The Middle East is looking for a place “under the sun”

In early October, Hamas launched a powerful attack on Israel. How do you explain the timing? And which regional players could benefit from this attack?

October 7 is a symbolic date because it is the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War. So it is obvious that it is not accidental. I think that Hamas planned the attack for this day.

The question is what they wanted to do. Because there are many versions out there now, even such exotic versions that Hamas was planning a second offensive, and if the first one had succeeded, they would have attacked major Israeli cities. I think there is very little truth in such versions. Based on the most basic logic, Hamas is light infantry, hence such a version is almost impossible.

But there are also more realistic versions, which are to some extent confirmed by Hamas’ actions. The first is to inflict a strategic defeat on Israel, that is, to prove that the Israeli army is unable to contain Hamas. The second is to take hostages, as many as possible, and then exchange them for Palestinian prisoners. This is a practice that has existed before.

We remember the case of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier who was exchanged for a thousand prisoners. And I think that some people in Gaza may have had this scenario in mind, even as a key scenario.

There is also a version voiced by Hamas itself. One can, of course, raise a big question about the veracity of this version, but it is worth voicing because it is also in the general context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They say that in recent years the Palestinian issue has practically disappeared from the headlines in the Arab world, no one was interested in it anymore, the Arabs have begun to get closer to Israel quite actively, and such an event was necessary to change this situation.

If we look back at the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, we remember that there were periods when the conflict was dying down, there were no active actions, and then there were many terrorist acts committed by Palestinians around the world, hijackings of aeroplanes, the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, and so on. Each of these terrorist attacks renewed discussions around Palestine and created new waves of discussion, and Hamas also wanted to renew this discussion around Palestine with this attack.

But they realized that Israel would respond very strongly to such an attack. Didn’t they?

Yes, they understood. But to what extent they did realize it is a big question. I think they realized that Israel would launch some kind of ground operation there. But they probably thought that they would be stopped.

A lot of the calculation was obviously that the Arab world would rise, and that a second front would probably begin, as it had been before 2006. That is, Hamas may well have been counting on external help, but they didn’t get it. And this means that they miscalculated. As a result, they will lose power and create a rather difficult situation in the Middle East in connection with the possible reoccupation of Gaza by Israel.

In your opinion, what other countries can take advantage of this situation to promote their interests?

I would put the question a little differently – who lost here? Of course, American policy has been seriously damaged. In general, the entire American strategy in the Middle East envisaged the formation of such an alliance of moderate Arab countries and Israel. And this alliance would restrain Iran’s expansionist efforts. This strategy was important to the Americans because it would save American taxpayers money. Fewer resources could then be spent to contain Iran.

The very fact of the existence of this alliance would allow Americans to act more freely, including in the Middle East, appealing to moderate Arab countries. So far, this has not happened, even though the Abraham Accords, negotiations with the Saudis and others, are now largely suspended.

And as for the beneficiaries, one of the key ones is Iran. Because Tehran did not like the rapprochement between Israel and the countries of the Middle East, for example, Saudi Arabia, and the Abraham Accords.

It is also important for the Iranians that they are increasing their influence. The Iranian president’s recent visit to Riad for a meeting of the Arab League shows that this is an unprecedented step in terms of bringing Turks, Iranians, and Arabs closer together. And this will mean that at least Iran and the Arab countries have a common field of interest.

Bashar al-Assad has been completely legitimized. Now no one remembers that he is a bloody dictator, what he did in Syria. The Chinese, who are quite actively playing on these contradictions, are using their soft power to advance their interests.

And Russia is clearly on the side of the Arabs, continuing the Soviet tradition. And in terms of this, we can recall Putin’s statement at the very beginning of this conflict that American policy in the Middle East has failed. This is the quintessence of Putin’s view of what is happening and what should happen in the Middle East.

The Russians are not very worried about the possible deterioration of relations with Israel. Because they are confident that their presence in Syria will not give Israel any serious room for manoeuvre. At the same time, they are reaffirming the importance of their strategic relationship with Iran.

How do you see the development of events in the context of the suspension of rapprochement between Israel and Arab countries?

Shortly, it is unlikely that anyone will return to the idea of warming relations, at least until the Gaza issue is resolved. In other words, a fundamental decision has to be made that will have an impact on the future. As far as I can see now, none of the players in the Middle East have a clear picture.

