



# Survey on Views and Positions of Turkish Migrants in Germany and Austria

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# Introduction and summary

More than 5 million people of Turkish descent live in Europe outside of Turkey, a humanitarian bond that Turkey and the entire European community have experienced since large-scale migration began in the 1960s. Issues of immigration, citizenship, integration, assimilation, the social exchange triggered by this migration and the establishment of permanent Turkish diaspora communities in Europe have long been politically sensitive. Conservative and right-wing parties in Europe have dealt with issues of migration and cultural diversity, often fueling fear of migrants and trying to highlight the concerns of some Europeans about rapid demographic change.

Relations between the European Union - and many of its member states - and Turkey have deteriorated dramatically in recent years. Since 2014, Turks have been able to vote in Turkish elections abroad, in Europe and elsewhere in the world, which has led to active campaigns by some Turkish heads of state and government in European countries. For these and several other reasons, political and academic interest in the Turkish diaspora and its interactions with European society and politics has increased significantly in recent years.

The Turkish diaspora feel at home in Europe as a whole. Its members are very satisfied with their living conditions and generally satisfied with the integration policies of their host countries.

The Turkish community in Germany and Austria is largely uninterested in European politics, with few complaints against authorities and little involvement in party politics in the countries concerned. Nonetheless, most of the European-based Turks continue to broadly identify themselves primarily as Turks rather than full members of the societies in which they live, and they remain more involved in developments and politics in Turkey than in their current ones Countries. In short, they implicitly and emphatically support the maxim of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that Turks in Europe should "integrate, but not assimilate", even if the exact understanding of this sentence is open to interpretation.

These and many other results were examined in an opinion poll among Turkish communities in Germany and Austria. This took place from December 2020 to January 2021 and was commissioned by the MENA Research and Study Center. 1,236 Turks were interviewed in Germany and 393 in Austria.

By providing a database, the authors hope that this research can help political decision-makers, scientists and the general public to see the connections between developments in Turkey and the European Union and possibly generate ideas that lead to so-called integration policy in Germany and Austria.

## Main results

One in five Turks living in the countries examined plan to return to Turkey to live there, while 72 percent want to stay in their current country of residence. The proportion of respondents based in Germany who stated that they are returning to Turkey or moving is slightly higher than in Austria at 24 percent.

Most of the respondents identify themselves mainly as Turks - 72 percent in total - and only a few identify themselves mainly as members of the host country. However, the concepts of “Turkishness”, religion and the passing on of Turkish traditions to the next generation are all very important to the respondents, with all of these concepts being given much greater importance than identification with the host country.

The responses on language use show a clear - and not surprising - separation between language used at home and language used at work: Most respondents speak the language of the host country at work but prefer Turkish at home. They are quite divided on the language in which they receive their messages, but Turkish is clearly preferred when it comes to dialogue and sharing. The respondents value their knowledge of Turkish very much.

In terms of media usage, television outweighs internet news, social media and newspapers, but the media environment as a whole has been shattered - a fragmentation that is

also evident in Turkey itself. Turkish language television is the most widely viewed, while very few respondents read Turkish language newspapers. There is great interest in news about Turkey, far more than news about the country of residence. Younger respondents are slightly less focused on news from Turkey than older respondents, but still show an equally keen interest in news about Turkey.

In general, respondents have positive views about their own Turkish community in their host country, positive views about the local non-Turkish population, and only slightly positive views about non-Turkish migrants and refugees.

Members of the community state that they perceive appropriate discrimination against Turks in their host country, but few respondents state that they have been personally insulted or physically assaulted because of their ethnicity. Many respondents believe that discrimination affects their career opportunities. Views differ as to whether the host country's government treats the Turkish community on an equal footing with the majority community.

Most of the respondents say they are happy to live in their current country, but a majority - albeit a slightly smaller one - also say they would be happier in Turkey. Most respondents say their current country is more democratic than Turkey. Nevertheless, most of the respondents would like their host country to give Turkey more support. Better bilateral relations, the prevailing opinion, would mean a better situation for the Turks in their current country. Respondents are somewhat contradicting themselves as to whether it is important to defend Turkish politics yourself - and interestingly, very few say that they are forced to do so by Turkish officials.

