We had the pleasure to discuss the state of affairs in Northern Africa with Zineb Ribua, Research Fellow and Program Manager of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East. She specialises in China’s involvement in the Middle East, North African affairs, and Israeli-Arab relations. The conversation was held by Denys Kolesnyk, the French consultant and analyst.
How would you characterise the trends and developments shaping the state of affairs in North Africa?
Strategically North Africa is important because it has access to the Mediterranean. It’s also geographically located in a very important area as it links the Middle East, Africa and Europe. And it has access to the Atlantic, even though it concerns only Morocco and Mauritania.
And that’s why we see a lot of competition in that area. There is a geographical side, but there’s also the energy side of such competition. For instance, Algeria, but also historically Libya and Egypt, are important countries on which Europeans like Italians and French rely for their gas supplies.
In terms of the Great Power Competition, today, Russia is one of the key world players trying to assert its influence there. And as for France, I think there’s a debate about where and how its influence is being reshaped, but I see it as declining in terms of serious military influence. The United States, of course, is a serious player, but not as strong as one may estimate. Italy is also getting more and more involved in regional affairs, especially in the Horn of Africa.
Turkey also competes for its share of influence and here play geographical reasons and historical ties it had with the region established through the Ottoman Empire. Finally, we also observe China which also plays an important role in being a giant investor not only in North Africa but in Africa in general.
It is really interesting in the sense that North Africa is attracting several powers and we see a competition going on. But at the same time, if I may, there is this many decades-long conflict between Algeria and Morocco about the Western Sahara. What is the role of this conflict for Northern Africa?
I would say it is a remnant of the Spanish colonisation of Morocco’s territory. At the time, the Moroccans were split between Spain and France, and so it was very difficult for them to get back all of their territories at once. When it came to the Western Sahara, it remained a very difficult issue, an issue that should have been dealt with by the 1975 Madrid Accords. But as soon as Morocco tried to get back its sovereignty on the Western Sahara, Algeria came to support the Polisario Front which declared itself as an independent militant movement and claimed the Western Sahara as part of its territory.
In short, this is the reason for the drastic degradation of Morocco-Algerian relations. For Rabat, it’s a very important issue because it’s about territorial integrity and security, especially since the Polisario Front carried out several terrorist attacks targeting Moroccan civilians.
Currently, in Africa it’s Algeria and South Africa who support the Polisario Front. They both support it as a legitimate actor. The issue took a drastic turn when Morocco normalised relations with Israel under the Trump administration, and when the US recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara.
And so this is where it got complicated for Algeria because it meant that it lost a cause as sacred as the Palestine one. So why is it so important for Algeria? Well, first of all, ideologically they oppose Morocco because it is a monarchy, a semi-constitutional monarchy to be precise. They do believe that Morocco’s very Western approach is not the right one. The Algerians are also geographically pretty much restrained, having only little access to the Mediterranean Sea, and since the Polisario Front can gain access to the Atlantic Ocean, it would be an important gain for Algiers.
So they have a lot to lose by not pressuring Morocco and by not having the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, as a neighbour. That’s also one of the reasons why Algeria maintains close ties with South Africa, Cuba, and some others who support it. But even though Russia does not support it explicitly or at least remain plain neutral about this issue, I would say the Russians are very smart because they know that this is a very hot button issue for both Morocco and Algeria.
Because of how powerful Russia is in the Sahel and is a partner to Algeria, Morocco is alienated and has to talk to Russia.
You’ve mentioned Russia and its arrival in the Sahel. Given that Mali was the first “success” of Russia in the region and the recent developments in Mali have negatively influenced the relations between Bamako and Algeria. I wonder, how does the stability in the Sahel affect the security in Maghreb?
I would say that Mali is going through a lot of issues at the same time. In the sense that there is, first of all, an ethnic conflict going on, especially with the Tuareg people who do not want to integrate with the people of the South of the country. I do think that there is a real conflict of governance when it comes to securing a unified government. So that’s the first part of it.
The second part is that they are also dealing with terrorism. Al-Qaeda has a strong presence in the Islamic Maghreb, and Mali is becoming a hub for Al-Qaeda. And this is why, after the coup d’état in Mali, Algeria was very nervous. Mali’s junta recalled and withdrew their ambassador from Algeria in December 2023. It happened mainly because Algeria was losing influence in Mali. And it became a threat to its national security, to its borders, since they had to deal with Al-Qaeda.
And there’s also a group in the North of Mali called Azawad. They want to have their independence, they want to form a country that I think would be perceived as a direct threat to Algeria as well. The separatists are very hostile to Algerian influence.
When Russia got into the Sahel, and also in Africa in general, they saw that there was a weakness that francophone countries had. They are dealing with a lot of issues, and feel a colonial resentment towards France.
I do think that this is a game here for the Mali rebels to turn against Algeria. For them is to serve Russian interests, which will give them security guarantees, but also to drive France out of there. So I think this is the end goal.
And this is where the United States can play a role in the sense that it’s not because these separatists or military juntas have harmful ties or have really bad ties to France, it means that they’re not open to negotiations or to dealing with the United States.
