the Middle East is concerned, Donald Trump would probably try to renew the Abraham Accords, some sort of Abraham Accords 2.0, by uniting Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel against Iran and its regional allies. This strategy is already taking shape.
Just to clarify, because in France, we still have a lot of voices that are unhappy about Trump coming to power. In your opinion, what is the reason for such a cold reception of Donald Trump’s election by the French?
There are indeed several factors to consider. First, there’s the traditional anti-Americanism in France, a form of cultural and historical mistrust of the United States. Then there’s the anti-conservatism of French elites, who systematically reject anything that might be associated with a conservative or nationalist vision of power. These two elements combined, they produce an almost visceral hatred of Donald Trump. But this phenomenon isn’t just about Trump. Remember when George W. Bush was president: he was perceived as a warmonger or an idiot by some of the French media.
By contrast, when Barack Obama was president, despite a policy that contributed to the destabilization of North Africa and the Middle East with the “Arab springs” – which I prefer to call “Islamist springs” – and despite his “reset” policy with Russia, he was idealized. He represented “light”, “hope”, “modernity”. He was young, charismatic, a basketball player and even a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. In reality, it was more a question of image than a lucid analysis of his foreign policy.
As for Donald Trump, his “America First” slogan reinforces this negative perception. This is not pure isolationism, but a policy rigorously focused on American interests. For example, Trump is demanding that NATO member countries respect their financial commitments, notably the 2% GDP contribution to defense. This is a legitimate demand under the agreements. But France, out of defiance or to mark its singularity, often deliberately stays just below this symbolic bar – at 1.99%. I see this as a way of saying: “We’re not followers, we’re French, independent and proud”.
We also need to take into account the idea of French “strategic autonomy” that Emmanuel Macron defends. This often-vaunted historic policy of balance between the USA and the USSR, and then Russia, is in fact quite recent: it dates back to the 1960s. Before that, France had always been involved in major European and world conflicts. The independence of the United States, for example, owes much to France’s decisive support against the United Kingdom.
It’s only since France lost its position as a world power in the 1960s that it has sought to play this card of balance. Today, this is reflected in a policy of strategic assertion, sometimes tinged with mistrust of the United States.
To put it in a few words, the reception given to Donald Trump by the French can be explained by a mixture of cultural distrust, ideological rejection of conservatism, as well as a desire to assert an independent position on the international stage.
And in Poland, how was Trump’s electoral victory perceived?
In Poland, the perception of Donald Trump’s victory was very marked and indicative of the country’s political divisions. Poland is one of the United States’ greatest allies in the European Union. Some even go so far as to accuse it of being an American “Trojan horse”, a criticism that has existed since the country joined the EU. We can also note that the same was said of the UK back then.
Polish conservatives, who are very pro-American, welcomed Trump’s victory. As we know, Donald Trump had excellent relations with Polish President Andrzej Duda. But even when a Democratic president is in power in Washington, Polish conservatives strive to maintain good relations with the United States.
While the progressive camp, which could be described as “pro-European” center-left, currently in power, adopts a different stance. Closer to Germany and Brussels, they see the United States through the prism of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their priorities are more oriented towards European federalism, peace and well-being, and they often advocate a policy of reset with Russia. Remember, for instance, that it wasn’t conservatives like Jarosław Kaczyński, but Donald Tusk’s liberals who, 12 years ago, initiated this rapprochement with Russia. In particular, we can recall the closeness displayed between then Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, which still causes controversy today.
In short, Trump’s victory was welcomed by the traditional Polish right, while the progressive and liberal camp was much more reserved, even critical. However, it is important to note that, regardless of who is in power, Poles as a whole remain deeply pro-American. And with the Polish presidential election approaching, this dynamic is likely to play a important role.
And that brings us to the next question. Last year’s Polish parliamentary elections marked a turning point, signaling the end of the PiS government in power since 2015. How would you assess the first year of the Tusk government?
The first year of Donald Tusk’s government has already been marked by structural difficulties. It’s a fragile coalition, made up of three political blocs, themselves made up of several parties, which complicates decision-making. The government is based on an alliance of some 8 to 10 parties – a precarious balance.
