Executive Summary:
This paper sheds light on the rapid developments in the Iranian-Syrian relationship and the influence of Russia, Western powers, and Arab countries on the Syrian regime’s orientation towards Iran. It also highlights the significance of Syria for Tehran and the potential for a strategic rift between the two countries. Additionally, it discusses the cooling and tensions in the relationship between the Syrian and Iranian regimes in light of recent regional events, Iranian threats to launch a war against Israel or carry out retaliatory strikes following the assassination of Hassan Haniyeh within Iranian territory, and attempts by Arab and European countries to engage with the Damascus regime.
Introduction:
From time to time, discussions resurface about a cooling or tension in the relationship between the Syrian and Iranian regimes, raising questions about the nature of the Iranian-Syrian relationship and its ability to withstand Western and Arab pressures aimed at distancing Damascus from Tehran. Several indicators and cautious statements suggest changes in relations between the two parties. Despite Assad being Iran’s “most prominent ally” in the region, he was among the last to offer condolences following the death of the Iranian president. During this occasion, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made statements reaffirming Syria’s continued presence in the resistance front, seemingly in an attempt to dispel rumors of a rift between the two sides. This comes as reports emerge of communications between Damascus and the U.S. administration alongside visible improvement in Saudi-Syrian relations.
On the military front, and regarding Syria’s role within the resistance axis led by Iran, it was noteworthy that Syria’s role in the Gaza War, which escalated into direct attacks between Iran and Israel for the first time, was minimal. While Iran used nearly all of its proxies to retaliate against Israel, especially in Yemen and Lebanon, the Syrian front remained relatively stable, with no significant participation from Syrian regime forces or Syrian militias in the conflict.
Indicators of Changing Relations Between Iran and Syria
Many political analysts suggest that Iran is increasingly relying on the Syrian Prime Minister, a position that previously held little significance in foreign or even domestic policy but has now been granted considerable new powers. In the aftermath of the Iranian president’s death, Syrian Prime Minister Hussein Arnous traveled to Tehran as one of the first mourners, while President Bashar al-Assad did not offer his condolences until about two weeks later. The Prime Minister has also become increasingly prominent in meetings with Iranian officials in Syria.
When Assad visited Iran, the statements and directives from Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, carried implicit messages emphasizing the importance of keeping Syria within the resistance axis. At the same time, these statements reassured Arab countries and the West that any shift by the Syrian regime towards them would occur only under conditions that align with Iran’s interests. Khamenei’s remarks provided a clear picture of the current and future relationship between the “allies.”
Unlike the Iranian leader’s official website, Syrian state media did not accurately publish the contents of the meeting between Assad and Khamenei. However, a series of significant posts were later shared on Khamenei’s official social media accounts, particularly on “X” (formerly Twitter). In one post, Khamenei accused the West and its regional allies of “seeking to overthrow Syria’s political system and remove it from regional dynamics by igniting war,” adding that they “failed in the past.” He also stated, “Now, they aim to remove Syria from regional dynamics using other methods, including promises they will never fulfill.” While Khamenei did not specify what the “regional role” or “promises” entailed, he emphasized in later posts the “resistance identity that Syria embodies” and that it “must be preserved.”
These remarks coincided with an improvement in Saudi and broader Arab relations with Syria, as well as preparations to reopen the Saudi embassy in Damascus, alongside reports of alleged contacts between Damascus and Washington. Therefore, Khamenei’s comments seemed directly aimed at Assad, especially following his earlier statements about engaging with the United States, which he described as yielding “no tangible results.”
Iranian Guardianship Over Damascus
As mentioned earlier, Khamenei’s remarks were intended to remind Assad that “Iran has had a similar experience negotiating with the Americans, who quickly reneged on agreements,” referencing the nuclear deal from which former U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew. This reflects a form of guardianship between two countries of the stature of Iran and Syria.
Khamenei’s insistence on Syria’s “resistance identity,” as he described it, essentially means remaining within the Iranian sphere as a subordinate to its policies, reinforcing Iran’s control over Syria. Khamenei’s comments were a reminder to Assad that Syria’s historical alignment has been within what is called the resistance axis, leaving Assad with few alternatives given his internal and military crises after a war that severely weakened his army.
During the meeting with Khamenei, Assad reportedly told the Iranian leader, according to Khamenei’s official website: “The Iranian-Syrian relationship is strategic and progresses under your guidance and leadership.” However, Syrian state media did not mention this statement, indicating that Iran seeks to emphasize Syria’s direct subordination to Khamenei. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime appears to hold a different view or reservations about this point.
Assad’s Attempts to Break Free from Iranian Guardianship
The Syrian regime has made clear attempts to distance itself from Iranian guardianship. One notable example is the decision by the National Security Office to impose restrictions on foreign visitors entering the Umayyad Mosque, specifically targeting Shia visitors. According to the local outlet “Sout Al-Asima,” which cited sources familiar with the directive, the new security measures require religious tourism delegations to obtain special permits before entering the mosque.