Even Antony Blinken said that there was perhaps an opportunity to not alienate these military juntas, to make sure that, for example, there can be deals in the sense that Russia is using them against France, but there’s an opportunity for the United States. This is basically what I wrote in an article published for the Washington Examiner titled “French decline in Africa paves the way for the US”, maintaining that it is important to dissociate between French-Africa and United States-Africa policy.
It is true that the anti-West sentiment is pretty strong in the Sahel, however, all of these countries do not have the same level of hostility towards France and the United States. And this is where I do think it’s really in the interest of the United States to continue cultivating a good relationship with these rebels, even if they are problematic in many ways.
First of all, the Sahel is important, given the migration routes that the Russians might control. Everyone remembers what Putin did in Syria with all the migrants by blowing up full cities and channeling them to Europe. It’s very important for Europeans, but also for Americans to pay attention to that while the war in Ukraine is happening.
The Sahel is a terrorist hub for Al-Qaeda, but not just them, different Iranian proxies sometimes get training there as well.
So, this is why the United States needs to have a coherent strategy when it comes to Africa, to see it as part of a bigger, I would say, challenge or a bigger competition with what I would call the “resistance axis”, which is Russia, China and Iran.
The conflict in Libya is almost forgotten by the main world media. But what’s happening right now there and what are the implications of this war on regional affairs?
Well, I would say that things are moving in a very dangerous direction. The Russians have been able to control the major oil fields. And so, a lot of the country’s resources are now in Russian hands.
It’s even more dangerous when you look at the Libyan interior situation and their inability to have a government, the inability to gather the tribes of the south and the north, of the west too, so they can get to the table and unify the country. The issue is that the Russians are trying to have a kind of corridor between Libya, Sudan and the Central African Republic. I think that this is what they are aiming for. And so, they are using Libya as their port for that.
Here Russians also think of better access to the Mediterranean Sea, which will be a direct threat to the European Union and also to NATO. And that’s something important to keep in mind that they can and that maybe they are planning something in this regard.
Libya is going through a transition. Morocco is involved in a kind of peace process, but the problem is that it’s a country that will have to go through enormous political and economic reforms so that it can finally have a functioning state.
A lot of wars are going on and intensified after the explosion of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It was interesting to observe that Morocco was the only African country to send weapons to Ukraine, while Algeria remained heavily aligned with Russia. How could you explain the difference in approach toward this conflict that exists in Rabat and Algiers?
First of all, I don’t think it’s been official that Morocco sent these weapons. I think those tanks belonged to Morocco and then were used by Poland or some other country in that region and then sent to Ukraine. Morocco did not initiate that.
However, Morocco, as you said, doesn’t have the same ties as Algeria has with Russia for a simple reason. And let’s not forget that Morocco is a major non-NATO ally, and this status highlights its strategic importance for NATO. Rabat also has historical ties and historical relationships with the United States.
So for Morocco, the West has always been kind of a friend. But for Algeria, it’s a very different story due to, for instance, governance reasons. The Algerians were ruled by a military junta and had close ties with the Soviets for a long time. Moreover, Morocco and Algeria were on different sides during the Cold War. And so I would say that somehow it stayed that way.
And that for Algeria to see that Russia is winning or to see that Russia is succeeding in basically destroying a Western-oriented country means that it can embolden Algeria’s ambitions when it comes to intimidating Morocco or trying to do certain provocations to revive the Western Sahara conflict.
So I think this is where it extends to where they have a different approach. And I think that Russia is very well aware of that. They know the tension, but they have to play both sides to benefit from Morocco’s strategic position and Morocco’s influence in Africa. At the same time, they also think that Algeria is always going to be an ally because of the gas projects they have. Also, Algeria is one of the major clients of Russia in terms of military equipment.
Interesting to note that Morocco played a huge role when it came to fertilisers, as Ukraine was struggling just to make sure that other African countries did not starve or did not have to undergo a certain tragedy when it came to food, for example.
You’ve said that Russia’s trying to destroy Ukraine, a Western-oriented country. And that it may embolden Algeria to have a more aggressive or more assertive stance in the region. Could you elaborate a bit on it? Does it only concern the Sahara or does it also the Sahel region, the influence in Tunisia?
When Algeria sees that Russia, which is one of its major security guarantors, is trying to annex a whole country and is trying to invade it in a very brutal and aggressive way, for Algiers it is a signal that if the West continues to lose, as it happened with Crimea, it means that maybe this is Algeria’s moment to expand its influence.
When it comes to Morocco, Algeria’s Foreign ministry adopted a pretty aggressive stance towards this North African state. They even went so far as to call Morocco a “Zionist entity that needs to be dealt with”.
And so there are the provocations that serve as propaganda for their population to put them against the Moroccans and also against Morocco as a state because maybe they also feel or think that this is the exact moment where more provocations can help them to advance their agenda, especially when it comes to denying Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara.
And here adds the Israel-Hamas dimension. Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th and, a day or two later, I saw that some of the supporters of the Polisario or even Polisario soldiers and combatants started tweeting on X (formerly known as Twitter), about them using certain tactics against Morocco.