For example, Israel is largely sending completely contradictory messages, starting with the idea that there could be a second Nakba. But these are exotic statements by government officials. But besides this, Netanyahu himself oscillates between a very tough position, which is close to his partners in the coalition of far-right religious Zionists, and the demands of the Americans.

And even though he is a hardliner, he does not like to make decisions. That is, he usually drags out any decision as long as possible, hoping that it will either be resolved by itself or something else will happen.

For a leader who is in a state of such a large-scale conflict, this is probably difficult. Because he needs to take political responsibility, and he is afraid of this. The only one who has not taken responsibility for the failure of the security situation on October 7 is Netanyahu.

And what would be an acceptable scenario for the Arab countries for the end of this war to resume negotiations on rapprochement with Israel?

As far as I understand, it has already been practically formulated. It is the end of the war in Gaza as soon as possible. The Arab states have tacitly agreed that Hamas must be destroyed.

Even though Hamas has renounced their kinship with the Muslim Brotherhood, we nevertheless understand that they are a Palestinian offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. For a lot of people, these are the Muslim Brotherhood, and this is an internal security issue for a different regional countries. And so they will not be particularly opposed to Hamas being destroyed as an irritant.

But the real question is what will happen in Gaza because the only legitimate solution is to transfer this territory to the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian autonomy is currently quite weak and it is seriously undermined, including by the actions of the Israeli government, as they have done a lot to prevent a return to the format of any direct negotiations on the two-state solution. Their main task was to discredit the Palestinian government, and Palestinian autonomy, and to keep Hamas as a bogeyman to demonstrate what could happen if Palestine gets its state.

The future of Gaza without the return and self-rule of the Palestinians is unacceptable to Arabs. And they will not agree to another scenario that would involve the Israeli occupation of Gaza. It is also important for Americans to reform the Palestinian Authority and make it more effective.

There is another war going on, namely the Russian-Ukrainian war. How would you characterize the policy of regional powers towards the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict?

Officially, they remain neutral. In Saudi Arabia, a new term has emerged – active neutrality, which implies more active involvement in finding ways to resolve conflicts.

It seems to me that Mohammad bin Salman’s position is that Saudi Arabia, as one of the key countries in the Middle East, can and should have an interest in the global redistribution of resources in the world. Here I would like to stress that power is also a resource. Influence on decision-making is also a resource. And it is important for them that they imagine and see this conflict as not local, but a conflict that can change the balance of power in the world. Riyadh and its allies are trying to secure a place in the future negotiation process that will redistribute resources in the world.

What kind of negotiation process will it be? No one understands or realizes who the parties will be, and who will sit at this table. But for sure, the Arabs do not want to look like they did in the First World War or the Second World War. That is when nothing depended on their points of view, their positions.

Therefore, from one point of view, the Saudis continue to be neutral, they are trying to strengthen their sovereignty, including in negotiations with the Americans. For example, here we can talk about Biden’s visit to the Middle East last year and the negotiations that ended in almost nothing. They also indicate that at least Bin Salman sees himself not as a client of America, but as an equal partner.

But here, too, there are questions about relations with Beijing and Russia. Pax Americana has tired many people, but no one knows what may come after it. And won’t it turn out that, say, instead of the Americans with their pragmatic approaches and willingness to compromise, there will come forces that completely ignore this? For instance, the Chinese, who can pour a lot of money into Saudi Arabia, but then it can cost Riyadh a lot.

Or the Russians, who are now playing the role of a junior partner of the Chinese, but at the same time, from an ideological point of view, they dominate. Even the Chinese repeat, in fact, all the key messages of the Russians.

So, in other words, Saudi Arabia is trying to play big geopolitical games as much as it can. I cannot say that they are very successful, but we still see that their sovereignty and weight in the world is increasing.

But at the same time, the decisions of the leading countries in the Middle East are not dominant, they cannot single-handedly impose a certain decision even in the region. In their eyes, the Russian-Ukrainian war was simply a moment to express themselves. And they took advantage of it, on the one hand, both for their interests and for the interest of increasing their weight on the world stage.

But there is another aspect – the food security of the region. The situation in Ukraine and the supply of food from Ukraine to the Global South is a very important component. They cannot ignore this in their policy and they need to secure this transportation corridor. But how this transportation corridor will operate is not important, the main thing is that the grain goes to the Middle East.