The measures also strictly prohibit delegations from engaging in religious rituals and practices that may disrupt the sanctity of the mosque. The outlet reported that the Umayyad Mosque administration has been instructed not to allow any “foreign citizen,” even those visiting for personal tourism, to enter without prior security approval.
The directive includes diplomats and Shia clergy, who must obtain approvals through their respective diplomatic missions before visiting the mosque. The restrictions also apply to foreign journalists, photographers, and tourists from various countries. Analysts believe the timing of this directive could be a message with an Arab dimension, as it coincided with the Arab League meeting in Manama, attended by Assad in May 2024.
Deteriorating Relations with Iran and Improvement with the U.S.
Following an Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Damascus that resulted in the deaths of several Iranian politicians and diplomats, analyses emerged suggesting a significant erosion of trust between Tehran and Damascus. Some speculate that the Syrian regime may have leaked information about the movements of Iranian militia leaders during their meetings in Syria. Additionally, the assassination of Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander in Syria and Lebanon, outside the Iranian consulate in Damascus points to a serious intelligence breach and raises suspicions of insider involvement.
Since the fall of 2020, Assad has gradually revealed discussions with Washington on limited topics. During Donald Trump’s presidency, the White House proposed establishing a direct communication channel with Damascus to address mutual concerns, including the disappearance of several American citizens, the release of Americans held in Syrian prisons, the use of chemical weapons, and easing sanctions on Syria. The visit of Kash Patel, the then-White House National Security Council Chief of Staff, to Damascus four years ago signaled a significant shift, marking the first visit by a senior American official since the start of the Syrian conflict.
In the spring of 2022, then-U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price stated that the U.S. would consider normalizing relations with Assad if there was tangible progress toward a political resolution in Syria. His comments reflected a change in Washington’s stance. While the U.S. had previously asserted that Assad’s days were numbered, the current environment appears more conducive to a potential normalization of relations.
More recently, there has been a noticeable shift in the tone of major European countries toward the Syrian regime. Although not explicitly stated, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced in May 2024 the possibility of repatriating asylum seekers who commit crimes to their home countries, specifically naming Afghanistan and Syria. This statement came in response to the murder of a German police officer by an Afghan youth, who was targeting a far-right politician. Scholz’s remarks imply that Germany may engage in discussions with the Syrian government, a prospect that both Germany and the European Union had rejected for years.
Why Didn’t Assad Participate in the Gaza War?
It has become clear that Damascus is avoiding involvement in the Gaza conflict, especially after a warning from Tel Aviv. According to an Israeli report, Assad is trying to balance his relationships with Russia and Iran. Since the start of the Gaza war, the Syrian regime has been careful not to get dragged into the conflict, despite the near-ignition of the region following the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. The report emphasized that Assad received a clear warning from Israel: if Syria is used against them, Israel will destroy his regime.
Andrew Tabler, an analyst at the Washington Institute, noted that both Russia and the UAE, which resumed diplomatic relations with Damascus in 2018, urged Assad to stay out of the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel since October 7. Since then, Israel has reportedly intensified strikes on Iranian targets in Syria, killing high-ranking members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
While Iran’s allies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen opened fronts against Israel in support of Hamas, the Golan Heights front has remained relatively quiet. Between 20 and 30 rocket attacks from Syria towards the Golan have been recorded since the start of the war, causing minimal damage. Additionally, Iran has recently reduced its military presence in southern Syria, particularly in areas adjacent to the Golan, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and a source close to Hezbollah.
On June 4, 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the establishment of an additional monitoring center in the Syrian Golan to observe ceasefire agreements, de-escalation efforts, and potential provocations between Israeli forces and the Syrian army. President Bashar al-Assad is attempting to strike a delicate balance between his two main backers: Iran, Israel’s staunch enemy, which has been supporting Hamas, and Russia, which is pushing for regional stability, according to Israeli sources.
The Role of Interests in the Syrian-Iranian Relationship
The current state of Syrian-Iranian relations is shrouded in ambiguity, but it’s certain that Iran won’t easily abandon the Syrian regime after the extensive efforts it made to support it during the war that began in 2011. Without Iran’s early support, which preceded Russia’s involvement, the Syrian regime might not have remained intact after the conflict. However, today, the Syrian regime faces new options that were previously unavailable, such as opening up to the Arab world, communicating with some Western countries, and even discreetly aligning with Israeli interests. These developments could potentially enhance Syria’s position vis-à-vis Iran. Even if the strong ties between the two continue, they may no longer be entirely subordinated to Iran’s Supreme Leader, as Syria now has alternatives beyond relying solely on Iran and Russia.
While President Bashar al-Assad remains distant from the issues in Palestine or the broader confrontation between Iran and Israel, diplomatic sources suggest that Assad hopes to secure rewards from Arab and Western nations for his restraint, a stance encouraged by Russia. After facing international isolation since the conflict began in 2011, Assad has been attempting to reintegrate his regime, especially following the gradual restoration of relations with Gulf countries starting in 2018 and regaining Syria’s seat in the Arab League. He hopes to secure Gulf funding to aid the reconstruction of a war-ravaged country with a devastated economy.
