A statement from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry indicated that high-level officials from Iraq and Türkiye conducted talks in Baghdad to discuss security issues such as potential actions against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which is banned in Iraq. The statement mentioned that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein and top security officials. The Foreign Ministry’s statement added that Türkiye welcomed the decision of the Iraqi National Security Council to designate the Kurdistan Workers’ Party as a “prohibited organization in Iraq.” The statement also noted that both sides discussed preparations for a planned visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Baghdad, expected “after the month of Ramadan.” Meanwhile, a Turkish Defense Ministry official told reporters that Turkish and Iraqi officials discussed “developing a mutual understanding on the fight against terrorism.” The official also said that Turkish military officials had talks with their Iraqi counterparts this week to discuss “measures to enhance the security of civilians” in the area where Türkiye conducts operations.
This meeting was not the first of its kind. On August 22 and 24, 2023, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Iraq, including the federal capital, Baghdad, and the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Erbil. Concurrently, Turkish Minister of Energy Alp Arslan Bayraktar traveled to Erbil to join the Foreign Minister’s meeting with the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan region and held separate meetings with oil and energy officials in both the federal government and the regional government. Meanwhile, Turkish Minister of Commerce Omar Bulut went to Baghdad on August 28 and 29, 2023, accompanied by other officials and businessmen. This visit conveyed several messages and opened up contentious issues between the two countries, especially regarding energy and water matters.
Relations between the two neighboring countries have been strained in recent years as Ankara has intensified its cross-border operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters based in the mountainous regions of northern Iraq. Iraq said that the operations violate its sovereignty, but Ankara insists it must protect itself and has warned of new incursions. However, the relationship between the two countries is not new but has been ongoing for decades, given they are neighboring states with strong historical ties that date back many years.
These relations between the two countries began when Türkiye recognized Iraq in 1927, characterized by friendly and evolving relations during both the monarchical and republican eras, particularly during the monarchical era when the Iraqi-Turkish Alliance was formed in 1955, which later evolved into the Baghdad Pact. This development continued in the Republican era during the 1970s and 1980s, in all political, economic, and security dimensions. However, these relations experienced tension and disagreement after Iraq’s invasion 1990 in Kuwait. Türkiye adopted a hostile stance toward Iraq from 1991 until the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003 and the occupation of Iraq by a state that was an ally of Türkiye, the United States of America. The rise of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with its modern Islamic inclination to power, changed the course of events and the policies of the countries in the region, leading to a positive shift in Iraqi-Turkish relations that paved the way for the horizontal and vertical development of relations between the two countries.
Four key issues are evident in the current course of Iraqi-Turkish relations: the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) dossier and the necessity of joint action between the two countries to defeat it; the “Path of Development” project, which positions Iraq back on the global trade map; the water issue; and the oil export through the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline. Properly managing these issues provides a good opportunity to reframe Turkish-Iraqi relations on a win-win principle and sets their relations back on the right track. Türkiye continues to launch attacks in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and northern Iraq areas, claiming to target PKK sites. The Iraqi government complains that these attacks violate its sovereignty and are unilaterally conducted by Türkiye, while Ankara argues that the Iraqi government does not take sufficient measures to end the PKK fighters’ presence on its territory. The situation is complicated by differences in the positions of Iraqi Kurdish parties on this issue; while the Kurdistan Democratic Party, ruling in Erbil and Dohuk, tends to accommodate the Turkish government and pressure the PKK, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, dominant in Sulaymaniyah, has better relations with the PKK and is accused by Türkiye of providing a safe haven for its members. Some Iraqi parties, especially the Shiite factions within the “Popular Mobilization Forces,” have escalated verbal attacks against Türkiye due to its military incursions into Iraqi territory, with some attacking Turkish forces’ positions. However, the factions seemed to have leaned towards de-escalation in this case since the formation of the current Iraqi government, headed by Al-Sudani, considered close to the factions, in an attempt to spare Al-Sudani embarrassment and not show his government as lacking control.
The dispute over oil is a thorny issue between the two countries. Although Türkiye is the only neighboring country through which Iraqi oil has continued to flow to the global market, the mutual interest governing this aspect of their relationship has not prevented the escalation of disputes over the oil dossier, culminating in the cessation of oil exports through the Iraqi pipeline crossing Turkish territory. The dispute dates back when Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional Government signed a long-term agreement allowing the regional government to export its oil through the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline without reverting to Baghdad. The International Commercial Court’s decision on the illegality of exporting Kurdish oil from the Turkish port of Ceyhan and imposing Türkiye to pay Iraq $1.5 billion in compensation for breaching the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline agreement led to Türkiye’s direct response to close the pipeline and stop the export of Iraqi oil through Turkish territory. While the governments of Baghdad and Erbil entered negotiations aiming to reach a new arrangement allowing the resumption of the region’s oil exports under the Iraqi government’s supervision, the Turkish stance has not shown any rush in this matter, using the earthquake disaster that hit Türkiye as an excuse on the Turkish side to delay the resumption of oil export.
Water is considered a strategic resource for both Iraq and Türkiye. The Euphrates River is a main source of water in the region, and Iraq relies heavily on its flow for irrigating farmland and providing fresh water for human use. Iraq has been facing a severe drought crisis for years, leading to the desertion of large areas of agricultural land, and Türkiye itself faces a shortage of water resources in some areas. This makes the issue of water quotas for the two countries (along with Syria) in the rivers of Tigris and Euphrates more critical and impactful in the long term. The problem goes back to dams on the Euphrates built by Türkiye, which affect water distribution and usage in Iraq. These include the Ilisu Dam, Ataturk Dam, and Keban Dam, reducing the water flow to Iraq. Estimates suggest that Iraq’s share has decreased from about 73 billion cubic meters in 2003 to 50 billion cubic meters in 2020 due to the filling process of the Turkish dams, and it is likely to decline further in the coming years if Türkiye’s water exploitation plans continue as they are. Ankara blames Iraq’s misuse of its water resources, the lack of modern irrigation systems, and asserts that its water management responds to the needs of the local economy and international laws. This issue has become present in most meetings between the two parties, gradually taking a political turn that affects and is affected by other files.
As Erdogan’s visit to Iraq approaches, Ankara and Baghdad must work to resolve the outstanding issues between the two countries, given the Turkish government’s need during Erdogan’s new presidential term for a positive regional atmosphere, meaning “zero problems”, especially with the difficulties surrounding normalization with Damascus currently, making relations with Baghdad necessary to secure the extended borders with it, in addition to the economic and trade benefits these relations carry for both countries, which are evident through the Development Road.
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