This internal diversity quickly revealed tensions. One of the flagship projects promised during the campaign, the decriminalization of abortion, failed in the Diet. Not because of PiS opposition, but because of the veto of the PSL, a moderately conservative center-right agrarian party and member of the coalition. This division highlighted internal fractures.
Another source of friction concerns the willingness of some to take former PiS officials, including Jarosław Kaczyński, to court. On this point, Szymon Hołownia, leader of the Poland 2050 party, affiliated to the centrist Renew group in the European Parliament, expresses reservations. These disagreements have intensified to the point where Donald Tusk himself is taking jabs at his coalition partners on social networks, creating a climate of tension within the government.
What’s more, the Tusk government has to deal with the Polish President, Andrzej Duda, a PiS member who remains in office until May-June 2025. As a conservative, he systematically uses his veto power to block the coalition’s ambitious reforms. This forces Donald Tusk to confine himself to the expedition of current affairs and to take control of public companies, the media and cultural institutions, without being able to carry out major structural reforms.
These institutional limitations will make the 2025 presidential election a crucial issue. The progressive coalition will focus its campaign on a clear message: ‘If you want us to govern fully and reform Poland, elect Rafał Trzaskowski.’ The mayor of Warsaw, already an unsuccessful candidate in 2020, is this time the favourite in the polls. For its part, the PiS will play on nostalgia for the years when it was in power, arguing that ‘things were better under us’, in a way echoing Donald Trump’s strategy.
In terms of foreign policy, the changes are minimal. On the issue of illegal immigration from the Middle East, Donald Tusk has adopted a line of continuity with the PiS. He does not hesitate to put on a show at the border, posing in front of fences and defence systems to demonstrate his firmness.
With regard to the United States, Poland’s position remains dependent on the American presidential elections. Donald Tusk knows that he will have to deal with Donald Trump as he returns to power. The relationship between Poland and the United States remains strategic, and no Polish government will risk calling it into question.
You mentioned the issue of hybrid threats on the border between Poland and Belarus, in particular the use of migrants by the Lukashenko regime, supported by Russia. These hybrid warfare strategies, which were particularly evident in 2020-2021, have had a major impact on Polish security. Faced with this situation, there is now an attempt to relaunch bilateral relations between France and Poland and to revitalise the Weimar Triangle, which brings together France, Germany and Poland. How do you see Poland’s role in these Franco-Polish relations and, more broadly, in Europe’s future security, at a time when NATO’s eastern flank remains central in the face of Russian aggression?
In my opinion, Poland’s role in European security is decisive, central, even crucial, and it’s time for the other European countries, particularly France, to become fully aware of this.
Poland occupies a unique strategic position in Europe: it borders Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Germany. This geographical location makes it a pillar of NATO’s eastern flank and a key player in European security arrangements. What’s more, Poland’s turbulent history with Russia – marked by occupations, divisions and resistance – fuels constant vigilance in the face of Russian ambitions.
For several years now, Poland has been engaged in a massive rearmament drive to bolster its security. Under the PiS, the country has invested in cutting-edge equipment: Abrams tanks purchased from the United States, K2 tanks from South Korea, American F-35 aircraft and French satellites. The stated aim is clear: to make Poland the leading conventional army in Europe.
While the European army remains a distant project, Poland maintains solid relations with the United States, regardless of the political colour of the White House. Washington remains its main strategic partner in ensuring its defence against the Russian threat.
One of the major challenges remains the hybrid war being waged by Russia and Belarus. The use of migrants from the Middle East, as we saw in 2020-2021, has had a major impact on Polish security. The Belarusian services bring these migrants to the border, sometimes equipping them with knives and pliers to get through the barriers. Despite the construction of a fence under the PiS government, the border remains porous. Thousands of illegal immigrants have entered Poland before continuing on to Germany, which is now trying to turn them back towards Poland.