The answers vary as to whether your current country has successfully integrated Turkish immigrants. Although most respondents say they "feel at home" in their host country, a strong majority say that the Turkish community should be more connected to the non-Turkish community. Similarly, a very large majority of respondents say that the Turkish community should keep its own identity. These competing wishes for connection and separate community affinity seem to reinforce the reflexive clinging to the idea of assimi-

lation without integration - a term advocated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and expressly welcomed by a large majority of respondents.

Turks who do not have citizenship in their host country are more critical of the host country's integration efforts than those who are already citizens. Indeed, those who hold citizenship are more positive about practically all aspects of life in the host country. Perhaps this is to be expected as citizenship is one of the ultimate measures of full integration at the individual level.

There is strong consensus that respondents' children have a good education in their current country. The respondents also strongly believe that the schools in their current country are better than the schools in Turkey. Few would prefer their children to grow up and be educated in Turkey. A large majority of respondents believe that Turks have a fair chance of attending university in their host country. Views on whether there is adequate access to Turkish-speaking and Islamic education are mixed, but few would prefer the Islamic school to replace the public school for their children.

Perhaps because of this overall satisfaction with life in their current country, and although most respondents said they had lived in their current country for a long time - an average of 27.5 years across the sample - most say they are not involved in politics of their country. In this context, most even say that they do not feel politically represented in their current country.

Overall, there is little interest in European politics and, in general, limited engagement with European politics and political parties, which is reflected in a high non-response rate to questions on these issues.

Respondents disagree on whether they are proud to live in an EU country, whether the European Union serves their economic interests and whether Turkey should become a member of the EU. Despite this ambivalence, respondents are generally satisfied with the European Union.

The poll shows mixed views on Turkish politics, including President Erdoğan personally, and whether he cares about the well-being of Turks in Europe. Erdoğan is, however, more

popular than any other interviewed Turkish political figure, including opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, nationalist leader Devlet Bahçeli. Unsurprisingly, the respondents rate PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan very negatively, although almost half of the 6 percent who identify primarily as Kurds rate him positively.


Among the around 66 percent of respondents with Turkish citizenship, a clear majority (around 56 percent) stated that they voted in the Turkish elections in 2018. Their self-reported preferences roughly mirror those in Turkey, although it is striking that the ultra-nationalist right wing in the diaspora appears to have minimal appeal: Among those who say they voted, the party for justice took part and Development (AKP) 51 percent, the Republican People's Party (CHP) 30 percent, the Democratic People's Party (HDP) 10 percent and other parties combined only 9 percent.

## Identity, Language and Citizenship

Austrian respondents say with 75 percent that they were born in Turkey, respondents from Germany 55 percent. The German respondents, on the other hand, at 45 percent, were more likely to be born in Germany and have also spent more time in Germany.

Regarding the identity question, respondents rated the importance of various aspects of their identity on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the least important and 10 being the most important. Traditional sources of identity - including ethnicity, religion and cultural traditions - are very important to almost all respondents. In general, for all questions, younger respondents place less value on the various components of the interviewed Turkish identity, while less educated respondents and those with less knowledge of the national language place more value on them.

Religion is also considered very important with a total weight of 7.84. As with ethnic identity, older respondents place more emphasis on their religion than younger respondents. Respondents say it is very important to keep Turkish traditions alive and pass them on to their children. Here, too, the older generation is more concerned with passing on Turkish traditions than the younger respondents.




With a total weight of 5.92, the respondents place less value on the identity of their host country. Here the age distribution is reversed, with younger respondents emphasizing their European identity much more strongly than the older ones, but still less than their Turkish identity.

When it comes to language, most respondents speak the host country language at work, but prefer Turkish at home. This is not surprising as most of the younger generation of the Diaspora are comfortable with the language of their host country - which is used in school and in their careers - but often return in the evenings to multi-generational households.

