The Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon found a favorable opportunity to develop its activities and strengthen its presence following the terror attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023. In Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood is represented by what is known as “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya,” founded by Faisal Mawlawi and Fathi Yakan in 1956. The group claims its goal is to “protect values and the individual in Islamic society.”
For years, the group focused on proselytizing, charitable work, and participating in political life. However, it has recently returned to military action, as its military wing (the “Fajr Forces”) announced that it had targeted the Israeli army with missile strikes and vowed to retaliate against any aggression targeting southern Lebanon.
For a long time, most Lebanese Sunnis resisted the Muslim Brotherhood’s calls for jihad. However, it seems that the group is betting that these sentiments could change quickly due to the pressures arising from the Gaza War, the economic crisis, and the local political vacuum. Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Sunni branches of the “Muslim Brotherhood” across the Middle East have renewed their calls for jihad, and some have reactivated their military cells. In Lebanon, the “Fajr Forces” coordinated their attacks with Hezbollah. In response, Israeli forces killed several members of the group, including prominent commander Shahrabil Ali Al-Sayyed, during a raid near Majdal Anjar.
This essay examines the presence and influence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” in Lebanon. What are the implications of its participation in military operations against Israel from Lebanon? And could this lead to an increase in the group’s influence in Lebanon in the long term?
Foundation, Political, and Proselytizing Presence
The “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” was founded in the 1950s in Tripoli and is considered the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was established in 1964 by Faisal Mawlawi and Fathi Yakan, a young Tripolitanian of Turkish origin influenced by Mustafa Al-Sibai, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, and Sayyid Qutb, one of its prominent figures in Egypt.
After the group’s announcement, the Islamic magazine Al-Shihab was issued in 1964, followed by the establishment of Jinan University by Fathi Yakan and his wife, Mona Haddad, in 1988. Faisal Mawlawi played a significant role in founding the group, and Ibrahim Al-Masri was later chosen as its Secretary-General. With the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, the group formed the “Mujahideen Fi Sabeel Allah” organization to defend Sunni areas in Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon.
The group achieved political victories in 1992 when its representative, Fathi Yakan, won a parliamentary seat for Tripoli, along with two members from Dinniyeh and Beirut. However, it then began to decline, securing only one seat in Akkar in 1996. Its parliamentary role ended in 2000 under Syrian presence in Lebanon, but it participated again in the 2009 elections, winning one seat.
The “Fajr Forces” were formed by some youths affiliated with “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” (the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon) following the Israeli invasion of 1982, in southern areas from Sidon to the border villages of Arqoub. After a wave of arrests by Israeli forces that targeted the group’s leadership and members in Sidon, some members relocated to Tripoli and Beirut. They rented houses, and some engaged in attacks on the Sidon-Beirut road, coordinating with Hezbollah, which was in its nascent stages.
Following the liberation of Sidon on February 16, 1985, “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” maintained a “symbolic” force within Hezbollah’s ranks in the south, operating under its leadership. The group then faded from view around 2006, only to reemerge recently following the recent Gaza events to announce its military operations in southern Lebanon, acting as an alternative to Hezbollah under an agreement between the two sides. On October 21, 2023, the group stated that it had launched new and concentrated rocket strikes targeting Israeli positions in the south, achieving direct hits.
The positions and movements of “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” have often mirrored those of its regional branches. For example, during the Syrian revolution in 2011, the group had a serious disagreement with Hezbollah over the latter’s support for the Assad regime, reflecting the Muslim Brotherhood’s support for the Sunni opposition in Syria.
Recently, however, “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” has shifted towards a strong political alliance with Hezbollah and Hamas—a trend that appeared well before the reactivation of the “Fajr Forces” during the current Gaza war. This began in 2022 when Mohamed Taqoush led the pro-Hamas “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” faction to victory in its internal elections, then sought to form a formal alliance with the Hezbollah-Hamas axis.
In the same year, some reports indicated that “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” won 22,978 votes in the Lebanese parliamentary elections, compared to 11,442 votes in 2018. This increase is mainly attributed to the absence of Sunni political leadership, and the group’s popularity has continued to grow recently after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.
A well-informed source notes that “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” possesses somewhat advanced military capabilities, though certainly not at the level of Hezbollah’s military technology. It is clear that the “Fajr Forces” have Kornet missiles, which are effective in battle, but it is impossible to confirm the source of these missiles, although Hezbollah is known to have large quantities of them.
