Various orders from the Turkish President have now become a typical feature of his hardline policies. Almost daily, Erdogan’s administration issues decrees in which the president makes use of the extensive powers granted to him by the constitution since the switch to the presidential system in 2018. These decrees can range from significant personnel decisions to detailed matters like the use of the Turkish designation of the country’s name, Türkiye, in foreign languages. For the president’s opponents, rule by decree has become a symbol of what they call Erdogan’s autocratic rule.
However, the Constitutional Court has now declared parts of this practice unconstitutional. Specifically, this concerns the president’s right to dismiss the governor of the Central Bank and appoint university rectors. The judges thus ruled in favor of a lawsuit filed by the largest opposition party, CHP, in 2018.
Erdogan has replaced the head of the Central Bank five times in the past five years, usually due to differences in interest rate policy. The Turkish president is a staunch advocate of low interest rates and considers them, contrary to all economic doctrines, the most effective means of combating inflation. The result of this disastrous policy is the devaluation of the national currency, the lira, and uncontrolled price developments.
After his re-election a year ago, however, Erdogan appointed a new economic leadership under Finance Minister Mehmet Simsek, which has turned the tide. The key interest rate has since been raised from 8.5% to 50%. The government is also pursuing a conservative fiscal policy. Independent experts expect that the current inflation rate of 75% will soon peak. How long Erdogan will tolerate this course is the burning question among economists. The ruling, which limits his right to dismiss the central bank chief, sends a reassuring signal in this regard. This is important for attracting urgently needed investors to the country.
Higher education policy is also an extremely controversial topic in Turkey. Secular, government-critical circles have long criticized the growing influence of religion in the education system. The appointment of a conservative rector at the elite Bogazici University in Istanbul particularly triggered a storm of outrage. For three and a half years, professors have gathered daily in front of the rectorate for silent protests. It is likely one of the longest-lasting university protests of its kind.
This is not the first conflict between the constitutional judges and the president. In the power struggle between the country’s two highest courts, sparked by the question of an opposition politician’s immunity, Erdogan sided with the opponents of the Constitutional Court. The extent to which the ruling actually strengthens the separation of powers is disputed. Shortly after the court’s decision was published, the presidential communications department clarified that the ruling does not fundamentally strip the president of the relevant powers. Only procedural issues were criticized. In fact, the judges stated that presidential personnel decisions at the central bank or universities require a corresponding legal basis. The parliament now has twelve months to create this. Given the majority situation, this is not a problem for the government camp.
Another court ruling has made it clear that the legal persecution of political opponents remains current in Turkey. The newly elected mayor of Hakkari from the pro-Kurdish DEM party was sentenced to nearly 20 years in prison for membership in a terrorist organization. A government-appointed trustee took over his duties. This is reminiscent of the 2019 local elections, after which nearly all mayors of the pro-Kurdish opposition were deposed and arrested. Several prominent Kurdish politicians had already been sentenced to very long prison terms.
The local elections have shaken up the power dynamics within the ruling coalition. Parts of Erdogan’s AKP, which is no longer the strongest force in the country for the first time in over two decades, are calling for judicial reforms and a turn towards the secular opposition. Without their support, Erdogan’s goal of another constitutional reform is unattainable. At the same time, Erdogan’s coalition partner MHP is fighting to maintain its influence on government policy. The ultranationalist party is not willing to make any concessions to the Kurdish opposition and demands an uncompromising approach.
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