# Media, News and Information Sources

Respondents rely on a variety of news sources for information on politics, economics and social issues, but place great value on Turkish-language sources in the two countries. The Austrian community is cross-platform most focused on Turkish-language sources. Older respondents are more likely to rely on Turkish-language sources, while younger respondents are more likely to consult news sources in the language of their current country. Less educated respondents rely on Turkish-language sources far more often, as do those who are only Turkish citizens and those with lower incomes.



These trends are particularly noticeable in TV behavior. Turkish-speaking television is the most influential source in the survey, with an average weight of 6.79 out of 10. TV news in the language of the host country is of significantly less importance with an average total weight of 4.58. Austrian respondents attribute the host country's news sources the lowest weight with a weight of only 3.29. The importance of Turkish-language television



can be linked to the medium itself, depending on the generation: television is generally preferred by older respondents who are also less fluent in the language of the host country.

With regard to online news sources, the gap between Turkish sources and sources from the host country is narrowing significantly, possibly because younger respondents use these sources more often and are more likely to be fluent in the host country's language. The respondents state that Turkish-language internet news portals play an important role with an average total weight of 5.73 in the countries examined, compared with 5.51 for internet news portals in the language of the host country. There are some differences between the countries on this question, with Austrian respondents reading Turkish Internet sources more, while German respondents are generally less dependent on Internet sources.

In terms of reliance on social media sources for information on politics, economics and social issues, respondents in both countries again rely more heavily on Turkish-language sources, but the differences are small. Turkish-speaking social media sources received an average weight of 5.74 in the survey, compared to a weight of 5.32 for social media in the host country's language. The split is greatest in Austria, where respondents consult Turkish social media sources far more often than Austro-German sources. In both countries, younger respondents rely more heavily on social media and the host country's social media sources are the main source of news for people aged 18-29, although a significant minority of the younger population relies primarily on Turkish media. This finding shows that even for younger respondents, who are more integrated into the language, society and the information ecosystem of the receiving countries, the Turkish language remains a strong point of differentiation from society in the broader sense.

As in most of the world's markets, the survey shows that newspapers and magazines are used much less overall. But perhaps because of the limited access to Turkish newspapers, this is an area where a host country medium proves to be slightly more important than the Turkish-speaking counter-medium: Throughout the survey, newspapers in the host country's language have an average weight of 3.96, while Turkish-speaking ones

Newspapers have an average weight of 3.56. Germany is the exception, as Turkish-language newspapers are only a short distance from German newspapers.

In the survey, respondents were asked how closely they follow the news from different fields - particularly from Turkey, the host country and other European countries and around the world. Interest in news about Turkey was consistently high, with an average of 7.87 across the countries studied and little variation across countries. Young, better educated, higher-income respondents are relatively less interested in news from Turkey, but still show a high level of absolute interest. Interest in news about the host country is relatively high with an average of 6.35 in the survey. Respondents are least interested in news about other European countries and the rest of the world with an average weight of only 5.1.

## Relations toward the Community and Discrimination

Respondents are generally positive about the wider population of their host country.


This generally positive view of the relationship between the diaspora community and the broader national community is made somewhat more difficult by answers to a number of specific questions on discrimination that paint a more nuanced picture. The survey asked to what extent a number of statements applied to the respondent, with 1 being “not at all” and 10 being “very much”. Respondents generally agree that Turks face discrimination in their country of residence.

At least at first glance, it is surprising that younger respondents, who are more integrated into the societies of the host country than the older ones through most of the measures, perceive greater discrimination. One could speculate that the younger generation has higher expectations of equal treatment precisely because they feel more comfortable in the country. In contrast, those of the older generation who, according to the survey, are

less comfortable in their chosen country may have fewer expectations of the host country than the right to earn a living.

This trend continues when respondents are asked if they have ever been personally offended or physically assaulted by xenophobes. Men and younger respondents again report such attacks more frequently. The trend continues again when asked if they have been discriminated against because of their Turkish name or their Turkish origin. Germany reports the highest incidence.