This situation presents the current government, led by Donald Tusk, with a moral dilemma. During the campaign, its allies criticised the management of this hybrid attack by PiS, calling for more compassion for migrants. Memorable scenes show Civic Platform MPs bringing food and supplies to illegal immigrants. Today, Donald Tusk seems to have changed his approach by adopting a firmer stance. This is a step in the right direction, but it remains to be seen whether this firmness will be maintained in the long term.
The threat is not limited to physical borders. Russia is also waging an information warfare: propaganda, fake news, manipulation of social networks, acts of provocation in the public space, and so on. These strategies are designed to stir up public opinion in Poland and the West, with anti-Ukrainian rhetoric fuelling internal divisions. This hybrid war is a battle in its own right, and it is crucial to wage it in the information sphere.
In brief, Poland is a key player in the future security of Europe. It is at the heart of a particularly dangerous environment, surrounded by states directly involved in Russia’s aggressive policy. Geographically and geostrategically, Poland is at the centre of the defence system of Central and Eastern Europe, between Finland to the north and Romania to the south.
What’s more, historically, Poland has always been a prime target for Russian expansionism, and it would be naïve to think that the situation will stop in Ukraine. If Ukraine were to fall, Poland would become the next front line. Therefore, the European partners’ awareness of this crucial role, particularly within the framework of the Weimar Triangle, will be decisive for the future of European collective security.
Let’s now discuss the recent events that have shaken up the geopolitical agenda in the Middle East, and here I mean the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. What do you think are the potential geopolitical consequences of this development?
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria marks a major turning point, creating multiple and complex geopolitical consequences for both the Middle East and Europe.
The first consequence is the immediate threat to Russian interests in Syria, particularly their strategic naval base at Tartous and the air base at Khmeimim, as well as their positions in Latakia. If the new regime demands that the Russians abandon these bases, it will be a serious blow to the Kremlin.
Syria has undergone a brutal collapse. Loyalist soldiers have abandoned the field, leaving behind their military equipment, a rare scene in recent military history. This hasty withdrawal is a real setback for the image of Russia and Iran, who appear weakened in the eyes of their allies and adversaries. Russia, in particular, had positioned itself as a pillar of the anti-Western axis. Today, its position and image are seriously damaged.
For Ukraine and its Western allies, this situation is a source of galvanisation. It shows that Russia is not as invincible as it claims, even when it is investing heavily in a conflict. If Russia were to lose Tartous, it would compromise its ambitions in Africa, where it uses the naval facility as a base for its military and logistical expeditions. It would therefore be an opportunity for France, which has interests in Africa.
However, the fall of Assad leaves room for new uncertainties. Syria could descend into a new civil war between rebel factions. There is a real risk of a resurgence of the Islamic State or other jihadist groups, which could lead to a new wave of migration to Europe, like the one in 2014-2015.
This is one of the main concerns for Europe: a massive and uncontrolled migratory crisis. This risk is real, but it is above all technical and political issue, and therefore not insurmountable. We have the tools to secure our borders and prevent the arrival of these flows. What we lack is the political will.
Beyond the security issues at stake, this proxy war is also a test of credibility for the West. If we withdraw in the face of Russia and Iran, what signal will we be sending to partners like Taiwan and Ukraine? Our ability to influence conflicts, even indirectly, is crucial to asserting our global leadership.
What’s more, military success – even in proxy wars – has an economic dimension. A country’s ability to sell its protection or armaments depends on its demonstration of effectiveness. The fall of Assad, if exploited strategically, can reinforce France’s image as an influential and credible player in regional conflicts.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that Western Europe, particularly France and Great Britain, has historical links with the Middle East, from the colonial mandates (and well before) to the present day. Unlike Central Europe, where these issues remain more abstract, these regions are of direct concern to us. What’s more, mass immigration from the Middle East has for decades brought these conflicts to our shores.
To conclude, I would like to stress once again that the fall of the Syrian regime is a major event that weakens Russia and Iran while posing security challenges for Europe. The West must capitalise on this moment to strengthen its influence while protecting its borders. The technical and military means exist. What is lacking is the political will to meet these challenges and ensure our security.