Strengthening Political Presence Through Military Action and Alliances with “Hamas” and “Hezbollah”
The number of fighters in the “Fajr Forces” is estimated to be around 500, making it a relatively small military force with limited impact in terms of military might. However, its presence and political significance are far more substantial due to the political benefits it offers to Hezbollah and Hamas. Hezbollah has consistently sought to expand its presence in Sunni areas, where its policies have been rejected for years, particularly after its involvement in supporting the Syrian regime.
For a long time, Hezbollah tried to infiltrate the Sunni northern region by inviting Sunni religious figures to appear at its rallies and support its discourse and orientations. The article noted that Hezbollah’s limited presence in the north changed when Lebanon experienced an economic crisis and living conditions deteriorated, allowing Hezbollah to exploit the situation and enter Akkar, Tripoli, and Minieh, offering economic relief. After Saad Hariri’s withdrawal from political life, Hezbollah found an opportunity to get closer to Sunni figures and institutions.
The Gaza war subsequently enhanced the party’s status in a Sunni region sympathetic to any party that supports the Palestinian cause. Similarly, the “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” seized the opportunity and aligned with Hezbollah’s position and approach. The Sunni group replaced the Future Movement’s policies with a passionate rhetoric that might succeed in attracting the younger generation. Reports indicate that while Sunni youth generally had not heard of “Fajr Forces” before October 7, a significant number of them are now trying to join the group to fight Israel.
It seems that the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah have converged through the participation of the “Fajr Forces” in military operations. Hezbollah needs a Sunni faction to dispel the notion that it is leading the country into war alone on behalf of all Lebanese. Meanwhile, the Sunni group, “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya,” found an opportunity to regain its popularity in areas where it once had a strong parliamentary and popular presence. Additionally, cooperation with Iran provides the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies with leverage through support and helps ease political and financial pressure on the group in case it loses its Arab partner, applying what is known as the “unity of arenas” as a conceptual axis for the union of political Islam movements.
On the other hand, Hamas gaining more influence over “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” in Lebanon would help Hezbollah further penetrate the Sunni community in the country, especially since the 2022 elections revealed the weakness of their Christian ally Gebran Bassil. This pushes Hezbollah to work on securing more allies, exploiting the Sunni weakness and the retreat of traditional Sunni leaders from political life. Reports indicate that the “Fajr Forces” receive financial allocations from Hamas.
Regarding the group’s relations with Hezbollah, Taqoush stated that they have experienced periods of ups and downs. He said they had differences over the conflicts in Syria and Yemen but put them aside to “resist the Israeli occupation of parts of our Lebanese lands.” Taqoush added, „our relations with Hezbollah are good, growing, and strengthening as we go through the war.” He also mentioned that all the weapons they use, from bullets to rockets, are from their own arsenal, stating, “We have not received even a single bullet from any party.”
“Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” in Lebanon has ties with Qatar, as well as with Turkey and its political and relief institutions. There is also an active presence of Muslim Brotherhood leaders in these two countries. According to the group’s former Secretary-General, Azzam Al-Ayoubi, “Sunni Muslims in Lebanon are looking for any power that can support them to achieve internal balance, starting from their search for a way to restore the lost balance in Lebanon.”
In this context, the cultural advisor of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Lebanon assured Taqoush that Tehran stands with all liberation and resistance movements “to achieve justice and liberate Palestine.” Earlier, Iran’s ambassador to Beirut, Mojtaba Amani, praised the relations between Iran and the group. However, others try to downplay the significance of any substantive ties between “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” and Hezbollah. Mohanad Hage Ali, a researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Center, believes that the group is not subordinate to Hezbollah—even though press sources have quoted a leader of “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” as saying the two sides are “in the same trench on the Palestinian issue.” This connection is slowly becoming undeniable. As the group’s political official, Ali Abu Yassin, stated, “All forces operating in southern Lebanon coordinate with each other.”
The relationship between “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” and Hezbollah is not without complexities, especially concerning the ongoing Syrian conflict that has lasted for a decade. This tension stems from the strained relations between Hamas and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since 2011, which in turn affected relations between “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” and Hezbollah. However, the election of Taqoush as Secretary-General of the group in 2022 marked a period of improved relations despite ongoing challenges in reconciling differences over Syria. At that time, he was quoted saying, “We and Hezbollah are similar.”
One of the group’s leaders stated that the return of “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” to the resistance front is an organic return, as confronting Israel has become a strategic priority following the brutal military assault by the occupying state on Gaza. The group is executing this objective “through full coordination with Hamas, supporting all armed forces, and ensuring that the Lebanese front remains a confrontation zone against the Israeli occupation.”
