The Italian website “Inside Over” warned that Libya is gradually becoming a new geopolitical hotspot between Russia and NATO, with the acceleration of events and increased military and diplomatic movements in the region. The website highlighted the airbridge established by Russia with Libya, noting that the Mediterranean Sea could become a new arena for power struggles. According to the report, the airbridge, which includes Il-76TD cargo planes, reflects a shift in Moscow’s strategy. Russia has begun withdrawing its forces from the Hmeimim base in Syria, focusing on the Al-Khaimah airbase in eastern Libya, an area of strategic importance due to its control by Khalifa Haftar’s forces, a close Kremlin ally. The selection of this region is seen as a response to the relative decline in Russia’s influence in Syria due to ongoing crises. Reports indicate that Russia is seeking to strengthen its influence in North Africa, aiming to control the Mediterranean, migration flows, and energy routes to Europe.
Russia’s movements in Libya pose a direct threat to NATO, especially with the potential establishment of a permanent Russian military base on the Libyan coast. Experts believe that this Russian presence could enhance Moscow’s capabilities in North Africa, raising concerns about European maritime and air security. Despite Turkey’s membership in NATO, its complex relationship with Moscow adds a new layer of complexity. By allowing Russian planes to use its airspace, Turkey plays an ambiguous role in Libya, supporting the Tripoli government while maintaining open channels with Russia. Amid geopolitical shifts, Libya shows signs of becoming a multi-polar conflict center. While Russia seeks to expand its influence, NATO faces challenges in offering a unified and effective response, increasing the risk of division within the alliance.
After the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Russia withdrew air defense systems from various parts of Syria and transferred them to Libya. A former officer from the regime of the late Syrian President Bashar al-Assad confirmed on Wednesday that some military equipment and tanks were moved to eastern Libya, controlled by General Khalifa Haftar. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights also confirmed the withdrawal of air defense systems. According to German news agency DPA, Western militaries have been closely monitoring whether Russia is expanding its presence in Libya.
A German Ministry of Defense analysis on December 11 suggested that Russia might also gain access to the port of Tobruk through Haftar, with potential for ammunition transfers. According to the Wall Street Journal, Russian cargo planes recently transported S-400 and S-300 air defense systems to eastern Libya.
Turkey has militarily entrenched itself in Libya, with new military agreements signed this year with the western Libyan government and discussions for further cooperation with Khalifa Haftar’s chief of staff. A memorandum of understanding signed between Ankara and Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh’s government in March 2024 concerns the status of Turkish forces in Libya. At the same time, Turkey also secured an agreement with the National Unity Government at the 2024 SAHA Expo to cooperate on security force training and potentially test Turkish missile defense systems in Libya. Reports suggest that Turkey might consider using Libya as a testing ground for Turkish ballistic missiles, though there is no official confirmation. Despite the difficulty, Turkey’s military presence in western Libya and eastern ambitions may lead it to consider such a move due to the ongoing military and security agreements.
Reports indicate that Libyan factions have been in political deadlock for years, preventing large-scale conflict, largely relying on an understanding between Russia and Turkey, both of which have military forces deployed in Libya. Experts predict that the fall of Assad will affect this fragile balance, particularly by disrupting Moscow’s ability to transport fighters and weapons to Libya. It is suggested that Assad’s regime has long provided direct or indirect support to Haftar’s repressive administration, through shared authoritarian ideology, elitist rule, and illicit business networks that have enriched both regimes, in addition to military assistance received from Russia.
After Haftar solidified his rule in eastern Libya, it is believed that he saw Assad’s regime as a model for political legitimacy and a source of military and economic support. This is why Haftar’s government reopened the Libyan embassy in Damascus in 2020, with encouragement from the UAE, which has long played a political and military supporting role for Haftar. The UAE was also leading the Arab efforts to normalize relations with the Syrian dictator. The report adds that “Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s younger brother and the commander of the Republican Guard and the Fourth Armored Division of the Syrian army, played a key role in all parts of the Syrian-Libyan organized crime network.”
Recent developments in Syria and the abrupt severing of these ties have placed Haftar and his group in an uncomfortable new position. This became evident from the limited media coverage by Haftar-aligned outlets of events in Syria, along with the absence of notable public reactions in eastern Libyan cities, contrasting with the reactions in the west. This situation may push Haftar to restructure the logistical foundations of his network, potentially working with remnants of the Assad regime in exile and its affiliated militias, or focus more on other sources of funding.
