Exactly sixty years ago, an organization claiming to represent all Palestinians convened for the first time in Jerusalem: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It was established by Egypt and other Arab states, aiming to control and utilize the Palestinian resistance against Israel for their own interests. However, the leadership of the PLO soon shifted to two men with their own agenda, not wanting to be mere instruments for neighboring Arab despots: Yasir Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas.
In October 1959, Arafat and Abbas, along with other Palestinian refugees, founded an organization in Kuwait named Fatah. Fatah is an acronym for the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine, which also means “conquest” in Arabic. At the time, Arafat and Abbas likely did not realize that they would significantly shape the history of the Middle East and the Palestinians. While this was undoubtedly their ambition, ultimately, events unfolded differently than anticipated.
The history of the PLO is inextricably linked with the history of Arafat, Abbas, and their Fatah. In light of the war in Gaza, the question arises: Does the PLO still have a future sixty years after its founding?
The Israeli War of Independence in 1948 was a severe blow to the Palestinians. Hundreds of thousands were displaced or fled in what is known as the Nakba (Catastrophe), and their leaders and elites scattered across the Middle East. Over time, various resistance groups formed, including Fatah, which sought the destruction of the Jewish state. For Fatah, armed struggle was seen as the only way to establish a democratic Palestinian state. However, these diffuse resistance groups lacked coordination and leadership. Consequently, the Arab League summit on May 28, 1964, established the PLO to unify these groups under one umbrella. The Arab states also intended to better control the unruly Palestinians, fearing being drawn into a larger conflict.
Under Yasir Arafat, Fatah began armed struggle against Israel in 1965, targeting, for example, Israel’s irrigation system. Initially, the organization remained insignificant. This changed in 1968 when Israel advanced on the Jordanian village of Karameh to destroy the Fatah bases there. Although Israel won the battle, the Palestinian fighters inflicted significant losses. Images of destroyed Israeli tanks went around the world, marking a public relations coup for Fatah, which became the face of the Palestinian resistance movement. Volunteers flocked to join the armed struggle, and with its anti-imperial rhetoric, Fatah also captivated parts of the European left. In 1969, the charismatic Arafat assumed leadership of the PLO, focusing all attention on himself, determining the organization’s tactics, strategy, and program, while gradually emancipating from the Arab states, though still reliant on their funding.
From Jordan, the PLO intensified its struggle against Israel, with some factions turning to international terrorism. In September 1970, Palestinian terrorists hijacked three planes to the Jordanian desert, prompting a harsh response from King Hussein of Jordan, who feared for his country’s stability and expelled the PLO. The weakened organization relocated its headquarters to Beirut, Lebanon. Due to brutal terrorist attacks by some PLO factions, it lost sympathies, especially in Europe. Thus, in 1974, Arafat shifted course, declaring his readiness for coexistence with Israel and distancing from international terrorism, though continuing attacks on the Jewish state. That same year, the Arab League recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Meanwhile, the UN General Assembly acknowledged the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and granted the PLO observer status.
In 1975, the PLO played a significant role in the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War and was subsequently fought by Christian militias. Israel, unwilling to tolerate Palestinian guerrilla actions from Lebanon, advanced to Beirut in 1982, forcing the PLO to relocate its headquarters to Tunis, moving the despised Israel out of reach. However, the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987 worked in Arafat’s favor, as the exiled leadership soon coordinated the uprising, regaining international sympathies for the Palestinian cause.
Arafat seized the moment and declared Palestinian independence in November 1988. In a speech before the UN General Assembly, he condemned all forms of terrorism, nullified the PLO Charter articles calling for Israel’s destruction, and supported a two-state solution. This set the stage for secret negotiations with Israel in the 1990s, culminating in the Oslo Accords. In these accords, Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, agreeing to negotiate a final peace agreement within five years. A Palestinian state seemed within reach.
During this period, however, a development occurred that Arabist Gilles Kepel termed the “Islamization of the Palestinian issue.” Founded in 1987, Hamas, an uncompromising Islamist organization, began challenging the PLO’s leadership in the Palestinian resistance, bolstered by ample Arab petrodollars. Arafat’s alignment with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War strained relations with the Gulf monarchies, reducing their support for the PLO.
The Oslo Accords had mixed effects on the PLO. While the exiled leadership could finally establish a power base in the Palestinian territories, taking control of the interim Palestinian Authority (PA) brought tangible responsibilities. Transitioning from a liberation movement to a governing party, the PLO had to address everyday governance issues. The PA absorbed most PLO functions, gradually diminishing the PLO’s authority until it virtually ceased to exist. This development also strained relations with the diaspora, who no longer had a genuine voice. Additionally, PA security forces now fought against Hamas and other Islamist groups, casting Arafat and his associates as collaborators with Israel and enemies of the liberation struggle.
Following the collapse of the Oslo Accords and the failure of the Camp David peace talks, the Second Intifada erupted, leaving Arafat facing ruin. To reclaim his legitimacy, he prominently led the bloody uprising, primarily driven by local Fatah cadres who reverted to terrorism against Israel. A competition ensued between Fatah-associated groups and Hamas for executing the most spectacular attacks, resulting in significant civilian casualties on both sides.
Arafat died in 2004, and his companion Mahmoud Abbas succeeded him as head of the PLO, PA, and Fatah. Under Abbas, the PA resumed limited cooperation with Israel, but the Palestinian leadership crisis deepened. The public increasingly viewed Abbas as an Israeli collaborator, using repressive measures to maintain power instead of striving for self-determination. Corruption plagued his administration, and control over the West Bank waned as Islamist terror groups proliferated.
The 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections saw Hamas win a majority, leading to a split between Abbas and Hamas. By the following year, Hamas had seized control of the Gaza Strip, creating two competing Palestinian power centers. Persistent tensions between the PA and Hamas benefited Israel, whose government actively sought to deepen these divides.
On October 7, 2023, a brutal Hamas attack on Israel bolstered the Islamists’ popularity in Palestinian territories, while Abbas’s leadership remained notably silent. Although the U.S. plans to “revitalize” the PA and install it as a governing force in Gaza after the war, there are no indications that Abbas’s leadership is willing or capable.
In February 2024, the PLO engaged in negotiations with Hamas—once again—over including the Islamists in the umbrella organization and forming a unified Palestinian government. These talks ended inconclusively, with Abbas aware that he would likely lose an election against Hamas.
It now seems unlikely that the PLO will reorganize and reclaim its leadership role in the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. More probable is a collapse of the PA in the West Bank, though the U.S. and Europeans will strive to prevent this, as they seek to avoid a Hamas takeover. Sixty years after its founding, the PLO is weaker than ever.
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