It is also worth noting that Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are the two countries that provided Ukraine with serious humanitarian aid. We are talking about hundreds of millions of dollars if I’m not mistaken, 400 million dollars each, but we don’t hear much about it.

There is also the issue of resentment. And most of the anti-Western, anti-American sentiment is built on it. And they will, of course, look for any ally to realize this resentment. And in this sense, both China and Russia are precisely the countries that offer them resources to become stronger, to influence decision-making, and these decisions are not likely to be in line with American interests. And here, the memory of the Soviet Union as an alternative to the West, thanks to which the Arabs could balance, also plays a role.

We can recall all the wars that took place in the Middle East, and they ended in direct negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. They would like to return to this format but with them playing a bigger role.

How would you characterize the main dynamics in the region from a few years ago to the present, and the role of Russia and China?

Let’s start with the Russians. They need to maintain the status quo, which will help them gradually strengthen their positions. That is, the conflicts in the Middle East give them this opportunity. Just as they once entered the Middle East thanks to these conflicts. And now, thanks to this, they can at least display their flag there.

A latent conflict that will allow Russia to keep Israel on a short leash, motivated by Israel’s strategic interests in the conflict with Iran. And we see Israel’s reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This is a great illustration.

Lately, of course, the Russian-Iranian alliance has taken on an unprecedented look, I would say. Previously, it was simply impossible to imagine such an alliance. But now we see that this alliance is developing successfully. And not only against the backdrop of the war in Syria, but against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, and now against the backdrop of the war in the Middle East. That is, contacts are increasing, and these are systemic ties that, on the one hand, strengthen the Russian presence, and on the other hand, create a certain frame for them to jump out of, given Iran’s interests.

If we are talking about the Americans, it was important for them to create this regional security system that would deter Iran and that would exist with gentle American intervention. That is, it would exist on its own, these countries would have common interests that would support this security system, and then the Americans would expect to spend fewer resources. That is why we are talking about soft power, as opposed to the hard power that they are forced to use when it comes to Syria, Iraq, and countering other terrorist organizations.

The European Union in this case plays a secondary role. For instance, they do not have special interests in the Middle East, but have interests in stability and ensuring the functioning of markets, freedom of navigation, and oil supplies. The decrease of migrants from the Middle East is probably also an important issue for the EU.

Some countries in the EU have special interests, and here we can talk about Spain, Italy, and France. While the first two countries have interests in the Maghreb countries, the French have a traditional policy in the Arab world as well. And it concerns, first of all, Lebanon and Syria. That is, all this can also, at the very least, be reflected in the relevant statements of the same French President Macron.

The Chinese have invested quite a bit in the Middle East recently. They are on the path of economic expansion. For them, the security of transportation routes and the supply of their goods is very important. They need a presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. They need allies there if only to have a permanent naval presence, like in Djibouti. In parallel, they are actively working on the diplomatic front, and the greatest success is the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Iran is also an interesting player, especially in terms of their vision and their strategic culture, as well as their ideas about how their interests in the Middle East should be secured.

On the one hand, pan-Islamism is important to them. And they are using all the pain points, all the conflicts generated by the Arab-Israeli conflict to promote this message, this pan-Islamic narrative.

In principle, pan-Islamism is an auxiliary tool for Iran. They have never really relied on it. At one time, they were very disappointed with the war between Iraq and Iran, because at that time all Arab countries supported Iraq. And they understand the limitations of this tool.

Shiism is undoubtedly a more important pillar of their strategic culture, but it is also a very instrumental pillar. This means that to ensure the security of Iran itself, it is necessary for wars to continue somewhere else, but not on the territory of Iran itself. Therefore, it makes sense to support Shiite groups in the Middle East, to strengthen them, to create combat-ready units, so that Arabs are busy confronting each other within the Arab world and do not form a united front against Iran.

Another important component of Iran’s strategic culture is Persian civilization. This component suggests that Iran has always been surrounded by enemies. A kind of besieged fortress, just like Russia. And here they are very similar.

To ensure security and prevent enemies from uniting around them, they need allies. And they are looking for these allies. And in this case, China and Russia are exactly those allies that allow them to survive and defend themselves in these conditions.