To approach these issues in a different way, respondents were asked how they feel by non-Turkish natives in their host country.




In addition, members of the Turkish community believe that discrimination and racism affect their career opportunities. Again, younger respondents and men are more likely to say that discrimination affects their careers. The diaspora community is divided over whether the government in their country of residence treats all citizens fairly.

Perhaps the best news in the survey is that respondents feel that their German and Austrian neighbors and colleagues accept their presence. This answer comes closest to being unanimous across the survey and is a powerful indication of a sense of belonging or acceptance.

# Integration


The survey raised a number of more specific questions about integration, immigration and relationships between the diaspora communities and the host communities in their countries of residence. The results show a differentiated picture of a diaspora which, as stated, feels at home in Europe despite occasional discrimination, but also values its own identity. The respondents expressly state that they feel at home in their current country of residence. There are no big differences in age. Women tend to feel more at home than men, which is in line with the above finding that men report higher levels of discrimination more than women.



In this section of the survey, two cornerstones of the “integrate but not assimilate” attitude are visible. On the one hand, respondents agree that the Turkish community should be more closely linked to the broader non-Turkish community. Interestingly, older respondents are more likely to support deeper connections with the non-Turkish community. On the other hand, the respondents are also firmly convinced that the Turkish community should keep its own identity. (5)

The respondents are divided about further immigration to their countries of residence. Overall, they believe that their countries should accept fewer immigrants.


Significantly, when it comes to integration issues, the greatest demographic schism is between people with citizenship in their country of residence and those without citizenship. It may be expected that those who lack citizenship but who desire it will be more critical of the pace of progress towards integration.



# Education


The survey also asked for views on education and schooling, as schools are important for integration and interaction between immigrant communities and the wider population. Respondents firmly believe that they or their children have (or have received) a good education in their current country of residence. Respondents also agree that the schools in their country of residence are better than those in Turkey. Respondents do not prefer their children to grow up and be educated in Turkey. Older respondents are much more likely to say they would prefer (or perhaps would have preferred) their children to grow up and get an education in Turkey. In fact, people over 50 are the only subgroup who rate this idea positively.

Respondents are generally satisfied with the opportunities for higher education in Europe. They agree that ethnic Turks have a fair opportunity to attend university in their country of residence. The respondents are largely satisfied with the access to Turkish-speaking and Islamic education in their countries of residence. Few prefer their children to attend an Islamic school all day. (6)



# Quality of Living in Europe

Members of the diaspora generally show a high level of satisfaction with life in Europe and their respective countries. In the survey, respondents were asked to rate how strongly they agreed with different statements, with 1 being a strong disagreement and 10 being a strong agreement. Respondents say they are happy to live in their country of residence. The respondents rate the idea that they would live happier in Turkey significantly lower, albeit with a not inconsiderable weight. Older respondents are much more likely to say they would be happier in Turkey. Meanwhile, younger, wealthier and better educated respondents are more satisfied with life in Europe. These answers are polarized, with many either strongly agreeing or strongly disagreeing. Most respondents believe that their country of residence is more democratic than Turkey.



Respondents generally agree that the relationship between their country of residence and Turkey affects the way Turks living in that country are treated. In this regard, respondents broadly agree that their country of residence should give more support to Turkey. Older respondents are more likely to say that their current country should give more support to Turkey, but all age groups see it that way.

The survey also requested open-ended descriptions of the benefits of living in their current country of residence. These answers are divided into broad categories and reflect the widespread belief that the European countries offer more prosperity, freedom and stability than Turkey. Overall, 19 percent say the opportunity to work in their current occupation and the potential to earn money from it is the most important benefit - the leading answer. Questions related to freedom, democracy and human rights are the most important benefit for 16 percent of respondents. Social security protection and workers' rights are the biggest benefits for 13 percent of respondents. The higher standard of living and the superior living conditions are the biggest advantages for a further 13 percent of the respondents. The benefits of an organized society, greater tolerance and legal certainty are most important for 10 percent of the respondents. Access to good schools, vocational training and the overall quality of the education system is the greatest benefit for 9 percent of those surveyed. Only 20 percent of the responses fell outside of these broad categories.