From Iran’s perspective, lifting Western sanctions on Syria is crucial, as Syria is a key strategic link connecting Iran with Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine. However, Iran is keen to ensure that this doesn’t lead to Damascus drifting away from the “Axis of Resistance” at any cost. Iran’s red lines in this process are reportedly focused on limiting Iranian influence in southern Syria, curbing the production and smuggling of Captagon pills, and reducing Tehran’s control in eastern Syria. At the same time, Iran fears that normalization could lead Syria to change its alliances or shift its strategic positioning.
For the Syrian regime, its alliance with Iran remains the most stable and enduring. Iran has consistently stood by Assad even during the darkest times. Therefore, distancing from Iran is not likely a priority for Assad, who recognizes the strategic importance of his country for Tehran. Syria’s role in maintaining the land corridor from Tehran to Beirut and providing access to the Mediterranean coast remains vital for Iran, as noted in several Western reports.
Assad is also aware that while Western and Arab initiatives are significant, they come with hefty costs, often requiring concessions on sovereignty. Historically, the deep-rooted relationship with Iran holds great importance for Assad, as Tehran does not impose unwanted political changes or transformations. This makes it difficult for Assad to sever ties with Iran, especially since the alliance is strategic, rooted in shared history, mutual threats, and common interests—none of which have changed.
Moreover, Iran’s influence in Syria is multifaceted and extends beyond formal relations. Tehran exercises control among tribes in eastern Syria, has a presence in Aleppo through service provision, and exerts influence in the Syrian coastal region. As noted by Jordanian researcher Amer al-Sabaileh, it’s not easy for Assad to break away from Iran. Hence, he is compelled to reassure Tehran while simultaneously engaging with the Arab world. Al-Sabaileh adds that Assad knows that Iran cannot end Syria’s isolation and that it remains a challenge in itself, forcing him to find a balanced diplomatic approach for now.
Within Iran, an increasing number of politicians are calling for scaling back the extensive support given to Syria. Some suspect that if Israel continues to strike Iranian targets accurately, Syrian intelligence may be partly to blame, though there’s no consensus in Tehran on Assad’s involvement.
Iran is also frustrated by being excluded from Syria’s reconstruction plans and the current commercial opportunities. Former parliamentary national security committee head Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh stated that Syria has done nothing to repay the $30 billion owed to Iran, while it has steadily settled its debts with Russia. Falahatpisheh noted that Syria’s debt to Iran is equivalent to the entire annual budget of the Islamic Republic.
To illustrate the saying that nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests, Falahatpisheh pointed out that Turkey, which supported Assad’s opponents, still had more than $2 billion in trade with Syria in 2023—20 times more than the exchanges between Iran and its supposed ally.
Decline in Syrian-Iranian Economic Cooperation
Despite the numerous agreements signed between Iran and the Syrian regime, a significant portion of them have not been implemented on the ground, unlike those agreements with Moscow, which have taken much more effective paths. According to Iranian media, Abdul Amir Rabihaoui, Director General of the West Asia Trade Development Organization, stated that last year Iran exported goods worth $244 million to Syria, adding that this figure does not reflect the level of economic cooperation expected between the two countries.
Iran is concerned about competition from other parties in Syria’s future economy and investments. One Iranian official remarked, “If we don’t move into this country now, when we don’t have strong competitors in Syria, it will be difficult to develop economic relations between the two countries in the future.”
Several factors collectively contribute to the low trade volume between Iran and Syria, according to researchers. These include the parallel informal pathways for major commercial dealings in Syria, unofficial taxes, and the general challenges of the Syrian market.
Iran is active in various economic sectors in Syria and has recently focused on entering Syrian markets. The Syrian researcher at the “Omran Center for Strategic Studies,” Mohammad Al-Abdullah, believes that one primary reason for weak trade exchanges between Iran and Syria lies with Syrian merchants themselves. He explains, “The majority within Syrian chambers of commerce are unwilling to engage with the Iranian side due to concerns that Iran floods the markets with low-quality products.” Al-Abdullah notes that the relationship between Syrian and Iranian traders is based on a “win-lose” dynamic rather than a mutually beneficial “win-win” approach.
He adds, “Iran seeks to dominate the commercial market in Syria without offering any real benefits to Syrian traders when viewed from a reciprocal gains perspective.” After its prolonged presence in Syria and the costs it has borne, Iran is now attempting to recover part of these expenses, whether from the regime’s treasury or through investment opportunities in the country. However, it is aware, according to the economic researcher, that “the regime is incapable of covering these high costs.” Therefore, Iran is trying to “control the housing sector and other areas that could secure economic returns to offset some of the costs it has incurred,” he said.
Given all the above, one may ask: Where is the Syrian-Iranian relationship heading?
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