They are not going to take over the entire Middle East. They do not have any powerful regional ambitions. I’m simplifying it a lot, but they are based on the principle that there are enemies everywhere and they need to defend themselves.

For a long time, even under Ataturk, Turkey has been suspicious of the Middle East. For Turkey, the Middle East is always a threat and a painful reminder of the lost Ottoman Empire.

For Erdogan, even when it came to the conflict with the Kurds in the early 2000s, his concept of reconciliation with the Kurds was based on the fact that both Turks and Kurds are different peoples, but they are all Muslims. And the Islamic factor can unite them, but as you know, it didn’t work in the Kurdish issue, because Kurdish nationalism is also mostly secular, and in this sense, it contradicts Erdogan’s policy.

But the Arab Spring opened a window of opportunity for Erdogan. Turkey has radically changed its position in the Middle East, actively supporting Islamist governments, primarily in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and intervening directly in the war in Syria.

The Turks got involved in a war that was contrary to their strategic culture because at one time they had a clear and distinct view that Turkey should not fight wars near its borders. Turkey is now firmly entrenched in Syria and does not know what to do with it. With a large number of refugees, with the occupied territories of northern Syria, with a complicated negotiation process that also involves Russia.

Saudi Arabia is determined by the policy of Mohammed bin Salman and the attraction to the Americans, which does not allow them to take any drastic steps. Saudi Arabia realizes that their security largely depends on continued active cooperation with the Americans. The war in Yemen showed the weaknesses of the Saudi army and its inability to secure any strategic goals even though it was well equipped.

Regarding the current conflict in Gaza, Riyadh wants to be a beneficiary as well, because it at least expects the prize that Saudi Arabia will be the country that will create a Palestinian state. And this is important to them.

The United Arab Emirates is a country that has great ambitions, it competes with the Saudis for influence, and it has great resources that it distributes and invests in various political projects in the Middle East. For example, their interests in Sudan, their interests in Egypt, their interests in Libya, where they support Haftar.

There is also Egypt, the largest country in the Arab East, which continues to see itself as the key country, the centre, so to speak, around which all Middle East politics should revolve. However Egypt has serious internal problems, and economically, the country is not playing the role that they have envisioned for themselves.

And they are in a rather difficult situation regarding the war in Gaza, because on the one hand, cooperation with the United States and Israel is very important, and on the other hand, there is a lot of pressure from the street, and they cannot ignore it. The key issue is security in the Sinai Peninsula and, accordingly, what to do with the Gaza Strip and refugees, but this is a political, political and security issue, and an economic one as well.

And let’s talk about Ukraine’s policy in the region. How would you describe it and who are Ukraine’s key partners?

Objectively speaking, the trade turnover between different countries for 2021, that is, before the start of a full-scale war, looks like this. With Saudi Arabia, the trade turnover is positive for Ukraine’s benefit, approximately $880 million. The United Arab Emirates, about $0.6 billion, with Egypt, $1.6 billion, all in favour of Ukraine. As for Qatar, we are talking $200 million, with the Turks $8.7 billion, and with Israel around $0.9 billion. Based on the economy, Turkey is a key partner for Ukraine.

But if we look at the total amount of money we receive from the Middle East, it becomes clear that we need relations with all of these countries. This is a market, investment, and we can recall that we developed the “Vilkha” missile system and many other things thanks to the Arab money. That is why cooperation with Arab countries is also very important for the Ukrainian defence industry.

But there is also the issue of port modernisation, where Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are interested in Ukrainian ports and are ready to invest in them. We should not forget about the issue of agriculture. In other words, we need the Middle East from an economic point of view, but also from the point of view of their voices on international platforms such as the UN.

But Ukraine has a lot to do in this area, for example, building a Ukrainian narrative in the Middle East in Arabic language. This is a long-term information presence, a political presence that should be developed.

Countries in the Middle East also look at how Ukraine votes at the UN and how it behaves on international platforms. And Ukraine should proceed primarily from its national interests. And to explain to our partners why we vote one way or another. By the way, it is worth noting that Ukraine did exactly that when it did not vote to end the war in Gaza. There was a separate explanation that Ukraine abstained because it did not include a condemnation of Hamas.

To summarize, the only right way for Ukraine in this context is to adhere to the principle of international law.

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