The survey also openly asked respondents' views on the disadvantages of living in Europe. These answers are more heterogeneous, but the disadvantage most frequently cited is the loss of one's own culture and the distance to family ties, which is stated by 19 percent of the respondents. The impact of racism and discrimination is the second most frequently cited disadvantage, cited by 17 percent of all respondents. Many complain about social cold or lack of warmth in their current countries of residence and the loneliness that goes with it - a complaint voiced by 8 percent of respondents. After all, a further 8 percent of those surveyed rated life in a foreign culture as a disadvantage.




# Political Engagement and Europe

The survey shows minimal political engagement and widespread ambivalence among Turkish communities towards European politics. An optimistic interpretation could be that this reflects the generally high level of satisfaction with life in Europe and avoids the urgency of political engagement. Of course, other explanations are possible, including the possibility that political parties in Europe do not target the groups in their communication and public relations. Certainly those who lack citizenship in the host country could be excused for the limited interest. In general, when Turks based in Europe express an opinion on European politics, they tend toward social democratic parties and the Greens, with deep skepticism towards conservative parties and an almost complete rejection of populist parties.

This ambivalence towards government and politics among the Turks living in Germany and Austria is reflected in a high non-response rate to political questions, a low affinity for political parties and an obviously widespread perception of distance and disrespect for established political parties.

Only a few respondents feel that they are politically represented in their country of residence. Those who only have Turkish citizenship consistently stated that they feel less politically represented in all countries.



When asked which political party respects them and their Turkish compatriots the most, many say that nobody does. In fact, in each of the two countries surveyed, the sum of “no answer” and the more emphatic “none” made up roughly half of the answers to this question.

In Germany, for example, 26 percent of respondents say that the Social Democratic Party (SPD) respects its community the most. 14 percent say that “no party” respects their community; 11 percent say the Greens; 7 percent say the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU); and 4 percent say Die Linke. But a full 35 percent give no answer - which likely reflects a negative judgment of all parties.


The overall pattern is roughly similar in Austria, although the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) has made significant progress. 41 percent say they have the most respect for the Turkish community. 15 percent say no party; 9 percent say the Greens; and only 1 percent say the right-wing populist Freedom Party (FPÖ). 30 percent give no answer.

The same ranking of parties applies, albeit with less support, when respondents are asked which party they “identify” with. The SPD wins in Germany with 21 percent, the SPÖ in Austria (47 percent). Here, too, the sum of “no answer” and the more emphatic “none” varies between 35 and 50 percent in each country. In fact, “none” is the leading answer in Germany (28 percent), in Austria it receives 20 percent.

The preference of the Turkish people in Germany and Austria - at least the part of it that expresses any political identity in the European context - for the European left appears to be in contrast to the tendency towards the right in many views of Turkish politics. Pending further studies, this is likely to be explained by the minority-friendly policies of left political parties in Europe. The Social Democratic Party of Germany, for example, pushed through a reform of German citizenship law from 1999 to 2000 that was specifically aimed at better integrating Turkish immigrants.


# Views on the European Union

The survey shows generally positive views about the European Union. The question was how much they would agree with the statement “I am proud to live in a country that is part of the EU”.



# Views on Turkish Politics


The survey also examined the attitudes of Turkish communities towards and participation in Turkish politics as well as the effects of Turkish politics on attitudes towards integration in their country of residence. Respondents believe that President Erdoğan cares about the welfare of the Turks in their current country. Younger respondents are rather skeptical about this idea. When asked about Erdoğan's earlier statement that Turks should "integrate, but not assimilate" in Europe, the respondents strongly agree with a high value, but with somewhat stronger support in Austria. Here, too, the younger age group supports this statement relatively less, although overall it still strongly agrees with Erdoğan's view.



Overall, President Erdoğan is the first choice, albeit with considerable differences between the countries and a high degree of polarization. Overall, the respondents give Erdoğan a positive value in Germany of 5.46, in Austria 6.61. President Erdoğan is also seen more positively by older respondents, which reflects the trend among the Turkish electorate.

Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul, is the second most popular Turkish political figure with a weight of 5.04. No other Turkish political leader receives an overall positive favoritism weighting. Given his mobilization of young supporters in Turkey itself, it is perhaps surprising that İmamoğlu is rated more favorably by older respondents than younger respondents, which may reflect the higher basic interest of older respondents in Turkish politics - many of them grew up in Turkey after all. Devlet Bahçeli is with a positive value of 4.27 - well below the neutral mark of 5.0 and in line with his values in Turkey - the second most frequently rated person, who achieved a slightly positive weighting of 5.26 in Austria. Bahçeli is also preferred by older respondents. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has a positive weighting of only 3.80 in total and is not rated positively in any country. Selahattin Demirtaş also has a positive weighting of only 3.02.

Overall, the diaspora communities therefore reflect many of the political and generational differences in Turkey.



When asked if they voted in the 2018 Turkish elections, 56 percent of Turkish citizens - single and dual, both eligible to vote - said they did so, while 39 percent did not. 5 percent gave no answer. (Again, Turkish citizens and dual citizens together made up 65 percent of the total sample.) This self-reported participation rate varied between the two

countries by a statistically insignificant 2 percent. Older respondents said they vote more often than others. This could again reflect their greater interest in Turkish politics.

Of those who said they voted, the AKP received 51 percent of the vote, the CHP 30 percent, the HDP 10 percent and other parties 9 percent. The AKP performed significantly better in Austria with 64 percent.

The reactions to the support of Turkish presidential candidates in the 2018 presidential elections are broadly similar: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received 55 percent support from declared voters, Muharrem İnce from CHP 31 percent, Selahattin Demirtaş from HDP 10 percent and others just 4 percent. Erdoğan did particularly well in Germany and Austria with 63 percent and 69 percent respectively.

With one important exception, they also largely reflect the political makeup of Turkish voters. The ultra-nationalist Party of the National Movement (MHP) with 11 percent and its perhaps slightly less nationalist party, the İyi Party (10 percent), together won more than 20 percent of the voters in Turkey, while they won less than half of them among the Turks living in Germany and Austria. This is remarkable in view of the attention that extremist MHP-associated gray wolves have received in Europe. (11)

Regardless of their citizenship or their views on Turkish politics, most Turks in Europe consider it important to defend Turkish politics. Respondents may think that the Turkish community in their country of residence is strong and uniform with an average weight of 5.92. Younger voters care less than their elders about supporting Turkish politics, although they still consider it more important than not.

# Conclusion

The survey offers a very mixed picture for those who want full integration of Turkish immigrants into European societies. It reflects a generally positive - albeit far from perfect - record of intercultural adjustment and understanding. European Turks deeply value their "adopted" countries - not only for the material advantages and professional and educational opportunities, but also for less tangible values such as freedom, organization and the rule of law. Younger Turks who have been trained in Europe feel increasingly more comfortable in the national languages than in Turkish.

However, the primary sense of identity of the Turkish community remains predominantly Turkish. On a scale from 1 to 10, the community rated the importance of their Turkish identity with 8.70 and the importance of their religion with 7.84. These numbers significantly exceed the importance that European Turks attach to identification with their country of residence. In short, most consider themselves Turkish or Muslim first rather than Austrian or German. In addition, a significant majority in their home use Turkish primarily, which is more the national language, for reading, entertainment, and most news purposes. You are much more concerned with political developments in Turkey than with those in the countries of your residence. Turkish language television is their main source of news. Even the younger generation, linguistically more open to the country they live in than their predecessor generation, largely shares the older generation's concept of identity and their focus on news about Turkey. If the political leaders of Europe want to speak to the Turkish diaspora, they clearly have to go where they are and carry out sustained public relations work in Turkish-language media, especially on television.

