Syria’s interim president, Ahmad al-Scharaa, is pushing ahead with the country’s political transition with determination – but his approach is fueling growing skepticism in the West, among liberal Syrians, and within ethnic and religious minority communities. Ever since the former jihadist leader took power at the helm of an alliance of Islamist militias, doubts about Syria’s future political direction have been mounting.
The most pressing questions revolve around whether the country will evolve into a conservative Islamic system under his leadership, where civil liberties and democratic principles could be curtailed. Critics fear that fundamental human rights, particularly gender equality and the rights of religious minorities, may be at risk. The political and social status of Christians, Kurds, and Alawites is also a cause for concern: will they become second-class citizens in the new Syria?
The Alawites, the religious group from which the ousted president Bashar al-Assad hails, face an uncertain future. For decades, they held key positions in government and the military, making them potential targets for retribution. Although Scharaa has repeatedly stated that all citizens would be treated equally in post-Assad Syria, many of these fears persist.
A major reason for the ongoing uncertainty is Scharaa’s evasive stance on crucial issues regarding the country’s future political order. He has particularly avoided taking a clear position on secularism. While liberal forces and minorities see a secular state as essential for a stable and inclusive Syria, Islamist factions within his alliance advocate for a stronger adherence to Sharia law. Scharaa’s ambiguity on these critical points reinforces concerns that his government may ultimately entrench the influence of radical forces and lead Syria toward an authoritarian Islamist system.
Despite international appeals for a transparent and inclusive approach, Scharaa’s strategy remains vague. The global community is watching the country’s transformation with growing concern, while voices within Syria are increasingly calling for a clear commitment to human rights, pluralism, and democratic structures. How the new order will ultimately take shape remains uncertain – but the signals so far have left many wary.
The same applies to the constitutional declaration that Scharaa has now signed. It outlines the framework for how Syria will be governed over the next five years—the transitional period leading up to the adoption of a permanent constitution and national elections. Scharaa himself has declared that the document marks the beginning of a new chapter in Syrian history. However, the declaration has done little to dispel the doubts of skeptics. It, too, leaves room for interpretation.
On one hand, it asserts that freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and women’s rights will be guaranteed, and that the “personal affairs” of religious minorities will be protected. The state guarantees freedom of religion, albeit with the restriction that it only applies to Abrahamic faiths—at least in theory, this excludes certain minority groups, such as the Yazidis. Furthermore, the declaration states that “public order” must not be disrupted, a clause that leaves the door open for state control and restrictions. Similarly, an article that states the “dignity of women” and their role in family and society should be protected could serve as a pretext for limiting women’s rights. The role of Islam has also been subtly strengthened. As in the previous constitution, the president must be Muslim. However, in the new draft, Islamic law is explicitly defined as “the main source of legislation,” rather than simply “a primary source” as before.
Western diplomats and liberal Syrians also point to the extraordinarily strong role assigned to the president during the transitional period. Some have even referred to it as “a kind of presidential monarchy.” While the separation of powers is formally enshrined, the legislative body, the People’s Assembly, will not be elected. Instead, one-third of its members will be appointed by the president, while the rest will be chosen by a commission overseen by a committee—whose members, in turn, will also be appointed by the head of state.
Even though the judiciary is supposed to be independent, according to the declaration, the president will appoint the judges. “Scharaa could use this mechanism to install loyalists across the leadership, creating a web of personal dependencies,” one diplomat remarked. Syrian critics already fear that the leader is building a deep state, entrenching networks that would secure his long-term grip on power. Another source of concern is the constitutional right to declare a state of emergency. While the process is regulated—it is limited to three months and can only be extended once with the approval of the People’s Assembly—the recent history of the Arab world is rich with precedents where emergency powers have become a permanent tool for maintaining authoritarian rule.
This has sparked unrest among Scharaa’s critics in Syria. Open opposition has come from the Kurds in northeastern Syria. “We categorically reject any attempt to restore a dictatorship under the guise of a transitional period,” declared the Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the Kurdish-dominated military force known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, which controls the northeast of the country. The council has rejected the draft outright, demanding that it be rewritten.
The Kurds, who seek maximum autonomy, are likely displeased with the fact that the country’s official name remains the “Syrian Arab Republic”—and even more so with the provision that Arabic will be the sole official language. The Kurdish criticism is that the draft fails to reflect Syria’s diversity. It is expected that the Syrian interim president will at least formally address these demands for inclusivity when he presents a new government. For now, a small circle of close confidants governs the country. Scharaa desperately needs broader support to alleviate the economic suffering of the population, which could also undermine his authority.
However, the latest reports from Syria have only heightened Western skepticism—particularly the news of the massacre of hundreds of Alawite civilians by militias operating under the banner of the Damascus leadership. Such events have raised serious concerns about the direction of the transition and cast further doubt on the true nature of Scharaa’s rule.