So it’s important to keep in mind that these conflicts, namely the Russo-Ukrainian war and the Hamas-Israel war, even if they are very far from North Africa, influence a lot how Algeria and its proxy Polisario front operate and may operate in the future.
Indeed. The Russian-Ukrainian war indirectly influences a lot of, let’s say lesser conflicts and gives more readiness to act for the anti-Western regimes and their proxies. We also observe Iran taking a more assertive stance and carrying out aggressive actions. All of this seems to be different pieces of one big puzzle, doesn’t it?
Yes. And I would say there is the West and there are Western-oriented countries. And then there is the, let’s call it, a “resistance axis”, that is China, Russia, Iran. And each of them operates on its way, through proxies, through mercenaries, or China, also through spies and industrial espionage. But the goal is the same — to weaken Western influence globally.
And this is where, even if it’s happening in the Sahel, even if it’s happening in Europe, no matter how far away their actions are, they coordinate towards the same goal, which is to prepare for the next, I would say, world order where the US is no longer a leader.
The Western influence is declining more or less everywhere, and so is the French influence that is fading away in Northern Africa. So, first of all, how would you characterise the French relations with the Maghreb countries? And what is the modus operandi of the Chinese, the Russians and the Turks in advancing their agenda in the Maghreb?
The Franco-Algerian and Franco-Tunisian relations are pretty much mediocre. Not as good as they used to be, even though the French are trying to normalise relations with Algeria and Tunisia, however, it is not reciprocated from what I’ve seen.
Interesting to note that India and Algeria have been more and more explicitly aggressive towards France, at least in their rhetoric. And the fact that Algeria relies on many different issues on Russia doesn’t help Franco-Algerian relations, for obvious reasons. And so for the French, it’s a big problem, since they are going to be trapped at some point if Ukraine doesn’t win and Russia’s influence increases.
When it comes to Morocco, I would say that the relationship between Morocco and France has been really bad. I don’t think it has ever reached such a low level. I’d characterise them as disastrous, mainly because France does not explicitly recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara. And by not doing that, Algeria puts more pressure on Morocco and perceives It as a “green light” to do what it wants to do.
And given the French position, Morocco is now more open to new investors. They have an important diversification strategy that only confirms the decline in Franco-Moroccan relations. The Moroccans are appealing to British, Indian and other foreign investors. Also, they are much more open to Chinese investment. And this is a direct consequence of France’s influence fading away.
However, I think this is a short-term issue, France and Morocco will at some point collaborate and improve ties for the simple reason that they both share similar values and they have similar strategic interests in the Mediterranean. But France, for political reasons, simply cannot make a move and explicitly recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara boldly. We should remember that France relies on Algerian gas.
As for Turkey, Ankara is trying to be more involved in the region. And they also are interested in Africa, since they need to diversify their economic ties. Erdogan wants his country to be more competitive, to conquer new markets to remedy the Turkish economic situation.
The Turks have good ties with Egypt. And just recently Erdogan paid a visit to his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The Turks also have an important national security interest in Libya and they maintain good relationships with all the North African countries.
As for the Chinese, I think they are especially mercantilist when it comes to Africa. They don’t have the same approach as Russia, but their approach is about positioning themselves as an alternative to Western investment. The problem with Western investment is that the countries have to follow certain regulations, while Chinese investment is a completely different story and Beijing has a different way of operating.
For instance, China doesn’t care much about this or that country sticks to human rights regulations. The Chinese are expanding their influence, but I don’t think that the West came up with a good strategy to counter them. And that’s why I think they’re going to only keep on expanding and growing.
But mostly economically, you mean?
Well, economically but also politically. And let’s not forget that the Chinese have a military base in Djibouti. They’re not saying that they are going to intervene in Yemen and shut down the Houthis, but the Houthis are saying they’re not going to target Chinese and Russian vessels.
Hence there’s a military side to that I didn’t point out earlier, but it’s also an important one because China is building a parallel system that does not obey Western rules. And that makes the West more vulnerable because they have this alliance with the resistance axis, as I mentioned earlier.
In fact, as the Houthis are attacking Western ships, China is sending a fleet that includes a guided-missile destroyer. It is a clear indicator that China is interested in playing a larger military role and that it is not a coincidence that it has been these last few years building up its shipyards.
The Chinese influence is growing and they use economic tools to reach their political and security goals.
Zineb Riboua is a research fellow and program manager of Hudson Institute’s Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East. She specialises in China’s involvement in the Middle East, North African affairs, and Israeli-Arab relations. Prior to joining Hudson Institute, Ms. Riboua was a research assistant at the Center for Jewish Civilisation of Georgetown University, where she worked on Jewish identity in Morocco, Moroccan-Israeli relations, and the cultural impacts of the Abraham Accords. She has held research positions at Morocco’s Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Economy and Finance, and Bank Al-Maghrib. Ms. Riboua’s pieces and commentary has been published in the Washington Examiner, Foreign Policy, The Wall Street Journal, Tablet Magazine, and other outlets. Ms. Riboua is also an associate at the Association for Global Political Thought at Harvard University.
All publishing rights and copyrights reserved to MENA Research Center.