The diaspora may reflect their generally positive view of life in Europe and their continued interest in and connection with Turkey, and are largely ambivalent, if not alienated, about European politics. On the one hand, the Turks based in Europe show few strong criticisms of the governments of the countries concerned, but they also show little interest in their politics. Most European Turks do not have strong political party preferences - in fact, most say they do not identify with political parties in Europe - aside from a nota-

ble aversion to the far-right parties. Those who express preferences tend to favor the social democratic parties. But most of them just feel they are not politically represented in Europe.

For Europeans concerned about Ankara's influence on the Turkish people in Europe, the message is also mixed. On the one hand, the diaspora community as a whole considers it important to support Turkish politics, although the survey did not ask for any specific policies. On the other hand, the Turks in this sample reject the idea that Turkish state and government representatives put pressure on them to support Turkish politics. In addition, a lack of interest in the politics of their host countries can reduce the influence of the diaspora on the foreign policy of European countries.

Turks of all ages are still closely involved in political developments in Turkey - closely linked by Turkish-language news sources and social media - and say that the state of relations between the host country and Turkey is the way they are viewed by the host population are significantly affected. President Erdoğan, who has carried European heads of state and government with clear words in recent years, is the most popular Turkish political figure among the European Turks surveyed. Erdoğan is also very polarizing in the diaspora community, just like in Turkey. Erdoğan and his party were also favored by a slight majority among Europe-based Turks who voted in the 2018 Turkish elections. The Turkish community firmly agrees with Erdoğan's admonition that they should "integrate, but not assimilate" into European societies. The interaction between this belief, which is reflected in a number of responses to questions in the survey, and the desire of many Europeans to better integrate Turkish minorities will no doubt continue to create tension.

The Turkish community seems increasingly satisfied with Europe and at home in Europe. However, the same community remains steadfast in its loyalty to its Turkish identity, which by far replaces all self-definitions as Austrian, Dutch, French or German or as European. It remains to be seen what tendency will ultimately lead to defining this developing community: integration, assimilation, multiculturalism, or some other concept entirely.



# Epilogue

Citizenship makes integration easier. Studies from Germany, based on online and offline surveys, show that the degree of integration of the Turkish diaspora into European society increases with the length of stay in Europe and exposure to European mainstream media and decreases with retention of Turkish citizenship . A representative study by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) from 2018 found that a significant number of German citizens with a Turkish background identified with the German state, while those who remained Turkish citizens identified more strongly with Turkey. Acquiring the same rights as the local population and thus becoming part of the European Community were important drivers of integration.

## Germany

The Turkish diaspora in Germany has its roots in the guest worker program of 1961, which was intended to temporarily bring Turkish workers to Germany in order to remedy the labor shortage caused by the economic recovery after the Second World War. The agreement was part of a comprehensive effort by the German government to secure cheap labor from Southeastern Europe, the Balkans and North Africa. The expectation was that this influx of workers would be temporary and very little effort was made to integrate workers or encourage them to learn German. In fact, however, only a few guest workers returned to Turkey and many decided to bring their families with them from Turkey and settle permanently in Germany. In 2016, the nearly 3 million Turks in Germany formed the country's largest ethnic minority, but only about 246,000 of them had German citizenship.

This lack of complete integration has its roots in German citizenship law, which did not provide for birthright until 2000 - and even then only with restrictions - and which still made dual citizenship quite difficult. According to German citizenship law, a person had to have at least one German parent from 1913 to 2000. Up until January 1, 2000,

“children of non-Germans born in Germany - no matter how long their parents stayed - had no right to German citizenship.” This meant that many children of guest workers born in Germany had grown up in Germany, but not German citizenship possessed. In almost all cases, German law also required those who wanted to naturalize themselves to renounce any other citizenship, which many Turkish immigrants were not prepared to do.