A leader of “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” admitted that “Fajr Forces” are conducting “joint operations with Hamas.” The group’s Deputy Political Bureau Chief, Bassam Hammoud, declared, “We and Hamas are two sides of the same coin in facing the Zionist enemy.” Imad Al-Hout, the only parliamentary representative of “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” in Lebanon, said that the size of the “Fajr Forces” is determined “according to what is necessary for them to respond to aggression and is funded with their own capabilities.” For Al-Hout, „as long as there is aggression, the group will continue to launch rockets at Israel.”
Recently, the “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” has also tried to integrate with Hamas. For instance, after the assassination of prominent Hamas leader Saleh Al-Arouri in January in an Israeli raid in Beirut, the group’s condolence statement claimed that “Lebanese and Palestinian blood merged to continue together the path of liberation.” The “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” also issued a martyrdom memorandum for Shahrabil Ali Al-Sayyed on May 18, noting that he was a commander of both the “Fajr Forces” and Hamas’ “Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.”
The Position of “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” Among the Sunni Community
Although “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” currently lacks substantial parliamentary representation, with only one seat in the parliament, it holds a significant influence within the Lebanese Sunni community. The group boasts a network of supporters spanning various regions, including Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, Sidon, Tripoli, and the Arqoub. Some sources claim that “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” ranks second only to the Future Movement, led by Saad Hariri.
Certain segments of the Sunni community in Lebanon have begun to express concern over the group’s involvement in military activities coordinated with Hezbollah and Hamas, viewing it as an overt slide into extremism and terrorism. This is due to the fact that Hezbollah and Hamas have been classified as terrorist organizations in several Arab and Western countries. Moreover, this indicates the emergence of Sunni factions showing cooperation with Iran despite its marginalizing project for the other Lebanese components and the decline of Arab, especially Saudi, support for the Sunni component in Lebanon. In February 2024, Saad Hariri, head of the Future Movement, stated, “If I feel that the Sunnis in Lebanon are drifting towards extremism, I will intervene.” However, many interpreted this as a green light from the Gulf countries for the former Prime Minister—who withdrew from politics in 2022—to return to a leadership role in Lebanese politics if other Sunni movements, including “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya,” start gaining significant support from the Sunni public in the country.
Sunni leaders and representatives, including the Future Movement, several politicians, and Dar al-Fatwa (the official body overseeing Sunni religious affairs in Lebanon), have opposed Hezbollah and its allies for nearly two decades. This opposition began with the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, for which many Sunnis blamed the Syrian regime and Hezbollah. This opposition solidified with the division of Lebanon into the March 8 and March 14 camps, followed by the events of May 7, 2008, when Hezbollah briefly took control of several Sunni neighborhoods in Beirut, and Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria against a popular uprising supported by the majority of Lebanese Sunnis. Thus, the recent move by “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” towards alignment with Hezbollah represents a departure from a fundamental element of contemporary Sunni political identity.
Former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who was very close to the late Rafik Hariri, has long opposed dragging Lebanon, particularly the Sunnis, into the ongoing conflict in Gaza. Similarly, Ridwan Al-Sayyid, a respected religious figure, called on the Grand Mufti and Dar al-Fatwa to intervene to control the clerics who support Hamas and Hezbollah. For these reasons, “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” was initially cautious about antagonizing segments of the Sunni community. When it announced its involvement on the southern front against Israel, it stated that its operations were not coordinated with any group, in a clear reference to Hezbollah.
Conclusions:
- It has become clear that “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” has successfully attracted Sunni citizens and several prominent figures within Dar al-Fatwa. Support for the Palestinian cause is a fundamental pillar of Arab nationalist thought and Islamic policies, both of which have historically enjoyed popularity among Lebanese Sunnis.
- Several years ago, Riyadh withdrew from the Lebanese political scene and significantly reduced its financial support, partly due to changing priorities in the Kingdom and also as a result of Hezbollah’s growing influence within Lebanon. Despite this shift, the current moment presents an important opportunity for Washington to persuade the Saudis to re-engage in the Lebanese issue. The matter is no longer merely a Lebanese problem; the spread of Sunni extremism in Lebanon will inevitably fuel extremism throughout the entire region, making the issue directly related to Saudi national security.
- On the religious and ideological fronts, a significant portion of the Sunni community in Lebanon still leans toward the relative moderation represented by Saudi Arabia, compared to the extremist ideas espoused by other factions. However, Saudi Arabia’s absence from the scene in recent years has provided an opportunity for “Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya” and other extremists to expand.
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