The reform of the citizenship law from 1999 to 2000 explicitly aimed to better integrate Turkish immigrants - in contrast to the general population and other immigrant communities - and was pushed by the SPD, which probably ensured a certain affinity for the Turkish diaspora. The new law granted citizenship to those born in Germany if one of the parents had lived in Germany for at least eight years at the time of their birth. The law also provided for provisions that would allow the previous citizenship to be retained upon naturalization. However, the law also stipulated that a child who had acquired several citizenships had to decide up to the age of 23 whether he or she would like to keep German citizenship and give up others or vice versa. While some naturalization requirements were later relaxed, such as the length of stay required, new requirements were introduced, such as an oath of loyalty and a language test. Since 1981, the Turkish authorities had allowed Turks abroad to briefly give up Turkish citizenship - so that they could naturalize elsewhere, such as in Germany - in order to then regain Turkish citizenship and tacitly retain dual citizenship. The German reforms from 1999 to 2000 eliminated this possibility and blocked a narrow path to dual citizenship. Taken together, the changes actually contributed to a decline in naturalization and Turkish naturalization in Germany. "The peak in 1999 was over 100,000, then fell to 19,695 in 2015 and only 16,290 in 2016."

Another reform in 2014 ended the requirement that children born in Germany up to the age of 23 have to choose between nationalities, which enables permanent dual citizenship, provided that the person has lived in Germany for eight years, attends school there for six years or has completed a German school. For those born elsewhere, such as the first generation of Turkish immigrants in Germany, dual citizenship is only permitted in very narrow cases. A full naturalization of the older generation of Turks is therefore still relatively rare.

# Austria

Austrian citizenship law is largely based on a law of 1949, which is governed by the principle of *ius sanguinis* - where a person's citizenship is primarily defined by the citizenship of their parents - and dual citizenship is hardly allowed. Austrian law regards naturalization as “only the last step” in a “successful integration process”. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) describes the path to citizenship in Austria as "one of the longest and most burdensome, secret and expensive ... Austria's guidelines are the most restrictive in Western Europe."

Austria has not had any attempt at liberalization that is comparable to the German changes from 1999 to 2000, and the principle of descent still applies. Children born to married parents acquire Austrian citizenship if one of the parents is Austrian. Until 2013, illegitimate children only acquired citizenship if their mothers were Austrian. In the case of a foreign mother, however, it was legally required that an Austrian father recognized a child born out of wedlock in order to confirm Austrian citizenship. A 2013 court ruling relaxed some of these restrictions, but not in all cases, and the law continues to require Austrian fathers of illegitimate children of foreign mothers to recognize the child before birth or within eight weeks of birth to obtain citizenship. Naturalization is difficult and requires, among other things, 10 years of legal residence, financial resources, proven language skills and passing tests on Austrian civics, history and culture. The stringent requirements and financial costs have resulted in lower naturalization rates for financially disadvantaged immigrants.

As in Germany, Austria began to allow guest workers to enter the country in the 1960s in order to address the labor shortage. Naturalizations increased with this influx, although they remained low in absolute terms, but they slowed significantly in the 1980s, only to grow again in the 1990s. Turkish nationals made up only 17 percent of all naturalizations in 1985 and rose to 31 percent in 2004. This demonstrated the significant interest shown by the Turkish community in Austria in naturalizations, but was also partly due to changes made in 1995 that allowed Turkish immigrants to retain most of the citizenship

rights Turkey avoids certain military obligations of Turkey and makes dual citizenship particularly attractive.

However, the implementation of Austrian naturalization and citizenship law is monitored by the local authorities and some places like Vienna have set more permissive naturalization criteria. This localism - like the growth of Turkish and Balkan immigrants - sparked a backlash, and laws passed in 1998 and 2005 introduced stricter, uniform national requirements, including language and civics tests. These years also brought indications of de facto administrative hurdles in naturalization, which reduced the number. As a result, the total number of naturalizations and the naturalization rate have decreased since the 2005 legislation, although the number of Austrian residents born abroad has continued to increase. Indeed, between 2003 and 2011, naturalizations fell 85 percent to their lowest level since 1973. The total number of naturalizations has risen again in recent years, although the naturalization rate remains quite low at 0.7 percent. According to official Austrian statistics from 2019, around 282,800 people of Turkish descent lived in Austria, of whom 160,300 are first-generation immigrants and 122,500 are second-generation immigrants and were born in Austria.

